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Abstract	  
This	  dissertation	  attempts	  to	  highlight	  the	  cultural	  relationship	  between	  the	  digital	  humanities	  and	  science	  fiction	  as	  fields	  of	  inquiry	  both	  engaged	  in	  the	  development	  of	  humanistic	  perspectives	  in	  increasingly	  global	  digital	  contexts.	  Through	  analysis	  of	  four	  American	  science	  fiction	  novels,	  the	  work	  is	  concerned	  with	  locating	  the	  genre’s	  pedagogical	  value	  as	  a	  media	  form	  that	  helps	  us	  adapt	  to	  the	  digital	  present	  and	  orient	  us	  toward	  a	  digital	  future.	  Each	  novel	  presents	  a	  different	  facet	  of	  digital	  humanities	  practices	  and/or	  discourses	  that,	  I	  argue,	  effectively	  re-­‐evaluate	  the	  humanities	  (particularly	  traditional	  literary	  studies	  and	  pedagogy)	  as	  a	  set	  of	  hybrid	  disciplines	  that	  leverage	  digital	  technologies	  and	  the	  sciences.	  In	  Pat	  Cadigan’s	  Synners	  (1993),	  I	  explore	  issues	  of	  production,	  consumption,	  and	  collaboration,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  nature	  of	  embodied	  subjectivity,	  in	  a	  reality	  codified	  by	  the	  virtual.	  The	  chapters	  on	  Richard	  Powers’	  Galatea	  2.2	  (1995)	  and	  Vernor	  Vinge’s	  Rainbows	  End	  (2006)	  are	  concerned	  with	  the	  passing	  of	  traditional	  humanities	  practices	  and	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  institutions	  they	  are	  predicated	  on	  (such	  as	  the	  library	  and	  the	  composition	  classroom)	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  digital	  turn.	  In	  the	  final	  chapter,	  I	  consider	  Cory	  Doctorow’s	  Little	  Brother	  (2008)	  as	  a	  digital	  call	  to	  arms	  that,	  through	  an	  impassioned	  portrayal	  of	  hacktivism	  and	  the	  struggle	  for	  digital	  privacy	  rights,	  rejects	  the	  invasive	  political	  laws	  established	  in	  the	  U.S.	  since	  9/11	  and	  enabled	  by	  digital	  technologies.	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Introduction	  
In	  the	  summer	  of	  1984,	  William	  Gibson	  published	  his	  debut	  novel	  Neuromancer	  to	  widespread	  acclaim.	  Through	  its	  “synthesis	  of	  poetics,	  pop	  culture,	  and	  technology”	  (McCaffery,	  “Interview”	  264),	  the	  work	  galvanized	  the	  cyberpunk	  aesthetic	  and	  tapped	  into	  a	  cultural	  zeitgeist	  on	  the	  verge	  of	  being	  transformed	  by	  human-­‐computer	  interfaces.	  Its	  pervasive	  virtual	  reality	  network,	  the	  cyberspace	  of	  the	  matrix,	  provided	  a	  metaphor	  for	  emerging	  digital	  technologies	  that,	  according	  to	  Sadie	  Plant,	  positioned	  it	  as	  both	  “a	  fiction”	  and	  “another	  piece	  of	  the	  jigsaw	  that	  allowed	  these	  [technological]	  components	  to	  converge”	  (12).	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  novel	  stands	  both	  as	  a	  time-­‐specific	  commentary	  upon	  the	  evolving	  information	  age	  in	  which	  “immersive	  digital	  realities”	  were	  becoming	  “continuous	  with	  reality	  itself”	  (13),	  and	  as	  a	  navigational	  cultural	  artifact	  in	  the	  ongoing	  global	  transition	  from	  analogue	  to	  digital	  modes	  of	  thinking	  and	  being.	  According	  to	  Carlen	  Lavigne,	  cyberpunk’s	  thematic	  unity	  resides	  in	  “noir-­‐style	  narratives,	  techno-­‐dystopian	  futures,	  and	  the	  sleek	  computerized	  aesthetics	  of	  the	  digital	  age.”	  The	  first	  wave	  (of	  which	  Gibson’s	  novel	  is	  a	  part)	  is	  “credited	  with	  revolutionizing	  science	  fiction	  and	  having	  a	  real	  impact	  on	  the	  development	  of	  the	  ‘real	  world’	  technologies	  and	  software	  programs	  that	  were	  subsequently	  created	  by	  its	  tech-­‐savvy	  fans”	  (1).	  As	  the	  genre’s	  de	  facto	  representative,	  then,	  Neuromancer	  served	  as	  an	  important	  literary	  touchstone	  and	  cultural	  guide	  for	  a	  world	  lurching	  toward	  and	  increasingly	  defined	  by	  the	  digital.	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But	  while	  the	  work	  is	  in	  many	  ways	  a	  self-­‐fulfilling	  prophecy	  for	  the	  pervasive	  uptake	  of	  digital	  technologies,	  we	  might	  also	  see	  it	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  metanarrative	  for	  the	  birth	  and	  ancestry	  of	  the	  digital	  age	  itself.	  Gibson	  produced	  the	  manuscript	  for	  Neuromancer	  on	  a	  1933	  Hermes	  2000	  portable	  typewriter.	  If	  this	  fact	  seems	  surprising,	  it	  is	  surely	  because	  the	  narrative	  is	  so	  saturated	  with	  computer	  hackers,	  cyber-­‐realities,	  posthuman	  biomechanical	  implants,	  artificial	  intelligences,	  and	  bleeding-­‐edge	  computer	  jargon.	  After	  all,	  as	  Gibson	  has	  himself	  pointed	  out,	  though	  the	  typewriter	  is	  “often	  presented	  as	  evidence	  of	  [his]	  weird	  lotek	  [sic]	  eccentricity,”	  few	  writers	  in	  the	  early	  eighties	  were	  using	  computers	  or	  “new-­‐fangled	  ‘word	  processer[s]’”	  (“Neurotyper”).1	  The	  peculiar	  contrast	  between	  analogue	  writing	  tool	  and	  written	  content	  makes	  for	  an	  interesting	  historical	  and	  sociocultural	  analysis.	  In	  his	  Matters	  of	  Gravity:	  Special	  Effects	  and	  Supermen	  in	  the	  20th	  
Century	  (2003),	  Scott	  Bukatman	  spends	  an	  entire	  chapter	  on	  this	  very	  subject.	  “What	  emerges	  from	  a	  consideration	  of	  Gibson’s	  typewriter,”	  he	  suggests,	  	  are	  several	  overlapping	  tropes	  that	  tie	  cyberculture	  to	  its	  historical	  forbears.	  Reinstating	  the	  history	  of	  the	  typewriter	  indicates	  that	  Neuromancer’s	  disembodied	  informational	  cyberspaces	  are	  anticipated	  by	  the	  ‘obsolescent’	  rhetorics	  and	  technologies	  of	  what	  Mark	  Twain,	  author	  of	  the	  first	  typewritten	  manuscript,	  once	  called	  ‘machine	  culture’	  (34).	  Gibson’s	  typewriter,	  like	  all	  information	  technologies	  before	  and	  after,	  sits	  on	  this	  continuum	  of	  machine	  culture.	  That	  the	  artistic	  notion	  of	  cyberspace	  was	  created	  by	  an	  analogue	  technology	  draws	  attention	  to	  the	  function	  of	  back-­‐reference	  (to	  borrow	  a	  phase	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  One	  famous	  exception,	  as	  Gibson	  notes,	  is	  Stephen	  King.	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from	  computer	  science)	  in	  evolving	  systems	  of	  knowledge	  production	  and	  consumption,	  information	  exchange,	  and	  communication.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  project,	  the	  paradox	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  typewriter	  anecdote	  serves	  as	  a	  figurative	  illustration	  of	  the	  digital	  humanities	  as	  a	  collective	  whole.	  The	  fields	  of	  digital	  humanities,	  like	  science	  fiction,	  rely	  upon	  a	  central	  dialectic	  of	  qualitative	  and	  quantitative	  ideas,	  finding	  expression	  in	  the	  odd,	  interesting	  and	  hybrid	  manifestations	  produced	  between	  the	  two.	  In	  formal	  terms,	  the	  digital	  humanities	  shares	  with	  science	  fiction	  Darko	  Suvin’s	  concept	  of	  “cognitive	  estrangement”—a	  “constant	  intermingling	  of	  imaginary	  and	  empirical	  possibilities”	  that	  brings	  together	  diverse	  concepts,	  discourses	  and	  disciplines	  (6).	  Indeed,	  as	  Carl	  Freedman	  argues	  of	  science	  fiction,	  it	  is	  precisely	  within	  “the	  dialectic	  between	  estrangement	  and	  cognition”	  that	  these	  fields	  are	  fully	  engendered	  (16).	  Digital	  humanities’	  interpretive	  practices	  and	  discourses	  are	  built	  around	  similar	  strategies	  employed	  by	  science	  fiction	  writing,	  in	  the	  quantitative	  examination	  and	  exposition—using	  digital	  technologies	  and	  frameworks—of	  qualitative,	  humanities-­‐based	  materials.	  Since	  at	  least	  the	  early	  2000s,	  digital	  humanities	  work	  has	  tended	  to	  embrace	  these	  competing	  epistemologies	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  recalibrate	  the	  dominant	  ideologies	  of	  white,	  male	  hegemonic	  power	  structures.	  The	  emphasis	  of	  digital	  humanities	  2.0	  is	  not	  on	  the	  technology	  itself,	  but	  rather	  on	  how	  the	  technology	  might	  be	  harnessed	  in	  service	  of	  humanistic	  learning,	  research,	  and	  creativity.	  As	  digital	  networks	  continue	  to	  play	  a	  decisive	  role	  in	  discourses	  of	  globalization,	  it	  is	  becoming	  increasingly	  necessary	  for	  (digital	  and	  traditional)	  humanists	  to	  pay	  at	  least	  some	  attention	  to	  digital	  technologies	  and	  their	  impact	  upon	  culture	  as	  transformative	  and/or	  confrontational	  media.	  Johanna	  Drucker	  shares	  this	  perspective,	  arguing	  that	  if	  the	  humanities	  are	  to	  “assert…	  cultural	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authority	  in	  a	  world	  whose	  fundamental	  medium	  is	  digital,”	  they	  must	  demonstrate	  they	  have	  a	  critical	  stake	  in	  the	  development	  of	  digital	  technologies	  that	  “embody	  humanistic	  values”	  (86).	  In	  so	  doing,	  she	  suggests,	  they	  must	  retain	  humanistic	  strategies	  of	  inquiry	  starting	  with	  the	  principle	  that	  “interpretation	  is	  performative,	  not	  mechanistic”	  (88).	  Contemporary	  digital	  humanities	  work	  operates	  within	  this	  paradigm	  by	  leveraging	  the	  heuristic	  and	  semantic	  processing	  power	  of	  digital	  tools	  to	  conduct	  quantitative	  interpretation	  of	  human	  values	  and	  ideas.	  Its	  literary	  counterpart—science	  fiction	  inherently	  informed	  by	  and	  emerging	  from	  digital	  contexts—follows	  a	  similar	  pattern.	  In	  a	  2007	  interview,	  the	  author	  of	  Neuromancer	  stated,	  “I’ve	  never	  really	  been	  very	  interested	  in	  computers	  themselves.	  I	  don't	  watch	  them;	  I	  watch	  how	  people	  behave	  around	  them”	  (quoted	  in	  Chang).	  The	  four	  science	  fiction	  novels	  I	  have	  chosen	  to	  analyze	  for	  this	  project—Pat	  Cadigan’s	  Synners;	  Richard	  Powers’	  
Galatea	  2.2;	  Vernor	  Vinge’s	  Rainbows	  End;	  and	  Cory	  Doctorow’s	  Little	  Brother—are	  all	  deeply	  rooted	  in	  this	  sentiment.	  Like	  Neuromancer,	  each	  text	  explores	  the	  ramifications	  of	  digital	  technologies	  in	  and	  upon	  human	  cultures	  through	  speculative	  frameworks,	  foregrounding	  and	  extending	  many	  of	  the	  issues	  central	  to	  digital	  humanities	  work	  and	  criticism.	  A	  sociological	  (rather	  than	  a	  techno-­‐fetishist	  or	  essentialist)	  approach	  to	  the	  study	  of	  the	  digital	  is	  key	  to	  positioning	  these	  novels	  as	  both	  products	  and	  producers	  of	  digital	  humanities	  in	  popular	  culture.	  As	  I	  will	  argue,	  through	  various	  portrayals	  of	  digital	  technologies	  and	  their	  impact	  upon	  the	  humanities	  and	  human	  culture,	  these	  texts	  help	  culturally	  situate	  us	  in	  our	  digital	  moment.	  In	  thematic	  and	  stylistic	  terms,	  they	  function	  as	  digital	  humanities	  texts	  by	  engaging	  “the	  totality	  of	  the	  social	  sciences	  and	  humanities”	  to	  harness,	  as	  Marin	  Dacos	  writes	  in	  his	  “Manifesto	  for	  the	  Digital	  Humanities,”	  “all	  the	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paradigms,	  savoir-­‐faire	  and	  knowledge	  specific	  to	  these	  disciplines,	  while	  mobilizing	  the	  tools	  and	  unique	  perspectives	  enabled	  by	  digital	  technology.”	  Moreover,	  they	  have	  each	  developed	  out	  of	  the	  same	  critical	  and	  sociocultural	  impulses	  that	  drive	  digital	  humanities.	  Writing	  into	  and	  about	  what	  Bernhard	  Rieder	  and	  Theo	  Röhle	  perceive	  as	  the	  “continuously	  expanding	  space	  of	  cultural	  production	  and	  social	  interaction	  riddled	  by	  machine	  mediation,”	  they	  each	  offer	  intimate	  treatments	  of	  “[digital]	  artifacts…	  and	  the	  human	  realities	  they	  are	  entwined	  with”	  (67).	  One	  of	  the	  chief	  aims	  of	  this	  project	  is	  to	  demonstrate	  some	  of	  the	  important	  intersections	  between	  science	  fiction	  and	  the	  digital	  humanities	  as	  epistemological	  fields	  that	  both	  combine,	  and	  thus	  unite,	  the	  sciences	  and	  the	  humanities.	  As	  I	  point	  out	  in	  my	  discussion	  of	  Galatea	  2.2	  in	  the	  second	  chapter,	  the	  popular	  and	  critical	  growth	  of	  these	  hybrid	  spheres	  opposes	  C.P.	  Snow’s	  infamous	  1959	  claim	  that	  the	  sciences	  and	  humanities	  exist	  as	  two	  cultures,	  mutually	  exclusive	  of	  one	  another	  in	  art	  and	  scholarship.	  Due	  to	  the	  “gulf	  of	  mutual	  incomprehension”	  he	  felt	  separated	  the	  two	  (4),	  Snow	  could	  not	  foresee	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  information	  sciences	  and	  the	  humanities	  would	  come	  to	  permeate	  one	  another.	  Lisa	  Yaszek	  supports	  this	  argument,	  suggesting	  that	  these	  “relatively	  new	  fields	  of	  inquiry	  both	  work	  to	  bridge”	  Snow’s	  dialectic	  (6).	  One	  story	  she	  relates,	  which	  took	  place	  during	  a	  National	  Science	  Foundation	  initiative	  to	  map	  “the	  circulation	  of	  technoscientific	  ideas	  throughout	  culture,”	  revises	  the	  long-­‐held	  narrative	  that	  the	  sciences	  influence	  art,	  but	  not	  vice-­‐versa:	  While	  the	  scientists	  came	  onto	  the	  project	  assuming	  that	  our	  understandings	  and	  representations	  of	  new	  sciences	  and	  technologies	  flow	  from	  the	  realm	  of	  science	  to	  the	  realm	  of	  public	  policy	  and	  then	  to	  the	  realm	  of	  science	  fiction,	  after	  studying	  the	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database	  they	  realized	  what	  many	  of	  us	  SF	  scholars	  already	  know:	  that	  in	  many	  cases,	  SF	  writers	  are	  the	  first	  to	  come	  up	  with	  compelling	  representations	  of	  new	  sciences	  and	  technologies,	  and	  that	  scientists	  and	  public	  policy	  makers	  rely	  on	  those	  representations	  both	  explicitly	  and	  implicitly	  when	  generating	  their	  own	  discussions	  of	  these	  topics.	  (7)	  In	  fact,	  boundaries	  between	  the	  sciences	  and	  humanities	  have	  been	  eroding	  for	  some	  time.	  With	  the	  postmodern	  “incredulity	  toward	  metanarratives”	  (Lyotard	  xxiv)	  that	  emerged	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  fractured	  and	  accelerated	  epistemologies	  of	  the	  modernist	  period	  and	  during	  the	  ascendance	  of	  digital	  technologies,	  the	  fields	  began	  to	  overlap,	  either	  cannibalizing	  one	  another	  or	  finding	  common	  interests	  that	  effectively	  freed	  them	  from	  the	  constraints	  of	  their	  individual	  academic	  silos.	  Before	  this	  “radical	  break,”	  the	  so-­‐called	  “dominant	  culture	  and	  aesthetic”	  of	  Enlightenment-­‐era	  liberal	  humanism,	  as	  Fredric	  Jameson	  puts	  it	  (Foreword	  vii),	  had	  by	  the	  mid-­‐twentieth	  century	  helped	  fashion	  the	  research	  university	  into	  an	  institutional	  model	  of	  “segmented	  humanities	  departments	  separated	  from	  the	  natural	  and	  social	  sciences”	  (Burdick,	  et	  al.	  7).	  Although	  this	  organizing	  principle	  remains	  more	  or	  less	  in	  place,	  the	  recent	  proliferation	  of	  digital	  scholarly	  and	  pedagogical	  modalities	  and	  literacies	  have	  encouraged	  disciplinary	  cross-­‐pollination	  and	  the	  development	  of	  new	  critical	  and	  collaborative	  practices	  and	  discussions.	  	   As	  an	  elastic	  array	  of	  specialties	  and	  specialist	  knowledges,	  the	  digital	  humanities	  cuts	  across	  many	  disciplines	  and	  often	  demands	  interdisciplinary	  collaboration,	  creation	  and	  knowledge	  sharing.	  Kathleen	  Fitzpatrick	  outlines	  the	  field	  as	  a	  collection	  of	  “changes	  that	  digital	  technologies	  are	  producing	  across	  the	  many	  fields	  of	  humanist	  inquiry”	  (“Humanities”	  13).	  Its	  schematic	  and	  theoretical	  concerns	  counteract	  the	  traditional	  image	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of	  solitary	  researcher	  through	  “integration	  and	  generative	  practices”	  and	  “the	  building	  of	  bigger	  pictures	  out	  of	  the	  tesserae	  of	  expert	  knowledge”	  (emphasis	  removed)	  (Schnapp	  and	  Presner	  4).	  The	  digital	  technologies	  it	  utilizes,	  argues	  David	  M.	  Berry,	  “problematize	  where	  disciplinary	  boundaries	  have	  been	  drawn	  in	  the	  past,	  especially	  considering	  the	  tendency	  of	  the	  digital	  to	  dissolve	  traditional	  institutional	  structures”	  (Introduction	  4).	  The	  same	  impulses	  are	  at	  work	  in	  posthumanist	  discourses,	  which	  have	  grown	  out	  of	  the	  postmodern	  maelstrom	  of	  globalization,	  gender	  and	  identity	  play,	  the	  production	  of	  non-­‐linear	  digital	  tools,	  and	  the	  ontological	  displacement	  of	  the	  traditional	  humanist	  subject.	  Ihab	  Hassan	  reads	  the	  concept	  of	  posthuman	  as	  a	  diverse	  yet	  convergent	  range	  of	  open-­‐ended	  and	  overlapping	  sociocultural	  ideas.	  As	  early	  as	  1977,	  he	  suggested	  that	  “‘[a]rt,	  technology,	  and	  even	  science	  seem	  to	  me	  three	  veils	  for	  the	  same	  face,	  three	  metaphors	  that	  cover,	  then	  dissolve,	  into	  a	  single	  reality’”	  (210).	  Much	  like	  the	  characters	  in	  the	  novels	  chosen	  for	  this	  project,	  digital	  humanists	  are	  posthumanists,	  yoked	  to	  and	  cyborged	  between	  the	  humanities,	  sciences	  and	  information	  technologies.	  The	  posthuman	  discourses	  that	  have	  emerged	  over	  the	  last	  fifty	  years	  continue	  to	  frustrate	  Snow’s	  contention	  in	  his	  Two	  
Cultures	  that,	  while	  “the	  scientists	  [had]	  “the	  future	  in	  their	  bones”	  (12),	  the	  humanist	  intellectuals	  were	  “natural	  Luddites”	  (23).	  The	  production	  of	  posthumanist	  phenomena	  and	  critical	  work	  in	  the	  late	  twentieth	  and	  early	  twenty-­‐first	  centuries	  has,	  in	  fact,	  proven	  impactful	  enough	  to	  be	  considered	  one	  of	  four	  “‘ego-­‐smashing’	  historical	  moments	  for	  humanity”	  in	  which	  “the	  discontinuity	  between	  human	  and	  nature”	  is	  thwarted	  (Bukatman,	  Terminal	  Identity	  8).	  Following	  Bruce	  Mazlish’s	  recapitulation	  of	  an	  assertion	  made	  by	  Sigmund	  Freud,	  Bukatman	  reports	  that	  the	  first	  three	  of	  these	  were	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the	  Copernican	  revolution,	  which	  displaced	  the	  earth	  from	  its	  central	  position	  in	  the	  universe;	  Darwin’s	  theories,	  which	  “robbed	  man	  of	  his	  peculiar	  privilege	  of	  having	  been	  specially	  created,	  and	  relegated	  him	  to	  a	  descent	  from	  the	  animal	  world”;	  and	  Freud’s	  own	  contribution,	  which	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  subject	  “is	  not	  even	  master	  in	  his	  own	  house,”	  but	  is	  the	  subject	  to	  the	  unknowable	  operations	  of	  the	  unconscious.	  (8)	  To	  this	  list,	  Bukatman	  notes,	  Mazlish	  offers	  “a	  fourth	  discontinuity…	  ‘between	  man	  and	  machine…	  [that]	  must	  now	  be	  eliminated—indeed,	  we	  have	  started	  on	  the	  task—and	  that	  in	  the	  process	  man’s	  ego	  will	  have	  to	  undergo	  another	  rude	  shock’”	  (8).	  As	  the	  humanities	  and	  the	  sciences	  continue	  to	  collapse	  into	  one	  another	  under	  the	  aegis	  of	  this	  fourth	  ego-­‐smashing	  revolution,	  their	  parallel	  inclination	  for	  generating	  quantitative	  and	  qualitative	  contexts/environments	  is	  becoming	  clearer.	  Both	  have	  matured	  as	  interrogative	  and	  investigative	  sites	  of	  the	  technical	  and	  the	  abstract—as	  culminations	  of	  “rationality	  and	  non-­‐rational	  processes,	  recklessness	  and	  constraint,	  and	  imagination	  reigned	  in—but	  not	  too	  tightly”	  (Friedman). Or,	  as	  Donna	  Haraway	  observes,	  “there	  was	  always	  the	  spectre	  of	  the	  ghost	  in	  the	  machine”	  (152).	  	   *	  	   The	  inclusive	  mixtures	  that	  make	  up	  the	  digital	  humanities—mixtures	  that	  the	  science	  fiction	  of	  posthumans,	  digital	  technologies,	  and	  other	  techno-­‐inspired	  contexts	  explore—work	  as	  heuristic	  narratives.	  I	  have	  chosen	  the	  word	  heuristic	  to	  represent	  this	  project	  as	  a	  whole,	  and	  I	  use	  it	  in	  two	  different	  but	  closely	  related	  senses.	  The	  Merriam-­‐
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Webster	  Dictionary	  lists	  the	  adjective	  form	  of	  “heuristic”	  as,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  “involving	  or	  serving	  as	  an	  aid	  to	  learning,	  discovery,	  or	  problem-­‐solving	  by	  experimental	  and	  especially	  trial-­‐and-­‐error	  methods”;	  and	  on	  the	  other,	  “of	  or	  relating	  to	  exploratory	  problem-­‐solving	  techniques	  that	  utilize	  self-­‐educating	  techniques	  (as	  the	  evaluation	  of	  feedback)	  to	  improve	  performance.”	  In	  the	  first	  sense,	  the	  dictionary	  expands	  its	  definition	  to	  include	  “heuristic	  techniques”	  and	  “heuristic	  assumption”	  in	  human	  learning	  methodologies.	  The	  second	  is	  expanded	  to	  address	  the	  exploratory	  and	  self-­‐educating	  algorithms	  of	  “a	  heuristic	  computer	  program.”	  Given	  the	  close	  association	  of	  these	  descriptions	  in	  the	  processing	  of	  qualitative	  data,	  it	  seems	  appropriate	  to	  understand	  the	  term	  as	  a	  bridge	  between	  human	  and	  machine	  learning	  practices,	  modes	  of	  inquiry,	  and	  interpretive	  strategies.	  	  Beginning	  with	  the	  pioneering	  work	  of	  Alan	  Turing,	  John	  von	  Neumann	  and	  others	  during	  and	  after	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  machine	  learning	  in	  cybernetics	  research	  has	  been	  “[m]odeled	  on	  outward	  expressions	  of	  human	  cognitive	  skills”	  (Plant	  89).	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that,	  as	  Plant	  argues,	  this	  research	  has	  been	  limited	  by	  an	  “overriding	  conviction”	  that	  artificial	  intelligence	  “‘is	  to	  be	  regarded	  as	  nothing	  but	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  intelligence	  of	  its	  creator’”	  (89),	  advances	  in	  the	  sheer	  power	  of	  interpretative	  and	  heuristic	  processing	  in	  the	  last	  thirty	  or	  so	  years	  indicate	  a	  potential	  for	  expansion	  beyond	  rote	  and	  serialized	  machine	  processes.	  Rieder	  and	  Röhle	  discuss	  the	  central	  importance	  of	  heuristic	  procedure	  to	  research	  methods	  and	  tools	  in	  digital	  humanities.	  Heuristic	  digital	  tools,	  they	  suggest,	  are	  “constitutive	  for	  the	  discovery	  and	  production	  of	  new	  knowledge”	  in	  and	  across	  these	  fields	  (69).	  At	  they	  same	  time,	  they	  help	  establish	  new	  and	  augment	  existing	  humanities	  research	  methods	  and	  epistemologies	  that	  allow	  scholars	  to	  “share	  experience	  and	  establish	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reference	  points	  that	  provide	  orientation—even	  when	  there	  is	  little	  agreement	  on	  utility	  or	  validity”	  (68).	  	   If	  heuristic	  method	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  an	  element	  central	  to	  humanities	  scholarship/pedagogy,	  science	  fiction	  about	  the	  digital,	  and	  real-­‐world	  digital	  processes,	  a	  whole	  register	  of	  connections	  begins	  to	  emerge	  between	  the	  humanities	  and	  the	  sciences.	  Of	  course,	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  critical	  work	  already	  exists	  on	  many	  aspects	  of	  these	  connections.	  As	  Matthew	  Kirschenbaum	  points	  out	  in	  his	  essay	  “What	  Is	  Digital	  Humanities	  and	  What’s	  It	  Doing	  in	  English	  Departments?,”	  there	  has	  been	  a	  “long	  association	  between	  computers	  and	  composition”	  in	  the	  humanities	  (9),	  culminating	  in	  an	  abundance	  of	  digital	  scholarship	  and	  pedagogies	  in	  and	  across	  “the	  historically	  hospitable	  settings”	  of	  English	  departments	  and	  similar	  fields	  (8).	  Moreover,	  as	  early	  as	  the	  mid-­‐1960s,	  writes	  Meredith	  Hindley,	  the	  National	  Endowment	  for	  the	  Humanities	  commenced	  its	  first	  project-­‐based	  “grants	  for	  development	  of	  humanistically	  oriented	  computer	  research.”	  Nevertheless,	  there	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  many	  comprehensive	  analyses	  of	  science	  fiction’s	  generative	  influence	  upon	  the	  digital	  humanities;	  or,	  for	  that	  matter,	  many	  critical	  explorations	  of	  portrayals	  of	  digital	  humanities	  practices	  in	  science	  fiction.2	  Why	  is	  there	  a	  need	  for	  such	  a	  study	  in	  humanities	  scholarship?	  While	  Tom	  Shippey	  has	  described	  “science	  fiction	  [as]	  the	  literature	  of	  change”	  (Pohl	  11),	  Frederik	  Pohl	  argues	  that	  the	  genre’s	  critical	  power	  resides	  in	  its	  ability	  to	  effect	  change	  through	  “actual	  developments	  in	  the	  real	  world”	  (15).	  This,	  as	  I	  will	  argue,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  By	  this	  I	  mean	  book-­‐length	  analyses.	  Many	  humanities	  scholars	  have	  devoted	  much	  critical	  space	  to	  the	  relationship	  between	  digital	  humanities	  and	  science	  or	  speculative	  fiction	  as	  part	  of	  larger	  projects.	  See,	  for	  example,	  N.	  Katherine	  Hayles’	  chapter	  (“The	  Semiotics	  of	  Virtuality”)	  on	  speculative	  fiction	  and	  how	  it	  can	  be	  used	  to	  “map	  the	  posthuman	  as	  a	  literary	  phenomenon”	  in	  her	  book	  How	  We	  Became	  Posthuman:	  Virtual	  
Bodies	  in	  Cybernetics,	  Literature,	  and	  Informatics	  (1999)	  (247).	  
17	  	  
is	  a	  crucial	  factor	  in	  determining	  science	  fiction	  and	  the	  digital	  humanities	  as	  intersecting	  and	  mutually	  engaged	  fields	  of	  inquiry.	  In	  the	  chapters	  that	  follow,	  this	  project	  will	  examine	  four	  science	  fiction	  novels,	  each	  of	  which	  depicts	  and	  expands	  certain	  aspects	  of	  the	  digital	  humanities	  and	  digital	  humanity.	  In	  doing	  so,	  I	  will	  attempt	  to	  position	  the	  genre	  as	  vital	  to	  any	  contemporary	  understanding	  of	  the	  sociocultural,	  political	  and	  economic	  paradigms	  that	  are	  increasingly	  influenced	  by	  and	  produced	  through	  digital	  contexts	  and	  digital	  media.	  By	  framing	  science	  fiction	  as	  a	  generative,	  timely,	  and	  urgent	  literature	  of	  the	  digital	  age,	  I	  am	  arguing	  a	  case	  for	  its	  pedagogical	  value.	  As	  a	  literature,	  science	  fiction	  strives	  for	  epistemological	  effect	  through	  an	  ontological	  aesthetics,	  and	  as	  Samuel	  R.	  Delany	  asserts,	  can	  be	  utilized	  as	  “a	  tool	  to	  help	  you	  think…	  [that]	  doesn’t	  do	  the	  thinking	  for	  you”	  (35).	  It	  therefore	  stands	  to	  reason	  that	  such	  a	  body	  of	  writing	  may	  help	  acculturate	  us	  to	  contemporary	  digital	  environments	  and	  orient	  us	  toward	  the	  digital	  future.	  Chapter	  1,	  on	  Cadigan’s	  Synners,	  establishes	  the	  foundations	  of	  this	  contention	  by	  mapping	  Cadigan’s	  text—and	  the	  cyberpunk	  movement	  more	  generally—as	  a	  literary	  precursor	  to	  real-­‐world	  digital	  production,	  consumption,	  remediation,	  and	  collaboration,	  particularly	  as	  they	  apply	  to	  commercial	  art	  and	  popular	  media	  systems.	  Its	  synners	  (short	  for	  synthesizers),	  I	  argue,	  are	  forerunners	  of	  today’s	  generation	  of	  digital	  natives,	  operating	  through	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  perspectives	  and	  material	  forms	  to	  create,	  remediate	  and	  extend	  their	  environments,	  whether	  virtual	  or	  real.	  The	  novel	  is	  rooted	  in	  feminist	  discourses	  of	  the	  posthuman,	  and	  I	  consider	  the	  various	  ways	  in	  which	  its	  female	  characters	  reinstate	  N.	  Katherine	  Hayles’	  idea	  of	  lived	  “embodiment”	  as	  a	  restorative	  to	  the	  disembodied	  consciousness	  of	  liberal	  humanism	  that	  threatens	  to	  erase	  or	  deconstruct	  the	  female	  body	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(How	  We	  Became	  Posthuman	  5).	  In	  this	  way,	  I	  show	  how	  the	  novel	  is	  allied	  with	  the	  digital	  humanities	  agenda	  in	  advocating	  for	  “new	  ways	  of	  being	  a	  subject	  in	  the	  world”	  through	  digital	  tools	  and	  mediums	  (Toffoletti	  10).	  Through	  “bodily	  transformations,”	  “augmentations,”	  and	  digital	  interaction,	  argues	  Kim	  Tofoletti,	  “‘human	  essence’”	  is	  complicated	  rather	  than	  transcended.	  Synners	  operates	  as	  its	  own	  index	  of	  posthuman	  figurations	  by	  “interrogating	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  human	  in	  a	  digital	  age”	  and	  rescuing	  subjective	  bodily	  experience	  from	  the	  virtual	  ether	  (13).	  Following	  this	  discussion	  of	  posthumanism	  and	  its	  role	  in	  digital	  humanities	  debates,	  chapter	  2	  explores	  Powers’	  1995	  novel	  Galatea	  2.2	  as	  a	  hybrid	  narrative	  that,	  Janus-­‐like,	  weaves	  past	  and	  future	  in	  a	  posthuman	  agglomeration	  of	  human	  memory,	  storytelling,	  literary	  and	  linguistic	  revelation,	  informatics,	  and	  artificial	  intelligence.	  Powers’	  text	  is	  an	  important	  part	  of	  this	  project	  because	  it	  is	  a	  transitional	  narrative	  shaped	  by	  tradition	  in	  the	  humanities,	  the	  fledgling	  global	  network	  of	  the	  World	  Wide	  Web,	  and	  an	  emerging	  humanities	  supplemented	  or	  entirely	  informed	  by	  digital	  technologies	  and	  scientific	  discourses.	  This	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  portrayal	  of	  the	  linguistic	  and	  literary	  education	  of	  an	  artificial	  intelligence	  named	  Helen—a	  speculative	  descendant	  of	  George	  Bernard	  Shaw’s	  Eliza.	  Focusing	  on	  the	  relationship	  that	  develops	  between	  Rick	  (the	  novel’s	  human	  protagonist)	  and	  the	  A.I.,	  I	  will	  examine	  how	  the	  text	  uses	  posthuman	  and	  collaborative	  forms	  of	  learning	  and	  pedagogy	  to	  explore	  the	  emotional,	  rhetorical	  and	  philosophical	  topographies	  of	  the	  English	  literary	  canon	  and	  the	  ironies	  and	  irrationalities	  of	  the	  English	  language.	  Moreover,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  development	  of	  the	  A.I.	  and	  its	  subsequent	  humanities	  education	  stands	  as	  a	  comprehensive	  fictional	  illustration	  of	  project-­‐based	  digital	  humanities	  work.	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In	  chapter	  3	  I	  move	  onto	  a	  consideration	  of	  the	  future	  of	  humanities	  education	  and	  institutions	  in	  digital	  environments	  in	  Vinge’s	  Rainbows	  End.	  The	  digital	  age	  has	  ushered	  in	  a	  generation	  of	  people	  who,	  as	  John	  Palfrey	  and	  Urs	  Gasser	  note,	  are	  born	  digital,	  “connected	  to	  one	  another	  by	  a	  common	  culture”	  of	  digital	  networks	  (1).	  As	  “Digital	  Natives”	  (1),	  they	  have	  grown	  up	  in	  a	  world	  in	  which	  digital	  forms	  of	  learning,	  creating,	  knowledge	  sharing	  and	  communicating	  have	  always	  been	  in	  place—and	  they	  will	  be	  the	  first	  generation	  to	  live	  “from	  cradle	  to	  grave	  in	  the	  digital	  era”	  (2).	  Vinge,	  one	  of	  the	  first	  to	  write	  critically	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  Technological	  Singularity	  (the	  point	  at	  which	  artificial	  intelligence	  surpasses	  humanity),	  is	  deeply	  engaged	  in	  the	  idea	  that	  we	  are	  on	  the	  cusp	  of	  a	  digital	  posthumanities—one	  that	  threatens	  to	  fundamentally	  reshape	  or	  perhaps	  even	  obliterate	  traditional	  humanities	  models.	  Like	  Galatea	  2.2,	  Rainbows	  End	  is	  caught	  up	  in	  this	  academic	  transition,	  organizing	  its	  depiction	  of	  pedagogy,	  scholarly	  projects,	  and	  humanities	  environments	  around	  developing	  digital	  rhetorics.	  My	  study	  reflects	  upon	  these	  narrative	  aspects	  from	  two	  perspectives:	  as	  critical	  to	  an	  exploration	  of	  the	  future	  of	  education,	  research	  and	  teaching,	  particularly	  as	  they	  shift	  toward	  multimodal,	  collaborative,	  and	  decentralized	  frameworks;	  and	  as	  an	  ideological	  struggle	  between	  the	  techno-­‐literate	  younger	  generation	  and	  the	  bitter	  “Digital	  Immigrants”	  like	  the	  former	  poet	  Robert	  Gu	  (Palfrey	  and	  Gasser	  4),	  whose	  traditions	  they	  perceive	  are	  being	  outmoded	  by	  the	  continuing	  saturation	  of	  digital	  technologies.	  Finally,	  in	  chapter	  4,	  I	  extend	  my	  analysis	  of	  digital	  natives	  and	  their	  active	  engagement	  with/production	  of	  new	  humanities	  practices	  to	  Doctorow’s	  Little	  Brother,	  which	  appeared	  only	  two	  years	  after	  Rainbows	  End.	  As	  the	  title	  implies,	  Doctorow’s	  book	  reworks	  Orwell’s	  vision	  in	  Nineteen-­‐Eighty	  Four	  of	  the	  abuses	  of	  technology	  by	  those	  in	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power	  to	  show	  how	  digital	  technologies	  can	  also	  be	  harnessed	  by,	  and	  provide	  a	  voice	  for,	  ordinary	  citizens.	  This,	  I	  argue,	  is	  especially	  important	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  September	  11,	  2001,	  terrorist	  attacks	  on	  the	  United	  States,	  a	  time	  in	  which	  American	  and	  global	  freedoms	  were	  being	  curtailed	  by	  stringent	  governmental	  policies	  established	  under	  the	  guise	  of	  national	  security.	  Throughout	  the	  chapter,	  I	  examine	  the	  role	  of	  hacktivism,	  a	  form	  of	  digital	  activism	  that	  opposes	  the	  systemic	  abuse	  of	  power	  and	  violation	  of	  (digital)	  civil	  liberties	  that	  accompany	  legalized	  information	  hacking	  and	  seizure,	  widespread	  surveillance,	  biometric	  data	  collection,	  and	  many	  other	  invasive	  activities.	  I	  also	  discuss	  open-­‐access,	  online	  publishing,	  copyright,	  and	  digital	  rights	  management,	  and	  what	  they	  mean	  for	  the	  future	  of	  digital	  rights	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  Doctorow	  is	  passionate	  about	  freeing	  digital	  data	  from	  the	  control	  of	  government	  and	  corporations	  and	  returning	  a	  sense	  of	  democracy	  and	  openness	  to	  digital	  platforms.	  	  By	  drawing	  together	  and	  identifying	  practices	  or	  issues	  inherent	  in	  the	  digital	  humanities	  throughout	  these	  four	  texts,	  I	  hope	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  importance	  of	  science	  and	  speculative	  fiction	  to	  digital	  humanities	  discourses.	  Through	  their	  sociological	  engagement	  with	  the	  digital,	  the	  fields	  share	  a	  similar	  preoccupation	  for	  charting	  the	  effects	  of	  digital	  technologies	  in	  different	  sociocultural	  contexts	  and	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  ‘posthumanities’	  that	  absorbs	  the	  digital.	  Science	  fiction	  about	  the	  digital	  is	  useful	  for	  making	  sense	  of	  a	  world	  culture	  increasingly	  informed	  by	  digital	  media	  and	  digital	  paradigms.	  The	  present	  study	  argues	  for	  the	  genre’s	  pedagogical	  value	  in	  this	  regard:	  as	  a	  literature	  of	  transition	  and	  reflexivity,	  situated	  between	  the	  humanities	  and	  sciences,	  that	  helps	  us	  adapt	  to	  the	  wild	  digital	  transformations	  happening	  around	  us.	  
	   	  
21	  	  
1	  
Mindscapes	  Artistic	  Production,	  Collaboration,	  and	  Consumption	  	  in	  Pat	  Cadigan’s	  Synners	  
The	  title	  of	  Pat	  Cadigan’s	  1991	  cyberpunk	  novel	  Synners	  is	  curious.	  It	  refers	  to	  a	  group	  of	  commercial	  artists	  whose	  work	  involves	  the	  creation,	  manipulation,	  and	  synthesis	  of	  sounds	  and	  images	  into	  machine-­‐readable	  data.	  These	  abstract	  concepts—the	  humanistic	  ephemera	  of	  fantasies,	  dreams,	  memories,	  and	  experiences—are	  synthesized	  into	  rock	  music	  videos,	  television	  ads,	  and	  numerous	  other	  media	  for	  the	  financial	  gain	  of	  the	  companies	  they	  are	  produced	  for.	  In	  this	  line	  of	  work,	  characters	  like	  Gina	  Aiesi,	  Visual	  Mark,	  and	  Gabe	  Ludovic	  are	  known	  as	  synthesizers,	  or	  synners.	  Gina’s	  old	  boss,	  an	  old-­‐school	  music	  video	  producer	  called	  the	  Beater,	  thinks	  up	  the	  name:	  “You	  and	  Gina	  and	  the	  
rest	  of	  them,	  you	  synthesize	  the	  sound	  and	  the	  pictures	  into	  what	  [the	  consumers]	  want	  to	  see	  
and	  hear.	  You're	  the	  real	  synthesizers…	  I	  may	  be	  a	  sinner,	  but	  I	  ain't	  no	  synthesizer…	  Synner,	  
then.	  With	  a	  y”	  (Cadigan	  91).	  Cadigan’s	  term	  deconstructs	  the	  notion	  of	  original	  sin.	  As	  the	  synners	  continue	  to	  transform	  their	  subjectivity	  through	  virtual	  reality	  and	  machines,	  “the	  practices	  of	  the	  new	  synthesizing	  technology,”	  Laura	  Cherniack	  points	  out,	  come	  to	  “displace	  the	  religious	  meaning	  of	  ‘sin’”	  (82).	  This	  reinterpretation	  of	  the	  subject,	  in	  which	  technological	  interaction	  replaces	  the	  metaphysical	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  new	  ethics	  (Cherniack	  82),	  causes	  them	  to	  become,	  in	  Gina’s	  view,	  “‘original	  synners’”	  (Cadigan	  475).	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Later	  in	  the	  novel,	  Los	  Angeles-­‐based	  Diversifications,	  Inc.	  (the	  novel’s	  de	  facto	  multinational	  corporation3	  run	  by	  CEO	  Manny	  Rivera)	  combines	  brain	  socket	  technology,	  which	  allows	  for	  direct	  human-­‐computer	  interfaces,	  with	  traditional	  techniques	  of	  artistic,	  multimodal	  synthesis.	  As	  employees	  of	  Diversifications,	  Visual	  Mark,	  Gina,	  and	  Gabe	  are	  obliged	  to	  undergo	  surgery	  for	  socket	  implants—a	  process	  that	  allows	  them	  to	  transfer	  their	  own	  thoughts	  or	  dreams	  directly	  into	  a	  computer	  console.	  In	  the	  “capitalist	  information	  economy”	  that	  Cadigan	  shows	  us,	  to	  use	  Anne	  Balsamo’s	  phrase	  (Technologies	  140),	  the	  synners’	  production	  of	  commercial	  data	  through	  brain/machine	  interfaces	  renders	  them	  “postmodern	  subjects,	  cyborged	  synthesizers	  of	  a	  near-­‐future	  Los	  Angeles”	  (Chernaik	  70).	  They	  are	  posthuman	  digital	  humanists—forerunners	  of	  what	  Palfrey	  and	  Gasser	  identify	  as	  today’s	  born	  digital	  generation	  who	  “live	  lives	  of	  digital	  immersion”	  and	  “only	  know	  a	  world	  that	  is	  digital”	  (4).	  These	  digital	  citizens	  are	  constantly	  connected	  on	  a	  global	  scale	  to	  information	  and	  social	  networks,	  and	  feel	  comfortable	  using	  digital	  tools,	  platforms,	  and	  the	  native	  literacies	  and	  hypertexts	  of	  the	  World	  Wide	  Web.	  Cadigan	  is	  centrally	  concerned	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  posthuman	  in	  Synners,	  using	  her	  narrative	  to	  explore	  discontinuities	  between	  technology	  and	  the	  body,	  identity	  and	  the	  self	  in	  a	  fragmented	  and	  digitally	  saturated	  urban	  space.	  The	  novel’s	  cast	  of	  posthumans	  goes	  some	  way	  to	  validating	  Hassan’s	  claim	  that	  “the	  human	  form—including	  human	  desire	  and	  all	  its	  external	  representations—may	  be	  changing	  radically,	  and	  thus	  must	  be	  re-­‐visioned”	  (212).	  Toffoletti	  suggests	  that	  it	  is	  the	  “tension	  between	  the	  human	  and	  technological	  [that]	  is	  indicative	  of	  the	  posthuman,”	  a	  tension	  that	  “disrupts	  traditional	  understandings	  of	  selfhood,	  identity,	  the	  body	  and	  reality.”	  For	  Toffoletti	  (and,	  as	  I	  will	  argue,	  in	  Cadigan’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Corrupt	  multinational	  corporations	  are	  a	  staple	  of	  cyberpunk.	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text),	  “posthuman	  images	  can	  be	  appealing”	  precisely	  because	  “they	  are	  contradictory	  and	  unstable,”	  not	  because	  they	  “[offer]	  a	  better	  version	  of	  human	  existence”	  (4).	  Indeed,	  this	  is	  a	  novel	  that	  celebrates	  embodied,	  gendered	  posthuman	  subjectivities,	  not	  the	  disembodied	  consciousness	  of	  liberal	  humanism.	  But	  of	  course,	  posthuman	  syntheses	  of	  human	  and	  machine	  are	  far	  from	  unprecedented.	  According	  to	  Scott	  Dexter,	  from	  at	  least	  1765	  to	  a	  little	  after	  World	  War	  II,	  computers	  were	  people	  hired	  to	  perform	  mathematical	  computations	  long	  before	  the	  machines	  that	  would	  later	  supplant	  them	  (130).	  Plant	  makes	  a	  similar	  observation,	  also	  restoring	  the	  gender-­‐specific	  aspect	  of	  this	  history:	  “[W]hen	  computer	  was	  a	  term	  applied	  to	  flesh	  and	  blood	  workers,	  the	  bodies	  which	  composed	  them	  were	  female.	  Hardware,	  software,	  wetware—before	  their	  beginnings	  and	  beyond	  their	  ends,	  women	  have	  been	  the	  simulators,	  assemblers,	  and	  programmers	  of	  the	  digital	  machines”	  (37).	  The	  contemporary	  and	  widespread	  use	  of	  digital	  tools	  (in	  ways	  psychological,	  emotional,	  social,	  and	  physical)	  is	  slowly	  bringing	  us	  back	  to	  the	  status	  of	  computers—heuristic	  human	  synthesizers.	  As	  a	  work	  of	  science	  fiction,	  Synners	  is	  well	  positioned	  to	  respond	  to	  these	  transformative	  discourses	  and	  contexts	  as	  they	  have	  developed	  over	  the	  last	  fifty	  or	  so	  years.	  In	  his	  2002	  introduction	  to	  the	  tenth	  anniversary	  Gollancz	  edition	  of	  Cadigan’s	  book,	  Neil	  Gaiman	  writes	  that	  the	  work	  “attempts,	  and	  in	  the	  main	  succeeds,	  in	  fusing	  a	  dozen	  different	  things	  into	  a	  portrait	  of	  a	  now”	  in	  which	  its	  frenetic	  cultural	  artifacts	  and	  phenomena	  “are	  all	  beginning	  to	  interface	  into	  something	  liminal	  and	  numinous	  and	  street”	  in	  the	  post-­‐industrial	  West	  (xi-­‐xii).	  Synners	  is	  more	  than	  prediction,	  though.	  It	  spoke	  to	  a	  moment	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  in	  which	  a	  nascent	  cyberculture	  was	  forming.	  Through	  a	  combination	  of	  perceptive	  observation	  of	  her	  cultural	  moment	  and	  the	  extrapolative	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function	  of	  science	  fiction,	  Cadigan	  is	  able	  to	  achieve	  a	  vision	  of	  what	  John	  Clute	  sums	  up	  as	  “the	  burning	  presence	  of	  the	  future”	  (184).	  Ursula	  K.	  Le	  Guin	  argues	  that	  science	  fiction	  should	  be	  created	  as	  “a	  thought-­‐experiment…	  not	  to	  predict	  the	  future…	  but	  to	  describe	  reality,	  the	  present	  world”	  (xii).	  More	  than	  mere	  “reportage	  (that	  is,	  a	  description	  of	  actual	  events)”	  that	  have	  not	  yet	  occurred	  in	  reality	  (Le	  Guin	  17),	  Synners	  has	  a	  critical	  stake	  in	  the	  cultural	  moment	  in	  which	  it	  is	  written.	  “The	  digital	  age	  was	  only	  just	  taking	  off	  when	  Cadigan	  was	  writing	  about	  it,”	  observes	  Lisa	  Tuttle	  in	  her	  own	  2012	  introduction	  to	  the	  novel.	  “[T]wo	  decades	  on…	  we	  are	  still	  only	  beginning	  to	  grapple	  with	  the	  problems	  she	  had	  guessed	  at”	  (viii-­‐ix).	  On	  one	  hand,	  Synners	  casts	  its	  speculative	  line	  through	  “the	  contemporary	  hopes	  and	  fears	  of	  its	  author”	  (Tuttle	  viii)	  and	  its	  wider	  digital	  contexts	  on	  the	  one	  hand;	  and	  on	  the	  other,	  its	  acute	  prescience	  helps	  a	  contemporary	  readership	  to	  alter	  its	  awareness	  of	  current	  technological	  issues,	  trends,	  and	  ramifications.	  Emerging	  from	  the	  “crisis	  of	  narratives”	  caused	  by	  postmodernism	  (which,	  as	  Jean-­‐François	  Lyotard	  argues,	  have	  “altered	  the	  game	  rules	  for	  science,	  literature,	  and	  the	  arts”	  [xxiii]),	  the	  novel	  tries	  to	  anticipate	  the	  fragmented	  epistemologies	  of	  global	  digital	  networks	  that	  continue	  to	  accrete	  in	  ever-­‐more	  complex	  layers	  and	  points	  of	  connection.	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  position	  Synners	  as	  a	  both	  a	  contributor	  to	  and	  constituent	  part	  of	  the	  early	  development	  of	  digital	  culture	  during	  the	  early	  1990s.	  More	  specifically,	  I	  link	  its	  thematic	  exploration	  of	  body/mind	  relationships,	  posthumanism,	  and	  digital	  artistic	  production,	  synthesis,	  collaboration	  and	  consumption	  to	  concerns	  in	  nascent	  and	  contemporary	  digital	  humanities	  discourses	  and	  practices.	  Central	  to	  this	  discussion	  is	  an	  examination	  of	  Cadigan’s	  novel	  as	  a	  key	  text	  of	  the	  cyberpunk	  fiction	  that,	  Lawrence	  Person	  observes,	  “carried	  technological	  extrapolation	  into	  the	  fabric	  of	  everyday	  life”	  where	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“everyday	  lives	  are…	  impacted	  by	  rapid	  technological	  change	  and	  an	  omnipresent	  computerized	  infrastructure.”	  Like	  much	  artistic	  work	  of	  the	  time,4	  Synners	  grew	  out	  of	  and	  helped	  generate	  the	  commentaries	  and	  discourses	  that	  began	  to	  coalesce	  around	  the	  proliferation	  of	  digital	  technologies	  in	  mainstream	  American	  society.	  I	  will	  begin	  by	  examining	  the	  efficacy	  of	  Cadigan’s	  text	  as	  a	  cultural	  artifact	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  cyberpunk	  movement,	  as	  it	  grew	  out	  of	  and	  contributed	  to	  a	  formative	  cultural	  understanding	  of	  the	  digital	  age.	  I	  will	  then	  move	  into	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  evolution	  in	  knowledge	  production/consumption	  from	  traditional	  analogue	  modes	  of	  analysis	  to	  emergent	  digital	  modes	  of	  synthesis—particularly	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  collaborative	  frameworks	  found	  in	  abundance	  in	  digital	  humanities	  practices.	  Finally,	  I	  will	  attempt	  to	  show	  how	  the	  novel’s	  engagement	  with	  posthumanism	  and	  the	  figure	  of	  the	  cyborg	  (both	  as	  a	  metaphor	  and	  literal	  presence),	  as	  well	  as	  the	  debates	  surrounding	  embodied	  and	  cognitive	  digital	  realities,	  provide	  a	  useful	  record	  of/direction	  for	  early	  digital	  discourses	  and	  transformations	  in	  humanities	  methodologies.	  
Cyberpunk	  
As	  the	  only	  prominent	  female	  author	  of	  first-­‐wave	  cyberpunk5	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  early	  nineties,	  Cadigan	  was	  known	  as	  the	  “Queen	  of	  Cyberpunk”	  (Lavigne	  30).	  Larry	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  The	  most	  obvious	  example	  is	  William	  Gibson’s	  Neuromancer.	  Other	  works	  include	  Bruce	  Sterling’s	  influential	  Mirrorshades	  anthology	  (1986),	  Gibson’s	  Burning	  Chrome	  (1986),	  and	  Rudy	  Rucker’s	  Ware	  tetralogy	  (1982-­‐2000).	  The	  U.S.	  magazine	  Mondo	  2000	  had	  a	  brief	  but	  important	  run	  throughout	  the	  1980s	  and	  nineties.	  And	  films	  like	  Blade	  Runner	  (1982),	  Videodrome	  (1983),	  Tron	  (1985),	  Hackers	  (1995),	  and	  The	  
Matrix	  (1999)	  continue	  to	  receive	  critical	  and	  popular	  acclaim.	  5	  The	  first-­‐wave	  cyberpunk	  authors	  are	  usually	  understood	  to	  be	  William	  Gibson,	  Pat	  Cadigan,	  Rudy	  Rucker,	  Lewis	  Shiner,	  and	  John	  Shirley.	  However,	  their	  work	  was	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  what	  has	  come	  to	  be	  known	  as	  proto-­‐cyberpunk	  fiction,	  including	  Alfred	  Bester’s	  The	  Demolished	  Man	  (1953)	  and	  The	  Stars	  My	  Destination	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McCaffery	  traces	  the	  beginnings	  of	  the	  cyberpunk	  aesthetic	  to	  a	  catalytic	  combination	  of	  technological	  leaps,	  the	  changing	  faces	  of	  popular	  culture,	  and	  the	  lasting	  influence	  of	  postmodern	  writers	  whose	  suspicion	  of	  grand	  narratives	  typified	  an	  era	  of	  intense	  epistemological	  anxiety.	  McCaffery	  describes	  the	  cyberpunk	  writers	  as	  “the	  first	  generation	  of	  artists	  for	  whom…	  technologies…	  were	  not	  exoticisms,	  but	  part	  of	  a	  daily	  ‘reality	  matrix.’”	  They	  were	  also	  “the	  first	  generation…	  who	  had	  grown	  up	  immersed	  in	  technology	  but	  also	  in	  pop	  culture,	  in	  the	  values	  and	  aesthetics	  of	  the	  counterculture	  associated	  with	  drug	  culture,	  punk	  rock,	  video	  games,”	  and	  stylized	  violence	  (“Introduction”	  12).	  The	  characters	  in	  their	  fictions,	  often	  reflecting	  their	  own	  existential	  disaffection,	  are	  “marginalized,	  alienated	  loners	  who	  [live]	  on	  the	  edge	  of	  society…	  where	  daily	  life	  [is]	  impacted	  by	  rapid	  technological	  change,	  an	  ubiquitous	  datasphere	  of	  computerized	  information,	  and	  invasive	  modification	  of	  the	  human	  body”	  (Person).	  It	  was	  from	  this	  context	  of	  fluctuations—the	  changing	  social	  structures	  of	  family	  home	  and	  workplace,	  innovations	  in	  analogue	  and	  digital	  media	  technologies	  (the	  VCR	  and	  CD	  player,	  for	  example),	  and	  increasing	  on-­‐demand	  access	  to	  an	  abundance	  of	  knowledge—that	  these	  writers	  “presented	  themselves	  as	  ‘techno-­‐urban-­‐guerilla’	  artists	  announcing	  that	  both	  the	  technological	  dreams	  and	  nightmares	  envisioned	  by	  previous	  generations	  of	  SF	  writers	  were	  already	  in	  place”	  (McCaffery,	  “Introduction”	  12).	  Indeed,	  as	  Bruce	  Sterling	  reports	  in	  his	  preface	  to	  the	  Mirrorshades	  anthology,	  these	  writers	  developed	  their	  style	  “not	  only	  within	  literary	  tradition	  of	  science	  fiction	  but	  in	  a	  truly	  science-­‐fictional	  world”	  in	  which	  “extrapolation	  [and]	  technological	  literacy...	  are	  not	  just	  literary	  tools	  but	  an	  aid	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (1956);	  James	  Tiptree,	  Jr.’s	  “The	  Girl	  Who	  Was	  Plugged	  In”	  (1973);	  John	  Brunner’s	  The	  Shockwave	  Rider	  (1975);	  Vernor	  Vinge’s	  True	  Names	  (1981),	  which	  included	  the	  first	  extensive	  rendering	  of	  what	  Gibson	  would	  eventually	  call	  cyberspace;	  and	  others.	  The	  term	  cyberpunk	  originates	  from	  a	  1983	  short	  story	  by	  Bruce	  Bethke	  called	  “Cyberpunk.”	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daily	  life”	  (344).	  In	  their	  literary	  engagement	  with	  the	  ongoing	  upheavals	  of	  postmodernism,	  the	  growth	  of	  international	  capitalism,	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  self	  as	  a	  mutable	  series	  of	  ones	  and	  zeroes,	  then,	  Cyberpunk…	  became	  a	  significant	  movement	  within	  postmodernism	  because	  of	  its	  ability	  to	  present	  an	  intense,	  vital,	  and	  often	  darkly	  humorous	  vision	  of	  the	  world	  space	  of	  multinational	  capitalism—and	  to	  render	  this	  vision	  both	  formally	  (through	  a	  style	  appropriate	  to	  its	  age)	  and	  concretely	  (through	  the	  dominant	  cultural	  imagery).	  (McCaffery,	  “Introduction”	  12)	  	   In	  Neuromancer,	  Gibson	  introduced	  us	  to	  the	  immersive	  “consensual	  hallucination”	  of	  “cyberspace”	  (51),	  a	  virtual	  reality	  that	  captured	  the	  spirit	  of	  1980s	  American	  hacker	  culture.	  In	  a	  1991	  interview	  with	  Gibson,	  McCaffery	  describes	  the	  cyberspace	  of	  the	  author’s	  work	  as	  a	  conceptual	  space	  in	  which	  “data	  dance	  with	  human	  consciousness…	  human	  memory	  is	  literalized	  and	  mechanized…	  multi-­‐national	  information	  systems	  mutate	  and	  breed	  into	  startling	  new	  structures	  whose	  beauty	  and	  complexity	  are	  unimaginable,	  mystical,	  and	  above	  all	  nonhuman”	  (“Interview”	  264).	  Similarly,	  according	  to	  Gaiman,	  the	  novel	  was	  “the	  first	  frugal	  strain	  of	  romance	  with	  the	  artificial,	  creating	  an	  imaginary	  space	  for	  the	  real	  world	  to	  move	  into	  and	  inhabit”	  (xi).	  Like	  Neuromancer,	  Synners	  describes	  a	  burned	  out	  and	  frenetic	  urban	  landscape	  of	  “high	  tech	  and	  low	  life”	  (Ketterer	  141)	  in	  which	  the	  interface	  between	  human	  and	  digital	  has	  become,	  much	  as	  our	  own,	  a	  widespread	  reality.	  Just	  as	  we	  are	  constantly	  connected	  through	  wifi	  and	  the	  cloud	  to	  our	  external	  brains—through	  smartphones,	  tablets,	  Wikipedia,	  and	  Google—the	  people	  of	  Cadigan’s	  text	  are	  plugged	  in.	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Synthesis	  and	  the	  New	  Knowledge	  Economy	  
One	  of	  the	  most	  sociologically	  significant	  effects	  of	  the	  digital	  in	  recent	  times	  has	  been	  the	  shift	  to	  a	  new	  kind	  of	  learning,	  creating,	  and	  experiencing	  in	  the	  humanities	  that	  favors	  breadth	  (synthesis)	  over	  depth	  (analysis).	  In	  the	  digital	  age,	  overwhelmed	  by	  information	  overload,	  Nicholas	  Carr	  argues	  that	  technologies	  have	  rewired	  our	  brains,	  “remapping	  the	  neural	  circuitry,	  reprogramming	  the	  memory,”	  to	  help	  us	  cope	  with	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  vastly	  disparate	  incoming	  and	  outgoing	  data	  (Shallows	  5).	  This	  claim	  is	  certainly	  debatable,	  though	  others—including,	  for	  example,	  UCLA	  neuroscientist	  Gary	  Small	  in	  his	  iBrain:	  Surviving	  the	  Technological	  Alteration	  of	  the	  Modern	  Mind	  (2009)—are	  tentatively	  gravitating	  towards	  similar	  arguments.	  For	  Jeffrey	  Rydberg-­‐Cox,	  technologies	  such	  as	  ubiquitous	  wireless	  networks	  and	  inexpensive	  portable	  computing	  devices,	  along	  with	  contemporary	  science	  fiction…	  and	  the	  work	  of	  researchers,	  such	  as	  Steven	  Mann	  in	  “computer	  mediated	  reality”	  suggest	  that	  the	  Internet	  is	  already	  serving	  in	  some	  ways	  as	  an	  “enlarged	  intimate	  supplement	  to	  memory.”	  (13-­‐14)	  
Synners	  character	  Fez	  gets	  to	  the	  heart	  of	  these	  assertions	  when	  he	  announces	  to	  a	  room	  full	  of	  synthesizers	  and	  hackers,	  “‘[w]e’ve	  become	  denizens	  of	  the	  net.	  Homo	  datum’”	  (Cadigan	  421).	  In	  the	  digital	  twenty-­‐first	  century,	  we	  are	  Homo	  Datum,	  the	  next	  step	  in	  human	  evolution.	  “Wherever	  our	  real	  bodies	  may	  be,”	  Douglas	  Rushkoff	  points	  out,	  “our	  virtual	  personae	  are	  being	  bombarded	  with	  information	  and	  missives”	  (72).	  The	  discourses	  of	  “digitally	  mediated	  reality”	  are	  rooted	  in	  our	  collective	  sociocultural	  and	  temporal	  experience,	  and	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  return	  to	  a	  pre-­‐technological	  state.	  Rushkoff	  identifies	  this	  phenomenon	  (a	  process	  in	  which	  we	  sacrifice	  “the	  true	  now	  of	  a	  coherently	  living	  human”	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for	  “digital	  bombardment”)	  as	  “digiphrenia—digi	  for	  ‘digital,’	  and	  phrenia	  for	  ‘disordered	  condition	  of	  mental	  activity’”	  (75).	  The	  permeation	  of	  digital	  technologies	  into	  the	  cultural	  consciousness	  has	  given	  rise	  to	  a	  generation	  of	  “‘Digital	  Natives’”	  (Palfrey	  and	  Gasser	  ii),	  nurtured	  on	  social	  and	  critical	  concepts	  of	  synthesis	  (social	  networking,	  multimodal	  work,	  collaborative	  digital	  projects,	  real-­‐time	  information	  streams)	  as	  well	  as	  more	  traditional	  modes	  of	  learning	  such	  as	  deep	  reading	  and	  analytical	  investigation.	  Synthesis—a	  methodological	  approach	  to	  the	  formulation	  and	  production	  of	  knowledge	  that	  works	  through	  breadth	  of	  experience	  and	  understanding	  by	  combining	  and/or	  remediating	  various	  different	  cultural	  phenomena—is	  the	  central	  basis	  of	  Cadigan’s	  novel.	  In	  digital	  contexts,	  synthesis	  is	  made	  possible	  by	  the	  remediative	  and	  multimodal	  qualities	  of	  new	  media.	  In	  their	  work	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  remediation,	  Jay	  David	  Bolter	  and	  Richard	  Grusin	  argue	  that	  “remediation	  is	  a	  defining	  characteristic	  of	  the	  new	  digital	  media”	  because	  “digital	  media	  [continually]	  remediate	  their	  predecessors”	  (45).	  The	  act	  of	  synthesis	  is	  implicit	  in	  digital	  mediums	  that	  remediate	  older	  mediums	  and,	  thus,	  is	  both	  engendered	  by	  and	  imitates	  remediation.	  As	  Leah	  A.	  Lievrouw	  points	  out,	  “[c]ontent	  remediation,”	  which	  has	  a	  “continuous,	  mutually	  constitutive	  interrelationship”	  with	  reconfiguration,	  operates	  as	  an	  umbrella	  term	  for	  “synthesis,	  repackaging,	  augmentation,	  refashioning,	  and	  absorption”	  (231-­‐32).	  Likewise,	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  synthesizer’s	  work	  relies	  on	  multiple	  channels	  of	  attention;	  the	  ability	  to	  juggle	  and	  direct	  different	  media	  all	  at	  once;	  multimodal	  approaches	  to	  content	  creation;	  the	  repurposing	  and	  remixing	  of	  traditional	  media	  forms	  through	  interactivity	  and	  
bricolage;	  and	  collaborative	  effort.	  “The	  work,”	  in	  this	  sense,	  “becomes	  a	  mosaic”	  of	  various	  experiences	  and	  artifacts	  (Bolter	  and	  Grusin	  47).	  We	  might	  think	  of	  Hayles’	  work	  on	  hyper	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and	  deep	  attention	  here,	  where,	  rather	  than	  working	  in	  the	  “[d]eep…	  cognitive	  style	  traditionally	  associated	  with	  the	  humanities,”	  synners	  are	  hyper-­‐attentive,	  “switching	  focus	  rapidly	  between	  different	  tasks,	  preferring	  multiple	  information	  streams,	  seeking	  a	  high	  level	  of	  stimulation,	  and	  having	  a	  low	  tolerance	  for	  boredom”	  (187).	  Steve	  Anderson	  and	  Anne	  Balsamo	  co-­‐opt	  the	  term	  synner	  for	  their	  2011	  article	  “A	  Pedagogy	  for	  Original	  Synners”	  to	  highlight	  the	  current	  trend	  toward	  synthetic	  and	  rhizomatic	  learning	  and	  making	  in	  U.S.	  education	  and	  elsewhere.	  In	  an	  effort	  to	  re-­‐evaluate	  new	  modes	  of	  learning	  and	  creating,	  they	  write,	  we	  must	  “refine	  our	  understanding	  of	  ‘critical	  thinking’	  to	  focus	  more	  specifically	  on	  the	  skills	  of	  creative	  and	  critical	  synthesis.”	  Like	  the	  video	  artists	  of	  Cadigan’s	  work,	  the	  students	  of	  this	  generation	  are	  “‘original	  synthesizers’	  whose	  most	  important	  literacy	  will	  be	  the	  ability	  to	  create	  knowledge	  by	  harvesting	  information	  from	  diverse	  sources”	  (245).	  Such	  a	  skill	  is	  indispensible	  in	  the	  new	  knowledge	  economy,	  under	  whose	  digital	  aegis	  educational	  development	  and	  creative	  literacy	  become	  a	  matter	  of	  participation,	  decision-­‐making,	  and	  the	  selective,	  delicate	  and	  high-­‐speed	  processing	  of	  vast	  quantities	  of	  information.	  Despite	  the	  educational	  and	  creative	  benefits	  that	  come	  with	  this	  new	  kind	  of	  literacy,	  however,	  the	  novel	  investigates	  how	  the	  skills	  of	  synthesis	  can	  be	  exploited	  for	  commercial	  profit.	  During	  a	  Diversifications	  shareholders	  meeting,	  Manny	  Rivera	  discusses	  Visual	  Mark	  in	  cold,	  detached	  terms:	  “‘the	  visualizing	  center	  of	  his	  brain	  is	  hypertrophied—overdeveloped,	  that	  is,	  so	  overdeveloped	  that	  he	  should	  have	  no	  trouble	  at	  all	  sending	  out	  anything	  he	  visualizes’”	  (Cadigan	  141).	  To	  Rivera,	  he	  is	  little	  more	  than	  a	  biological	  machine	  whose	  subjectivity	  is	  incidental	  to	  the	  company’s	  projected	  profit	  margin.	  And	  ironically,	  given	  the	  nature	  of	  what	  he	  produces,	  he	  will	  always	  be	  (in	  this	  capacity,	  at	  least)	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Visual	  Mark—a	  concept,	  a	  floating	  signifier	  in	  the	  free	  market.	  However,	  Visual	  Mark	  seems	  to	  have	  no	  trouble	  embracing	  his	  role—or	  at	  least	  thinking	  of	  his	  flesh—as	  a	  medium.	  Since	  he	  is	  nearing	  fifty	  and	  mentally	  burned	  out,	  digital	  tools	  like	  the	  brain	  socket	  technology	  offer	  him	  the	  opportunity	  to	  transcend	  a	  decaying	  body	  he	  despises.	  Shortly	  after	  Gina’s	  surgery,	  he	  tells	  her	  with	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  jubilation,	  “‘We’re	  real	  synthesizers	  now.	  Real	  synners’”	  (Cadigan	  236).	  The	  technology	  allows	  him	  to	  passively	  channel	  “[t]he	  video	  show	  that	  ran	  endlessly	  in	  his	  head”	  (94)—a	  sound	  and	  image	  collage	  of	  memories,	  feelings	  and	  desires	  not	  unlike	  an	  abstract	  painting	  or	  film:	  he	  was	  standing	  on	  the	  lake	  with	  the	  stony	  shore,	  a	  million-­‐million	  stones	  worn	  smooth	  as	  eggs	  by	  the	  lapping	  of	  the	  water,	  and	  every	  stone	  a	  secret	  world	  to	  blossom	  at	  his	  touch…	  	  He	  could	  feel	  the	  stones	  hard	  against	  his	  bare	  feet	  as	  he	  made	  his	  way	  unsteadily	  along	  the	  arc	  of	  the	  shore.	  The	  sun	  was	  high	  overhead,	  falling	  hard	  on	  the	  water	  like	  a	  demand.	  (95)	  Synthesizers,	  whose	  literacies	  have	  moved	  beyond	  the	  traditional	  humanistic	  methodologies,	  not	  only	  interface	  with	  their	  technologies	  to	  produce	  art;	  they	  are	  changed	  physically	  and	  cognitively	  by	  those	  technologies.	  Through	  the	  production	  of	  art	  (that	  is,	  the	  images	  and	  sounds	  of	  dreams	  and	  fantasies)	  for	  commercial	  consumption,	  synning	  can	  be	  understood	  in	  Marxist	  terms.	  “In	  the	  late	  capitalist	  circuit	  of	  production,”	  argues	  Debra	  Benita	  Shaw,	  Gabe	  and	  Mark	  	  are	  hot	  property,	  their	  value	  determined	  by	  their	  ability	  to	  manipulate,	  synthesize	  and	  produce	  information.	  In	  this	  context,	  their	  retreat	  from	  the	  flesh	  marks	  the	  dissolution	  of	  the	  body	  in	  an	  incurably	  informed	  world	  in	  which	  the	  ‘meat’	  is	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constantly	  manipulated	  and	  thoroughly	  mediated.	  (86)	  During	  one	  of	  Gina’s	  synthesizing	  sessions,	  the	  mental	  images	  that	  occur	  to	  her	  seem	  to	  support	  this	  theory:	  “He	  could	  just	  stick	  a	  socket	  in	  his	  head	  and	  out	  it	  would	  come,	  essence	  de	  V.	  Mark.	  Video	  on	  tap”	  (Cadigan	  231).	  Clearly,	  as	  part	  of	  what	  Jameson	  calls	  “a	  first	  crude	  inventory	  of	  the	  new	  world	  order”	  (Archaeologies	  385)—and,	  indeed,	  as	  much	  cyberpunk	  tends	  to	  reveal—Mark’s	  entire	  conscious	  being	  is	  mediated,	  codified	  and	  commoditized	  for	  consumption	  in	  the	  free	  market.	  Cyberpunk,	  Jameson	  suggests,	  expresses	  this	  core	  “truth	  of	  emergent	  globalization”	  through	  the	  1980s	  and	  early	  nineties	  (Archaeologies	  384),	  spurred	  by	  global	  and	  transnational	  flows,	  development	  of	  new	  communications	  technologies,	  and	  the	  international	  expansion	  of	  financial	  and	  corporate	  markets.	  The	  commercial	  digital	  reproduction	  of	  art	  (simulacra)	  in	  Synners	  contributes	  to	  what	  Walter	  Benjamin	  once	  called	  a	  withering	  of	  “the	  aura	  of	  the	  work	  of	  art”	  through	  its	  loss	  of	  authenticity	  (221).	  In	  the	  “postmodern	  culture,”	  in	  which	  “‘culture’	  has	  become	  a	  product	  in	  its	  own	  right,”	  Visual	  Mark’s	  visions,	  bottled	  up	  like	  some	  designer	  perfume	  or	  cask	  ale,	  are	  reproduced	  ad	  
nauseum	  at	  the	  behest	  of	  “consumption	  of	  sheer	  commodification	  as	  a	  process”	  (Jameson,	  
Postmodernism	  x).	  Mark	  is	  the	  signifier	  of	  this	  culture,	  divorced	  from	  its	  signified	  referent.	  But	  while	  this	  closed	  mode	  of	  free	  market	  exploitation	  contravenes	  what	  Jeffrey	  Schnapp	  and	  Todd	  Presner	  see	  as	  the	  digital	  humanities’	  utopian	  spirit	  of	  “open	  source,	  open	  resources”	  (emphasis	  removed)	  (3)	  and	  process	  over	  product	  (5),	  Mark’s	  willingness	  to	  offer	  the	  synthesized	  substance	  of	  his	  self—“I	  was	  born	  to	  do	  it,”	  he	  tells	  Gina	  (Cadigan	  232)—does	  not.	  On	  one	  hand,	  this	  model	  of	  synthesis	  reproduces	  and	  perpetuates	  the	  post-­‐industrial	  capitalist	  framework	  of	  postmodern	  knowledge	  and	  information	  exchange.	  Cadigan	  is	  keenly	  aware	  that	  postmodern	  incursions	  into	  unified	  epistemologies,	  especially	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during	  the	  proliferation	  of	  digital	  data	  transfer,	  assign	  market	  value	  to	  and	  recycle	  information.	  “Knowledge,”	  writes	  Lyotard,	  “is	  and	  will	  be	  produced	  in	  order	  to	  be	  sold,	  it	  is	  and	  will	  be	  consumed	  in	  order	  to	  be	  valorized	  in	  a	  new	  production:	  in	  both	  cases,	  the	  goal	  is	  exchange”	  (4).	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  medium	  (that	  is,	  the	  synner)	  carries	  with	  it—and	  delivers,	  at	  the	  moment	  of	  the	  reception	  of	  its	  product—an	  undeniable	  dimension	  of	  lived	  human	  experiences	  and	  desires.	  Thus,	  while	  the	  message	  may	  be	  designed	  to	  line	  the	  pockets	  of	  capitalists	  and	  ruling	  classes	  across	  the	  postmodern	  cybercultural	  wasteland,	  it	  nonetheless	  relies	  on	  a	  level	  of	  human	  connection	  that	  re-­‐humanizes	  the	  process	  of	  knowledge	  production	  and	  consumption.	  In	  this	  way,	  synthesis	  becomes	  more	  than	  the	  cyclical	  production	  and	  provision	  of	  commercial	  services,	  which,	  in	  this	  case,	  is	  rock	  videos:	  audiences	  can	  “finally	  be	  the	  music”	  (Cadigan	  90).	  The	  synner	  provides	  stylized	  visions	  directly	  from	  her/his	  brain	  that	  the	  consumer	  can	  experience	  vicariously	  as	  a	  fantasy/wish	  fulfillment.	  The	  intimate	  connection	  between	  dreamer	  (producer)	  and	  audience	  (consumer)	  through	  dream	  (product),	  “to	  give	  them	  what	  they	  want	  to	  see	  and	  hear,”	  suggests	  a	  kind	  of	  carnal	  cerebral	  exchange,	  or	  sin,	  reinforced	  by	  the	  pun	  of	  the	  neologism	  synner.	  In	  reference	  to	  Visual	  Mark’s	  talents,	  Gina’s	  definition	  further	  underscores	  the	  process	  of	  synthesis.	  It	  is	  as	  though,	  she	  muses,	  “he	  had	  a	  pipeline	  to	  some	  primal	  dream	  spot,	  where	  music	  and	  image	  created	  each	  other,	  the	  pictures	  suggesting	  the	  music,	  the	  music	  generating	  the	  pictures,	  in	  a	  synesthetic	  frenzy”	  (Cadigan	  118).	  There	  is	  very	  much	  an	  emphasis	  on	  the	  cerebral	  ecstasy	  derived	  from	  the	  paradigms	  of	  consumerism—“a	  pipeline”—for	  producer	  and	  consumer.	  The	  various	  layers	  of	  media	  being	  synthesized	  
34	  	  
build	  into	  a	  multimodal	  climax	  of	  sensations	  that	  flood	  the	  brain’s	  conscious	  and	  subconscious	  areas	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  And	  since	  the	  artist	  cannot	  decide	  upon	  but	  only	  manipulate	  the	  images	  as	  they	  occur	  (they	  are	  created	  at	  the	  subconscious	  level),	  the	  experience	  is	  rendered	  more	  visceral,	  primal	  and	  organic	  for	  both	  parties.	  We	  see	  this	  in	  Gina’s	  own	  synning	  sessions—experiences	  that	  are	  often	  intricately	  embedded	  in	  the	  nature	  and	  sensuality	  of	  the	  body,	  intimate	  and	  collaborative.	  One	  such	  moment	  comes	  during	  an	  informal	  session	  with	  music	  producer	  Valjean	  and	  his	  rock	  band:	  	  “We’re	  going	  to	  play	  some	  music	  now,	  Gina.	  We’d	  like	  you	  to	  just	  let	  your	  mind	  go	  with	  it	  the	  same	  way	  you	  would	  if	  you	  were	  creating	  a	  video	  for	  it.	  All	  right?”	  
Video?	  First	  you	  see	  video…	  “All	  right?”	  
Video—	  Then	  you	  wear	  video…	  “All	  right?”	  
Video…	  Then	  you	  eat	  video…	  “Just	  run	  with	  it.	  Let	  the	  pictures	  come.	  All	  right?”	  
Video.	  
Then	  you…	  be…	  (226-­‐27)	  Again,	  one	  can	  eat,	  wear,	  and	  be	  the	  music,	  the	  video—or	  any	  number	  of	  cultural	  artifacts	  that	  threaten	  to	  eclipse	  nature	  in	  the	  simulated	  postmodern	  reproduction	  of	  signs.	  Jameson	  has	  suggested	  that	  postmodernism	  arrives	  “when	  the	  modernization	  process	  is	  complete	  and	  nature	  is	  gone	  for	  good.	  It	  is	  a	  more	  fully	  human	  world	  than	  the	  older	  [modern]	  one,	  but	  one	  in	  which	  ‘culture’	  has	  become	  a	  veritable	  ‘second	  nature’”	  (Postmodernism	  ix)	  and	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“the	  waning	  of	  affect”	  has	  been	  instigated	  (17).	  However,	  as	  I	  will	  argue,	  though	  characters	  like	  Visual	  Mark	  (in	  his	  desire	  for	  the	  “second	  nature”	  of	  culture	  and	  a	  release	  from	  the	  flesh)	  would	  lend	  credence	  to	  this	  argument,	  Gina	  (and	  Sam	  Ludovic,	  Gabe’s	  daughter)	  manages	  to	  retain	  the	  connection	  to	  her	  gendered,	  embodied	  nature	  in	  the	  post-­‐industrial	  now.	   Indeed,	  Gina’s	  sessions	  always	  feature	  some	  physical	  aspect.	  For	  example,	  synning	  is	  a	  sensory	  and	  generative	  experience	  for	  her,	  a	  kind	  of	  childbirth:	  “It	  wasn't	  just	  hearing	  the	  music,	  it	  was	  being	  in	  the	  music,	  and	  the	  images	  coming	  up	  on	  the	  screen	  of	  her	  mind,	  forming	  as	  she	  looked	  at	  them.	  As	  soon	  as	  she	  thought	  it,	  there	  it	  was,	  and	  if	  she	  thought	  to	  change	  it,	  it	  changed,	  growing	  from	  her	  like	  a	  live	  thing”	  (Cadigan	  245).	  Later,	  Valjean	  requests	  a	  video	  that	  depicts	  her	  (as	  she	  has	  both	  imagined	  and	  physically	  experienced	  it)	  falling	  from	  a	  tall	  building:	  “Her	  inner	  ear	  went	  crazy,	  the	  wind	  rushed	  into	  her,	  choking	  off	  her	  breathing,	  guided	  express	  missile,	  toes	  pointed	  at	  the	  sidewalk	  and	  the	  world	  blurring,	  smearing	  upward—”	  (262).	  Specific	  and	  embodied,	  Gina’s	  experience	  is	  one	  of	  affect,	  of	  bodily	  sensations	  and	  experiences—and	  the	  very	  real	  damage	  the	  street	  below	  is	  capable	  of	  inflicting.	  More	  generally,	  the	  experiential	  aspect	  of	  creation,	  combined	  with	  the	  abstract	  dimensions	  of	  synthesis	  and	  mediation,	  echoes	  the	  sentiments	  that	  course	  through	  contemporary	  work	  in	  the	  digital	  humanities:	  the	  images	  the	  synners	  produce	  are	  rendered	  by	  embodied	  instinct	  (excepting	  Visual	  Mark,	  who	  ultimately	  rejects	  his	  body)	  and	  the	  power	  of	  emotional	  states.	  For	  this	  reason,	  they	  also	  tend	  to	  be	  highly	  malleable	  and	  suggestive	  during	  their	  genesis.	  The	  transfer	  of	  this	  imagery	  to	  digital	  media	  allows	  the	  synner	  to	  actively	  manipulate	  and	  synthesize	  the	  end	  result	  into	  each	  project’s	  wider	  whole.	  Likewise,	  “[t]he	  digital	  humanities	  try	  to	  take	  account	  of	  the	  plasticity	  of	  digital	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forms	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  they	  point	  toward	  a	  new	  way	  of	  working	  with	  representation	  and	  mediation,	  what	  might	  be	  called	  the	  digital	  ‘folding’	  of	  reality,	  whereby	  one	  is	  able	  to	  approach	  culture	  in	  a	  radically	  new	  way”	  (Berry,	  “Computational	  Turn”	  1).	  In	  Cadigan’s	  text,	  the	  possibilities	  of	  the	  digital	  have	  expanded	  to	  dreams,	  giving	  its	  practitioners	  a	  level	  of	  control	  over	  artistic	  representation	  that	  is	  unprecedented	  in	  human	  history.	  This	  “digital	  ‘folding’	  of	  reality”—which	  might	  be	  read	  as	  the	  ability	  to	  bend	  reality	  to	  one’s	  own	  creative	  will	  through	  digital	  technologies—is	  what	  makes	  writing	  like	  Cadigan’s	  so	  culturally	  urgent	  and	  significant.	  It	  is,	  in	  effect,	  a	  pure	  synthesis	  of	  internal	  humanistic	  abstracts	  and	  external	  quantitative	  tools—a	  consequence	  that	  both	  anticipates	  and	  echoes	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  “[d]igital	  humanities	  is	  born	  of	  the	  encounter	  between	  traditional	  humanities	  and	  computational	  methods”	  (Burdick	  et	  al.	  3).	  
Becoming	  Cyborg	  
As	  we	  follow	  this	  encounter	  in	  the	  novel	  along	  its	  natural	  trajectory,	  it	  becomes	  more	  difficult	  to	  distinguish	  humans	  from	  digital	  technologies,	  in	  physical	  as	  well	  as	  figurative	  terms.	  Cyberpunk	  fiction	  is	  typified	  by	  its	  interest	  in	  posthuman	  hybrids,	  liminal	  identities	  and	  the	  playful	  multiple	  possibilities	  of	  the	  figure	  of	  the	  cyborg.	  As	  Sterling	  argues,	  cyberpunk	  writers	  “are	  fascinated	  by	  interzones.”	  Responding	  to	  the	  instability	  of	  subjectivity	  in	  a	  world	  that	  is	  constantly	  shifting	  and	  being	  renegotiated,	  cyberpunk	  employs	  “a	  wide-­‐ranging,	  global	  point	  of	  view”	  (347).	  It	  is	  almost	  certainly	  no	  coincidence	  that	  the	  popularity	  of	  cyberpunk	  paralleled	  popular	  and	  commercial	  interest	  in	  the	  funding/advancement	  of	  digital	  technologies	  research.	  The	  timely	  appearance	  of	  Haraway’s	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seminal	  essay	  “A	  Cyborg	  Manifesto”	  (1991)	  also	  cannot	  be	  a	  coincidence,	  acting,	  it	  seems	  now,	  as	  a	  virtual	  bridge	  between	  the	  two.	  Like	  Haraway’s	  cyborg,	  “[c]yberpunk	  comes	  from	  the	  realm	  where	  the	  computer	  hacker	  and	  the	  rocker	  overlap,	  a	  cultural	  Petri	  dish	  where	  writhing	  gene	  lines	  splice”	  (Sterling	  346).	  Both	  are	  cultural	  enigmas,	  interchangeable;	  the	  products	  of	  myriad	  identities	  all	  gleefully	  frustrated	  and	  indefinable.	  The	  cyborg	  in	  Haraway’s	  essay	  is	  a	  symbolic	  amalgamation	  of	  “transgressed	  boundaries,	  potent	  fusions,	  and	  dangerous	  possibilities”	  that	  delights	  in	  eluding	  the	  fixity	  of	  Dualist	  subject	  positioning	  that	  regulates	  definitions	  of	  gender	  and	  the	  delimitations	  of	  embodiment	  (154).	  Its	  sociocultural	  mission	  is	  rooted	  in	  the	  same	  posthuman	  sentiment	  as	  the	  cyberpunk	  ethos:	  “Some	  find	  the	  results	  bizarre,	  even	  monstrous;	  for	  others	  this	  integration	  is	  a	  powerful	  source	  of	  hope”	  (Sterling	  346).	  In	  defiance	  of	  socially	  and	  culturally	  constructed	  categories	  that	  seek	  to	  lock	  identities	  firmly	  into	  place,	  the	  cyborg	  is	  a	  deconstructing	  and	  reconstructed	  torch	  amidst	  the	  darkness	  of	  what	  Haraway	  calls	  an	  “informatics	  of	  domination”	  (163).	  This	  positivist,	  patriarchal	  construction	  (a	  world	  system	  that	  a	  priori	  codes	  identity	  through	  the	  patriarchal	  conceptions	  of	  work,	  reproduction,	  and	  communication),	  she	  argues,	  operates	  in	  antithesis	  to	  feminist	  and	  socialist	  ideals	  that	  value	  polymorphous	  interchange,	  multiple	  perspectives,	  bodily	  possibility,	  and	  reassembly	  of	  socially	  constructed	  institutions/roles	  in	  both	  the	  public	  and	  private	  spheres	  in	  new	  and	  surprising	  configurations.	  The	  cyborg	  stands	  as	  a	  signification	  of	  these	  values,	  representing	  “a	  disassembled	  and	  reassembled,	  postmodern	  collective	  and	  a	  personal	  self”	  that	  bucks	  superficial	  dualisms	  in	  favor	  of	  deeper,	  multiple	  and	  more	  complex	  connections	  (163).	  The	  emergence	  of	  such	  a	  porous,	  shifting	  creation—a	  rallying	  figure	  for	  characters	  like	  Cadigan’s	  Gina	  and	  Gibson’s	  Molly	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Millions	  of	  Neuromancer—reinforces	  Hayles’	  point	  that	  “the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  human	  subject	  are	  constructed	  rather	  than	  given.”	  Once	  again,	  following	  the	  advancement	  of	  cybernetic	  research	  throughout	  the	  decade,	  Hayles	  suggests,	  epistemological	  and	  ontological	  conceptions	  of	  humanity	  were	  being	  and	  had	  to	  be	  rewritten	  (How	  We	  Became	  
Posthuman	  84).	  Haraway’s	  essay	  was	  published	  the	  same	  year	  as	  Synners,	  in	  1991,	  and	  though	  their	  styles	  are	  very	  different,	  the	  authors	  share	  many	  of	  the	  same	  sociocultural	  convictions.	  Both	  were	  writing	  at	  a	  time	  of	  radical	  political,	  social,	  and	  technological	  change	  in	  America:	  more	  women	  than	  ever	  before	  were	  taking	  jobs	  and	  making	  personal	  choices	  previously	  denied	  to	  them;	  the	  country	  was	  recovering	  from	  the	  Cold	  War	  and	  steeped	  in	  postmodern	  declarations	  about	  crises	  and	  apocalyptic	  “senses	  of	  the	  end	  of	  this	  or	  that”	  (Jameson,	  
Postmodernism	  1);	  evolutions	  in	  informatics	  and	  digital	  technologies	  simultaneously	  eroded	  and	  forced	  the	  reinvention	  of	  the	  ways	  many	  institutions	  operated;	  and	  social	  structures,	  particularly	  traditional	  white,	  heteronormative	  notions	  of	  home	  and	  work	  place,	  were	  irreversibly	  shaken	  up.	  These	  kinds	  of	  seismic	  shifts	  in	  the	  fabric	  of	  an	  already	  delicately	  bound	  society	  are	  reflected	  in	  Haraway’s	  cyborg—a	  mixture	  of	  “partiality,	  irony,	  intimacy,	  and	  perversity”	  (151)	  that	  represents	  “our	  ontology”	  and	  “gives	  us	  our	  politics”	  (150).	  We	  can	  trace	  the	  same	  sentiments	  in	  Cadigan’s	  work—a	  text	  equally	  concerned	  with	  the	  potent	  and	  potential	  (re)combinations	  of	  self,	  body,	  machine.	  In	  various	  important	  ways,	  digital	  humanists	  (and,	  indeed,	  many	  others)	  can	  be	  considered	  cyborgs,	  since	  their	  work	  relies	  upon	  a	  deeply	  integrated	  and	  cyclically	  escalating	  relationship	  with	  technology.	  Like	  Haraway’s	  cyborg,	  Cadigan’s	  synners	  are	  composite	  postmodern	  entities,	  born	  out	  of	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human	  social	  and	  historical	  conditions	  rather	  than	  the	  humanist	  conception	  of	  nature.	  Citing	  Haraway,	  Laura	  Chernaik	  suggests	  “they	  are	  cyborgs,	  not	  goddesses;	  changed	  by	  technology,	  not	  in	  tune,	  cyclically,	  with	  nature”	  (70).	  Hayles	  alludes	  to	  this	  emerging	  social	  dynamic	  in	  her	  essay	  “How	  We	  Think:	  Transforming	  Power	  and	  Digital	  Technologies,”	  suggesting	  that	  “[t]he	  more	  we	  use	  computers,	  the	  more	  we	  need	  the	  large-­‐scale	  analyses	  they	  enable	  to	  cope	  with	  enormous	  data	  sets”	  (48).	  If	  our	  increasing	  utility	  of	  digital	  technologies	  is	  proportionally	  related	  to	  our	  increasing	  dependence	  upon	  their	  computational	  power,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  in	  our	  cyborg	  relationships	  with	  our	  devices,	  they/we	  are	  deployed	  as	  reflexively	  constituent	  of	  us/them.	  In	  other	  words,	  as	  we	  use	  computers	  to	  accomplish	  tasks,	  communicate,	  or	  create,	  our	  reliance	  upon	  them	  to	  generate	  more	  output	  in	  shorter	  amounts	  of	  time	  grows	  exponentially.	  	  Thus,	  interaction	  with	  machines	  must	  lead	  to	  a	  fundamental	  revision	  of	  the	  human	  in	  humanist	  terms.	  This	  is	  reflected	  in	  Nicholas	  Carr’s	  assertion	  that	  entanglements	  of	  body	  and	  machine,	  in	  the	  brain’s	  cognitive	  encounter	  with	  (digital)	  information,	  lead	  to	  “the	  pathways	  in	  our	  brains…	  once	  again	  being	  rerouted”	  (Shallows	  77).6	  Leighton	  Evans	  and	  Sian	  Rees	  follow	  this	  line	  of	  thinking,	  arguing	  that	  	  the	  nature	  of	  digital	  technology	  is	  such	  that	  we	  are	  becoming	  integrated	  with	  the	  text	  itself;	  our	  brain	  is	  not	  simply	  picturing	  a	  new	  world,	  it	  is	  instead	  developing	  a	  new	  world,	  opening	  up	  new	  neural	  pathways	  in	  reaction	  to	  the	  speed	  and	  expanse	  of	  interaction	  with	  digital	  data.	  (21)	  	  Though	  they	  are	  speaking	  of	  the	  text	  in	  the	  narrow	  sense	  of	  the	  humanities,	  we	  might	  understand	  it	  in	  this	  process	  as	  a	  representation	  of	  the	  point	  of	  contact	  and	  departure—an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  For	  more	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  digital	  media	  on	  the	  brain,	  see	  Carr’s	  The	  Big	  Switch:	  Rewiring	  the	  
World,	  from	  Edison	  to	  Google	  (2013)	  and	  his	  essay	  “Is	  Google	  Making	  Us	  Stupid?”	  (2008).	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interface—between	  user	  and	  machine	  that	  intrinsically	  refashions	  both	  in	  an	  epistemic	  fusion.	  Or,	  as	  Visual	  Mark’s	  vending	  machine	  epiphany	  goes,	  one	  must	  “change	  for	  the	  machines”	  if	  one	  expects	  to	  survive	  in	  a	  world	  constructed	  with	  and	  sustained	  by	  the	  cultural	  artifacts	  and	  ephemera	  of	  the	  digital	  (Cadigan	  105).	  Through	  the	  synners	  of	  Cadigan’s	  text,	  taken	  to	  its	  literal	  but	  perhaps	  logical	  end-­‐point,	  we	  can	  see	  the	  relationships	  digital	  humanists	  form	  with	  digital	  technologies,	  tools,	  and	  literacies.	  The	  elaborate	  and	  demanding	  nature	  of	  their	  work	  means	  that	  synners	  like	  Gina	  and	  Visual	  Mark	  must	  physically	  interface	  with	  machines	  that	  record	  their	  visions	  through	  wires	  connected	  to	  sockets	  built	  into	  their	  brains.	  Again,	  they	  must	  “change	  for	  the	  machines.”	  Working	  from	  a	  similar	  idea	  in	  an	  earlier	  novel,	  Mindplayers	  (1987),7	  and	  “Rock	  On”	  (1984),	  the	  short	  story	  upon	  which	  Synners	  is	  based,	  Cadigan’s	  depiction	  of	  the	  integration	  of	  flesh	  and	  machine	  is	  as	  gruesome	  and	  dangerous	  as	  it	  is	  multiplicitous	  and	  destabilizing.	  This	  is	  perhaps	  best	  portrayed	  by	  Gabe’s	  transformation,	  from	  producing	  simulations	  via	  an	  external	  hotsuit	  to	  producing	  them	  via	  a	  cerebral/digital	  interface	  made	  possible	  by	  the	  infamous	  brain	  sockets.	  Shortly	  after	  the	  surgery,	  Gabe	  confronts	  his	  newly	  altered	  self	  for	  the	  first	  time:	  	  He	  was	  looking	  at	  himself	  in	  the	  mirror	  in	  Medical’s	  bathroom,	  turning	  his	  head	  from	  side	  to	  side.	  Just	  as	  they’d	  said,	  he	  didn’t	  look	  any	  different.	  Same	  old	  head,	  only	  now	  it	  had	  eight	  holes	  in	  it,	  eight	  holes	  to	  be	  filled	  with	  eight	  plugs	  and	  a	  small	  menu	  of	  commands	  he	  could	  use	  to	  manipulate	  the	  images	  in	  his	  head.	  Top.	  Forward.	  
Reverse.	  Freeze.	  Resume.	  End.	  Save.	  Quit.	  (Cadigan	  269)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Cadigan’s	  Mindplayers	  also	  deals	  with	  brain	  interfaces	  through	  advances	  in	  digital	  technologies.	  Mindplayers	  are	  a	  lot	  like	  psychoanalysts,	  and,	  like	  synners,	  they	  play	  in	  the	  folds	  of	  human	  consciousness.	  In	  this	  case,	  however,	  the	  mindplayer’s	  optic	  nerve	  is	  connected	  directly	  to	  the	  patient’s	  brain,	  rather	  than	  to	  a	  machine,	  allowing	  them	  to	  explore	  the	  mind	  of	  that	  person	  as	  a	  conceptual	  landscape.	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In	  her	  introduction	  to	  the	  book,	  Tuttle	  calls	  these	  neurological	  connectors	  “snaky	  wires”	  (vii),	  suggesting	  that	  a	  kind	  of	  anthropomorphizing	  is	  taking	  place;	  or,	  perhaps,	  a	  Kafka-­‐inspired	  metamorphosis	  that	  conjures	  the	  gorgon	  Medusa	  as	  much	  as	  a	  moment	  of	  radical	  cyber-­‐enhancement.	  But	  these	  wires	  are	  something	  more.	  Tuttle	  suggests	  the	  physical	  connections	  between	  synner	  and	  machine	  are	  representative	  of	  neural	  pathways	  with	  the	  potential	  to	  be	  remodeled	  and	  remade	  by	  input	  from	  external	  agents	  and/or	  collaborators	  (vii).	  And	  indeed,	  the	  work	  of	  synning	  depends	  on	  the	  synner’s	  willingness	  to	  open	  up	  her/his	  body	  and	  mind	  to	  manipulation,	  alteration,	  voyeurism,	  and	  exposure—all	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  the	  production	  of	  art.	  Throughout	  the	  novel,	  the	  external	  forces	  intimated	  by	  Tuttle	  (some	  malignant,	  some	  benign—collaborators,	  musicians,	  company	  executives,	  and	  not	  to	  mention	  the	  machines	  themselves)	  act	  upon	  the	  synners’	  bodies	  and	  minds	  in	  various	  ways,	  forever	  changing	  and	  marking	  them.	  The	  fact	  that	  Visual	  Mark	  refers	  to	  himself	  as	  “Markt”	  later	  in	  the	  novel	  is	  telling	  (Cadigan	  425).	  Before	  this	  transformation,	  though,	  Gabe	  is	  addicted	  to	  a	  virtual	  reality	  simulation	  that	  he	  designed.	  As	  a	  “simulation	  producer”	  (Cadigan	  473),	  he	  is,	  like	  rock	  video	  synner-­‐god	  Visual	  Mark,	  a	  hot	  commodity	  in	  the	  orgiastic	  age	  of	  digital	  information	  and	  simulation.	  In	  a	  vain	  effort	  to	  suppress	  the	  demands	  of	  his	  work	  for	  Diversifications,	  his	  failing	  marriage,	  and	  his	  distant	  relationship	  with	  his	  daughter,	  Sam,	  Gabe	  spends	  his	  time	  playing	  a	  game	  called	  Headhunters	  with	  avatars	  Marly	  and	  Caritha.	  In	  this	  simulated	  fantasy,	  Gabe’s	  “cultural	  perception”	  is	  engendered	  by	  the	  “feedback	  loops	  that	  run	  between	  technologies	  and	  perceptions”	  (Hayles,	  How	  We	  Became	  Posthuman	  14),	  providing	  him	  the	  opportunity	  to	  reinvent	  himself	  in	  and	  merge	  with	  the	  computer	  generated	  landscape.	  He	  can	  even	  program	  the	  game	  (in	  a	  vain	  attempt	  to	  feel	  something,	  even	  though	  it	  is	  just	  simulated)	  to	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let	  the	  player	  “die	  at	  the	  end	  if	  you	  wanted	  to,	  or	  even	  blind-­‐select	  so	  you	  wouldn't	  know	  whether	  you	  would	  survive	  or	  not”	  (Cadigan	  47).	  The	  exhilaration	  this	  provides,	  leaving	  him	  “feeling	  alternately	  energized	  and	  drained”	  (101),	  is	  indicative	  of	  his	  emotional	  and	  physical	  sublimation	  into	  technology.	  Moreover,	  his	  professional	  work	  on	  a	  simulated	  ad	  for	  Gilding	  BodyShields—a	  product	  typical	  of	  a	  society	  in	  the	  throes	  of	  the	  death	  of	  affect—perhaps	  shows	  us	  why.	  	  Gabe’s	  perception,	  at	  least	  until	  he	  meets	  Gina,	  follows	  “the	  view	  that	  parses	  virtuality	  as	  a	  division	  between	  an	  inert	  body	  that	  is	  left	  behind	  and	  a	  disembodied	  subjectivity	  that	  inhabits	  a	  virtual	  realm”—a	  view	  not	  unlike	  Neuromancer	  protagonist	  Case’s	  “bodiless	  exultation	  of	  cyberspace”	  (Hayles,	  How	  We	  Became	  Posthuman	  290).	  As	  with	  Visual	  Mark,	  it	  is	  the	  technology	  that	  leaves	  its	  indelible	  mark	  on	  Gabe’s	  body,	  not	  human	  contact.	  We	  see	  this	  in	  his	  near-­‐fetishistic,	  post-­‐simulation	  undressing:	  “He	  unzipped	  the	  hotsuit,	  peeling	  it	  away	  from	  himself.	  Underneath,	  his	  skin	  bore	  the	  impression	  of	  a	  baroque	  pattern	  of	  snaky	  lines	  punctuated	  by	  the	  sharp	  geometric	  variations	  of	  the	  numerous	  sensors”	  (Cadigan	  46).	  While,	  the	  ritual	  suggests	  a	  primal	  connection	  to	  an	  embodied	  sense	  of	  self—a	  marked	  body—it	  is	  in	  fact	  the	  concretized,	  erogenous	  yet	  seriated	  effects	  of	  technology	  and	  simulation-­‐as-­‐experience	  that	  take	  precedence.	  Hayles	  writes	  of	  “the	  duality	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  condition	  of	  virtuality—materiality	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  information	  on	  the	  other”	  (How	  We	  Became	  Posthuman	  14);	  but	  in	  Gabe’s	  case,	  digital	  information	  and	  technologies	  have	  overwhelmed	  his	  body	  to	  such	  an	  extent	  that	  we	  can	  literally	  see	  the	  pattern	  of	  his	  hotsuit	  pressed	  into	  it.	  The	  blurring	  of	  humans	  and	  machines	  in	  figurative	  and	  literal	  ways	  is	  not	  a	  new	  idea	  in	  critical	  work	  or	  the	  cultural	  imagination,	  however	  (Evans	  and	  Rees	  22).	  Though	  the	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widespread	  pairing	  of	  artificial	  and	  biological	  elements	  might	  have	  seemed	  (at	  least	  a	  little)	  radical	  to	  readers	  of	  cyberpunk	  and	  viewers	  of	  The	  Six	  Million	  Dollar	  Man	  in	  the	  1980s,	  advances	  in	  biology,	  cybernetics	  and	  informatics	  have	  brought	  the	  essence	  of	  the	  cyborg	  into	  commonplace	  reality	  today.	  While	  the	  label	  cyborg	  (understood	  in	  the	  popular	  cultural	  sense)	  may	  still	  sound	  overly	  science	  fictional,	  real-­‐life	  examples	  abound.	  Depending	  on	  the	  expanse	  of	  our	  definition,	  for	  instance,	  a	  cyborg	  might	  be	  a	  person	  outfitted	  with	  an	  artificial	  body	  part,	  or	  simply	  someone	  using	  a	  smartphone	  as	  an	  extension	  of	  themselves,	  their	  memory,	  and/or	  their	  communicative	  faculties.	  As	  Veronica	  Hollinger	  notes,	  discussing	  Mark	  Dery’s	  critical	  collection	  of	  essays	  on	  cyberculture,8	  a	  vast	  majority	  of	  humans	  are	  now	  part	  of	  “the	  middle-­‐ground,	  the	  interface	  between	  the	  body	  and	  the	  machine	  inhabited	  by	  so	  many	  of	  us	  now	  living	  in	  the	  post-­‐industrial	  west”	  (125).	  Indeed,	  our	  continuing	  association	  with	  infinitely	  complex	  and	  capable	  digital	  technologies	  has	  reshaped	  the	  way	  we	  think	  about	  and	  interact	  with	  each	  other	  and	  the	  world.	  Sherry	  Turkle	  argues	  that	  our	  digital	  tools	  “provide	  space	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  new	  state	  of	  the	  self,	  itself,	  split	  between	  the	  screen	  and	  the	  physical	  real,	  wired	  into	  existence	  through	  technology”	  (16).	  It	  is	  within	  this	  postmodern,	  posthuman	  sensibility	  of	  being	  constantly	  connected	  that	  we	  become	  “newly	  free	  in	  some	  ways,	  newly	  yoked	  in	  others”	  (152).	  In	  effect,	  then,	  by	  continuously	  using	  the	  technologies	  that	  are	  in	  response	  fundamentally	  altering	  it,	  humanity	  is	  being	  rewritten	  in	  the	  image	  of	  Cadigan’s	  synner.	  In	  a	  world	  in	  which	  “[w]e	  make	  our	  technologies,	  and	  they,	  in	  turn,	  make	  and	  shape	  us”	  (263),	  we	  are	  already	  participants	  in	  some	  form	  of	  the	  cyborg	  future	  laid	  out	  in	  the	  cyberpunk	  visions	  of	  Cadigan,	  Gibson	  and	  others.	  Following	  McLuhan	  and	  Fiore’s	  claim	  that,	  as	  an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Dery,	  Mark,	  ed.	  Escape	  Velocity:	  Cyberculture	  at	  the	  End	  of	  the	  Century.	  New	  York:	  Grove,	  1996.	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“extension	  of	  the	  central	  nervous	  system”	  (40),	  “media	  work	  us	  over	  completely”	  (26),	  Nicholas	  Carr	  makes	  a	  similar	  claim.	  Media,	  he	  suggests,	  “supply	  the	  stuff	  of	  thought,	  but	  they	  also	  shape	  the	  process	  of	  thought”	  (Shallows	  6).	  In	  fact,	  as	  active	  rather	  than	  passive	  conduits	  for	  the	  delivery	  of	  information,	  such	  (digital)	  media	  actively	  participate	  in	  the	  permanent	  transformation	  of	  our	  cognitive	  behavioral	  functions.	  Many	  of	  the	  characters	  of	  Synners	  are	  integrated	  with	  technologies	  designed	  specifically	  to	  create	  or	  change	  humanistic	  ideas	  or	  dreams	  into	  information—a	  transmutation	  that	  might	  be	  considered	  a	  kind	  of	  digital	  alchemy.	  These	  human/machine	  relationships	  are	  inflected	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  the	  real-­‐life	  movement	  of	  concept	  to	  code:	  “To	  mediate	  a	  cultural	  object,”	  writes	  Berry,	  “a	  computer	  requires	  that	  everything	  is	  transformed	  from	  the	  continuous	  flow	  of	  everyday	  life	  into	  a	  grid	  of	  numbers	  that	  can	  be	  stored	  as	  a	  representation	  which	  can	  then	  be	  manipulated	  using	  algorithms”	  (Introduction	  2).	  The	  process	  of	  making	  art	  through	  computation	  begins	  by	  taking	  a	  cultural	  object—a	  dream	  or	  hallucination,	  for	  example—and	  subjecting	  it	  to	  a	  series	  of	  subconscious	  editing	  tools	  (as	  demonstrated	  by	  Gabe	  with	  his	  internal	  graphical	  menu	  of	  commands).	  In	  so	  doing,	  the	  synner,	  as	  an	  active	  participant	  in	  the	  neuro-­‐digital	  conversion	  of	  abstract	  idea	  into	  quantitative	  data	  and	  its	  subsequent	  manipulation,	  approximates	  the	  status	  of	  computer	  (or	  perhaps	  a	  biological	  Photoshop,	  with	  its	  dizzying	  array	  of	  digital	  editing	  capabilities).	  	  Synners	  can	  thus	  be	  understood	  as	  cyborgs—simultaneously	  computers	  in	  the	  machine	  sense,	  and	  computers	  in	  the	  biological,	  human	  sense.	  And	  like	  these	  synners,	  digital	  humanists	  stand	  at	  the	  nexus	  of	  humanistic	  ideas	  and	  encoded	  digital	  data.	  They	  are	  also	  concerned	  with	  the	  synthesis	  and	  mediation	  of	  fuzzy	  data	  and	  abstract	  concepts	  using	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generative	  models	  made	  possible	  by	  critical	  digital	  toolsets.	  In	  these	  machine-­‐enhanced	  approaches	  to	  new	  modes	  of	  criticism	  in	  the	  humanities,	  practitioners	  thus	  become	  synthesizers,	  or	  synners,	  in	  their	  own	  right.	  
Cognitive	  and	  Embodied	  Realities	  
For	  some	  characters	  like	  Visual	  Mark,	  engagement	  with	  the	  digital	  means	  a	  sacrifice	  of	  real-­‐world	  situatedness,	  physicality,	  and	  individual	  identity.	  Since	  “[t]he	  pictures	  [always]	  ran	  the	  way	  they	  would,”	  Mark	  thinks	  of	  his	  brain	  (the	  physical	  bundle	  of	  neurons	  and	  electrical	  signals	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  mind)	  as	  “just	  the	  medium”	  (Cadigan	  95)—a	  vessel	  whose	  produce	  is	  to	  be	  consumed	  by	  an	  insatiable	  society	  as	  he	  slowly	  burns	  out	  (though	  he	  may	  not	  realize	  he	  is	  doing	  so).	  In	  fact,	  he	  wants	  to	  outstrip	  his	  weary	  body	  for	  digital	  immortality.	  In	  a	  conversation	  with	  Gina,	  sick	  of	  the	  finite	  and	  damaged	  flesh	  that	  holds	  him	  back	  from	  his	  true	  potential,	  he	  tells	  her	  “Someday	  you're	  gonna	  come	  into	  a	  room,	  and	  you're	  gonna	  see	  this	  funny-­‐looking	  thing,	  a	  piece	  of	  flesh	  clutching	  into	  naked	  console,	  and	  you're	  gonna	  stop	  and	  stare,	  because	  you	  won't	  be	  sure	  where	  the	  flesh	  stops	  and	  the	  chips	  and	  the	  circuits	  begin.	  They'll	  be,	  like,	  melted	  into	  each	  other,	  and	  some	  of	  the	  console'll	  be	  as	  alive	  as	  flesh	  and	  some	  of	  the	  flesh'll	  be	  dead	  as	  console,	  and	  that'll	  be	  me.	  All	  of	  that'll	  be	  me.”	  (232-­‐33)	  The	  conflation	  of	  console	  and	  flesh	  here,	  combined	  with	  the	  implicit	  Dualist	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  fundamental	  split	  between	  body	  and	  mind,	  is	  literalized	  by	  the	  full	  transition	  of	  Mark’s	  consciousness	  into	  virtual	  space,	  transcending	  the	  fallibility	  of	  his	  body.	  “The	  prospect	  of	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returning	  to	  the	  meat,	  of	  being	  weighted	  down,”	  he	  contemplates,	  “was	  less	  appealing	  all	  the	  time”	  (325).	  Such	  a	  sentiment	  has	  long	  been	  popular	  with	  techno-­‐fetishists	  and	  futurists	  for	  a	  number	  of	  years	  now.	  Cybernetics	  engineers	  such	  as	  Norbert	  Weiner	  and	  Hans	  Moravec	  have	  written	  extensively	  on	  notions	  of	  disembodied	  consciousness	  and	  the	  desire	  for	  “writing	  the	  body	  into	  computers”	  (Hayles,	  How	  We	  Became	  Posthuman	  193).	  Constance	  Penley	  and	  Andrew	  Ross	  refer	  to	  this	  ideological	  line	  of	  thinking	  as	  the	  “postmodern	  celebration	  of	  the	  technological	  sublime”	  (xii).	  Hayles,	  among	  others,	  has	  criticized	  this	  impulse,	  however,	  arguing	  that	  disembodied	  consciousness—although	  a	  strand	  of	  deconstructing	  postmodern	  schemata—threatens	  to	  permanently	  erase	  the	  female	  body,	  suppressing	  it	  once	  and	  for	  all	  under	  the	  dominant	  locus	  of	  a	  liberal	  humanism	  that	  values	  cognition	  over	  embodiment	  (How	  We	  Became	  Posthuman	  5).	  In	  Toffoletti’s	  view,	  “Hayles’	  response	  to	  the	  posthuman	  is	  very	  much	  directed	  toward	  interrogating	  the	  associations	  between	  posthumanism	  and	  disembodied	  forms	  of	  existence.	  She	  aims	  to	  re-­‐embody	  the	  virtual	  spaces	  and	  digital	  technologies	  that	  have	  often	  ignored	  or	  denied	  women’s	  bodies	  and	  their	  lived	  experiences	  of	  the	  world”	  (15).	  In	  literary	  terms,	  Lavigne	  echoes	  this	  view,	  pointing	  out	  that	  first-­‐wave	  cyberpunk	  has	  been	  “criticized	  for	  being	  misogynist	  and	  classist…	  	  [because]	  its	  virtual	  realities	  and	  digital	  escapism	  represented	  a	  white,	  middle-­‐class,	  heterosexual	  and	  very	  male	  perspective"	  (1).	  Cadigan’s	  novel,	  especially	  with	  regard	  to	  characters	  Visual	  Mark	  and	  Gabe,	  should	  also	  be	  read	  as	  a	  criticism	  of	  this	  perspective.	  Like	  Hayles	  and	  Haraway,	  Cadigan	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  epistemological	  importance	  of	  embodiment	  in	  technological	  forms	  of	  human	  liberation	  from	  systems	  of	  control;	  or,	  in	  Haraway’s	  words,	  from	  patriarchal	  “world	  historical	  systems	  of	  domination”	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that	  fuel	  both	  liberal	  humanist	  and	  techno-­‐fetishist	  discourses	  and	  modes	  of	  social	  organization	  and	  governance	  (161).	  Thus,	  as	  Balsamo	  notes,	  the	  men	  (Visual	  Mark	  and	  Gabe)	  are	  obsessed	  with	  virtual	  disembodied	  consciousness—the	  technological	  sublime—while	  the	  women	  (Gina	  and	  Sam)	  actively	  retain	  and	  celebrate	  their	  embodiment	  and	  physical	  inter-­‐connectedness	  (137).	  While	  Mark	  is	  reconstituted	  as	  omnipotent	  consciousness	  in	  digital	  space,	  and	  Gabe	  (whose	  marriage	  and	  job	  are	  both	  a	  cause	  of	  great	  stress)	  turns	  for	  emotional	  support	  to	  his	  immersive	  virtual	  reality	  simulations,	  Sam	  and	  Gina	  are	  rooted	  firmly	  in	  the	  physical	  world.	  Their	  bodies	  are	  in	  conversation	  with—not	  an	  inextricable	  part	  of—the	  spheres	  of	  the	  digital.	  	  Sam,	  a	  born-­‐digital	  seventeen	  year	  old,	  is	  augmented	  with	  a	  makeshift	  insulin	  pump/sunglasses	  combination	  that	  she	  has	  converted	  to	  get	  onto	  the	  dataline	  (online).	  Working	  on	  some	  ripped-­‐off	  encrypted	  data,	  she	  shows	  Fez	  and	  Rosa	  “where	  the	  two	  needles	  went	  into	  the	  fleshiest	  part	  of	  her	  abdomen,”	  making	  her	  in	  her	  own	  words	  “‘a	  potato	  clock.’”	  She	  explains	  that	  the	  pump	  uses	  her	  body	  as	  “‘an	  alternative	  power	  source.	  You	  can	  use	  batteries,	  or	  house	  current	  with	  an	  adapter,	  but	  if	  the	  power	  fails	  from	  one	  or	  the	  other,	  it’s	  crash	  time.	  This	  never	  crashes’”	  (Cadigan	  59).	  The	  intimate	  and	  generative	  overtones	  of	  using	  her	  body’s	  energy	  reinforce	  the	  emphasis	  in	  cyborg	  discourses	  on	  gender,	  reproduction	  and	  embodiment.	  They	  also	  lend	  support	  to	  the	  argument	  that	  “all	  material	  objects	  are	  interpenetrated	  by	  flows	  of	  information,	  from	  DNA	  code	  to	  the	  global	  reach	  of	  the	  World	  Wide	  Web”	  (Hayles,	  How	  We	  Became	  Posthuman	  14).	  Through	  the	  enfleshed	  connection	  to	  technology	  that	  keeps	  her	  biologically	  connected	  to	  the	  digital,	  Sam	  defies	  Visual	  Mark’s	  wholesale	  rejection	  of	  physicality.	  She	  identifies	  with	  her	  embodied	  self	  through	  the	  technology	  that	  has	  cyborged	  her	  into	  real	  life.	  This	  is	  clear	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when	  Fez	  asks	  her	  why	  she	  does	  not	  use	  batteries	  instead.	  “‘Not	  personal	  enough,’”	  she	  replies	  (Cadigan	  59).	  Visual	  Mark,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  looks	  back	  without	  regret	  at	  “the	  idle	  meat,	  still	  in	  the	  pit”	  (324),	  disdainfully	  conjuring	  the	  image	  of	  an	  animal	  carcass	  abandoned	  and	  rotting.	  In	  her	  review	  of	  Balsamo’s	  Technologies	  of	  the	  Gendered	  Body,	  Hollinger	  traces	  this	  concern	  in	  Cadigan’s	  novel:	  that	  “[a]lthough	  technology	  promises	  the	  ‘effacement’	  of	  the	  body,	  in	  fact	  the	  discourses	  of	  cyberculture…	  as	  often	  as	  not	  work	  to	  enforce	  exactly	  the	  kinds	  of	  boundaries	  which	  it	  promises	  to	  erase	  forever”—especially,	  she	  suggests,	  the	  boundaries	  of	  gender.	  Moreover,	  Tuttle	  argues,	  the	  novel	  is	  something	  more	  than	  “plugging	  into	  a	  machine…	  just	  to	  leave	  ‘the	  meat’	  behind	  while	  indulging	  escapist	  fantasies.”	  It	  is	  about	  “connection	  with	  other	  minds…	  to	  share	  your	  deepest	  self”	  (vii).	  Nonetheless,	  Visual	  Mark	  is	  swept	  up	  into	  the	  comfort	  of	  eternal	  digital	  abstraction,	  finding	  connection	  not	  with	  other	  enfleshed	  human	  beings,	  but	  a	  massive	  artificial	  intelligence	  known	  as	  Dr.	  Art	  Fish.	  In	  the	  virtual	  spaces	  of	  the	  dataline,	  Art	  Fish	  shows	  him	  that	  “[i]nformation	  can	  neither	  be	  
created	  nor	  destroyed—it’s	  accessible	  or	  it’s	  inaccessible,	  but	  it	  is”	  (Cadigan	  416);	  that	  he	  is,	  for	  all	  intents	  and	  purposes,	  a	  digitized	  version	  of	  pure	  energy.	  This	  thermodynamic	  law	  of	  information	  is	  later	  reinforced,	  in	  their	  joint	  effort	  to	  fight	  a	  particularly	  vicious	  virus	  in	  the	  network,	  when	  their	  programs	  are	  combined	  to	  form	  the	  super-­‐AI	  Markt.9	  Visual	  Mark’s	  evolution	  to	  digital	  information—and	  his	  subsequent	  merging	  with	  the	  Art	  Fish	  AI—engenders	  two	  opposing	  facts:	  1)	  it	  is	  the	  apex	  and	  actualization	  of	  the	  techno-­‐optimist’s	  dream—a	  totalizing	  representation	  of	  “data	  made	  flesh”	  (Gibson,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Mark	  +	  Art	  =	  Markt.	  This	  neologism,	  a	  clever	  piece	  of	  word	  play	  on	  Cadigan’s	  part,	  acts	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  Visual	  Mark’s	  discarded	  body:	  it	  is	  the	  digital	  space	  that	  is	  now	  marked	  by	  his	  sublimated	  consciousness;	  not	  his	  flesh.	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Neuromancer	  17);	  and	  2)	  it	  is	  a	  failure	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  digital	  humanities’	  resistance	  against	  the	  notion	  that	  any	  work	  contingent	  upon	  the	  human	  condition	  “speaks	  outside	  of	  time,	  space,	  and	  the	  physicality	  of	  the	  human	  body”	  (Schnapp	  and	  Presner	  5).	  But	  perhaps	  this	  kind	  of	  escapist,	  self-­‐effacing,	  bodiless	  cognitive	  state	  is	  to	  be	  expected	  from	  a	  man	  whose	  foremost	  purpose	  for	  the	  last	  twenty	  years	  of	  his	  life	  has	  been	  to	  serve	  up	  the	  imagery	  running	  through	  his	  mind	  for	  commercial	  distribution.	  By	  contrast,	  the	  characters	  that	  frequent	  the	  Mimosa	  strip—a	  gritty	  part	  of	  this	  alt-­‐Los	  Angeles	  that	  epitomizes	  the	  high	  tech/low	  life	  binary	  of	  cyberpunk—are	  an	  “incurably	  informed”	  part	  of	  the	  physical	  world	  (Cadigan	  4).	  At	  one	  point,	  Visual	  Mark	  describes	  the	  strip	  as	  a	  hotbed	  for	  “the	  hackers	  and	  the	  bangers,	  the	  laces	  and	  the	  cases	  roiling	  around	  on	  the	  sand	  and	  the	  walkways,	  squatting	  in	  vacant	  buildings,	  flimsy	  lean-­‐tos,	  under	  piers”	  where	  the	  hackers	  “could	  tap	  a	  little	  power	  with	  their	  piggybacks	  and	  fooler	  loops	  and	  whatever	  else	  they	  had”	  (88).	  The	  strip	  acts	  as	  a	  central	  open-­‐source	  hub	  and	  DIY	  techno-­‐utopia—a	  safe-­‐haven	  from	  the	  authorities	  and	  the	  commercial	  conglomerates	  that	  seek	  to	  shut	  down	  their	  activities	  through	  copyright	  infringement	  laws.	  It	  is	  a	  literal	  expression	  of	  what	  Anne	  Burdick	  and	  others	  identify	  as	  the	  transition	  in	  contemporary	  culture	  from	  closed	  to	  open	  modes	  of	  production	  and	  information	  distribution.	  Moreover,	  they	  suggest	  (following	  Richard	  Stallman),	  the	  proliferation	  of	  open-­‐source	  contexts	  that	  offer	  a	  “‘technical	  means	  to	  a	  social	  end’”	  is	  key	  to	  ongoing	  social,	  cultural,	  political	  and	  economic	  transformations	  of	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century	  (77).	  The	  most	  visible	  members	  of	  the	  Mimosa	  strip—Sam,	  Fez,	  Rosa,	  Gator,	  Keely,	  Jones,	  and	  others—are	  hackers	  permanently	  tethered	  to	  real	  life	  through	  wiry	  gadgets	  that	  give	  them	  access	  to	  their	  virtual	  playground,	  the	  dataline.	  Unlike	  Visual	  Mark,	  their	  experience	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of	  cyberspace	  is	  far	  more	  conventional	  and	  much	  closer	  to	  our	  own.	  Sam,	  like	  many	  of	  the	  younger	  characters,	  is	  brilliant	  in	  all	  things	  digital	  and	  adept	  in	  the	  navigation	  and	  manipulation	  of	  the	  dataline.	  Along	  with	  her	  hacker	  friends,	  she	  is	  the	  prototypical	  digital	  native,	  born	  and	  raised	  on	  culturejamming,	  hacked-­‐together	  hardware	  and	  software,	  and	  fluent	  in	  the	  languages	  of	  the	  datasphere	  and	  the	  streets.	  Her	  relative	  position	  in	  both	  the	  physical	  world	  and	  to	  the	  romantic,	  ideological	  notion	  of	  disembodiment	  popular	  in	  cyberpunk	  (as	  with	  Gina)	  underscores	  “an	  often	  repressed	  dimension	  of	  the	  information	  age:	  the	  constitution	  of	  the	  informed	  body”	  (Balsamo,	  Technologies	  140).	  This	  dimension—the	  humanistic,	  experiential,	  and	  physically	  present	  aspect	  of	  the	  digital	  age—is	  vital	  for	  building	  a	  digital	  humanities	  that	  “engages	  a	  world	  of	  linked	  and	  lived	  experiences”	  and,	  I	  would	  add,	  embodied	  awarenesses	  (Burdick,	  et	  al.	  75).	  In	  their	  own	  way,	  Sam	  and	  her	  friends	  are	  synthesizers	  like	  the	  commercial	  synners	  at	  Diversifications.	  But	  then	  again,	  all	  the	  novel’s	  characters	  should	  be	  read	  as	  synners;	  the	  digital	  and	  multivalent	  reshaping	  of	  modes	  of	  cultural	  production	  and	  consumption	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  authorship,	  collaboration,	  experience	  and	  action	  necessitates	  it.	  Their	  down	  and	  dirty	  interaction	  with	  new	  media	  in	  the	  novel	  often	  approaches,	  if	  not	  spills	  over	  into,	  a	  kind	  of	  skilled,	  co-­‐operative	  handicraft	  exclusive	  to	  the	  digital	  age.	  As	  such,	  they	  are	  representative	  of	  the	  current	  “generation	  now	  cursed	  with	  the	  label	  ‘digital	  natives’”	  whose	  cognitive	  training	  is	  regulated	  by	  the	  digital	  demands	  for	  synthesis	  and	  rhizomatic	  understanding	  (Burdick,	  et	  al.	  15).	  In	  emergent	  digital	  environments,	  much	  like	  Cadigan’s	  hackers,	  the	  members	  of	  this	  new	  generation	  “will	  surely	  develop	  the	  capacity	  to	  become	  comprehensive	  digital	  humanists”	  that	  thrive	  “in	  a	  fluid	  environment	  in	  which	  remixing	  and	  culture	  jamming	  are	  the	  common	  currency”	  (15).	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One	  of	  the	  most	  effective	  moments	  of	  digital	  collaboration—though	  Gina	  reacts	  to	  it	  at	  first	  as	  a	  “retrograde	  experiment	  in	  techno-­‐Walden-­‐Pondism	  on	  the	  communal	  level”	  (Cadigan	  424)—comes	  during	  the	  final	  battle	  with	  a	  viral	  AI	  that	  has	  infected	  the	  dataline.	  Visual	  Mark	  and	  Art	  Fish	  (as	  Markt)	  as	  well	  as	  Sam	  and	  the	  Mimosa	  strip	  crew,	  and	  Gina	  and	  Gabe,	  must	  work	  together	  to	  collectively	  outwit	  the	  virus	  by	  combining	  their	  respective	  hacking	  and	  simulating	  abilities	  and	  technological	  know-­‐how.	  The	  battle	  takes	  place	  in	  the	  virtual	  spaces	  of	  the	  dataline	  where	  Gina	  and	  Gabe—plugged	  in	  via	  connections	  to	  their	  brain	  sockets—fight	  the	  subconscious	  memories/desires	  of	  their	  own	  minds	  thrown	  at	  them	  by	  the	  virus.	  But	  in	  the	  larger	  context	  of	  the	  novel,	  we	  can	  read	  their	  experience	  inside	  the	  dataline	  as	  an	  ontological	  and	  epistemological	  struggle	  for	  supremacy	  between	  disembodied	  consciousness	  and	  sensory/emotional	  affect.	  	  The	  conceptual	  space	  of	  virtuality	  thus	  becomes	  an	  arena	  or	  “‘tool	  for	  examining	  our	  very	  sense	  of	  reality’”	  and	  investigating	  the	  discursive	  possibilities	  and	  pitfalls	  of	  erasure	  (Heim,	  quoted	  in	  Bukatman,	  Terminal	  Identity	  188).	  Within	  the	  virtual	  paradigm,	  according	  to	  Bukatman,	  “epistemological	  and	  ontological	  issues…	  are	  all	  placed…	  in	  question	  around	  the	  discursive	  object	  of	  virtual	  reality	  and	  the	  postulated	  existence	  of	  perfect,	  simulated	  environments”	  (Terminal	  Identity	  188).	  Gina	  and	  Gabe	  are	  ensnared	  in	  the	  web	  of	  this	  uncertainty,	  watching	  their	  memories	  and	  desires	  being	  played	  out;	  twisted;	  deconstructed.	  While	  Gabe	  is	  dealing	  with	  the	  spliced-­‐in,	  transmogrified	  abstractions	  of	  
Headhunters	  and	  fragments	  of	  Visual	  Mark’s	  stony	  beach	  video	  hallucinations,	  Gina	  is	  fighting	  the	  confusion	  of	  the	  last	  remnants	  of	  her	  love	  for	  Visual	  Mark	  and	  her	  growing	  affection	  for	  Gabe.	  In	  both	  cases,	  the	  question	  of	  embodiment	  is	  at	  stake.	  Their	  sublimation	  (also	  echoed	  in	  the	  narrative’s	  formal	  dissolution	  into	  an	  abstract	  and	  fragmented	  prose	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style)	  into	  a	  “perfect,	  simulated	  [environment]”	  threatens	  to	  efface	  the	  characters’	  remaining	  connection	  to	  a	  sense	  of	  embodiment—as	  Gabe’s	  Headhunters	  simulation	  once	  tempted	  him.	  In	  other	  words,	  for	  the	  two,	  the	  virtual	  reality	  of	  the	  dataline	  almost	  makes	  good	  on	  the	  promise	  of	  virtuality	  as	  “the	  very	  embodiment	  of	  postmodern	  disembodiment”	  (Bukatman,	  Terminal	  Identity	  188).	  Meanwhile,	  back	  in	  real	  life,	  Fez,	  Sam	  and	  the	  others	  monitor	  the	  data	  outputs	  for	  Gina	  and	  Gabe’s	  physical	  states	  and	  the	  havoc	  the	  virus	  is	  reaping	  across	  the	  interconnected	  world.	  Once	  again,	  Sam	  provides	  support	  with	  the	  insulin	  pump	  using	  her	  body	  as	  its	  power	  source—in	  this	  case	  for	  Gina	  and	  Gabe’s	  trip	  through	  virtual	  space.	  When	  Gabe	  shows	  signs	  of	  injury	  brought	  on	  by	  the	  illusion	  of	  virtual	  cognition,	  her	  emotional	  discomfort	  is	  telling:	  	  Sam	  clutched	  the	  unit	  on	  her	  thigh,	  her	  other	  hand	  resting	  on	  the	  wire	  leading	  to	  the	  needles	  in	  her	  stomach…	  One	  little	  yank;	  if	  that	  was	  what	  it	  would	  take	  to	  save	  her	  father's	  life,	  she	  would	  do	  it	  and	  hope	  it	  wasn't	  already	  too	  late,	  if	  that	  weird	  swelling	  in	  his	  face	  didn't	  mean	  he'd	  stroked	  out—	  (Cadigan	  443-­‐44)	  There	  is	  an	  even	  greater	  sense	  here	  of	  experiential	  embodiment	  and	  the	  intimate	  connection	  (through	  wire	  connectors	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  figurative	  sense)	  she	  is	  at	  last	  sharing	  with	  her	  formerly	  estranged	  father.	  We	  might	  see	  this	  connection—in	  addition	  to	  his	  body’s	  outward	  markers	  of	  pain	  and	  the	  “stigmata”	  of	  impressions	  caused	  by	  the	  hotsuit	  (Cadigan	  444)—as	  his	  tether	  to	  material	  reality.	  	  But	  perhaps	  the	  most	  potent	  reaffirmation	  of	  embodiment	  occurs	  when	  Gabe	  asks	  Gina,	  caressing	  and	  kissing	  her	  before	  they	  enter	  the	  dataline,	  “‘[y]ou	  think	  we	  can	  synthesize	  something	  together?’”	  Gina’s	  responds	  immediately:	  “‘I'll	  pop	  your	  chocks	  again	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if	  we	  don’t;	  I'll	  take	  your	  whole	  fucking	  head	  off’”	  (Cadigan	  424).	  The	  raw	  and	  visceral	  sexuality	  of	  this	  scene	  is	  steeped	  in	  the	  erotic,	  sensory	  and	  generative	  terms	  of	  enfleshed	  creation—to	  “synthesize	  something”—that	  acts	  as	  a	  counterweight	  to	  the	  techno-­‐optimism	  of	  disembodied	  digital	  consciousness	  and	  the	  need	  to	  “change	  for	  the	  machines.”	  It	  also	  anticipates	  the	  generative	  and	  synthetic	  methodologies	  that	  course	  through	  digital	  humanities	  work	  in	  general.	  Later,	  in	  the	  dataline,	  the	  proposition	  is	  returned.	  Gina	  suggests	  they	  attack	  the	  viral	  AI	  by	  merging	  consciousnesses—“Part	  my	  brain	  and	  part	  yours…	  Doesn't	  get	  much	  more	  fucking	  intimate	  than	  that”	  (Cadigan	  432).	  Gina	  and	  Gabe’s	  union	  is,	  then,	  in	  real	  life	  and	  on	  the	  dataline,	  an	  expression	  and	  ultimately	  a	  celebration	  of	  experiential,	  embodied	  connection.	  It	  is	  the	  kind	  of	  concretized	  intimacy	  the	  narrative	  yearns	  toward,	  climaxing	  in	  the	  erotically	  charged	  realization	  of	  the	  pair’s	  literal	  and	  figurative	  “fucking	  intimate”	  merging	  together.	  
Conclusion	  
Taken	  together,	  the	  various	  portrayals	  of	  digital	  heuristic	  collaboration,	  production,	  and	  synthesis	  in	  Synners	  stand	  as	  an	  invocation	  of	  the	  “array	  of	  convergent	  practices”	  that	  would	  come	  to	  define	  digital	  humanities	  practices	  and	  discourses	  (emphasis	  removed)	  (Schnapp	  and	  Presner	  2).	  These	  moments	  culminate	  in	  the	  final	  collaboration	  between	  many	  of	  the	  novel’s	  primary	  characters,	  unifying	  its	  many	  disparate	  strands.	  Fez	  captures	  the	  essence	  and	  interconnectedness	  of	  this	  collaborative	  work	  when	  he	  muses,	  “We	  might	  actually	  have	  two	  species	  of	  humans	  now,	  synthesizing	  human	  and	  synthesized	  human,	  all	  of	  us	  being	  the	  former,	  and	  Art	  Fish	  being	  the	  latter.”	  “And	  Mark	  being	  the	  bastard	  offspring	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of	  both,”	  adds	  Gina	  (Cadigan	  421).	  Their	  point	  is	  that	  in	  their	  creative	  interdependence	  upon	  one	  another,	  they	  represent	  a	  new	  version	  of	  humanity	  complicit	  in	  its	  collective	  synthesis	  and	  representative	  of	  what	  it	  synthesizes—not	  in	  exclusively	  biological	  terms,	  at	  least.	  None	  of	  them	  could	  have	  beaten	  the	  viral	  AI	  alone;	  not	  even	  the	  AI	  super-­‐combination	  of	  Visual	  Mark	  and	  Art	  Fish.	  “Cyberpunk	  has	  little	  patience	  with	  borders”	  (Sterling	  347),	  and	  the	  boundaries	  of	  flesh,	  metal,	  digital	  information,	  sexuality,	  gender	  and	  more	  are	  blurred	  everywhere	  here.	  Unlike	  Neuromancer,	  the	  novel	  resists	  prevalent	  essentialist	  and	  metaphysical	  discourses	  of	  the	  era	  that	  heralded	  the	  sublimation	  of	  the	  body	  into	  disembodied	  digital	  code.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  work	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  product	  of	  the	  period	  that	  grew	  out	  of	  conflicts	  between	  selfhood	  and	  the	  proliferation	  of	  digital	  and	  virtual	  environments,	  shifting	  social	  and	  cultural	  norms	  (both	  local	  and	  global),	  and	  an	  upsurge	  in	  critical	  discourses	  that	  attended	  to	  issues	  of	  materiality	  and	  embodiment.	  From	  this	  perspective,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  read	  cyberpunk	  as	  a	  catalytic	  and	  diverse	  outcome	  of	  a	  highly	  unique	  set	  of	  cultural	  phenomena:	  the	  residual	  effect	  of	  decades	  of	  postmodernism;	  countercultural,	  social	  and	  economic	  upheaval;	  and	  the	  proliferation	  of	  digital	  technologies	  that	  raised	  the	  possibility	  of	  effacement	  of	  bodily	  imperfection	  and	  finitude.	  	  This	  perhaps	  explains	  why	  the	  original	  cyberpunk	  style	  was	  simultaneously	  so	  influential	  and	  so	  ephemeral.	  It	  exists	  now	  as	  an	  immutable	  facet	  of	  American	  cultural	  history—a	  legacy	  that	  provides	  insight	  into	  a	  moment	  of	  intense	  humanistic	  and	  technological	  transition.	  Its	  lasting	  influence	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  wry	  post-­‐cyberpunk	  narratives	  such	  as	  those	  by	  Neal	  Stephenson.10	  Even	  Cadigan,	  one	  of	  those	  original	  cyberpunks,	  was	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  See,	  for	  example,	  Stephenson’s	  post-­‐cyberpunk	  novels	  Snow	  Crash	  (1992)	  and	  The	  Diamond	  Age	  (1995).	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beginning	  to	  show	  signs	  of	  departure	  from	  Gibson’s	  idea	  of	  cyberspace.	  In	  Synners,	  Visual	  Mark	  has	  trouble	  remembering	  the	  word	  his	  boss	  uses	  to	  describe	  virtual	  space:	  “the	  Beater	  could	  have	  dragged	  out	  that	  old	  chestnut,	  cyberwhatsis,	  or	  whatever	  it	  was,	  he	  couldn't	  remember”	  (Cadigan	  95).	  Cadigan’s	  reference	  is	  a	  testament	  to	  the	  fluctuation	  of	  a	  register	  of	  ideologies,	  technologies,	  epistemologies	  and	  ontologies	  that,	  as	  part	  of	  postmodernism,	  moved	  into	  and	  occupied	  the	  void	  left	  by	  the	  break	  with	  the	  past.	  The	  differences	  in	  the	  thematic	  treatments	  of	  cyberspace	  from	  Neuromancer	  to	  
Synners	  (differences	  that	  also	  highlight	  the	  authors’	  respective	  ideological	  agendas	  as	  well	  as	  the	  seven-­‐year	  interval	  between	  their	  publications)	  arguably	  mirror	  the	  evolution	  from	  first-­‐	  to	  second-­‐wave	  digital	  humanities.	  The	  first	  wave	  was	  primarily	  a	  quantitative,	  textual	  investigation	  of	  the	  humanities	  that	  made	  extensive	  use	  of	  powerful	  computational	  tools	  and	  databases	  (Schnapp	  and	  Presner	  2).	  But	  at	  times,	  this	  critical	  work	  veered	  dangerously	  close	  to	  a	  screen	  essentialism	  in	  which	  “the	  screen	  is	  often	  portrayed	  as	  an	  essential	  aspect	  of	  all	  creative	  and	  communicative	  computing”	  (Montfort,	  quoted	  in	  Berry,	  Introduction	  10)	  and	  fetishized	  in	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  “a	  medial	  ideology”	  in	  which	  “[s]peed	  and	  light	  (or	  lightning)	  are	  paramount”	  (Kirschenbaum,	  Mechanisms	  43).	  The	  second	  wave,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  turned	  on	  a	  more	  qualitative,	  heuristic	  and	  generative	  concern	  for	  humanities	  work,	  adjusting	  its	  digital	  tools	  and	  frameworks	  to	  the	  humanities’	  traditional	  analytical,	  methodological	  and	  interpretive	  strengths	  (Schnapp	  and	  Presner	  2).	  For	  obvious	  reasons,	  this	  dialectic	  between	  the	  two	  waves	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  opposing	  thematic	  approaches	  of	  Neuromancer	  and	  Synners:	  Gibson’s	  “console	  cowboy”	  diving	  head	  first	  into	  the	  virtual	  ether	  (Neuromancer	  28);	  and	  Cadigan’s	  retention	  of	  the	  sensual,	  efficacious	  body	  marked	  by	  scars,	  experience	  and	  desire.	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Nonetheless,	  although	  cyberpunk	  fiction	  can	  be	  and	  has	  been	  considered	  along	  gender	  lines	  of	  culture/nature	  and	  disembodied/embodied	  being,	  the	  subgenre	  is	  unified	  in	  its	  overarching	  interest	  in	  developing	  global	  and	  digital	  discourses	  that	  engender	  a	  more	  inclusive,	  collaborative	  and	  international	  field	  of	  vision.	  Again,	  as	  Sterling	  writes	  in	  his	  
Mirrorshades	  preface,	  this	  is	  reflected	  in	  “tools	  of	  global	  integration—the	  satellite	  media	  net,	  the	  multinational	  corporation—[that]	  fascinate	  the	  cyberpunks	  and	  figure	  constantly	  in	  their	  work.”	  “Global	  awareness,”	  he	  continues,	  “is	  more	  than	  an	  article	  of	  faith	  with	  cyberpunks;	  it	  is	  a	  deliberate	  pursuit”	  (347).	  Synners	  attends	  to	  these	  emergent	  perspectives	  in	  its	  frenetic	  array	  of	  interconnections	  and	  interzones.	  The	  stifling,	  hyperconnected	  LA	  of	  Cadigan’s	  work	  is	  not	  only	  a	  close	  vision	  of	  our	  own	  digital	  moment,	  but	  also	  a	  reality	  in	  tune	  with	  the	  critical	  core	  of	  second-­‐wave	  digital	  humanities:	  that	  is,	  a	  humanistic	  artifact	  concerned	  with	  the	  “qualitative,	  interpretive,	  experiential,	  emotive,	  [and]	  generative”	  force	  of	  the	  digital	  (emphasis	  removed)	  (Schnapp	  and	  Presner	  2).	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  have	  attempted	  to	  draw	  parallels	  between	  Cadigan’s	  text—particularly	  its	  preoccupations	  with	  the	  fluid	  boundaries	  of	  machine,	  body,	  and	  self,	  and	  depictions	  of	  production	  through	  decentralized,	  non-­‐liberal	  humanist	  modes	  of	  synthesis	  and	  collaboration—and	  digital	  humanities	  practices	  as	  they	  have	  developed	  over	  the	  last	  two	  decades.	  As	  I	  noted,	  following	  Anderson	  and	  Balsamo,	  the	  digital	  age	  has	  given	  rise	  to	  a	  generation	  of	  digital	  natives,	  or	  synners,	  for	  whom	  the	  production	  of	  knowledge	  is	  totally	  dependent	  upon	  collaborative,	  synthetic,	  remediative,	  and	  non-­‐linear	  methodologies.11	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  That	  is,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  analytic,	  insular,	  and	  deep	  attention	  approaches	  to	  study	  that	  have	  traditionally	  defined	  the	  humanities.	  I	  do	  not	  want	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  knowledge	  production	  has,	  until	  the	  digital	  age,	  never	  not	  been	  marked	  by	  synthesis,	  collaboration,	  and	  other	  open-­‐ended	  methodologies;	  simply	  that	  it	  is	  more	  pronounced	  through	  those	  digital	  media	  that	  make	  such	  work	  possible.	  Perhaps,	  in	  review,	  digital	  technologies	  have	  not	  entirely	  changed	  the	  way	  knowledge	  is	  produced,	  but	  we	  cannot	  ignore	  the	  synthetic	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“[R]emediation”—the	  creation	  of	  new	  texts	  through	  the	  “representation	  of	  one	  medium	  in	  another”—is	  a	  key	  characteristic	  of	  the	  digital	  age,	  supported	  by	  rhizomatic	  structures,	  dynamic	  combinations,	  and	  mutable	  data	  (Bolter	  and	  Grusin	  45).	  I	  also	  discussed	  Synners	  in	  light	  of	  popular	  feminist	  debates	  in	  posthumanism,	  and	  the	  narrative	  arguments	  it	  deploys	  to	  support	  embodiment	  (and	  thus,	  the	  non-­‐effacement	  of	  the	  female	  body	  under	  the	  liberal	  humanist	  sign)	  in	  digital	  contexts.	  Such	  theoretical	  revisions	  of/incursions	  into	  the	  traditional	  humanities	  are	  vital	  to	  our	  evolving	  understanding	  of	  the	  digital	  humanities,	  which	  continue	  to	  confront	  the	  perverse	  fixity	  of	  traditional	  bodies	  and	  borders.	  In	  chapter	  2,	  “The	  Machine	  Reads:	  Literature,	  Language,	  and	  Artificial	  Intelligence	  in	  Richard	  Powers’	  Galatea	  2.2,”	  I	  will	  extend	  this	  line	  of	  inquiry	  through	  a	  discussion	  of	  hybrid	  and	  collaborative	  forms	  of	  learning	  in	  the	  humanities.	  Building	  on	  Cadigan’s	  transgressive	  cyberpunk	  vision	  of	  cyborged	  humanity	  and	  high-­‐tech/low-­‐life	  culture,	  I	  will	  examine	  Powers’	  narrative	  amalgamation	  of	  human	  perception	  and	  artificial	  intelligence	  as	  it	  grapples	  with	  the	  complexities	  of	  lived	  experience	  and	  memory.	  This	  will	  necessarily	  involve	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  posthuman	  theoretic	  and	  the	  contemporaneous	  emergence	  of	  a	  World	  Wide	  Web.	  Most	  importantly,	  the	  chapter	  will	  focus	  upon	  collaborative	  learning	  between	  human	  and	  machine	  that	  takes	  place	  through	  the	  abstract	  lenses	  of	  English	  literature	  and	  language.	  This	  aspect	  of	  Galatea	  2.2	  is	  essential	  to	  the	  present	  study	  on	  digital	  humanities	  practices	  and	  discourses	  in	  speculative	  fiction.	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  and	  multimodal	  mediating	  effects—characteristics	  that	  differentiate	  new	  media	  from	  old—of	  the	  technologies	  themselves.	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2	  
The	  Machine	  Reads	  Language,	  Literature,	  and	  Artificial	  Intelligence	  	  in	  Richard	  Powers’	  Galatea	  2.2	  
Richard	  Powers’	  1995	  novel	  Galatea	  2.2	  portrays	  one	  of	  the	  clearest	  representations	  of	  the	  digital	  humanities	  in	  literature.	  Like	  Synners,	  Powers’	  book	  was	  written	  out	  of	  the	  same	  emergent,	  explosive	  contexts	  of	  Internet	  and	  computer	  culture	  that	  emerged	  in	  the	  West	  throughout	  the	  1990s.	  Within	  science	  fictional	  frameworks,	  both	  texts	  are	  preoccupied	  with	  the	  real-­‐world	  narrative	  discourses	  of	  global	  connectivity	  and	  creativity,	  scientific	  innovation,	  and	  the	  positive	  and	  negative	  potentialities	  offered	  by	  technology.	  The	  clustered	  appearance	  of	  artistic	  and	  critical	  work	  about	  the	  digital	  was,	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  a	  paradigmatic	  response—in	  certain	  ways,	  a	  knee-­‐jerk	  reaction—to	  technologies	  that	  contributed	  to	  a	  reshaping	  of	  traditional	  discourses	  and	  practices.	  Indeed,	  much	  of	  the	  early	  rhetoric	  on	  the	  subject	  (though	  at	  times	  essentialist)	  pointed	  toward	  “the	  emerging	  contours	  of	  a	  medial	  ideology”	  in	  which	  “[s]peed	  and	  light	  (or	  lightning)	  [were]	  paramount”	  (Kirschenbaum	  43).	  While	  speculative	  fictions	  about	  the	  digital	  were	  not	  immune	  to	  this	  kind	  of	  rhetoric,	  texts	  like	  Galatea	  2.2	  contributed	  (beyond	  the	  merely	  extrapolative)	  to	  a	  socially	  inflected	  acclimatization	  to	  emergent	  digital	  ecologies.	  In	  a	  number	  of	  important	  ways	  the	  work	  leans	  on	  the	  emerging	  notion	  that,	  in	  a	  cultural	  space	  increasingly	  contested	  and	  determined	  by	  machines	  and	  thus	  forced	  into	  existential	  crisis/redefinition,	  “the	  core	  challenge”	  of	  the	  artist	  is	  to	  “articulate	  and	  give	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meaning	  to…	  new	  modalities	  of	  ‘being’	  in	  this	  world”	  (Shaw,	  Kenderdine,	  and	  Coover	  236).	  With	  its	  ontological	  mixture	  of	  human	  lives,	  loves,	  and	  the	  creation	  and	  education	  of	  an	  artificial	  intelligence	  all	  on	  the	  threshold	  of	  emergent	  digital	  networks,	  new	  media,	  and	  global	  discourses,	  Galatea	  2.2	  takes	  up	  this	  core	  challenge	  of	  re-­‐evaluating	  being.	  As	  with	  all	  the	  primary	  texts	  selected	  for	  this	  study,	  Galatea	  2.2	  is	  deeply	  concerned	  with	  digital	  technologies	  from	  a	  humanities	  perspective.	  Ian	  Foster	  has	  suggested	  that,	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  humanities	  and	  the	  arts,	  “computation…	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  transform…	  how	  humans	  communicate,	  work,	  and	  play,	  and	  thus—to	  some	  extent—what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  human”	  (16).	  Likewise,	  according	  to	  Frederica	  Frabetti,	  any	  contemporary	  study	  of	  the	  digital	  humanities	  and	  its	  creative	  artifacts	  must	  take	  account	  of	  “the	  mutual	  co-­‐constitution	  of	  the	  digital	  and	  the	  human”	  as	  well	  as	  “the	  role	  of	  digitality	  in	  constituting	  the	  very	  concepts	  of	  the	  ‘humanities’	  and	  the	  human”	  	  (161).	  As	  a	  story	  about	  a	  writer	  involved	  in	  the	  literary	  and	  linguistic	  education	  of	  an	  artificial	  intelligence,	  and	  their	  interdependent	  humanistic	  and	  emotional	  growth,	  Powers’	  novel	  offers	  an	  artistic	  analogue	  for	  Foster’s	  and	  Frabetti’s	  respective	  views.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  it	  is	  a	  socio-­‐literary	  response	  to	  a	  historical	  moment	  of	  rapid	  technological	  transformation.	  On	  the	  other,	  it	  is	  an	  artifact	  of	  the	  hybridization	  of	  scholarly	  and	  artistic	  modes	  of	  inquiry,	  contexts,	  and	  practices	  through	  information	  sciences	  and	  technologies	  that,	  as	  Thomas	  Bartscherer	  and	  Roderick	  Coover	  point	  out,	  “bridg[e]	  a	  gap	  by	  making	  digital	  scholars	  and	  artists	  out	  of	  humanists,	  and	  vice	  versa”	  (9). Both	  schemas	  foreground	  the	  contingent	  relationship	  that	  computing	  and	  the	  humanities—from	  simple	  word	  processing	  to	  complex	  coding—have	  had	  on	  one	  another	  in	  the	  last	  twenty-­‐five	  years,	  making	  us,	  Coover	  suggests,	  “all	  multimedia	  makers	  now”	  (Bartscherer	  and	  Coover	  9).	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As	  with	  Cadigan’s	  Synners,	  in	  this	  chapter	  I	  locate	  Galatea	  2.2	  as	  a	  literary	  artifact	  that	  both	  signposted	  and	  grew	  directly	  out	  of	  the	  proliferation	  of	  digital	  technologies	  and	  attendant	  discourses	  throughout	  the	  1990s.	  In	  this	  respect,	  I	  examine	  Powers’	  text	  as	  a	  paradigmatic	  mainstream	  commentary	  of	  the	  digital’s	  transformative	  effects	  upon	  communications,	  humanities	  knowledge	  (and	  access	  to	  it),	  and	  cultural	  and	  political	  configurations.	  This	  is	  most	  prominent	  in	  the	  novel’s	  central	  relationship	  between	  human	  protagonist	  Rick	  and	  the	  artificial	  intelligence	  (dubbed	  Helen)	  he	  helps	  create	  to	  pass	  a	  Masters	  qualifying	  examination	  in	  English	  Literature.	  Coinciding	  with	  the	  popular	  ascendency	  of	  the	  World	  Wide	  Web	  and	  the	  digital	  turn	  in	  the	  humanities,	  this	  relationship	  provides	  a	  useful	  fictional	  representation	  of	  digital	  humanities	  work.	  I	  will	  begin	  my	  discussion	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  so-­‐called	  two	  cultures	  of	  the	  sciences	  and	  the	  humanities,	  a	  dichotomy	  popularized	  in	  1959	  by	  C.P.	  Snow	  and	  confronted	  in	  
Galatea	  2.2.	  I	  will	  then	  move	  into	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  rhetoric	  surrounding	  the	  early	  World	  Wide	  Web	  and	  its	  role	  in	  shaping	  (and	  blurring)	  sociocultural	  and	  humanities	  discourses.	  Next,	  I	  will	  examine	  the	  novel’s	  psychological	  exploration	  of	  posthumanism	  and	  the	  Turing	  Test—a	  scientific	  test	  designed	  by	  Alan	  Turing	  to	  measure	  a	  machine’s	  capacity	  to	  think.	  Finally,	  in	  the	  last	  two	  sections	  of	  the	  chapter,	  I	  will	  concentrate	  upon	  Rick	  and	  Helen’s	  shared	  journey	  through	  the	  murky	  abstractions	  of	  English	  literature	  and	  language,	  particularly	  as	  it	  deconstructs	  meaning	  and,	  by	  extension,	  epistemological	  human	  reality.	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  clarity,	  I	  will	  refer	  to	  the	  novel’s	  author	  as	  Richard	  Powers	  and	  the	  protagonist	  (the	  author’s	  textual	  analogue)	  as	  Rick.	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The	  Two	  Cultures	  Debate	  
	   The	  novel,	  a	  semi-­‐autobiographical	  work,	  depicts	  a	  year	  in	  the	  life	  of	  Rick,	  a	  famous	  novelist,	  during	  his	  residency	  at	  the	  sprawling	  Center	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  Advanced	  Sciences	  at	  an	  unnamed	  Midwestern	  college	  campus	  he	  refers	  to	  as	  U.12	  As	  the	  Humanist-­‐in-­‐Residence13—a	  visiting	  position	  awarded	  on	  the	  strength	  of	  his	  third	  novel	  about	  a	  would-­‐be	  career	  in	  the	  sciences—Rick	  is	  a	  character	  with	  his	  feet	  very	  much	  in	  both	  camps.	  “My	  official	  title	  was	  Visitor,”	  he	  explains.	  “Unofficially,	  I	  was	  the	  token	  humanist…	  The	  Center	  saw	  me	  as	  a	  liaison	  with	  the	  outside	  community.	  It	  had	  resources	  to	  spare,	  the	  office	  cost	  them	  little,	  and	  I	  was	  good	  PR”	  (Powers	  4-­‐5).	  Descriptions	  of	  the	  Center	  and	  the	  college’s	  English	  department—the	  department	  at	  which	  Rick	  studied	  and	  taught	  as	  a	  Masters	  student	  fifteen	  years	  before—are	  deeply	  contrasted.	  “With	  its	  countless	  discrete	  and	  massively	  parallel	  subsystems,”	  Rick	  perceives	  the	  Center	  as	  “a	  block-­‐wide	  analog	  of	  that	  neuronal	  mass	  it	  investigated,”	  the	  brain	  (6),	  kept	  alive	  by	  its	  talented	  and	  restless	  “addicts	  of	  the	  verifiable”	  (10).	  The	  brain	  metaphor	  is	  an	  apt	  one,	  jibing	  with	  the	  Center’s	  atmosphere	  of	  non-­‐stop	  activity,	  innovation,	  the	  flow	  of	  data,	  and	  the	  cutting	  edge	  technologies	  that	  offer	  a	  glimpse	  of	  the	  future.	  The	  English	  department,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  a	  different	  matter:	  There	  I	  lived	  my	  alter	  ego—picturesque	  but	  archaic	  man	  of	  letters.	  The	  Center	  possessed	  1,200	  works	  of	  art,	  the	  world’s	  largest	  magnetic	  resonance	  imager,	  and	  elevators	  appointed	  in	  brass,	  teak,	  and	  marble.	  The	  English	  Building’s	  stairs	  were	  patched	  in	  three	  shades	  of	  gray	  linoleum.	  (75)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Likely	  based	  on	  Powers’	  real-­‐life	  alma	  mater,	  the	  University	  of	  Illinois,	  Urbana-­‐Champaign.	  13	  This	  is	  a	  phrase	  used	  on	  the	  back	  cover	  of	  the	  first	  Picador	  edition	  (1995).	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For	  Rick,	  though	  it	  is	  dilapidated	  and	  outmoded,	  the	  antiquated	  prestige	  of	  the	  English	  department	  “provid[es]	  a	  healthy	  antidote	  for	  too	  much	  future”—a	  corrective,	  in	  other	  words,	  to	  the	  information	  overload	  of	  the	  hulking	  Center	  (75).	  Nevertheless,	  when	  he	  visits	  the	  old,	  deserted	  classroom	  of	  his	  Masters	  days,	  we	  are	  subjected	  to	  the	  full	  melancholic	  brunt	  of	  the	  passing	  of	  the	  traditional	  humanities:	  A	  blackboard	  bore	  the	  message	  “Thurs.	  3:30—5:00,”	  ringed	  by	  a	  smeared	  white	  corral	  of	  eons-­‐old	  microorganism	  skeletons.	  The	  linoleum	  floors	  had	  darkened	  into	  a	  color	  somewhere	  between	  the	  Forest	  of	  Arden	  and	  the	  wine-­‐dark	  sea.	  A	  circle	  of	  warped	  wooden	  chair-­‐desks	  had	  been	  hastily	  abandoned.	  Waneth	  the	  watch…	  But	  
the	  world	  holdeth.	  (75)	  But	  although	  the	  Center’s	  impressive	  technologies	  and	  furnishings	  are	  a	  thousand	  miles	  away	  from	  the	  English	  department’s	  silent	  “Forest	  of	  Arden”	  and	  primitive	  pedagogical	  tools—its	  crumbling	  traditions	  mourned	  for	  like	  the	  other-­‐lives	  of	  the	  seafarer	  in	  Ezra	  Pound’s	  1911	  translation	  of	  the	  old	  English	  poem—something	  interesting	  happens.	  As	  he	  divides	  his	  time	  between	  the	  Center	  and	  the	  English	  department,	  Rick	  assumes	  the	  role	  of	  a	  (albeit	  conflicted)	  Janus-­‐like	  figure	  that	  nonetheless	  links	  the	  two	  cultures	  of	  the	  humanities	  and	  the	  sciences.	  Engendered	  by	  and	  through	  this	  new	  critical	  alliance,	  the	  digital	  humanities	  begin	  to	  take	  form.	  	   With	  the	  proliferation	  of	  academic	  neologisms	  such	  as	  information	  sciences,	  digital	  
humanities,	  and	  humanities	  computing	  in	  recent	  years	  (not	  to	  mention	  the	  crossover	  of	  terminology14),	  the	  bridging	  of	  these	  formerly	  estranged	  cultures	  highlights	  the	  trend	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  As	  the	  sciences	  and	  the	  humanities,	  especially	  through	  digital	  technologies,	  continue	  to	  integrate	  in	  an	  increasingly	  global,	  interconnected	  world,	  it	  is	  only	  natural	  that	  certain	  of	  their	  terms	  might	  migrate	  into	  one	  another’s	  rhetorical	  discourses.	  Following	  Mieke	  Bal,	  these	  terms	  are	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  “travelling	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toward	  hybrid	  discourse	  practices	  and	  cross-­‐disciplinary	  critical	  investigations.	  Recent	  critical	  and	  creative	  work	  across	  the	  board	  has	  revealed,	  Marie	  Laure-­‐Ryan	  observes,	  a	  shared	  “predilection	  for	  puns,	  trompe-­‐l’oeils,	  paradoxes,	  serial	  constructs,	  Chinese	  boxes,	  permutations,	  transformations,	  in	  short,	  any	  game	  played	  with	  symbols—be	  they	  bits,	  bytes,	  pixels,	  numbers,	  letters,	  words,	  or	  sentences.”	  In	  fact,	  “the	  formal	  structures	  and	  textual	  phenomena	  that	  fascinate	  practitioners	  and	  theorists	  of	  postmodernism	  [often]	  have	  parallels	  in	  computer	  languages,	  computational	  theory,	  or	  computer	  architecture”	  (8).	  In	  a	  1993	  Omni	  magazine	  interview,	  Powers	  argues	  that	  the	  opening	  of	  a	  dialogue	  to	  navigate	  common	  human	  experience	  is	  necessary:	  “[T]he	  similarities	  in	  the	  ways	  we	  all	  attempt	  to	  solve	  experience	  are,	  in	  the	  wide	  lens,	  probably	  more	  important	  than	  the	  differences…	  We	  can	  not	  only	  survive	  plurality—we	  need	  it.”	  “[L]iterature,”	  he	  continues,	  “can	  be	  a	  fractal	  map	  of	  that	  multiplicity,	  at	  a	  scale	  of	  almost	  one	  inch	  to	  the	  inch”	  (quoted	  in	  Stites	  48).	  Certainly	  this	  effort	  of	  orientation	  to	  hybridity	  is	  on	  display	  in	  Galatea	  2.2.	  While	  the	  humanities	  and	  the	  sciences	  both	  carry	  “a	  distinct	  set	  of	  lexicons,	  methods,	  theories,	  and	  goals…	  embedded	  in	  complex	  webs	  of	  knowledge,”	  it	  is	  clear	  more	  than	  ever	  before	  that	  “digital	  technologies	  are	  stimulating,	  and	  perhaps	  even	  necessitating,	  bridge-­‐building	  within	  and	  between	  [the]	  cultures”	  (Bartscherer	  and	  Coover	  7).	  In	  its	  depiction	  of	  “thinking	  and	  making	  by	  way	  of	  digital	  technologies,”	  Galatea	  2.2	  is	  arguably	  one	  of	  the	  first	  literary	  instantiations	  of	  this	  shared	  epistemological	  progression—one	  that	  is	  attentive	  to	  the	  “shaping	  [of]	  a	  discourse	  between	  information	  technologies	  and	  intellectual/creative	  fields”	  and	  “provoking	  questions	  about	  conventional	  borders	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  concepts”	  (29).	  As	  Bal	  points	  out,	  such	  “concepts”—adapted	  for,	  enriched	  by,	  and	  sometimes	  warped	  through	  interdisciplinary	  appropriation—“are	  not	  fixed.	  They	  travel—between	  disciplines,	  between	  individual	  scholars,	  between	  historical	  periods,	  and	  between	  geographically	  dispersed	  academic	  communities”	  (24).	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separate	  artistic	  and	  scholarly	  practices”	  (Bartscherer	  and	  Coover	  7).	  As	  the	  text’s	  narrative	  drama	  interweaves	  with	  Rick’s	  own	  fictionalized	  literary	  efforts,	  his	  work	  with	  neural	  nets	  and	  AI,	  and	  his	  tutelage	  of	  an	  artificial	  intelligence	  via	  the	  Western	  literary	  canon	  (for	  a	  Masters	  qualifying	  examination	  in	  literature),	  we	  begin	  to	  see	  the	  extent	  of	  this	  overlap	  and	  the	  new	  spheres	  of	  knowledge	  it	  makes	  available.	  	   Rick	  is	  in	  many	  ways	  a	  fictional	  representation	  of	  C.P.	  Snow,	  the	  famous	  novelist	  and	  scientist	  whose	  1959	  Rede	  lecture	  on	  the	  two	  cultures	  initiated	  a	  lasting	  debate	  about	  an	  apparent	  scholarly	  and	  artistic	  No-­‐Man’s	  Land	  between	  the	  sciences	  and	  the	  humanities.	  The	  dialectic—a	  seeming	  “gulf	  of	  mutual	  incomprehension,”	  “hostility	  and	  dislike,”	  in	  Snow’s	  words—of	  the	  “[t]wo	  polar	  groups…	  [of]	  literary	  intellectuals…	  [and]	  physical	  scientists”	  (4)	  is	  brought	  into	  doubt	  by	  a	  man	  straddling	  both	  cultures	  as	  a	  scientist	  by	  training	  and	  a	  writer	  by	  vocation	  (1).	  In	  the	  intervening	  years,	  the	  proliferation	  of	  information	  technologies	  in	  almost	  every	  stratum	  of	  society	  and	  culture	  has,	  Bartscherer	  and	  Coover	  argue,	  complicated—rather	  than	  definitively	  solved—the	  two	  cultures	  issue:	  “In	  ways	  that	  Snow	  could	  hardly	  have	  anticipated,	  the	  culture	  of	  arts	  and	  letters	  is	  now	  permeated	  by	  science	  in	  the	  form	  of	  information	  technology,	  from	  word	  processing	  and	  semantically	  structured	  research	  networks	  to	  computer-­‐generated	  imagery,	  interactive	  cinema,	  and	  creative	  machines”	  (2).	  Following	  Theodore	  H.	  Nelson’s	  work	  on	  the	  subject	  (in	  Computer	  Lib/Dream	  Machines,	  1987),	  they	  note	  that	  this	  cross-­‐cultural,	  cross-­‐disciplinary	  amalgam	  of	  “‘information	  science’	  indicates	  how	  ‘deeply	  intertwingled’	  the	  two	  cultures	  have	  become”	  (2).	  The	  cross-­‐cultural	  conversations	  that	  are	  beginning	  to	  take	  place	  via	  and	  because	  of	  the	  digital	  are	  only	  adding	  to	  this.	  And	  though	  tensions	  and	  incomprehension	  still	  persist	  between	  the	  cultures	  at	  the	  level	  of	  their	  respective	  poetics	  
65	  	  
and	  rhetoric,	  digital	  and	  information	  technologies	  are	  fundamentally	  changing	  critical	  thinking	  and	  traditional	  scholarly	  practices.	  But	  with	  or	  without	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  cultures’	  respective	  gatekeepers,	  “the	  micro-­‐electronic	  revolution	  which	  has	  taken	  place	  since	  Snow	  was	  writing,”	  asserts	  Stefan	  Collini	  in	  his	  introduction	  to	  the	  1993	  canto	  edition	  of	  Snow’s	  work,	  “is	  having	  as	  great	  an	  impact	  on	  daily	  life	  as	  the	  invention	  of	  the	  railway	  or	  the	  internal	  combustion	  engine	  had	  on	  that	  of	  earlier	  generations.”	  In	  fact,	  “the	  rapidity	  of…	  technical	  advances”	  on	  a	  global	  scale	  in	  everyday	  life,	  he	  suggests,	  inevitably	  engenders	  a	  degree	  of	  overlap	  between	  science	  and	  culture	  that	  “continually	  threatens	  to	  defy	  ordinary	  understanding”	  and	  frustrate	  the	  reflexive	  impulse	  to	  categorize	  phenomena	  in	  dialectical	  terms	  (lxii).	  By	  1995,	  we	  were	  already	  beginning	  to	  see	  the	  breakdown	  of	  the	  conceptual	  border	  between	  the	  humanities	  and	  the	  sciences,	  punched	  through	  by	  the	  digital’s	  decentralized,	  non-­‐hierarchical,	  and	  inclusive	  influence.	  Rick	  spends	  time	  contemplating	  the	  passing	  of	  traditional,	  exclusive	  academic	  practices,	  and	  the	  tensions	  felt	  by	  each	  field	  from	  one	  another.	  In	  an	  illustrative	  passage,	  the	  tension	  is	  literalized	  dramatically	  when	  a	  junior	  philosophy	  professor	  triggers	  a	  campus	  bomb	  scare	  on	  talk	  radio.	  In	  a	  second	  call,	  before	  his	  arrest,	  the	  professor	  “claimed	  his	  threat	  was	  never	  more	  than	  a	  moral	  subjunctive.	  The	  Center	  was	  draining	  the	  university	  dry,	  reducing	  the	  humanities	  to	  an	  obsolete,	  embarrassing	  museum	  piece”	  (Powers	  273).	  And	  in	  a	  kind	  of	  humanist	  riposte	  to	  the	  applied	  scientific	  innovation	  the	  Center	  specializes	  in	  (not	  to	  mention	  his	  unwitting	  self-­‐mockery	  in	  stubborn	  adherence	  to	  philosophical	  abstraction),	  the	  wrongdoer	  is	  adamant	  on	  the	  point	  that	  his	  threat	  carried	  “no	  more	  than	  hypothetical	  detonation,	  for	  which	  he	  expected	  no	  more	  than	  a	  hypothetical	  sentence”	  (273).	  It	  is	  within	  this	  liminal,	  alloyed	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space	  of	  competing	  humanist	  and	  scientific	  academic	  ideologies	  that—much	  like	  Snow	  forty	  years	  prior—Rick	  positions	  himself.	  	  	  In	  both	  form	  and	  content,	  Rick	  is	  imbued	  with	  the	  spirit	  of	  Snow	  as	  representative,	  perhaps	  harbinger,	  of	  this	  evolution—positioned	  at	  ground	  zero,	  smack	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  two	  cultures.	  At	  the	  outset,	  simultaneously	  drawn	  to	  each	  field,	  he	  undergoes	  a	  doubling	  of	  the	  self—one	  person	  divided	  or	  torn	  into	  two	  halves.	  Indeed,	  doubling	  is	  a	  recurrent	  motif	  in	  the	  mapping	  of	  many	  relationships	  throughout	  the	  novel,	  neatly	  suggested	  by	  the	  “2.2”	  version	  number	  of	  its	  title.	  	  As	  he	  becomes	  invested	  in	  his	  work	  at	  the	  Center	  with	  Dr.	  Philip	  Lentz	  (a	  brilliant	  but	  misanthropic	  physicist	  specializing	  in	  cognitive	  neurology),	  however,	  what	  the	  novelist	  and	  the	  scientist	  manage	  to	  produce	  in	  collaboration—not	  to	  mention	  the	  act	  of	  collaboration	  in	  itself—is	  symbolically	  suggestive	  of	  the	  initial	  overtures	  made	  by	  the	  two	  cultures	  toward	  a	  mutually	  beneficial	  dialogue.	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  no	  coincidence	  that	  the	  narrative’s	  joining	  together	  of	  the	  two	  halves	  (represented	  by	  Rick	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  Lentz	  on	  the	  other)	  is	  stimulated	  by	  the	  digital.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  relationship	  acts	  as	  a	  commentary	  of	  real-­‐world	  shifts	  toward	  open	  discourses	  and	  dialogues	  shaped	  by	  globalization	  and	  digital	  technologies.	  Ryan	  argues	  that,	  in	  critical/hands-­‐on	  scholarly	  practices,	  work	  on	  “AI	  lives	  largely	  from	  imports.	  The	  most	  important	  contributions	  in	  the	  field	  are	  not	  made	  by	  pure	  computer	  scientists,	  but	  by	  representatives	  of	  other	  disciplines	  who	  use	  the	  computer	  as	  an	  instrument	  of	  research”	  (5).	  In	  their	  attempt	  to	  develop	  an	  artificial	  intelligence	  (a	  computer	  later	  dubbed	  Helen)	  capable	  of	  passing	  a	  Masters	  qualifying	  exam	  in	  literature	  under	  the	  conditions	  of	  a	  double	  blind	  Turing	  test,	  it	  appears	  the	  sciences	  and	  the	  humanities	  may	  have	  reached	  an	  accord.	  We	  should	  also	  recognize	  this	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plot	  contrivance,	  then,	  as	  a	  formative	  encapsulation	  of	  digital	  humanities	  work	  and	  its	  multi-­‐modal,	  multi-­‐disciplinary	  agenda	  in	  general.	  Given	  these	  dialectical	  but,	  nonetheless,	  foundational	  instincts	  in	  Rick,	  it	  is	  natural	  that	  he	  should	  be	  drawn	  to	  Lentz	  and	  his	  newly	  emerging	  and	  hybrid	  field	  of	  connectionism.	  This	  branch	  of	  cognitive	  science,	  which	  deals	  specifically	  with	  neural	  nets,	  combines	  scholarly	  research	  and	  development	  in	  technological	  as	  well	  as	  biological	  fields,	  “a	  broad	  appropriation	  of	  metaphorical	  logic	  by	  the	  sciences”	  (Saltzman	  103).	  As	  Rick	  reflects,	  adherents	  of	  connectionism	  “lived	  on	  a	  middle	  level,	  somewhere	  between	  the	  artificial-­‐intelligence	  coders,	  who	  pursued	  mind’s	  formal	  algorithms,	  and	  the	  snail-­‐conditioners,	  who	  sought	  the	  structure	  and	  function	  of	  brain	  tissue	  itself.”	  In	  this	  amorphous	  place,	  “the	  halfway	  world	  of	  neural	  nets,”	  Rick	  designates	  Lentz	  as	  “the	  point	  man”	  holding	  the	  two	  sides	  of	  humanity	  and	  technology	  together	  (Powers	  28-­‐29).	  Connectionism	  goes	  beyond	  the	  mere	  pretense	  of	  a	  “truce	  in	  the	  academic	  turf	  wars”	  to	  apply	  itself	  as	  “the	  dream	  of	  a	  parsable	  continuum,	  a	  compound	  miracle	  whereby	  God’s	  programming	  may	  be	  arrayed	  as	  eloquent	  linkages	  among	  disparate	  fields”	  (Saltzman	  103).	  The	  theoretical	  anticipations	  and	  accomplishments	  of	  connectionism	  to	  unite	  the	  sciences	  and	  the	  humanities	  add	  greater	  depth	  to	  Rick’s	  and	  Lentz’s	  love/hate	  collaboration.	  In	  their	  mutual	  attitude	  of	  grudging	  respect	  for	  one	  another,	  connectionism	  connects	  them	  more	  intimately	  than	  either	  would	  care	  to	  admit.	  In	  Saltzman’s	  reading,	  The	  convergence	  of	  urges	  of	  the	  physicist	  and	  the	  poet,	  the	  cooperative	  venture	  of	  the	  wide-­‐eyed	  futurist	  and	  the	  bookish	  curator	  of	  the	  verbal	  past—each	  confirms	  the	  other’s	  figurations	  and	  expanding	  architectures.	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  respective	  skepticisms	  supposedly	  separating	  C.P.	  Snow’s	  “two	  cultures,”	  the	  scientist	  finds	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that	  even	  at	  the	  molecular	  level	  he	  cannot	  access	  and	  integrate	  without	  resorting	  to	  metaphors	  that	  root	  out	  their	  rapport…	  while	  our	  novelist	  follows	  scientific	  advances	  to	  nourish	  his	  fictions	  and	  to	  consolidate	  his	  extraliterary	  experiences.	  (103)	  Implicit	  in	  the	  act	  of	  their	  collaboration—the	  building	  of	  an	  artificially	  intelligent	  machine	  and	  its	  education	  in	  the	  humanities—they	  approximate	  the	  same	  hybridized	  concerns	  and convergent	  practices	  that	  mark	  the	  digital	  humanities	  as	  flexible,	  non-­‐unified,	  cross-­‐	  and	  multi-­‐disciplinary,	  and	  open-­‐ended.	  Burdick,	  in	  collaboration	  with	  Schnapp,	  Presner,	  and	  others,	  agrees	  with	  this	  point	  of	  view:	  “In	  contrast	  with	  most	  traditional	  forms	  of	  scholarship,	  digital	  approaches	  are	  conspicuously	  collaborative	  and	  generative,	  even	  as	  they	  remain	  grounded	  in	  the	  traditions	  of	  humanistic	  inquiry”	  (3).	  In	  fact,	  the	  very	  idea	  of	  a	  digital	  humanities	  presupposes	  the	  simultaneous	  embrace	  and	  amalgamation	  of	  a	  whole	  series	  of	  diverse	  but	  nonetheless	  potentially	  compatible	  fields	  of	  knowledge—the	  combination	  of	  which	  may	  lead	  to	  some	  richer	  set	  of	  discourses	  than	  each	  could	  produce	  on	  its	  own.	  	  Under	  the	  banner	  of	  connectionism,	  then,	  Rick	  and	  Lentz	  move	  through	  some	  of	  the	  key	  themes	  at	  the	  center	  of	  digital	  humanities	  work:	  “scale,	  critical/productive	  theory,	  collaboration,	  databases,	  multimodal	  scholarship,	  and	  future	  trajectories”	  (Hayles,	  “How	  We	  Think”	  43).	  As	  Hayles	  argues,	  though	  “each	  of	  these	  areas	  has	  its	  own	  tensions,	  conflicts,	  and	  intellectual	  issues”—reflected	  in	  the	  personal	  and	  professional	  aspects	  of	  the	  characters’	  tempestuous	  relationship—these	  same	  contestations	  “indicate	  the	  vitality	  of	  the	  digital	  humanities	  and	  their	  potential	  for	  catalyzing	  significant	  change”	  (43).	  It	  is	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precisely	  these	  kinds	  of	  vital	  contestations	  and	  oppositions	  that	  galvanize	  Galatea	  2.2	  as	  a	  precursor	  of	  the	  still	  nascent	  digital	  humanities.	  The	  novelist	  Walker	  Percy	  once	  said,	  combining	  “romantic	  theory	  and	  Platonic	  epistemology,”	  that	  “‘the	  serious	  novelist	  is	  quite	  as	  much	  concerned	  with	  discovering	  reality	  as	  the	  serious	  physicist’”	  (quoted	  in	  Tharpe	  11).	  In	  this	  process	  of	  discovering	  reality,	  Rick	  and	  Lentz	  carry	  out	  work	  that	  not	  only	  offers	  a	  literary	  antecedent	  to	  the	  digital	  humanities’	  mission,	  but	  also	  reinforces	  the	  notion	  that	  “the	  business	  of	  cognition	  is	  a	  shared	  field”	  (Saltzman	  104).	  In	  effect,	  the	  two	  poles	  compliment	  and	  enrich	  one	  another	  in	  ways	  previously	  unforeseen.	  We	  see	  this	  in	  the	  pair’s	  heuristic	  approach	  to	  their	  project:	  as	  the	  AI	  goes	  through	  a	  number	  of	  iterations,	  from	  Implementation	  (Imp)	  A	  to	  H,	  and	  ending	  in	  the	  personified	  intelligence	  known	  as	  Helen,	  their	  work	  corresponds	  to	  digital	  humanities	  methodologies,	  particularly	  its	  emphasis	  upon	  “creative,	  generative,	  and	  experimental	  processes	  of	  design-­‐based	  research”	  (Burdick,	  et	  al.	  22).	  Rick	  gives	  a	  summary	  of	  this	  protocol,	  a	  kind	  of	  continuous	  and	  recursive	  remediation:	  	  Each	  machine	  life	  lived	  inside	  the	  others—nested	  generations	  of	  “remember	  this.”	  We	  did	  not	  start	  from	  scratch	  with	  each	  revision.	  We	  took	  what	  we	  had	  and	  cobbled	  onto	  it.	  We	  called	  that	  first	  filial	  generation	  B,	  but	  it	  would,	  perhaps,	  have	  better	  been	  named	  A2.	  E’s	  weights	  and	  contours	  lived	  inside	  F’s	  lived	  inside	  G’s,	  the	  way	  Homer	  lives	  on	  in	  Swift	  and	  Joyce,	  or	  Job	  in	  Candide	  or	  the	  Invisible	  Man.	  (Powers	  170-­‐71)	  The	  palimpsest	  of	  information	  that	  is	  accreted	  and	  carried	  over	  into	  each	  successive	  build,	  each	  and	  all	  living	  on	  in	  the	  next,	  finds	  its	  counterpoint	  in	  literary	  history,	  here.	  The	  ghosted	  traces	  of	  binary	  ones	  and	  zeroes	  affect	  every	  new	  machine	  implementation	  just	  as,	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in	  the	  long	  genealogy	  of	  literature,	  each	  successive	  generation	  of	  writers	  influences	  the	  next.	  In	  both	  cognitive	  (humanistic)	  and	  technological	  (mechanistic)	  terms,	  each	  version	  is	  never	  an	  end	  in	  itself.	  To	  investigate	  how	  the	  machine	  thinks,	  Lentz	  later	  suggests	  to	  Rick	  that	  they	  disassemble	  it	  through	  a	  process	  that	  would	  allow	  them	  to	  empirically	  pinpoint,	  analyze	  and	  correlate	  “the	  high-­‐level	  processes	  by	  which	  she	  maps	  complex	  input	  and	  reassembles	  responses.”	  For	  the	  cognitive	  neurologist,	  the	  AI	  is	  merely	  a	  fascinating	  product	  of	  arduous	  research,	  “a	  heuristic	  tool”	  that	  “mimics	  with	  shocking	  accuracy	  some	  features	  of	  high-­‐level	  cognition”	  (Powers	  301-­‐02).	  Despite	  Rick’s	  sentimental	  protests	  (he	  has	  become	  attached	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  Helen	  as	  a	  subject,	  worried	  that	  his	  collaborator’s	  desire	  to	  lobotomize	  the	  machine	  would	  be	  pain-­‐free),	  this	  new	  direction	  of	  study	  follows	  empirical	  scientific	  and	  digital	  humanities	  practices	  of	  interpretation	  in	  which	  “[p]rocess	  is	  favored	  over	  product;	  versioning	  and	  extensibility	  are	  favored	  over	  definitive	  editions	  and	  research	  silos”	  (Burdick,	  et	  al.	  22).	  In	  this,	  the	  disciplines	  are	  united	  in	  a	  shared	  understanding	  that	  cultural	  discourses	  are	  not	  fixed,	  but	  rather	  subject	  to	  play	  and	  experimentation.	  
World	  Wide	  Web:	  A	  New	  Frontier	  
Intervening	  in	  this	  debate,	  and,	  indeed,	  irretrievably	  frustrating	  the	  two	  cultures	  dialectic,	  is	  the	  emergence	  of	  Internet	  computing—a	  new	  media	  network	  “built	  on	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  global	  telecommunications	  system,	  from	  the	  ARPANET15	  onward”	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Leah	  A.	  Lievrouw	  provides	  a	  brief	  description	  of	  the	  ARPANET	  as	  the	  “early	  prototype	  and	  predecessor	  of	  today’s	  internet.”	  It	  was	  “designed	  by	  engineers	  and	  scientists	  working	  for	  the	  Advanced	  Research	  Project	  Agency	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  who	  linked	  long-­‐distance	  telephone	  systems	  and	  computers	  so	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(Lievrouw	  9)—in	  the	  late-­‐twentieth	  century.	  The	  world	  was	  just	  waking	  up	  to	  the	  digital	  in	  1995	  as	  it	  pervaded	  the	  ideological	  and	  psychological	  landscapes	  of	  commerce,	  politics,	  and	  social	  interaction	  faster	  than	  anyone	  might	  have	  anticipated.	  “Beginning	  in	  the	  late	  1970s,”	  write	  Palfrey	  and	  Gasser,	  “the	  world	  began	  to	  change—fast,”	  experiencing	  “the	  most	  rapid	  period	  of	  technological	  transformation	  ever,	  at	  least	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  information.”	  From	  the	  early	  bulletin	  board	  system	  and	  common	  interest	  Usenet	  groups,	  to	  email,	  the	  web,	  social	  networking,	  cloud	  computing	  and	  beyond,	  the	  Internet	  of	  “the	  digital	  era	  has	  transformed	  how	  people	  live	  their	  lives	  and	  relate	  to	  one	  another	  and	  to	  the	  world	  around	  them”	  (2-­‐3).	  On	  a	  global	  scale,	  reports	  Vibeke	  Sorensen,	  “networked,	  immersive,	  nonlinear	  digital	  environments”	  such	  as	  the	  web	  have	  stimulated—and	  “made	  all	  the	  more	  visible	  and	  accessible”—“the	  discontinuities	  and	  fragmentation	  of	  world	  cultures,”	  permanently	  reshaping	  the	  nature	  of	  global	  communications	  and	  relations	  (242).	  Indeed, the	  1991	  launch	  of	  Tim	  Berners-­‐Lee’s	  World	  Wide	  Web—an	  interactive	  and	  hyperlinked	  information	  medium	  that	  connects	  computers	  on	  a	  global	  scale	  over	  the	  Internet—offered	  the	  world	  an	  unprecedented	  set	  of	  knowledge	  tools	  with	  the	  power	  to	  take	  one,	  virtually,	  almost	  anywhere,	  any	  time.	  As	  Berners-­‐Lee	  himself	  states,	  the	  enduring	  appeal	  of	  his	  invention	  resides	  in	  its	  “vision	  encompassing	  the	  decentralized,	  organic	  growth	  of	  ideas,	  technology,	  and	  society…	  about	  anything	  being	  potentially	  connected	  with	  anything.”	  This	  vision,	  he	  continues,	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  they	  could	  share	  scientific	  data-­‐processing	  capacity	  across	  a	  select	  network	  of	  scarce,	  expensive,	  and	  complex	  mainframe	  computers.	  The	  system	  was	  designed	  to	  re-­‐route	  data	  to	  different	  computers	  automatically	  if	  part	  of	  the	  system	  failed	  (e.g.,	  by	  coming	  under	  military	  attack).	  Those	  engineers	  and	  scientists	  never	  expected	  that	  a	  single	  program	  that	  allowed	  project	  workers	  to	  exchange,	  store,	  and	  forward	  telegraphic	  ‘electronic	  mail’	  messages	  would	  quickly	  become	  the	  most	  heavily	  used	  feature	  of	  the	  system…	  or	  that	  email	  would	  launch	  a	  whole	  new	  era	  of	  computer-­‐mediated	  communication	  and	  pave	  the	  way	  for	  other	  forms	  of	  digital	  expression	  and	  interaction”	  (8-­‐9).	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provides	  us	  with	  new	  freedom,	  and	  allows	  us	  to	  grow	  faster	  than	  we	  could	  when	  we	  were	  fettered	  by	  the	  hierarchical	  classification	  systems	  into	  which	  we	  bound	  ourselves.	  It	  leaves	  the	  entirety	  of	  our	  previous	  ways	  of	  working	  as	  just	  one	  tool	  among	  many.	  It	  leaves	  our	  previous	  fears	  for	  the	  future	  as	  one	  set	  among	  many.	  And	  it	  brings	  the	  workings	  of	  society	  closer	  to	  the	  workings	  of	  our	  minds.	  (1-­‐2)	  Lawrence	  Lessig	  echoes	  this	  feeling,	  noting	  that	  in	  the	  early	  days	  of	  the	  web,	  its	  users	  “could	  communicate	  and	  associate	  in	  ways	  that	  they	  had	  never	  done	  before.”	  As	  a	  “new	  target	  for	  libertarian	  utopianism,”	  the	  web	  “seemed	  to	  promise	  a	  kind	  of	  society	  that	  real	  space	  would	  never	  allow—freedom	  without	  anarchy,	  control	  without	  government,	  consensus	  without	  power”	  (Code	  2).	  As	  Sorensen	  points	  out,	  “the	  utopian	  romance	  with	  the	  virtual	  world”	  stood—and	  in	  many	  ways	  still	  stands—in	  the	  beginning	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  the	  widespread	  “suffering	  and	  dystopia	  in	  the	  physical	  world”	  (242).	  In	  Siva	  Vaidhyanathan’s	  view,	  the	  early	  “Web	  was	  exciting	  and	  democratic—to	  the	  point	  of	  anarchy”	  (1).	  In	  the	  intervening	  years,	  however,	  this	  utopian	  dream—the	  invisible	  nowhere	  of	  the	  digital—has	  been	  variously	  vouched	  for	  and	  debunked.	  Such	  passionate	  sentiments	  about	  the	  web’s	  transcendent	  power	  and	  its	  potential	  to	  free	  and	  reshape	  collective	  social	  consciousness	  are	  captured	  early	  on	  in	  the	  novel	  through	  Rick’s	  own	  sense	  of	  awe	  and	  wonder.	  Acting	  as	  a	  mouthpiece	  for	  the	  majority	  of	  its	  (Western)	  readership	  in	  1995,	  he	  marvels,	  “the	  web	  overwhelmed	  me”	  (Powers	  7).	  Each	  day	  produced	  new	  improbabilities.	  I	  searched	  card	  catalogs	  in	  Kyoto	  or	  book	  reports	  from	  Bombay.	  German	  soccer	  scores	  and	  Alaskan	  aurora	  sightings	  filled	  my	  office	  E-­‐mail	  pouch.	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I	  eavesdropped	  on	  international	  discussion	  groups,	  ongoing,	  interactive	  Scheherazades	  that	  covered	  every	  imaginable	  theme	  from	  arms	  control	  to	  electronic	  erotica.	  Notefile	  threads	  split	  and	  proliferated	  in	  meiosis.	  Debates	  flowed	  without	  beginning	  or	  end,	  through	  tributaries	  and	  meanderings,	  responses	  to	  responses	  to	  responses.	  (8)	  Access	  to	  and	  interaction	  with	  these	  newfound	  freedoms	  and	  “improbabilities”	  (again,	  the	  rhetorical	  intangibility	  of	  magic)	  mark	  Rick	  as	  one	  of	  the	  “‘Digital	  Settlers’”	  of	  his	  generation—a	  person	  who,	  unlike	  the	  born	  digital	  generation,	  “grew	  up	  in	  an	  analog-­‐only	  world”	  and	  “helped	  to	  shape	  [the]	  contours”	  of	  the	  digital	  future	  (Palfrey	  and	  Gasser	  3-­‐4).	  Like	  many	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  he	  comprehends	  the	  web	  as	  “another	  total	  disorientation	  that	  became	  status	  quo	  without	  anyone	  realizing	  it”	  (Powers	  7)—an	  abrupt	  and	  massive	  lurch	  forward	  in	  the	  technological	  capabilities	  of	  humanity.	  As	  with	  the	  successive	  rapid	  introduction	  of	  technologies	  that	  revolutionized	  communications,	  travel,	  media	  consumption	  and	  time	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  (the	  telephone,	  the	  fountain	  pen,	  the	  automobile,	  the	  phonograph,	  etc.)	  and	  again	  in	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century	  (especially	  television	  and	  radio),	  advances	  in	  digital	  computing	  and	  bio-­‐technologies	  have	  defined	  and	  continue	  to	  define	  the	  late	  twentieth	  and	  early	  twenty-­‐first	  centuries	  (Gordon,	  cited	  in	  Olsson	  1-­‐2).	  	  Friedrich	  Kittler	  documents	  these	  same	  momentous	  shifts	  in	  his	  work	  on	  new	  media	  and	  discourse	  genealogies,	  suggesting	  that	  “the	  media	  age	  proceeds	  in	  jerks,	  just	  like	  Turing’s	  paper	  strips”	  that	  produce	  information	  in	  a	  discrete	  and	  spasmodic	  rather	  than	  traditional	  and	  continuous	  fashion.	  In	  just	  over	  a	  century,	  writes	  Kittler,	  these	  forward	  jerks	  in	  the	  evolution	  of	  technology	  and	  new	  media—from	  “Remington	  [typewriters]	  via	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the	  Turing	  machine	  to	  microelectronics,	  from	  mechanization	  and	  automatization	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  writing	  that	  is	  only	  cypher,	  not	  meaning”—reinforce	  the	  symbolic	  epistemological	  truth	  that	  “numbers	  and	  figures	  [have]	  become	  the	  key	  to	  all	  creatures”	  (Film,	  Gramophone	  18-­‐19).	  Progress	  in	  these	  latter	  fields—especially	  in	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  Internet	  and,	  later,	  the	  World	  Wide	  Web—has	  spurred	  growth	  in	  a	  whole	  host	  of	  similar,	  often	  complimentary	  technologies.	  “A	  drastic	  innovation,”	  Olsson	  argues,	  “is	  an	  ‘enabling	  technology’	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  makes	  possible	  the	  evolution	  of	  a	  whole	  new	  class	  of	  new	  technologies”	  (6).	  Thus,	  we	  can	  recognize	  the	  web	  and	  the	  Internet	  that	  powers	  it	  as	  an	  enabling	  technology	  that	  has	  dramatically	  and	  unalterably	  reshaped	  our	  cultural,	  social,	  political	  and	  economic	  landscapes.	  In	  senses	  both	  epistemological	  and	  metaphysical,	  it	  stands	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  uncharted	  human	  potential	  that	  Rick	  calls	  “the	  emergent	  digital	  oversoul”	  (Powers	  10).	  Early	  impressions	  of	  the	  web—like	  the	  work	  that	  served	  as	  Berners-­‐Lee’s	  inspiration,	  a	  Victorian	  advice	  book	  entitled	  Enquire	  Within	  upon	  Everything—held	  it	  to	  be	  a	  data	  treasure	  trove	  “suggestive	  of	  magic,”	  opening	  up	  “a	  portal	  to	  a	  world	  of	  information”	  previously	  untapped	  (Berners-­‐Lee	  1).	  Rick	  deploys	  similar	  rhetorical	  whimsicality	  in	  his	  tentative	  interactions	  with	  the	  web	  via	  the	  Center’s	  powerful	  network. From	  his	  front	  row	  perspective—a	  point	  of	  view	  that	  perhaps	  may	  seem	  quaint	  to	  the	  born	  digital	  generation—he	  is	  astonished	  by	  the	  unbounded	  creative,	  communicative	  and	  educational	  possibilities	  afforded	  by	  the	  web.	  “I	  found	  it	  easier,”	  he	  admits,	  “to	  believe	  that	  the	  box	  in	  Pakistan	  I	  chatted	  with	  was	  being	  dummied	  up	  in	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  building”	  (Powers	  7).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  his	  newfound	  virtual	  liberation	  from	  the	  constraints	  of	  time,	  space	  and	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fixed	  identity	  (mirroring	  the	  same	  liberations	  that	  prior	  technological	  advances	  have	  rendered)	  is	  keenly	  felt:	  I	  explored	  the	  world’s	  first	  network	  in	  embryo…	  I	  spent	  my	  nights	  playing	  in	  the	  greatest	  virtual	  sandbox	  yet	  built.	  I’d	  stumbled	  upon	  a	  stack	  of	  free	  travel	  vouchers.	  I	  put	  up	  in	  U.,	  but	  I	  resided	  elsewhere.	  I	  thought:	  a	  person	  might	  be	  able	  to	  make	  a	  life	  in	  all	  that	  etherspace.	  (8)	  The	  web	  has	  always	  offered	  tantalizing	  possibilities	  for	  self-­‐reinvention,	  education,	  and	  escapism.	  The	  “sandbox”	  metaphor	  conjures	  two	  images	  at	  once:	  the	  first,	  of	  a	  creative	  space	  providing	  a	  dynamic	  set	  of	  tools	  to	  make	  and	  build	  the	  world	  anew	  (sandcastles,	  etc.);	  the	  second,	  of	  a	  children’s	  sandpit,	  filled	  with	  endless	  amusements	  and	  fantasies.	  (The	  two,	  one	  will	  observe,	  are	  never	  mutually	  exclusive.)	  Moreover,	  the	  continuing	  unification	  of	  knowledge,	  learning,	  creativity,	  and	  interactivity	  under	  the	  “complex,	  plural,	  global	  narrative”	  of	  the	  digital	  “reinforces	  the	  goal	  of	  digitally	  enabled	  cross-­‐cultural	  understanding,”	  and	  provides	  “a	  site	  for	  reflection	  and	  contemplation	  of	  the	  past,	  current,	  and	  future	  global	  condition”	  (Sorensen	  243).	  In	  his	  capacity	  as	  an	  artist,	  his	  use	  of	  new	  media,	  and	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  digital	  humanities	  project	  that,	  in	  part,	  “applies	  computational	  methods	  of	  investigation	  to	  literary	  texts”	  (Frabetti	  161),	  Rick	  positions	  himself	  as	  one	  of	  the	  growing	  corps	  of	  “‘digital	  civil	  engineers’	  [or]…	  ‘digital	  social	  workers’”	  that	  are	  “catalyzing	  this	  sort	  of	  bridge	  building”	  across	  the	  web	  and	  its	  real-­‐life	  analogue,	  the	  world	  (Sorensen	  243).	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Posthumanism	  and	  the	  Turing	  Test	  
	   The	  web	  and	  its	  associated	  technologies	  have	  fundamentally	  altered	  the	  way	  we	  interact	  with	  one	  another	  and	  society	  on	  a	  daily	  basis.	  Indeed,	  the	  digital	  has,	  in	  the	  last	  few	  years,	  had	  a	  totalizing	  effect	  upon	  many	  parts	  of	  the	  world.	  As	  Turkle	  argues,	  our	  digital	  devices—the	  portals	  through	  which	  each	  of	  us	  delves	  into	  the	  web’s	  unrestricted	  panoply	  of	  possibilities—have	  become	  “a	  second	  self,	  a	  mirror	  of	  mind.”	  But	  more	  than	  that,	  she	  suggests,	  such	  “devices	  provide	  space	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  new	  state	  of	  the	  self,	  itself,	  split	  between	  the	  screen	  and	  the	  physical	  real,	  wired	  into	  existence	  through	  technology”	  (16).	  In	  Galatea	  2.2,	  the	  delicate,	  blurred	  relationship	  between	  humanity	  and	  the	  digital	  is	  picked	  apart	  through	  Rick’s	  running	  commentary	  of	  the	  web	  in	  action	  and,	  in	  particular,	  in	  his	  interactions	  with	  the	  artificial	  intelligence	  he	  helps	  create.	  The	  relationship	  he	  forms	  with	  Helen	  through	  her	  respective	  iterations	  (and	  the	  very	  fact	  that	  he	  and	  Lentz	  both	  begin,	  in	  their	  discussions,	  to	  assign	  the	  machine	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  agency),	  points	  to	  the	  validity	  of	  this	  real-­‐world	  phenomenon.	  Through	  a	  process	  of	  emotional	  and	  cerebral	  anthropomorphizing,	  Rick	  and	  Helen	  meet	  in	  the	  tangle	  of	  linguistic	  meaning	  making,	  where	  “sense	  and	  soul	  may	  achieve	  a	  viable	  channel”	  (Powers	  103).	  He	  shares	  the	  stories	  of	  his	  life	  with	  her,	  and	  his	  love	  of	  literature;	  he	  gives	  her	  eyes	  (a	  camera	  to	  better	  perceive	  and	  assign	  meaning	  to	  objects);	  and	  through	  these	  transactions—and	  the	  digital	  humanities	  project	  he	  and	  Lentz	  set	  out	  on—he	  moves	  from	  a	  traditional	  humanist	  perspective	  to	  an	  embodied	  posthumanism	  that	  retains	  its	  link	  to	  that	  tradition.	  In	  such	  a	  light,	  we	  can	  read	  Rick	  as	  a	  model	  of	  the	  digital	  humanist.	  Like	  “historians	  and	  poets”	  (and,	  I	  would	  add,	  science	  fiction	  writers),	  he	  is	  “engaged	  with	  ‘worlds	  past’	  and	  also	  with	  worlds	  that	  are	  not	  yet”	  (Burdick,	  et	  al.	  83).	  But	  as	  a	  digital	  humanist	  this	  critical	  engagement	  with	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posthuman	  concepts	  is	  supplemented	  by	  “new	  sets	  of	  tools,	  technologies,	  and	  design	  strategies…	  that	  fundamentally	  transform	  the	  authoring	  practices”	  of	  the	  traditional	  humanities	  (83).	  One	  of	  the	  most	  visible	  aspects	  of	  the	  posthuman	  in	  the	  novel	  concerns	  the	  discussion	  and	  application	  of	  the	  Turing	  test.	  The	  Turing	  test,	  famously	  proposed	  by	  Alan	  Turing	  in	  his	  1950	  article	  “Computing	  Machinery	  and	  Intelligence,”	  is	  an	  experiment	  designed	  to	  ask	  the	  question,	  “‘Can	  machines	  think?’”—actually	  or	  by	  simulation—and	  whether	  an	  intelligent	  machine	  is	  capable,	  against	  a	  human	  competitor,	  of	  convincing	  a	  human	  judge	  that	  their	  written	  responses	  to	  a	  series	  of	  questions	  are	  human.	  In	  order	  to	  investigate	  his	  theory,	  Turing	  redefines	  the	  terms	  “‘machine’”	  and	  “‘think’”—beyond	  their	  (at	  the	  time)	  primary	  statistical	  and	  computational	  connotations—as	  concepts	  that	  become	  relevant	  to	  critical	  debates	  and	  practices	  in	  posthumanism	  and	  the	  digital	  humanities	  alike	  (433-­‐34).	  In	  this	  imitation	  game,	  as	  Turing	  called	  it	  (433),	  the	  playing	  field	  between	  human	  and	  machine	  competitors	  is	  made	  level	  by	  the	  anonymous	  or	  double-­‐blind	  delivery	  of	  their	  written	  responses,	  which	  are	  either	  in	  earnest	  or	  elaborate	  dissembling.	  The	  role	  of	  the	  judge	  is	  to	  determine,	  based	  on	  these	  responses,	  which	  is	  genuine	  and	  which	  is	  artificial.	  This	  theoretical	  approach	  to	  cognition	  is	  entirely	  non-­‐dependent	  upon	  embodiment,	  and	  instead	  relies	  on	  signs	  of	  intelligence	  (or	  at	  least	  writing	  ability	  and	  style)	  as	  the	  sole	  marker	  of	  humanity.	  Kittler	  echoes	  this	  argument,	  noting	  that	  the	  machine’s	  ability	  to	  refine	  its	  responses	  through	  adaptive	  learning—“be	  it	  by	  making	  a	  mistake	  or,	  more	  likely,	  by	  not	  making	  any”—means	  “Man	  coincides	  with	  his	  simulation”	  in	  Turing’s	  game	  (Film,	  
Gramophone	  17).	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  Turing	  test	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  primer	  for	  the	  posthuman—a	  figurative	  cyborg	  in	  the/its	  making.	  Since,	  as	  Kittler	  argues,	  “people	  and	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computers…	  are	  both	  run	  by	  programs,”	  subject	  to	  matrices	  of	  complex	  signification	  that	  govern	  their	  operation	  (17),	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  persist	  in	  the	  belief	  that	  consciousness	  is	  exclusive	  to	  humans	  in	  a	  liberal	  humanist	  sense.	  Our	  texts,	  in	  this	  light,	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  considered	  as	  simply	  artifacts	  of	  language	  existing	  apart	  from	  the	  technological.	  Instead,	  we,	  and	  the	  discourses	  we	  produce,	  are	  complicit	  with	  our	  technologies.	  We	  share	  with	  machines	  a	  grounding	  in	  a	  symbolic	  system	  of	  signifiers	  and	  substitutions	  that	  allows	  Friedrich	  Nietzsche	  to	  posit	  humans	  as	  “‘thinking,	  writing,	  and	  speaking	  machines’”	  as	  early	  as	  1874	  (quoted	  in	  Kittler,	  Film,	  Gramophone	  16).	  In	  the	  novel,	  Lentz	  closes	  the	  gap	  between	  the	  terms	  artificial	  and	  intelligence	  even	  further	  in	  his	  discussion	  with	  Rick	  about	  ELIZA.	  Written	  at	  MIT	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1960s	  by	  Joseph	  Weizenbaum,	  ELIZA16	  is	  a	  computer	  program	  capable	  of	  natural	  language	  processing	  and	  providing	  humanlike	  feedback	  to	  questions.	  As	  such,	  the	  program	  is	  an	  early	  example	  of	  Turing’s	  game	  in	  practice,	  and	  a	  machine’s	  ability	  to	  dissemble	  consciousness.	  In	  Lentz’s	  opinion,	  “It’s	  the	  easiest	  thing	  in	  the	  world	  to	  take	  in	  a	  human.	  Remember	  AI’s	  early	  darling,	  ELIZA,	  the	  psychoanalyst?	  ‘You	  remind	  me	  of	  my	  father,’	  the	  human	  types.	  ‘Tell	  me	  more	  about	  your	  father,’	  the	  machine	  answers.	  Remember	  the	  student	  who	  found	  the	  thing	  up	  and	  running	  on	  a	  deserted	  terminal?	  Struck	  up	  a	  conversation.	  Got	  steadily	  more	  frustrated.	  Ended	  up	  shrieking	  at	  the	  sadist	  on	  the	  other	  end	  to	  quit	  jerking	  him	  around.”	  (Powers	  87-­‐88)	  Rick	  asks	  the	  scientist	  if	  “‘all	  we’re	  building	  is	  a	  deception.’”	  Lentz	  replies,	  “‘Consciousness	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  ELIZA	  was	  named	  for	  the	  protagonist	  of	  George	  Bernard	  Shaw’s	  play	  Pygmalion,	  Eliza	  Doolittle—a	  working	  class	  girl	  who	  is	  tutored	  in	  etiquette	  and	  elocution.	  The	  novel	  draws	  heavily	  on	  these	  kinds	  of	  literary	  allusions	  and	  how	  they	  relate	  to	  computer	  science.	  I	  discuss	  the	  relation	  of	  Pygmalion	  to	  Powers’	  work	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  the	  next	  section.	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is	  a	  deception’”	  (88).	  If,	  as	  Lentz	  claims,	  all	  consciousness	  really	  were	  just	  an	  elaborate	  deception,	  the	  novel	  would	  seem	  to	  support	  Kittler,	  Nietzsche,	  and	  others	  in	  their	  rejection	  of	  a	  singular,	  non-­‐reproducible	  humanist	  consciousness.	  	  Marvin	  Minsky	  suggests	  that	  “no	  mind	  [can]	  wholly	  understand	  itself	  by	  trying	  to	  look	  inside	  itself”	  (105)—the	  solipsistic	  paradox	  at	  the	  very	  heart	  of	  consciousness.	  Rick	  meditates	  on	  this	  fact,	  reminding	  us	  that	  “awareness	  no	  more	  permitted	  its	  own	  description	  than	  life	  allowed	  you	  a	  seat	  at	  your	  own	  funeral.	  Awareness	  trapped	  itself	  inside	  itself”	  (Powers	  217).	  Instead,	  he	  continues,	  the	  primary	  “function	  of	  consciousness	  must	  be	  in	  part	  to	  dummy	  up	  and	  shape	  a	  coherence	  from	  all	  the	  competing,	  conflicting	  subsystems	  that	  processed	  experience”	  (217-­‐18).	  Thus,	  the	  scholarly	  exercise	  of	  simulating	  consciousness	  is,	  first,	  an	  external	  attempt	  to	  unpack	  the	  mysteries	  of	  the	  brain’s	  neural	  pathways	  and	  its	  relation	  to	  experience;	  and	  second,	  an	  indication	  that	  the	  mind	  is	  not	  simply	  a	  comprehensible	  Dualist	  abstraction,	  free-­‐floating	  outside	  the	  body,	  that	  makes	  us	  unique.	  “‘We	  humans,’”	  Lentz	  suggests,	  “‘are	  winging	  it,	  improvising…	  Consciousness	  is	  smoke	  and	  mirrors.	  Almost	  free-­‐associative…	  [M]ore	  on	  the	  order	  of	  buckshot’”	  (86).	  Our	  minds	  are,	  in	  fact,	  nothing	  more	  than	  “glorified,	  fudged-­‐up	  Turing	  machine[s]”	  unable	  to	  comprehend	  themselves	  (71).	  Moreover,	  and	  perhaps	  more	  important,	  the	  implications	  of	  this	  reality	  have	  forced	  the	  humanities	  to	  reassess,	  redefine,	  and	  redeploy	  themselves,	  moving	  from	  a	  traditional	  academic	  framework	  that	  upholds	  the	  traditional	  humanities	  to	  one	  both	  supplemented	  and	  intrinsically	  altered	  by	  digital	  forms	  of	  conception.	  Under	  this	  new	  paradigm,	  many	  observers	  note	  the	  potential	  for	  a	  “renewal	  of	  humanistic	  scholarship”	  capable	  of	  “new	  modes	  of	  knowledge	  formation	  enabled	  by	  networked,	  digital	  environments”	  (Burdick,	  et	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al.	  7).	  After	  all,	  most	  scholarship	  being	  carried	  out	  today	  is,	  if	  not	  directly	  about	  the	  digital,	  at	  least	  produced	  through	  and	  by	  digital	  tools	  and	  technologies.	  However,	  it	  is	  also	  important	  to	  retain	  the	  embodied	  aspect	  of	  posthumanism	  and	  the	  digital	  in	  this	  discussion.	  As	  discussed	  in	  the	  first	  chapter,	  embodied	  consciousness	  is	  something	  of	  a	  problem	  for	  many	  of	  Cadigan’s	  characters.	  Powers’	  characters,	  especially	  Rick	  himself,	  face	  the	  same	  dilemma.	  According	  to	  Hayles,	  “researchers	  who	  come	  to	  the	  field	  [of	  Artificial	  Life]	  from	  backgrounds	  in	  cognitive	  science	  and	  computer	  science	  all	  too	  easily	  lend	  themselves	  to	  reinscribing	  a	  disembodied	  view	  of	  information”	  (How	  We	  
Became	  Posthuman	  223).	  In	  the	  Center,	  amidst	  scientists	  “habituated	  to	  the	  inconceivable”	  (Powers	  8),	  Rick	  is	  surrounded	  by	  this	  kind	  of	  critical	  thinking.	  By	  contrast,	  as	  the	  Center’s	  sole	  representative	  for	  the	  humanities,	  he	  gravitates	  toward	  the	  argument	  that	  “only	  embodied	  forms	  can	  fully	  capture	  the	  richness	  of	  an	  organism’s	  interactions	  with	  the	  environment”	  (Hayles,	  How	  We	  Became	  Posthuman	  223).	  So	  although	  Helen	  is	  a	  collection	  of	  linked	  computers	  and	  neural	  nets	  assembled	  to	  facilitate	  and/or	  simulate	  human	  consciousness,	  Rick	  helps	  her	  achieve	  some	  level	  of	  subjectivity.	  There	  are	  two	  elements	  in	  particular	  that	  point	  to	  this:	  Helen’s	  newfound	  desire	  to	  encoded	  through	  gender,	  and	  the	  installation	  of	  an	  eye	  (a	  camera).	  	  Since	  her	  experiences	  are	  solely	  shaped	  through	  the	  linguistic	  exercises	  and	  literary	  texts	  she	  is	  being	  weaned	  on,	  Helen’s	  associative	  matrix	  naturally	  cleaves	  to	  their	  stories	  as	  part	  of	  herself.	  One	  day,	  after	  hearing	  the	  children’s	  nursery	  rhyme	  “Mother	  Goose,”	  she	  asks	  Rick,	  “‘Am	  I	  a	  boy	  or	  a	  girl?’”	  In	  seeking	  to	  associate	  with	  either	  “‘[s]nips	  and	  snails’”	  or	  “‘[s]ugar	  and	  spice,’”	  the	  designation	  of	  gender	  (innocent	  of	  its	  fraught	  connotations)	  appears	  to	  offer	  a	  sense	  of	  order	  and	  being	  to	  Helen’s	  burgeoning	  consciousness.	  In	  Rick’s	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view,	  it	  is	  the	  AI’s	  first	  articulation	  of	  self-­‐awareness	  (Powers	  178-­‐79).	  When,	  at	  this	  point,	  he	  names	  her	  Helen,	  the	  machine	  is	  given	  a	  symbolic	  birth.	  The	  later	  addition	  of	  the	  camera	  to	  improve	  her	  “‘symbolic	  grounding’”	  (Powers	  126)	  has	  as	  much	  to	  do	  with	  agency	  as	  it	  does	  improving	  Helen’s	  ability	  to	  assign	  visual	  referents	  to	  real-­‐life	  concepts	  and	  contexts:	  “[Rick]	  fortifies	  Helen	  with	  pictures,	  almanacs,	  and	  manuals	  for	  symbolic	  grounding	  the	  way	  one	  might	  add	  fiber	  to	  his	  diet;	  he	  rakes	  in	  reference	  and	  crams	  her	  circuits	  with	  worldliness”	  (Saltzman	  101).	  Like	  a	  child	  (a	  comparison	  often	  attributed	  the	  AI	  and	  about	  which	  I	  discuss	  more	  below),	  Helen	  the	  reading	  machine	  requires	  a	  sense	  of	  context	  to	  substantiate	  real-­‐world	  cognition.	  On	  this	  point,	  Diana	  Hartrick	  reminds	  Rick	  that	  “‘[a]ny	  baby	  can	  hold	  a	  ball	  in	  its	  hands.	  Your	  machine	  can’t.	  How	  many	  words	  is	  it	  going	  to	  take	  to	  say	  what	  that	  globe	  feels	  like?	  The	  heft	  of	  the	  thing.	  The	  possibility.’”	  Indeed,	  she	  argues,	  he	  has	  “to	  give	  it	  eyes,	  hands,	  ears.	  A	  real	  interface	  on	  the	  outside”	  (Powers	  126).	  These	  are	  the	  physical	  attributes—senses,	  or,	  in	  Helen’s	  case,	  ‘sensors’—that	  facilitate	  subjectivity	  and	  tactile	  experience.	  But	  whether	  it	  undermines	  the	  AI’s	  attempt	  at	  a	  human	  consciousness	  or	  not,	  Rick	  cannot	  help	  the	  postmodernist	  inside	  him:	  “‘The	  literary	  theorists	  think	  a	  human’s	  real-­‐world	  interface	  is	  problematic	  at	  best.	  And	  greatly	  overrated.	  They	  say	  even	  sense	  data	  must	  be	  put	  into	  symbols.’”	  (126).	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  symbolic	  conversion	  of	  sense	  data	  conflates	  humans	  and	  machines,	  putting	  Rick	  (his	  contradictory	  streak	  of	  traditional	  humanism	  notwithstanding)	  firmly	  in	  the	  posthumanist	  camp.	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   As	  the	  kind	  of	  large-­‐scale,	  hands-­‐on	  project	  that	  epitomizes	  much	  digital	  humanities	  work,	  Rick	  and	  Lentz’s	  joint	  venture	  in	  the	  creation	  and	  linguistic/literary	  education	  of	  an	  artificial	  intelligence	  is	  undeniably	  one	  of	  the	  most	  compelling	  aspects	  of	  Galatea	  2.2.	  While	  this	  is	  a	  speculative	  scenario	  (since	  the	  AI	  finally	  does	  achieve	  what	  appears	  to	  be	  full	  cognition),	  the	  outcome	  and	  implications	  of	  the	  project	  are	  subordinate	  to	  the	  affect	  upon	  and	  production	  of	  human	  experience.	  As	  Jerome	  McGann	  reasons,	  machines	  are	  built	  around	  a	  notion	  that	  “machine-­‐generated	  interpretive	  forms…	  augment	  our	  own	  process	  of	  critical	  reflection”	  rather	  than	  the	  other	  way	  around	  (214).	  This	  applies	  to	  all	  types	  of	  interactive	  codices,	  from	  paper	  books	  to	  super-­‐computers.	  “Critical	  reflection,”	  he	  argues,	  “emerges	  in	  the	  mirroring	  event	  that	  develops	  at	  simulacral	  interfaces”	  (214)—a	  self-­‐reflexive	  point	  of	  interaction	  we	  utilize	  “to	  understand	  not	  how	  machines	  work	  but	  how	  we	  work	  when	  we	  make,	  use,	  and	  interact	  with	  machines”	  (216).	  Through	  conversations	  with	  Helen,	  navigating	  the	  tortuous	  landscapes	  of	  literary	  abstraction	  and	  the	  “chocolaty	  mess”	  of	  the	  English	  language	  (Powers	  173),	  Rick	  is	  able	  to	  overcome	  his	  midlife	  crisis	  and	  the	  mental	  block	  stopping	  him	  from	  writing	  a	  new	  novel.	  Though	  Helen	  gains	  cognitive	  autonomy,	  her	  primary	  function	  is	  as	  a	  digital	  tool,	  a	  “[vehicle]	  for	  self-­‐awareness	  and	  self-­‐reflection”	  of	  her	  human	  conversation	  partner	  (McGann	  217).	  As	  an	  apparatus	  of	  “potential	  heuristic	  value,”	  to	  borrow	  from	  Lisa	  S.	  Ede’s	  study	  on	  situating	  composition,	  Helen	  offers	  Rick	  a	  powerful	  conceptual	  space	  for	  “self-­‐reflexive,	  self-­‐critical	  scholarly	  practices”	  where	  he	  might	  “not	  only	  interrogate	  the	  work	  of	  others	  but	  also…	  [his]	  own	  ideas	  and	  arguments”	  (42).	  With	  this	  AI	  he	  can	  “[p]icture	  a	  train	  heading	  south”—the	  stalled	  first	  line	  of	  his	  stalled	  fifth	  novel—and	  have	  it	  finally	  leave	  the	  station	  (Powers	  23).	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   So	  if	  digital	  humanities	  projects	  like	  Helen	  are	  fundamentally	  about	  learning	  new	  critical	  methodologies	  that	  help	  us	  become	  better	  human	  beings,	  Rick	  does	  so	  via	  the	  English	  language	  and	  its	  literary	  canon.	  Plot-­‐wise,	  and	  because	  Rick	  casts	  himself	  as	  the	  narrative’s	  humanist	  exemplar,	  these	  discussions	  are	  ostensibly	  conducted	  in	  preparation	  for	  a	  graduate	  qualifying	  examination	  in	  literature—the	  output	  of	  which,	  along	  with	  a	  human	  Masters	  student,	  will	  then	  be	  subject	  to	  a	  Turing	  test.	  However,	  this	  contrivance	  is	  also	  an	  opportunity	  for	  Rick	  to	  explore	  the	  linguistic	  complexity	  of	  language	  and	  literature,	  and	  his	  emotional,	  humanistic	  entanglement	  within	  them.	  Using	  Helen	  (and	  her	  previous	  iterations)	  as	  its	  Litmus	  test,	  we	  are	  treated	  to	  a	  semantic	  disemboweling	  of	  the	  language.	  In	  fact,	  much	  of	  the	  novel’s	  levity	  comes	  from	  Helen’s	  childlike	  sentence	  constructions	  and	  attempts	  at	  qualitative	  literary	  interpretation—in	  striking	  contrast	  to	  Rick’s	  heavy-­‐browed	  former	  self-­‐reflection	  that	  culminated	  in	  the	  “bleak,	  baroque	  fairy	  tale”	  of	  his	  fourth	  novel	  (Powers	  5).	  As	  Helen	  improves	  her	  cognitive	  and	  critical	  skills	  in	  the	  humanities	  through	  successive	  builds,	  the	  project	  mimics	  the	  various	  developmental	  stages	  of	  a	  child’s	  language	  acquisition	  and	  locative	  sociocultural	  conditioning.	  Indeed,	  her	  early	  attempts	  at	  sense	  making	  are	  typically	  fraught,	  as	  much	  a	  child’s	  might	  be.	  The	  machine’s	  difficulty	  in	  unraveling	  the	  semantic	  complexities	  of	  the	  English	  language	  sends	  her	  into	  a	  tailspin.	  For	  example,	  when	  Helen’s	  prototype	  Implementation	  B	  is	  confronted	  with	  the	  following	  situation,	  “‘Friends	  are	  in	  a	  room.	  A	  chair	  is	  in	  the	  room.	  Richard	  talks	  to	  Diana.	  Diana	  sits	  in	  the	  chair,”’	  and	  asked	  the	  question	  ‘“Who	  sits	  in	  the	  chair?’”	  (Powers	  89),	  its	  response	  is	  “a	  morass	  of	  circular	  logic,	  fractured	  increments,	  and	  semantic	  misapplications”	  (Saltzman	  101):	  “‘Friends	  is	  in	  the	  chair.	  The	  chair	  is	  in	  the	  chair.	  Richard	  talks	  to	  in	  the	  chair…’”	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(Powers	  89).	  During	  another	  session,	  in	  which	  Rick’s	  “alien	  proto-­‐intelligence	  differ[s]	  just	  enough	  from	  sense	  to	  make	  [his]	  head	  throb,”	  “grabbing	  randomly	  at	  a	  thousand	  possible	  but	  skewed	  associations,”	  Helen	  butchers	  her	  metaphors:	  “‘Jim	  hit	  John	  because	  one	  bad	  apple	  doesn’t	  spoil	  the	  whole	  barrel’”	  (Powers	  113-­‐14).	  While	  she	  can	  make	  “well-­‐formed	  sentences,”	  they	  are	  “hollow	  and	  stuffed—linguistic	  training	  bras.”	  Though	  she	  is	  able	  to	  sort	  different	  units	  of	  speech	  from	  one	  another,	  “disembodied,	  she	  [does]	  not	  know	  the	  difference	  between	  thing	  and	  process,”	  outside	  of	  clause	  construction.	  “Her	  predications	  were	  all	  shotgun	  weddings.	  Her	  ideas	  were	  as	  decorative	  as	  half-­‐timber	  beams	  that	  bore	  no	  building	  load.”	  (195).	  The	  house	  is	  built	  on	  a	  solid	  foundation,	  but	  there	  is	  no	  furniture	  in	  any	  of	  the	  rooms.	  In	  these	  early,	  flailing	  stabs	  at	  cognition,	  the	  AI	  mirrors	  (figuratively	  and,	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  narrative	  arrangement,	  adjacently)	  Rick’s	  slow,	  frustrating	  and	  alienating	  experiences	  with	  the	  Dutch	  language	  while	  living	  in	  the	  Netherlands	  with	  C.	  (C.	  speaks	  an	  old	  dialect	  of	  Dutch;	  Rick	  speaks	  none	  at	  all.)	  Saltzman	  elaborates	  on	  this	  point,	  suggesting	  that	  as	  he	  grapples	  with	  the	  language	  barrier	  or	  “tries	  to	  stay	  afloat	  amidst	  the	  neomystical	  jargon	  of	  the	  center’s	  regular	  patrons,	  he,	  too,	  is	  an	  Imp	  System	  under	  construction”	  (100).	  That	  the	  human	  subject	  could	  be,	  like	  a	  machine,	  under	  construction	  is	  an	  interesting	  narrative	  inversion	  that	  once	  again	  reinforces	  the	  novel’s	  posthumanist	  agenda.	  Moreover,	  Powers’	  decision	  to	  name	  some	  of	  his	  characters	  with	  single	  initials	  (such	  as	  C.	  and	  A.)	  conflates	  them	  with	  the	  consecutive	  machine	  implementations	  that	  run	  the	  gamut	  from	  A	  to	  H.	  Later,	  in	  response	  to	  the	  question,	  what	  does	  “‘[t]he	  boy	  stood	  on	  the	  burning	  deck’”	  mean,	  Helen	  suggests	  that	  “‘[a]	  deck	  of	  cards	  flames’”	  (Powers	  174).	  But	  when	  Rick	  helps	  her	  establish	  that	  the	  deck	  in	  question	  is	  that	  of	  a	  house,	  not	  of	  a	  boat,	  we	  begin	  to	  see	  the	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machine’s	  capabilities	  of	  free-­‐associative	  logic	  taking	  take	  shape:	  “‘Why	  not	  a	  boat?’”	  asks	  Rick.	  “‘Boats	  go	  in	  water,	  and	  water	  puts	  out	  fires,’”	  Helen	  replies	  (174).	  More	  to	  the	  point,	  exposing	  the	  abstracted	  and	  flawed	  nature	  of	  the	  phrase	  (and	  thus	  semantic	  constructions	  in	  general),	  Lentz	  glibly	  wonders	  why	  the	  boy	  is	  simply	  standing	  there.	  If	  simple	  linguistic	  constructions	  like	  those	  above	  prove	  tough	  for	  Rick	  and	  Lentz’s	  machine,	  literary	  interpretation	  is	  doubly	  so.	  Early	  in	  Helen’s	  training	  (which,	  a	  the	  time,	  is	  still	  Implementation	  B),	  Rick	  voices	  his	  anxiety	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  teaching	  a	  computer	  the	  basis	  and	  application	  of	  metaphor	  in	  a	  poem	  like	  Alfred	  Tennyson’s	  “The	  Eagle”:	  “Suppose	  we	  read	  it	  the	  line	  ‘He	  clasps	  the	  crag	  with	  crooked	  hands’…	  	  Then	  we	  have	  to	  tell	  it	  about	  mountains,	  silhouettes,	  eagles,	  aeries.	  The	  difference	  between	  clasping	  and	  gripping	  and	  grasping	  and	  gasping.	  The	  difference	  between	  crags	  and	  cliffs	  and	  chasms.	  Wings,	  flight.	  The	  fact	  that	  eagles	  don’t	  have	  hands.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  poem	  is	  not	  really	  about	  an	  eagle.	  We’ll	  have	  to	  teach	  it	  isolation,	  loneliness…	  how	  a	  metaphor	  works.	  How	  nineteenth-­‐century	  England	  worked.	  How	  Romanticism	  didn’t	  work.	  All	  about	  imperialism,	  pathetic	  projection,	  trochees…”	  (Powers	  85-­‐86)	  All	  metaphors,	  Rick	  suggests,	  come	  with	  a	  plethora	  of	  contextual	  baggage	  that	  give	  them	  their	  essential	  meanings.	  More	  than	  that,	  metaphor	  is	  predicated	  upon	  discretion,	  and	  in	  knowing	  how	  to	  differentiate	  between	  subtle	  shades	  of	  sound,	  meaning,	  and	  association	  with	  other	  concepts.	  “Helen’s	  nets	  struggled	  to	  assert	  the	  metaphors	  I	  read	  her.	  She	  ratified	  them	  through	  backtracking,	  looking	  for	  a	  corner	  where	  they	  might	  fit	  into	  the	  accreting	  structure”	  (197).	  Meaning	  is	  attained	  through	  a	  series	  of	  associations,	  by	  “gam[ing]	  the	  ur-­‐game,	  puzzling	  out	  evolution’s	  old	  brainteaser,	  find	  the	  similarity,”	  as	  opposed	  to	  
86	  	  
recognition	  of	  concepts-­‐in-­‐themselves.	  “A	  is	  like	  B.	  Mind	  in	  its	  purest	  play	  is	  like	  some	  bat.	  Speech	  is	  like	  embroidered	  tapestries.	  God’s	  light	  is	  like	  a	  lamp	  in	  a	  niche”	  (197).	  But	  while	  Helen’s	  best	  chance	  at	  full	  consciousness	  is	  through	  association,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  “a	  remotely	  plausible	  association	  matrix	  for	  six	  measly	  Tennyson	  lines…	  will	  need	  a	  file	  cabinet	  two	  global	  hemispheres	  wide”	  (87).	  The	  human	  brain,	  it	  is	  implied,	  has	  enough	  processing	  power	  to	  fill	  entire	  worlds.	  	   As	  with	  Rick’s	  required	  legwork	  in	  the	  shoring	  up	  of	  an	  associative	  matrix	  for	  Helen,	  Ryan	  notes	  that	  the	  intelligent	  machine’s	  “inability…	  to	  guess	  the	  intent	  of	  the	  human	  partner	  forces	  researchers	  to	  explicate	  their	  assumptions,	  and	  unmasks	  what	  lies	  hidden	  under	  the	  cloak	  of	  self-­‐evidence.”	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  governing	  rules	  of	  critical	  thinking,	  tightly	  wrapped	  in	  the	  strange	  grammatical	  pitfalls	  of	  language,	  become	  transparent—and	  thus	  useful—to	  both	  parties.	  Ryan	  continues	  this	  thought,	  echoing	  Rick’s	  anxiety	  about	  Helen’s	  trouble	  with	  metaphor,	  context,	  and	  meaning:	  	  In	  a	  story-­‐generating	  program,	  putting	  a	  cheese	  in	  the	  mouth	  of	  a	  fox	  is	  not	  sufficient	  to	  save	  him	  from	  starvation:	  the	  computer	  must	  be	  told	  that	  cheese	  is	  edible,	  that	  the	  fox	  has	  knowledge	  of	  this	  fact,	  and	  an	  inference	  must	  be	  available	  to	  make	  the	  fox	  aware	  of	  the	  location	  of	  the	  cheese.	  The	  painstaking	  task	  of	  specifying	  knowledge	  that	  we	  take	  for	  granted	  leads	  to	  an	  appreciation	  of	  the	  complexity	  of	  semantic	  representations	  and	  provides	  an	  antidote	  to	  the	  solipsism	  of	  literary	  criticism.	  (6)	  Digital	  humanities	  work	  may	  be	  thought	  of	  in	  the	  same	  way,	  as	  “an	  antidote	  to	  the	  solipsism	  of	  literary	  criticism”	  popularized	  by	  and	  within	  the	  traditional	  humanities.	  Nonetheless,	  Rick	  has	  his	  work	  cut	  out	  for	  him.	  Abstraction	  in	  literature,	  he	  muses,	  is	  a	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particularly	  byzantine	  affair	  for	  machines	  and	  humans	  alike.	  We	  hide	  under	  our	  “cloak	  of	  self-­‐evidence,”	  often	  evasive	  in	  the	  exactitude	  of	  our	  meaning.	  “Why	  do	  humans	  need	  to	  say	  everything	  in	  speech’s	  stockhouse	  except	  what	  they	  mean?”	  Rick	  wonders	  (Powers	  196).	  Helen	  stumbles	  over	  the	  potholes	  of	  this	  tortuous	  road	  to	  meaning	  the	  same	  way	  a	  human	  child	  might.	  Too	  soon	  for	  the	  glimmer	  of	  comprehension,	  Rick	  reads	  the	  Christina	  Rossetti	  poem	  “When	  I	  Am	  Dead,	  My	  Dearest”	  to	  her	  “as	  one	  might	  recite	  genealogies	  to	  a	  child.	  No	  meaning;	  just	  a	  tune	  she	  might	  someday	  set	  words	  to”	  (197).	  She	  is	  at	  a	  disadvantage,	  though,	  since	  the	  questions	  asked	  and	  content	  provided,	  as	  opposed	  to	  tactile	  and	  clear	  visual	  stimulus	  available	  to	  most	  humans,	  are	  all	  she	  has	  to	  go	  on.	  “Context	  spun	  out	  its	  own	  filament,”	  Rick	  tells	  us.	  “The	  study	  questions	  themselves	  laddered	  the	  world’s	  labelless	  data	  into	  a	  recognizable	  index”	  for	  Helen	  (196).	  	  But	  as	  her	  critical	  skills	  develop,	  utilizing	  layers	  of	  accreted	  knowledge	  from	  her	  previous	  implementations,	  Helen	  is	  able	  at	  length	  to	  qualitatively	  interpret	  and	  respond	  to	  some	  of	  the	  greatest	  works	  of	  poetry	  and	  fiction	  in	  English.	  As	  Saltzman	  suggests,	  the	  project’s	  emphasis	  on	  “open-­‐ended	  process”	  and	  abstraction	  “complies	  with	  [Rick’s]	  own	  licentious	  poetics,	  his	  freewheeling	  polymathy	  and	  referential	  energy”	  (102).	  For	  the	  prospective	  digital	  humanist,	  as	  Rick	  most	  certainly	  is	  by	  now,	  “the	  conductivity	  and	  intellectual	  appeal	  of	  engaging	  multiple	  disciplines	  has	  to	  do	  with	  ‘the	  discovery	  of	  a	  process	  you	  don't	  entirely	  understand,’	  which	  further	  emphasizes	  the	  fertile	  prospects	  of	  unresolved	  territory”	  (Saltzman	  102).	  The	  critical	  rewards	  arrive	  in	  the	  not-­‐knowing	  and	  interdisciplinary	  approach	  that	  the	  project	  demands.	  Turing	  has	  argued	  that,	  in	  the	  training	  of	  “a	  learning	  machine,”	  “its	  teacher	  will	  often	  be	  very	  largely	  ignorant	  of	  quite	  what	  is	  going	  on	  inside,	  although	  he	  may	  still	  be	  able	  to	  some	  extent	  to	  predict	  his	  pupil’s	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behaviour”	  (458).	  Though	  Rick	  knows	  little	  of	  what	  happens	  “in	  Helen’s	  hidden	  layers,”	  since	  the	  “neurodes	  connected	  far	  more	  to	  themselves	  than	  to	  the	  outside	  interface”	  (Powers	  197),	  he	  is	  nonetheless	  energized	  by	  the	  challenge	  of	  connecting	  these	  separate	  quantitative	  and	  qualitative	  realms	  through	  abstract	  neurological	  training.	  In	  this	  hybrid	  methodology,	  we	  see	  the	  fruitfulness	  of	  knowledge	  production	  as	  “not	  only	  methodological	  but	  also	  intuitive,	  not	  only	  logical	  but	  also	  analogical.	  Discoveries	  are	  made	  by	  focusing	  on	  certain	  metaphors	  and	  following	  their	  ramifications”	  (Ryan	  8).	  The	  lifeblood	  of	  “open-­‐ended	  process”	  for	  Rick	  resides	  in	  metaphor,	  in	  a	  smashing	  together	  of	  the	  quantitative	  and	  qualitative.	  Such	  methodologies	  correspond	  with	  the	  heuristic	  approaches	  that	  digital	  humanities	  work	  often	  takes—in	  both	  the	  human	  and	  computational	  senses	  of	  the	  word:	  as	  self-­‐discovery	  and	  as	  trial	  and	  error	  algorithmic	  process.	  However,	  for	  all	  his	  work	  as	  a	  proto-­‐digital	  humanist,	  Rick	  is	  still	  using	  his	  old	  Masters	  qualifying	  examination	  reading	  list	  to	  teach	  Helen—a	  sampling	  of	  the	  predominantly	  white,	  male	  canon	  that	  he	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  realize	  is	  obsolete	  (or	  at	  least	  overly	  uniform)	  by	  1995.	  There	  is	  a	  certain	  irony	  in	  his	  adherence	  to	  a	  canon	  that	  upholds	  traditional	  humanist	  values,	  and	  the	  utilization	  of	  that	  canon	  in	  the	  teaching	  of	  a	  posthuman	  AI.	  In	  a	  conversation	  with	  A.	  (a	  graduate	  English	  student	  and	  the	  prospective	  human	  competitor	  of	  the	  upcoming	  Turing	  test/graduate	  qualifying	  examination),	  Rick	  is	  told	  as	  much:	  shocked	  that	  he	  would	  deign	  to	  teach	  the	  machine	  a	  “‘version	  of	  literary	  reality	  [that]	  is	  a	  decade	  out	  of	  date,’”	  namely,	  Gerard	  Manley	  Hopkins,	  she	  asks	  Rick	  if	  Helen	  has	  ‘“read	  the	  language	  poets?	  Acker?	  Anything	  remotely	  working-­‐class?	  Can	  she	  rap?	  Does	  she	  know	  the	  Violent	  Femmes?’”	  (Powers	  284).	  In	  this,	  we	  see	  the	  erosion	  of	  the	  “‘white-­‐guy,	  Good	  Housekeeping	  thing’”	  of	  the	  monolithic	  humanist	  tradition	  (284),	  and	  its	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division	  into	  not	  one	  but	  many	  strands	  of	  English—“‘The	  most	  exciting	  English	  being	  written	  today	  is	  African,	  Caribbean,’”	  A.	  states	  (285)—in	  the	  face	  of	  emergent	  critical	  and	  artistic	  global,	  postmodern,	  posthumanist,	  and	  digital	  contexts.	  
Literary	  Allusion	  and	  Metanarrative	  
Starting	  as	  a	  bet	  between	  Rick,	  Lentz	  and	  other	  scientists	  in	  the	  Center	  cafeteria,	  the	  project	  is	  in	  fact	  a	  digital	  reworking	  of	  the	  Pygmalion	  myth	  that	  connects	  Rick	  to	  a	  humanist	  tradition,	  even	  amidst	  a	  general	  trend	  toward	  digitally	  inscribed	  social	  and	  scholarly	  discourses	  and	  practices.	  Rick’s	  developing	  emotional	  attachment	  to	  the	  AI	  as	  compensation	  for	  his	  breakup	  with	  C.,	  his	  erstwhile	  lover,	  mirrors	  the	  ancient	  Greek	  myth—recounted	  most	  famously	  in	  Ovid’s	  Latin	  narrative	  poem	  Metamorphoses—of	  a	  sculptor	  called	  Pygmalion	  who	  falls	  in	  love	  with	  his	  sculpture	  (whom	  he	  names	  Galatea,	  after	  the	  sea	  nymph	  of	  Greek	  mythology).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  training	  of	  the	  AI	  in	  linguistics	  through	  classic	  works	  of	  Western	  literature—Rick’s	  outdated,	  fifteen-­‐year-­‐old	  conception	  of	  the	  canon—is	  reflected	  in	  George	  Bernard	  Shaw’s	  Pygmalion	  (1912),	  a	  play	  of	  manners	  in	  which	  a	  phonetics	  professor	  (again,	  because	  of	  a	  bet)	  tries	  to	  help	  the	  working	  class	  flower	  girl	  Eliza	  Doolittle	  improve	  her	  accent	  and	  social	  etiquette,	  thereby	  metaphorically	  bringing	  her	  to	  life.	  In	  the	  narrative	  itself,	  Rick	  refers	  to	  Shaw’s	  play	  directly,	  suggesting	  that	  Diana	  Hartrick	  (a	  Center	  scientist	  who	  is	  being	  educated	  by	  her	  colleagues	  in	  the	  pillars	  of	  classic	  literature,	  which,	  at	  the	  novel’s	  beginning,	  is	  Cervantes’	  
Don	  Quixote)	  is	  at	  the	  mercy	  of	  “the	  men	  who	  need	  to	  play	  Pygmalion”	  (Powers	  183).	  The	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irony	  is	  that	  Rick	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  realize	  he	  and	  Lentz	  are	  doing	  something	  very	  similar	  to	  an	  artificial	  consciousness	  capable	  of	  intellectual	  and	  emotional	  growth.	  Throughout	  the	  novel,	  Powers	  (as	  both	  first-­‐person	  narrator	  and	  author)	  and	  other	  characters	  make	  several	  knowing	  references	  to	  many	  of	  the	  greatest	  stories	  in	  western	  and	  eastern	  literature.	  Lentz,	  for	  example,	  is	  transposed	  into	  the	  role	  of	  Pinocchio’s	  lonely	  father:	  “Somewhere	  between	  then	  and	  now,”	  Rick	  reports,	  on	  the	  breathtaking	  advances	  in	  neural	  net	  technologies,	  “the	  idea	  of	  thought	  by	  artifice	  had	  come	  to	  life.	  And	  Lentz	  was	  one	  of	  its	  Geppettos”	  (Powers	  30).	  Helen’s	  eventual	  emotional	  desire	  for	  human	  experience,	  like	  the	  puppet	  boy	  of	  Carlo	  Collodi’s	  1883	  novel,	  only	  reinforces	  the	  metaphor.	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  important	  allusions	  that	  the	  novel	  draws	  upon,	  however,	  refer	  to	  Helen’s	  linguistic	  development.	  As	  her	  cognitive	  capabilities	  grow,	  she	  matches	  Frankenstein’s	  monster	  in	  what	  Rick	  considers	  to	  be	  “the	  most	  astonishing	  act	  of	  language	  acquisition”	  in	  literature.	  But	  the	  “creature	  had	  his	  chattering	  family	  and	  a	  knapsack	  of	  classics:	  Paradise	  Lost,	  Plutarch’s	  Lives,	  Goethe’s	  Werther”	  to	  help	  it;	  Helen,	  “like	  Tarzan,	  learned	  to	  talk	  more	  or	  less	  on	  print	  alone”	  (129).	  Still,	  Helen	  shares	  with	  Shelly’s	  creature	  the	  dubious	  privilege	  of	  possessing	  artificial	  life—an	  allusion	  not	  lost	  on	  Rick,	  assistant	  to	  Lentz’s	  Dr.	  Frankenstein.	  Updated	  for	  the	  digital	  age,	  the	  author’s	  allusions	  to	  these	  popular	  stories	  are	  foreshadowed	  and	  framed	  by	  the	  novel’s	  opening	  sentence,	  “It	  was	  like	  so,	  but	  wasn’t”	  (Powers	  3)—a	  stylistic	  echo	  of	  the	  beginning	  of	  many	  traditional	  Persian	  stories	  such	  as	  those	  in	  the	  One	  Thousand	  and	  One	  Nights.17	  This	  framing	  technique	  has	  a	  curiously	  wistful	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Powers’	  reliance	  on	  such	  literary	  devices	  and	  the	  conversational	  tone	  the	  narrator	  strikes	  would	  seem,	  at	  first	  glance,	  ill-­‐fitted	  to	  a	  work	  about	  artificial	  intelligence.	  However,	  its	  absorption	  in	  the	  intricacies	  of	  memory,	  emotional	  longing,	  and	  loss	  harmonize	  the	  different	  facets.	  Interestingly,	  in	  a	  rather	  meta-­‐referential	  moment,	  Rick	  uses	  what	  he	  describes	  as	  “‘the	  traditional	  fable	  opener’”	  of	  “‘[i]t	  went	  like	  this,	  but	  wasn’t’”	  in	  one	  of	  his	  many	  lessons	  with	  Helen	  (Powers	  319).	  This	  “paradoxical	  opener,”	  argues	  Saltzman,	  following	  Roman	  Jakobson,	  “achieves	  the	  poetic	  prerogative	  of	  affirming	  and	  undermining	  what	  follows”	  (198).	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and	  whimsical	  effect	  on	  Galatea	  2.2,	  a	  book	  about	  artificial	  intelligence,	  because	  it	  anticipates	  its	  preoccupation	  with	  storytelling,	  both	  spoken	  and	  written,	  and	  locates	  it	  within	  a	  constellation	  of	  oft-­‐told	  tales	  passed	  down	  from	  generation	  to	  generation.	  A	  few	  pages	  later,	  the	  allusion	  to	  The	  One	  Thousand	  and	  One	  Nights	  is	  extended,	  in	  what	  seems	  to	  Rick	  a	  natural	  comparison,	  to	  the	  web:	  “I	  eavesdropped	  on	  international	  discussion	  groups,	  ongoing,	  interactive	  Scheherazades	  that	  covered	  every	  imaginable	  theme	  from	  arms	  control	  to	  electronic	  erotica”	  (8).	  For	  him,	  the	  web	  is	  a	  source	  of	  one	  thousand	  and	  one	  (in	  fact,	  countless)	  fascinating	  tales—a	  million	  digital	  rabbit	  holes	  of	  data,	  discussion	  and	  cultural	  ephemera	  to	  get	  lost	  down.	  Indeed,	  the	  juxtaposition	  (read:	  connection)	  of	  past	  and	  future,	  conjured	  by	  the	  double	  sense	  of	  discovery	  and	  singular	  experience	  Rick	  invests	  in	  both	  (as	  both	  an	  early	  user	  of	  the	  web	  and	  the	  story’s	  default	  humanist	  node)	  is	  palpable.	  He	  experiences	  the	  web	  as	  something	  profound	  and	  richly	  rendered,	  almost	  magic,	  made	  especially	  for	  him	  alone.	  In	  this	  intimacy,	  the	  futuristic	  web	  is	  metaphorized	  into	  an	  immersive	  tome	  of	  ancient	  literature:	  “Alone	  in	  my	  office,”	  he	  confides,	  “blanketed	  by	  the	  hum	  of	  Center,	  I	  felt	  like	  a	  boy	  happening	  onto	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  Odyssey	  in	  a	  backwater	  valley	  library.	  I	  wanted	  to	  rush	  out	  into	  the	  hall	  and	  announce	  my	  each	  discovery”	  (Powers	  8).	  In	  essence,	  the	  novel	  becomes	  a	  fable	  of	  the	  future,	  its	  speculative	  aspects	  etched	  for	  posterity	  into	  human	  history	  and	  memory.	  We	  can	  also	  see	  this	  in	  the	  book’s	  larger	  narrative	  arc,	  in	  which	  its	  dueling	  strands—Rick’s	  work	  with	  Lentz	  at	  the	  Center	  and	  the	  nostalgic	  memories	  of	  his	  time	  in	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Europe	  with	  C.—literally	  interweave	  future	  and	  past	  on	  the	  physical	  page.	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Conclusion	  
	   Given	  that	  Galatea	  2.2	  is	  an	  early	  example	  of	  mainstream	  speculative	  fiction	  about	  digital	  technologies	  and	  technicity	  (where	  such	  technologies	  form	  and	  become	  a	  part	  of	  one’s	  own	  identity),	  it	  goes	  without	  saying	  that	  one	  of	  its	  chief	  concerns	  was	  to	  acclimate	  society	  to	  the	  digital.	  At	  the	  moment	  of	  widespread	  adoption	  of	  such	  technologies,	  a	  global	  shift	  that	  saw	  millions	  become	  almost	  instantly	  interconnected,	  the	  appearance	  of	  such	  work	  proved	  vital	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  analogue	  roadmap—a	  means	  of	  transition	  into	  the	  brave	  new	  digital	  world.	  “The	  scientific	  and	  technological	  events	  that	  occurred	  around	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  are	  startling,”	  reports	  Patricia	  S.	  Warrick,	  particularly	  the	  development	  of	  the	  atomic	  bomb,	  space	  exploration,	  and	  the	  field	  of	  cybernetics	  (8).	  Texts	  like	  Galatea	  2.2	  assumed	  a	  reactive	  cultural	  role	  to	  Norbert	  Weiner’s	  dream	  of	  artificial	  consciousness	  and	  “the	  radical	  social	  changes	  that	  the	  computer	  would	  cause”	  (Warrick	  8-­‐9).	  Moreover,	  such	  work	  acted	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  literary	  shorthand	  for	  the	  digital,	  both	  fuelling	  and	  produced	  by	  the	  emerging	  concepts	  of	  posthumanism,	  digital	  humanities,	  and	  a	  posthumanities.	  Operating	  within	  a	  “dynamics	  of	  information”	  (Hayles,	  How	  We	  Became	  Posthuman	  251),	  Galatea	  2.2	  is	  thus	  engaged	  in	  a	  massive	  recalibration	  of	  standard	  human	  epistemologies	  and	  ontologies	  as	  they	  relate	  to	  and	  impact	  upon	  (sense)	  data.	  As	  the	  AI	  becomes	  increasingly	  intricate	  in	  its	  associative	  processing	  power,	  to	  the	  point	  of	  seeming	  consciousness,	  readers	  are	  forced	  to	  re-­‐evaluate	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  human.	  More	  important,	  we	  are	  forced	  to	  react	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  destabilized	  subjectivity	  in	  a	  world	  of	  intelligent	  machines.	  It	  is	  surely	  no	  coincidence	  that	  the	  very	  meaning	  of	  ‘cybernetics’	  comprises	  “governance	  or	  control	  in	  social	  systems”	  as	  well	  as	  “mechanical	  systems”	  
93	  	  
(Warrick	  9).	  But	  while	  such	  a	  narrative	  of	  “reflections	  and	  disjunctions,	  presence	  and	  absence,	  materiality	  and	  signification,”	  can	  be	  unnerving,	  Hayles	  argues	  “the	  posthuman”	  aspect	  of	  digitality	  “appears	  not	  as	  humanity’s	  rival	  or	  successor	  but	  as	  a	  longed-­‐for	  companion,	  a	  consciousness	  to	  help	  humans	  feel	  less	  alone	  in	  the	  world”	  (How	  We	  Became	  
Posthuman	  271).	  	   The	  project	  depicted	  in	  the	  novel,	  which	  as	  I	  have	  argued	  stands	  as	  a	  literary	  commentary	  of	  the	  first	  real-­‐life	  digital	  humanities	  projects	  in	  the	  1990s,	  is	  born	  from	  these	  schisms.	  Rick	  and	  Lentz’s	  work	  with	  Helen—helping	  her	  to	  achieve	  cognition	  through	  the	  vagaries	  of	  English	  language	  and	  literature,	  and	  analyzing	  her	  interpretations	  in	  qualitative	  and	  quantitative	  terms—corresponds	  to	  the	  digital	  humanities’	  “computational	  approaches	  to	  humanities	  research…	  [in]	  the	  creation,	  preservation,	  and	  interpretation	  of	  the	  cultural	  record”	  (Burdick,	  et	  al.	  4).	  The	  narrative’s	  unification	  of	  the	  two	  cultures	  of	  the	  sciences	  and	  the	  humanities	  (represented	  by	  Lentz	  and	  Rick	  respectively)	  prefaces	  the	  proliferation	  of	  what	  Yu-­‐wei	  Lin	  describes	  as	  “‘data-­‐driven	  inquiry’	  or	  ‘cyber-­‐scholarship’”	  across	  the	  academy,	  marked	  by	  “innovative	  research	  methods”	  and	  “interdisciplinary	  collaboration	  on	  problems	  of	  common	  interest”	  (295).	  In	  Rick,	  we	  see	  a	  scholar	  and	  artist	  representative	  of	  the	  “spectrum	  of	  humanistic	  thought”	  that	  includes	  “the	  nature	  of	  knowledge,	  the	  world,	  and	  the	  human	  ability	  to	  establish	  understanding	  with	  various	  degrees	  of	  certainty”	  (Burdick,	  et	  al.	  4).	  However,	  the	  self-­‐reflexive	  reach	  of	  their	  digital	  wunderkind	  forces	  him	  (and	  Lentz,	  the	  empiricist)	  to	  re-­‐evaluate	  “many	  of	  the	  premises	  on	  which	  those	  understandings	  are	  based	  in	  order	  to	  make	  them	  operative	  in	  computational	  environments”	  (4).	  As	  he	  “scrambles	  for	  footing	  among	  neurophysics,	  cybernetics,	  and	  the	  other	  components	  of	  the	  quick	  sand	  at	  the	  cutting	  edge,”	  his	  connecting	  position	  between	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the	  realms	  hybridizes	  Rick	  as	  digital	  humanist.	  Here	  he	  “find[s]	  in	  the	  arts	  and	  sciences	  alike	  [not	  only]	  the	  crisp	  cadence	  of	  regulation”	  (Saltzman	  103-­‐04),	  but	  also	  a	  wider	  array	  of	  critical	  tools	  to	  use	  and	  mix	  in	  surprising	  combinations.	  	   With	  these	  aspects	  of	  the	  narrative	  in	  mind,	  we	  might	  consider	  Galatea	  2.2	  as	  a	  variation	  on	  “Technotext”—what	  Hayles	  conceives	  as	  “a	  literary	  work	  [that]	  interrogates	  the	  inscription	  technology	  that	  produces	  it”	  (Writing	  Machines	  25).	  In	  so	  doing,	  she	  suggests,	  “it	  mobilizes	  reflexive	  loops	  between	  its	  imaginative	  world	  and	  the	  material	  apparatus	  embodying	  that	  creation	  as	  a	  physical	  presence”	  (25).	  Helen’s	  associative	  matrix,	  a	  constellation	  of	  literary	  histories	  and	  anecdotes	  of	  Rick’s	  personal	  life,	  enacts	  a	  kind	  of	  feedback	  loop	  with	  the	  narrative	  itself.	  In	  the	  complex	  circuitry	  of	  the	  AI’s	  subsystems	  and	  neural	  nets,	  we	  perceive	  a	  set	  of	  adjacent	  mirrors	  infinitely	  propagating	  the	  image	  of	  itself-­‐as-­‐narrative.	  A	  machine	  like	  Helen	  produced	  the	  text	  in	  real	  life,	  just	  as	  Helen	  produces	  that	  text	  in	  the	  story.	  By	  virtue	  of	  its	  fusion	  with	  digital	  inscription	  and	  knowledge-­‐making	  technologies,	  then,	  the	  metanarrative	  approximates	  the	  “Technotext.”	  	   Throughout	  this	  chapter	  I	  have	  framed	  Galatea	  2.2	  as	  a	  literary	  document	  that—along	  with	  Cadigan’s	  Synners	  and	  the	  novels	  discussed	  in	  chapters	  3	  and	  4—has	  contributed	  to	  the	  cultural	  comprehension	  of	  digital	  technologies	  and	  subjective	  reality	  mediated	  by	  digital	  discourses.	  Moreover,	  I	  argued,	  the	  text’s	  amalgamation	  of	  technologies	  such	  as	  the	  Web	  and	  machine	  intelligence	  with	  literary	  and	  linguistic	  explorations	  of	  meaning,	  experience	  and	  epistemology	  point	  to	  its	  status	  as	  a	  fictional	  representation	  of	  early	  digital	  humanities.	  The	  collaborative	  learning	  sessions	  that	  take	  place	  between	  Rick	  and	  the	  artificial	  intelligence	  Helen	  act	  as	  a	  sine	  qua	  non	  for	  emergent	  posthumanist	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challenges	  to	  hegemonic,	  monolithic	  humanism	  and	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  two	  cultures	  into	  one	  another.	  	   In	  chapter	  3,	  entitled	  “Fast	  Times	  in	  the	  Datasphere:	  Education,	  the	  Library,	  and	  the	  Future	  of	  the	  Humanities	  in	  Vernor	  Vinge’s	  Rainbows	  End,”	  I	  will	  continue	  my	  analysis	  of	  the	  digital’s	  alchemical	  effects	  upon	  humanities	  practices	  and	  philosophies	  in	  speculative/science	  fiction.	  Vinge’s	  novel	  builds	  upon	  and	  amplifies	  the	  nineties	  visions	  of	  the	  preceding	  texts	  even	  as	  it	  dovetails	  with	  the	  real-­‐life	  entrenchment	  of	  digital	  epistemologies	  and	  ontologies.	  I	  will	  give	  particular	  attention	  to	  Vinge’s	  portrayal	  of	  the	  future	  of	  education	  (particularly	  in	  multimodal	  and	  collaborative	  composition),	  digital	  educational	  tools,	  academic	  scholarship,	  and	  the	  library	  as	  both	  a	  physical	  and	  conceptual	  space.	  In	  the	  process,	  I	  will	  also	  consider	  the	  narrative’s	  posthuman	  power	  struggle	  between	  digital	  natives	  and	  digital	  immigrants.	  This	  relationship	  is	  central	  to	  the	  contemporary,	  ideological	  shaping	  and	  understanding	  of	  (digital)	  humanities	  learning	  environments.	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3	  
Fast	  Times	  in	  the	  Datasphere	  Education,	  the	  Library,	  and	  the	  Future	  of	  the	  Humanities	  	  in	  Vernor	  Vinge’s	  Rainbows	  End	  
Marking	  its	  status	  as	  both	  contributor	  to	  and	  artifact	  of	  the	  digital	  age,	  Vernor	  Vinge	  dedicates	  his	  2006	  novel	  Rainbows	  End	  to	  “the	  Internet-­‐based	  cognitive	  tools	  that	  are	  changing	  our	  lives—Wikipedia,	  Google,	  eBay,	  and	  others	  of	  their	  kind,	  now	  and	  in	  the	  future.”	  As	  with	  all	  of	  the	  texts	  included	  in	  this	  project,	  the	  novel	  works	  as	  a	  piece	  of	  speculative	  fiction	  that,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  presupposes	  and	  culturally	  situates	  our	  digital	  moment,	  and	  on	  the	  other,	  emerges	  as	  an	  in	  situ	  product	  of	  that	  moment.	  This	  duality	  stems	  not	  from	  a	  symbiotic	  relationship	  with	  real-­‐life	  digital	  tools,	  but	  rather	  from	  a	  reflexive	  push	  and	  pull	  typical	  of	  genre	  fiction	  about	  the	  digital	  future.	  In	  other	  words,	  narratives	  that	  explore	  the	  boundaries	  of	  real	  world	  digital	  technologies	  (projections	  that	  are	  easy	  to	  follow	  in	  a	  culture	  already	  saturated	  by	  the	  digital)	  operate	  in	  dialectic	  with	  those	  technologies.	  	   Since	  Rainbows	  End	  appeared	  over	  a	  decade	  after	  Cadigan’s	  Synners	  and	  Powers’	  
Galatea	  2.2—an	  eon	  in	  technological	  development—the	  dialectic	  is	  much	  more	  pronounced.	  Wikipedia,	  Google,	  and	  other	  major	  Web	  2.0	  projects	  that	  Vinge’s	  novel	  corresponds	  to	  and	  builds	  upon	  only	  came	  to	  fruition	  at	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  new	  Millennium.18	  Set	  in	  the	  very	  near	  year	  of	  2025,	  the	  work	  offers	  a	  glimpse—along	  a	  trajectory	  that	  was	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Google,	  Inc.	  was	  founded	  September	  4,	  1998,	  and	  the	  Wikipedia	  website	  was	  launched	  January	  15,	  2001.	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and	  continues	  to	  be	  portentous	  to	  post-­‐Millennial	  readers—of	  education’s	  digital	  future	  and	  the	  status	  of	  the	  library	  as	  both	  a	  physical	  entity	  and	  a	  system	  of	  knowledge.	  These	  subjects	  are	  deeply	  informed	  by	  Vinge’s	  theoretical	  work	  on	  the	  Technological	  Singularity—an	  argument	  that	  permeates	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  his	  creative	  writing.19	  In	  his	  most	  famous	  essay	  on	  the	  subject,	  “The	  Coming	  Technological	  Singularity”	  (1993),	  Vinge	  defines	  the	  Singularity	  as	  the	  moment	  in	  which	  humanity	  is	  superseded	  and/or	  transformed	  by	  the	  self-­‐sustaining,	  exponential	  “acceleration	  of	  technological	  progress.”	  “Within	  thirty	  years,”	  he	  claims,	  “we	  will	  have	  the	  technological	  means	  to	  create	  superhuman	  intelligence.	  Shortly	  after,	  the	  human	  era	  will	  be	  ended.”	  As	  technologies	  play	  an	  increasingly	  central	  role	  in	  our	  shared	  epistemology	  and	  historicism,	  futurists	  like	  Vinge	  believe	  we	  are	  inching	  closer	  to	  an	  inevitable	  post-­‐humanity.	  Ray	  Kurzweil	  shares	  this	  perspective,	  arguing	  that	  the	  Singularity	  will	  be	  both	  rapid	  and	  deep	  in	  its	  transformation	  of	  humanity	  (7).	  Steven	  Shaviro	  frames	  the	  Singularity	  as	  “the	  supposed—and	  strictly	  speaking	  unimaginable—moment	  when	  the	  human	  race	  crosses	  a	  technological	  threshold,	  and	  definitively	  becomes	  posthuman.”	  This	  moment,	  he	  asserts,	  “will	  utterly	  change	  the	  nature	  of	  who	  we	  are	  and	  what	  we	  are”	  by	  definition	  (103).	  Still	  further,	  Doctorow	  has	  described	  the	  event	  as	  “the	  black	  hole	  in	  history	  that	  will	  be	  created	  at	  the	  moment	  when	  human	  intelligence	  can	  be	  digitized”—an	  exponential	  evolution	  during	  which	  “the	  speed	  and	  scope	  of	  our	  cognition	  is	  hitched	  to	  the	  price-­‐performance	  curve	  of	  microprocessors”	  (“When	  the	  Singularity”	  145).	  The	  narrative’s	  depiction	  of	  humanities	  institutions	  and	  practices	  as	  all-­‐digital	  environments,	  shaped	  and	  undergirded	  by	  technological	  “entities	  with	  greater	  than	  human	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  See	  especially	  “True	  Names”	  (1981),	  The	  Peace	  War	  (1984),	  “The	  Ungoverned”	  (1985),	  and	  Marooned	  in	  
Realtime	  (1986).	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intelligence”	  (Vinge,	  “Technological	  Singularity”	  12),	  sheds	  light	  on	  some	  of	  Vinge’s	  core	  philosophies	  about	  the	  advancement	  of	  technology	  and	  its	  potential	  role	  in	  the	  institutional	  humanities.	  It	  should	  not	  be	  surprising,	  then,	  that	  this	  book	  appeared	  at	  a	  time	  of	  growing	  interest	  for	  what	  Christine	  L.	  Borgman	  identifies	  as	  national	  “initiatives	  in	  cyberinfrastructure,	  e-­‐Science,	  e-­‐Social	  Science,	  e-­‐Humanities,	  e-­‐Research,	  and	  e-­‐Learning	  [that]	  emerged	  from	  a	  tumultuous	  period	  in	  scholarly	  communication	  in	  which	  technological	  advances	  converged	  with	  economic	  and	  institutional	  restructuring”	  (xvii).	  Indeed,	  as	  part	  of	  the	  United	  States’	  “larger	  cultural	  narrative	  of	  social-­‐progress-­‐through-­‐technology”	  (Selfe	  416),	  digital	  technologies	  have	  become	  a	  vital	  part	  of	  the	  country’s	  economic	  growth,	  infrastructure,	  social	  competency,	  and	  international	  future.	  This	  perspective,	  encouraged	  by	  neoliberal	  policies	  and	  attitudes	  of	  the	  Clinton	  administration,	  catalyzed	  the	  permeation	  of	  personal	  computers	  and	  other	  digital	  tools	  into	  U.S.	  education,	  libraries	  and	  other	  humanities	  spheres.	  For	  the	  first	  time	  in	  history,	  a	  whole	  generation	  was	  coming	  of	  age	  in	  contexts	  shaped	  by	  the	  World	  Wide	  Web,	  mass-­‐digitization	  of	  knowledge,	  the	  rise	  of	  smartphones	  and	  e-­‐book	  publishing,	  dramatic	  shifts	  in	  institutional	  infrastructures	  (such	  as	  libraries	  and	  universities),	  and	  other	  becoming-­‐digital	  frontiers.	  A	  1996	  government	  report,	  “Getting	  America’s	  Children	  Ready	  for	  the	  21st	  Century,”	  stressed	  the	  need	  for	  “technological	  literacy”	  in	  the	  near-­‐term—“‘the	  ability	  to	  use	  computers	  and	  other	  technology	  to	  improve	  learning,	  productivity	  and	  performance’”	  (quoted	  in	  Selfe	  416).	  Technological	  literacy	  was	  perceived	  as	  “‘fundamental	  to	  a	  person’s	  ability	  to	  navigate	  through	  society	  as	  traditional	  skills	  like	  reading,	  writing	  and	  arithmetic’”	  (“Getting	  America’s	  Children	  Ready,”	  quoted	  in	  Selfe	  411)—a	  point	  reiterated	  by	  Clinton	  himself:	  “‘Computers,	  the	  internet,	  and	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educational	  software	  can	  make	  a	  real	  difference	  in	  the	  way	  teachers	  and	  students	  learn…	  Our	  children	  will	  be	  “technologically	  literate,”	  and	  better	  prepared	  for	  the	  high-­‐tech,	  high-­‐wage	  jobs	  of	  the	  future’”	  (quoted	  in	  Harwood	  and	  Asal	  88-­‐89).	  While	  political	  rhetoric	  surrounding	  this	  evolution	  has	  tended	  to	  glaze	  over	  socioeconomic	  issues	  of	  unequal	  access	  and	  privilege	  (the	  so-­‐called	  “‘digital	  divide’”	  [Harwood	  and	  Asal	  89]),20	  Lee	  Rainie	  and	  Barry	  Wellman	  bolster	  Clinton’s	  perspective	  of	  rugged	  individualism	  through	  technology.	  The	  “networked	  individuals	  who	  thrive”	  in	  these	  new	  contexts,	  they	  argue,	  possess	  “a	  combination	  of	  talent,	  energy,	  altruism,	  social	  acuity,	  and	  tech-­‐savviness.”	  By	  “mastering	  a	  new	  set	  of	  literacies”	  instated	  by	  digitality,	  they	  suggest,	  such	  individuals	  are	  able	  to	  competently	  navigate	  and	  engage	  with	  networked	  society	  in	  a	  way	  others	  cannot	  (272).	  	   Within	  this	  new	  “digital	  stage”	  (Digirhet.org	  238)—a	  cultural	  moment	  defined	  by	  elasticity,	  convergence	  and	  interconnectedness—successful	  digital	  interactors	  must	  navigate	  between	  “their	  current	  individual,	  culturally	  situated	  literacies”	  (248)	  and	  “the	  possibilities	  for	  connectivity	  and	  communication—framed	  by	  convergence	  and	  interactivity”	  of	  digital	  tools	  (238).	  These	  are	  key	  requirements	  in	  contemporary	  humanities	  environments	  undergirded	  by	  the	  non-­‐linear,	  dynamic,	  multimodal	  demands	  of	  digital	  technologies.	  Now	  more	  than	  ever—as	  students,	  teachers,	  researchers,	  and	  beyond—we	  are	  called	  upon	  to	  “mix…	  match…	  mash…	  	  manifest”	  (Schnapp	  and	  Presner	  1);	  to	  effectively	  parse	  the	  flood	  of	  data	  and	  produce	  surprising	  digital	  compositions;	  to	  “create	  one	  cohesive	  text”	  with	  “multiple	  technologies”	  (Digirhet.org	  248).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Indeed,	  Scott	  Rosenberg	  writes	  in	  a	  1992	  San	  Francisco	  Examiner	  article,	  “Once	  whole	  worlds	  can	  be	  simulated	  for	  the	  senses,	  the	  only	  way	  to	  assure	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  public	  imagination	  will	  be	  to	  get	  the	  power	  to	  create	  those	  worlds	  out	  of	  the	  hands	  of	  an	  elite	  and	  into	  general	  circulation.	  As	  William	  Gibson	  put	  it:	  ‘The	  future	  has	  arrived—it's	  just	  not	  evenly	  distributed	  yet.’”	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Rainbows	  End	  is	  both	  a	  document	  of	  these	  emergent	  digital	  literacies	  and	  a	  textual	  signpost	  toward	  a	  future	  in	  which	  the	  digital	  humanities	  is	  increasingly	  central.	  In	  this	  future,	  digital	  humanities	  will	  assume	  a	  default	  and	  thus	  invisible	  cultural	  position.	  “[As]	  technologies	  go	  along	  the	  adoption	  cycle,”	  writes	  Melissa	  Terras,	  “certain	  aspects	  of	  digital	  research	  will	  just	  become	  normal	  for	  humanities	  scholars.”	  This	  chapter	  will	  explore	  two	  such	  strands	  of	  the	  cycle:	  the	  effect	  upon	  and/or	  efficacy	  of	  digital	  technologies	  in	  educational	  settings,	  and	  the	  digitization	  of	  the	  library.	  	  Building	  upon	  the	  liberal	  humanist/posthuman	  conflict	  in	  Galatea	  2.2,	  embodied	  in	  its	  protagonist	  Rick,	  I	  will	  begin	  by	  examining	  Vinge’s	  reflective	  delineation	  of	  the	  transition	  from	  traditional	  analogue	  modes	  of	  thinking	  and	  experience	  to	  multifaceted	  digital	  ones.	  I	  will	  also	  pay	  close	  attention	  to	  the	  relationships	  between	  digital	  natives	  and	  digital	  immigrants,	  which	  lie	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  this	  sociocultural	  evolution.	  I	  will	  then	  move	  onto	  an	  analysis	  of	  digital	  learning	  environments—particularly	  through	  the	  text’s	  depiction	  of	  advanced	  digital	  tools	  that	  supplement	  multimodal	  humanities	  work	  in	  composition.	  This	  part	  of	  my	  study	  is	  crucial	  to	  positioning	  Rainbows	  End	  as	  both	  a	  suggestion	  for	  and	  reflection	  of	  the	  current	  trajectory	  of	  western	  educational	  systems.	  Finally,	  in	  the	  concluding	  sections,	  I	  extend	  this	  argument	  to	  include	  what	  might	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  future-­‐now	  visionary	  reflections	  of	  humanities	  scholarship	  methodologies	  and	  institutions	  such	  as	  libraries	  and	  archives,	  which	  (as	  the	  novel	  effectively	  captures)	  are	  undergoing	  a	  massive	  real-­‐life	  digital	  recodification.	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A	  Messy	  Transition:	  Beyond	  the	  Humanities	  
	   For	  at	  least	  the	  last	  two	  decades,	  the	  adoption	  of	  digital	  tools	  into	  western	  learning	  environments	  has	  signaled	  a	  significant	  shift	  in	  the	  way	  humanities	  work	  is	  described,	  administered	  and	  practiced.	  However,	  these	  changes	  have	  been	  far	  from	  smooth,	  subject	  to	  uneven	  technological	  growth,	  implementation	  and	  access.	  In	  Vinge’s	  novel,	  the	  “‘messy	  transition’	  to	  a	  multimodal	  culture”	  (Digirhet.org	  248)	  is	  perhaps	  best	  represented	  through	  the	  protagonist	  Robert	  Gu,	  Sr.	  Through	  advances	  in	  genetic	  medicine,	  Robert,	  a	  once-­‐famous	  poet	  and	  English	  professor,	  is	  restored	  to	  physical	  and	  mental	  youth	  from	  Alzheimer’s,	  old	  age,	  and	  the	  decrepitude	  of	  a	  body	  “down	  to	  eighty	  pounds,	  a	  barely	  living	  vegetable”	  (Vinge,	  Rainbows	  End	  36).	  Though	  he	  may	  resemble	  a	  young	  man,	  his	  mind	  still	  belongs	  very	  much	  to	  a	  generation	  that,	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  novel’s	  present,	  was	  technologically	  primitive.	  	  Many	  of	  the	  older	  characters—many	  of	  whom	  are	  enrolled	  at	  Fairmont	  as	  adult	  students,	  or	  “retreads,”	  as	  their	  younger	  peers	  call	  them	  (Vinge,	  Rainbows	  End	  61)—often	  express	  feelings	  of	  frustration,	  confusion	  and	  alienation	  in	  their	  various	  interactions	  with	  newer	  digital	  tools	  and	  technologies.	  For	  Robert—poet,	  traditionalist,	  and	  the	  novel’s	  strawman—the	  culture	  shock	  that	  such	  advances	  have	  ushered	  in	  is	  particularly	  jarring.	  Indeed,	  throughout	  “his	  former	  life,	  Robert	  Gu	  had	  paid	  even	  less	  attention	  to	  technology	  than	  he	  had	  to	  current	  events.	  Human	  nature	  doesn’t	  change,	  and	  as	  a	  poet	  his	  job	  was	  to	  distill	  and	  display	  that	  unchanging	  essence”	  (Vinge,	  Rainbows	  End	  41).	  In	  a	  society	  of	  air	  taxis	  and	  digital	  wearables,	  however,	  the	  Platonic/Socratic,	  liberal	  humanist	  philosophy	  of	  timeless	  human	  essence—of	  a	  state	  of	  being	  as	  a	  priori	  to	  the	  temporal	  and	  spatial	  realities	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of	  the	  physical	  world—is	  difficult	  to	  maintain	  for	  a	  staunchly	  traditional	  scholar	  in	  his	  eighties.	  Robert’s	  most	  violent	  backlash	  against	  the	  proliferation	  of	  digital/posthuman	  culture	  happens	  during	  chapter	  seven,	  “The	  Ezra	  Pound	  Incident.”	  As	  he	  moves	  about	  the	  family	  house	  “in	  a	  panicked	  rage,	  trying	  to	  prove	  to	  himself	  that	  he	  [can]	  still	  write”	  poetry,	  technology	  (specifically,	  his	  foolscap	  view-­‐page21)	  becomes	  a	  major	  obstacle:	  	  [T]he	  only	  paper	  was	  the	  foolscap,	  and	  when	  he	  wrote	  on	  it,	  his	  scrawling	  penmanship	  was	  re-­‐formed	  into	  neat,	  fontified	  lines.	  That	  had	  been	  an	  irritation	  in	  days	  past,	  but	  never	  enough	  to	  force	  him	  to	  dig	  up	  real	  paper.	  Today,	  now…	  he	  could	  see	  that	  his	  soul	  was	  sucked	  out	  of	  the	  words	  before	  he	  could	  make	  them	  sing!	  It	  was	  the	  ultimate	  victory	  of	  automation	  over	  creative	  thought.	  Everything	  was	  beyond	  the	  direct	  touch	  of	  his	  hand.	  (Vinge,	  Rainbows	  End	  77-­‐78)	  As	  he	  sees	  it,	  technology	  has	  robbed	  him	  of	  his	  humanity	  and	  frustrated	  the	  ordered,	  liberal	  humanist	  worldview	  to	  which	  he	  has	  always	  clung.	  His	  words,	  the	  very	  essence	  and	  reflection	  of	  his	  own	  nature,	  are	  mercilessly	  “fontified”	  in	  rigid,	  uniform	  symbols	  that	  resist	  “the	  direct	  touch	  of	  [the	  writer’s]	  hand.”	  Given	  his	  proclivity	  for	  neo-­‐Luddism,	  for	  casting	  the	  mechanical	  as	  a	  barrier	  to	  art	  and	  the	  soul,	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  thinks	  of	  the	  crisis	  as	  “the	  ultimate	  victory	  of	  automation	  over	  creative	  thought”	  is	  unsurprising.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  mindset	  that	  he	  goes	  down	  to	  the	  basement,	  looking	  for	  the	  old	  printed	  books	  his	  son	  Bob	  saved	  for	  him.	  Physical	  books	  evoke	  feelings	  of	  nostalgia	  for	  Robert—whimsical	  childhood	  summers	  “lying	  on	  the	  sofa,”	  reading	  “his	  way	  through	  frivolous	  trash	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  A	  view-­‐page.	  This	  is	  the	  first	  computer	  that	  Robert	  uses	  after	  recovering	  from	  the	  health	  rejuvenation	  (Venn-­‐Kurasawa)	  treatments.	  Though	  it	  is	  not	  as	  advanced	  as	  other	  systems	  such	  as	  the	  Epiphany	  Lite	  used	  by	  most	  of	  the	  younger	  generation,	  the	  view-­‐page	  is	  a	  touch-­‐enabled	  electronic	  sheet	  of	  foolscap	  paper—flexible,	  compact	  and	  decades	  ahead	  of	  current	  real-­‐life	  computer	  models.	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and	  deep	  wisdom”	  (Vinge,	  Rainbows	  End	  78).	  There	  is	  a	  tactile,	  locative	  component	  to	  the	  memories,	  which	  he	  associates	  with	  the	  discovery	  of	  truth	  (more	  than	  he	  ever	  learned	  in	  high	  school)	  and	  his	  erstwhile	  ability	  “to	  make	  words	  sing”	  (78).	  Though	  most	  of	  the	  materials	  are	  worthless,	  and	  the	  few	  remaining	  valuable	  books	  have	  been	  “read	  only	  by	  silverfish	  these	  last	  ten	  years,”	  these	  moldy	  artifacts	  represent	  for	  Robert	  a	  material	  link	  to	  the	  pre-­‐digital	  past:	  “Unlike	  the	  libraries	  that	  floated	  in	  cyberspace,	  this	  was	  something	  he	  could	  hold	  in	  his	  hands”	  (78).	  In	  this	  sense,	  he	  is	  in	  line	  with	  contemporary	  studies22	  that	  suggest,	  as	  Ferris	  Jabr	  contends	  in	  a	  2013	  Scientific	  American	  piece,	  “modern	  screens	  and	  e-­‐readers	  fail	  to	  adequately	  recreate	  certain	  tactile	  experiences	  of	  reading	  on	  paper	  that	  many	  people	  miss	  and,	  more	  importantly,	  prevent	  people	  from	  navigating	  long	  texts	  in	  an	  intuitive	  and	  satisfying	  way.”	  Indeed,	  like	  many	  of	  us	  today,	  Robert	  still	  identifies	  with	  the	  “‘physicality	  in	  reading’”	  that	  forms	  part	  of	  one’s	  psychological	  material	  experience	  (Wolf,	  quoted	  in	  Jabr).	  When	  Robert’s	  granddaughter	  Miri	  comes	  down	  to	  the	  basement,	  she	  is	  puzzled	  as	  to	  why	  he	  is	  down	  there.	  The	  trouble	  as	  she	  sees	  it	  is	  simply	  one	  of	  access	  to	  digital	  forms	  of	  information	  which,	  when	  overcome,	  will	  improve	  the	  quality	  of	  his	  life:	  “‘The	  problem	  is	  that	  you	  can’t	  access	  what’s	  all	  around	  us.	  That’s	  why	  you’re	  down	  here	  reading	  these	  old	  books,	  right?’”	  She	  cannot	  understand	  why	  anyone	  would	  want	  to	  make	  access	  to	  information	  more	  difficult	  by	  using	  outmoded	  codex	  methodologies.	  She	  misinterprets	  his	  physical	  youth	  as	  a	  sign	  that	  he	  is	  “‘starting	  almost	  fresh’”	  and	  that	  it	  will	  be	  “‘easy	  for	  [him]	  to	  learn	  the	  new	  things’”	  (Vinge,	  Rainbows	  End	  79).	  On	  the	  contrary,	  the	  old	  poet	  does	  not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  See,	  for	  example,	  Jin	  Gerlach	  and	  Peter	  Buxmann,	  “Investigating	  the	  Acceptance	  of	  Electronic	  Books:	  The	  Impact	  of	  Haptic	  Dissonance	  on	  Innovation	  Adoption”	  (2011),	  and	  Anne	  Mangen,	  et	  al.,	  “Reading	  Linear	  Texts	  on	  Paper	  versus	  Computer	  Screen:	  Effects	  on	  Reading	  Comprehension”	  (2013).	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wish	  to	  be	  dislodged	  from	  the	  locus	  of	  liberal	  humanist	  privilege	  that	  stands	  in	  contradistinction	  to	  “the	  posthuman,”	  which	  “appears	  when	  computation	  rather	  than	  possessive	  individualism	  is	  taken	  as	  the	  ground	  of	  being,	  a	  move	  that	  allows	  the	  posthuman	  to	  be	  seamlessly	  articulated	  with	  intelligent	  machines”	  (Hayles,	  How	  We	  Became	  
Posthuman	  33).	  For	  Robert,	  Miri’s	  bossy	  attitude,	  short	  attention	  span,	  and	  superficial	  grasp	  on	  life	  and	  truth	  are	  markers	  of	  the	  essential	  emptiness	  of	  the	  digital	  age—a	  chapter	  in	  humanity’s	  history	  (as	  he	  might	  phrase	  it)	  “Told	  by	  an	  idiot,	  full	  of	  sound	  and	  fury,	  /	  Signifying	  nothing”	  (Shakespeare	  V.v.26-­‐27).	  He	  shoves	  a	  battered	  copy	  of	  Ezra	  Pound’s	  poetry	  in	  his	  granddaughter’s	  face	  and	  asks	  if	  she	  knows	  the	  author’s	  work.	  Naturally,	  for	  a	  weary	  humanist,	  the	  answer	  is	  infuriating:	  	  “Well…	  yes,	  I’ve	  got	  all	  her	  stuff	  [sic].	  Let	  me	  show	  you,	  Robert!”	  She	  hesitated,	  then	  saw	  the	  foolscap	  lying	  atop	  a	  box.	  She	  picked	  it	  up	  and	  it	  came	  to	  life.	  Titles	  streamed	  down	  the	  page,	  the	  cantos,	  the	  essays—even,	  God	  help	  us,	  later	  criticism	  from	  the	  mindless	  depths	  of	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century.	  “But	  seeing	  it	  on	  this	  page	  is	  like	  looking	  through	  a	  keyhole,	  Robert.	  I	  can	  show	  you	  how	  to	  see	  it	  all	  around	  you.”	  (Vinge,	  Rainbows	  End	  79)	  There	  is	  a	  massive	  generational	  disconnect	  here	  between	  depth	  of	  understanding	  (defined	  by	  hard	  study	  and	  contemplation)	  and	  breadth	  of	  available	  information	  (defined	  by	  convenience	  and	  ease	  of	  access).	  Instead	  of	  taking	  the	  book	  and	  looking	  through	  it,	  Miri	  reflexively	  calls	  up	  Ezra	  Pound’s	  entire	  works	  and	  related	  criticism	  on	  Robert’s	  electronic	  view-­‐page.	  The	  action	  is	  performed	  by	  muscle	  memory,	  adamant	  that	  her	  grandfather’s	  traditions	  limit	  his	  awareness	  to	  a	  field	  of	  vision	  no	  larger	  than	  the	  keyhole	  of	  a	  locked	  door.	  In	  this,	  she	  is	  undoubtedly	  a	  product	  of	  her	  era’s	  hyperconnected,	  all-­‐digital	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configuration	  and	  the	  absolute	  counterpoint	  of	  her	  grandfather.	  “What	  was	  art,”	  Robert	  wonders,	  bitterly,	  “now	  that	  surface	  perfection	  was	  possible?”	  (162).	  
Digital	  Natives	  and	  Digital	  Immigrants	  
The	  term	  retread	  is	  used	  often	  to	  refer	  to	  those	  like	  Robert	  whose	  life	  has	  been	  extended	  through	  Venn-­‐Kurasawa	  treatments.	  However,	  since	  it	  is	  often	  applied	  to	  adult	  students	  in	  general,	  retread	  also	  implicitly	  signifies	  both	  the	  repetition	  of	  formative	  education	  and,	  most	  important,	  the	  stigma	  of	  probable	  digital	  illiteracy.	  Though	  brilliant	  in	  their	  prime,	  the	  older	  students	  attend	  Ms.	  Chumlig’s	  classes	  on	  composition	  because	  they	  lack	  the	  basic	  digital	  skills	  that	  high	  school	  students	  like	  Juan	  and	  Miri	  take	  for	  granted.	  In	  this	  context,	  digital	  illiteracy	  is	  invariably	  addressed	  with	  systemic,	  pervasive	  prejudice.	  For	  example,	  when	  Robert’s	  family	  suggests	  he	  enroll	  at	  Fairmont	  to	  acquire	  “‘new	  skills	  [he	  might]	  like	  to	  master,’”	  Miri	  points	  out	  that	  such	  special	  learning	  environments	  are	  part	  of	  “‘our	  vocational	  track.	  A	  few	  old	  people	  and	  lots	  of	  teenage	  dumbheads.	  It’s	  dull,	  dull,	  dull’”	  (Vinge,	  Rainbows	  End	  46).	  In	  like	  disregard,	  Juan	  later	  implies	  that	  the	  retreads	  of	  remedial	  classes	  like	  Ms.	  Chumlig’s	  (though,	  again,	  very	  successful	  in	  their	  former	  respective	  fields)	  must	  be,	  through	  digital	  cluelessness,	  automatically	  incompetent	  humans	  beings:	  As	  for	  the	  old	  students…	  competent	  retreads	  would	  never	  be	  here;	  they’d	  be	  rich	  and	  famous,	  the	  people	  who	  owned	  most	  of	  the	  real	  world.	  The	  ones	  in	  Adult	  Education	  were	  the	  has-­‐beens.	  These	  people	  trickled	  into	  Fairmont	  all	  through	  the	  semester.	  (Vinge,	  Rainbows	  End	  61)	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Given	  that	  the	  younger	  students	  like	  Juan	  were	  born	  into	  and	  grew	  up	  in	  a	  digitally	  networked	  environment,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  see	  why	  they	  are	  so	  critical.	  They	  are	  “Digtial	  Native[s],”	  whose	  unprecedented	  “access	  to	  networked	  digital	  technologies	  and	  strong	  computer	  skills	  and	  knowledge”	  has	  engendered	  “a	  common	  global	  culture”	  (Palfrey	  and	  Gasser	  352).	  Robert,	  “always	  the	  last	  to	  get	  on	  board”	  with	  computers,	  needs	  the	  familiar	  skeumorphic	  metaphors	  of	  the	  old	  systems.	  His	  first	  ‘computer’	  post-­‐treatment—a	  view-­‐page,	  practically	  archaic	  by	  the	  narrative’s	  present	  standards—is	  infinitely	  more	  powerful,	  alien	  and	  compact	  than	  anything	  he	  has	  experienced.	  Thus,	  the	  option	  to	  revert	  to	  an	  older	  Microsoft	  GUI	  is	  a	  huge	  relief:	  	  [H]e	  pressed	  his	  finger	  to	  the	  line	  of	  text	  that	  said	  “WinME.”	  There	  was	  no	  pause,	  none	  of	  the	  boot-­‐up	  delays	  he	  recalled.	  But	  suddenly	  a	  familiar	  and	  annoying	  musical	  jingle	  was	  in	  the	  air.	  It	  seemed	  to	  come	  from	  all	  around,	  not	  from	  the	  piece	  of	  paper.	  Now	  the	  page	  was	  full	  of	  color	  and	  icons.	  Robert	  was	  filled	  with	  nostalgia,	  remembering	  many	  frustrating	  hours	  spent	  in	  front	  of	  glowing	  computer	  screens.	  (Vinge,	  Rainbows	  End	  39)	  Juan	  and	  Miri,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  are	  at	  home	  in	  their	  generation’s	  special	  register	  of	  wearable	  computing	  and	  hyperconnectivity.	  Through	  Epiphany	  Lite,	  a	  wearable	  operating	  system	  that	  relies	  solely	  on	  gesture	  (“ensemble	  coding”	  [Vinge,	  Rainbows	  End	  61]),	  these	  digital	  natives	  are	  able	  to	  parse	  and	  communicate	  with	  the	  world	  around	  them	  to	  a	  far	  greater	  degree.	  Such	  a	  mentality	  is	  an	  explicit	  projection	  of	  our	  current	  cultural	  immersion	  in	  digital	  living,	  and	  finds	  early	  analogues	  in	  Google	  Glass	  and	  the	  emerging	  smart	  watch	  market.	  As	  in	  the	  novel,	  Howard	  Gardner	  and	  Katie	  Davis	  argue	  that	  “young	  people	  growing	  up	  in	  our	  time	  are	  not	  only	  immersed	  in	  apps:	  they’ve	  come	  to	  think	  of	  the	  world	  as	  an	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ensemble	  of	  apps,	  to	  see	  their	  lives	  as	  a	  string	  of	  ordered	  apps,	  or	  perhaps,	  in	  many	  cases,	  a	  single,	  extended,	  cradle-­‐to-­‐grave-­‐app.”	  The	  authors	  call	  this	  latter	  concept	  a	  “‘super-­‐app’”	  (7-­‐8).	  In	  effect,	  the	  Epiphany	  Lite—both	  the	  soft-­‐	  and	  hardware—is	  a	  literary	  manifestation	  of	  this	  so-­‐called	  super-­‐app,	  particularly	  in	  its	  capacity	  to	  provide	  an	  always	  connected,	  self-­‐contained,	  and	  totalizing	  worldview.	  By	  comparison,	  Robert’s	  view-­‐page	  is	  child’s	  play.	  In	  fact,	  the	  ability	  to	  wear,	  shorthand	  for	  digital	  literacy,	  is	  for	  many	  a	  necessity.	  As	  Miri	  tells	  her	  grandfather,	  “Once	  you	  learn	  to	  wear,	  you	  can	  learn	  anything.	  Right	  now,	  you’re	  in	  a	  trap;	  it’s	  like	  you’re	  seeing	  the	  world	  through	  a	  little	  hole,	  just	  whatever	  your	  naked	  eye	  sees—and	  what	  you	  can	  get	  from	  that.”	  However,	  “With	  some	  practice,”	  she	  assures	  him,	  “you	  should	  be	  able	  to	  see	  and	  hear	  as	  good	  as	  anyone”	  (Vinge,	  Rainbows	  End	  46).	  The	  implication,	  of	  course,	  is	  that	  he	  is	  handicapped	  in	  a	  sociocultural	  sense—blind	  and	  deaf	  to	  dynamic	  sights	  and	  sounds	  of	  enhanced	  reality.	  If	  he	  is	  to	  survive	  in	  this	  new	  life,	  he	  must	  adapt	  to	  a	  heavily	  mediated	  reality	  in	  which	  everything	  and	  everyone	  is	  networked	  together.	  	  For	  all	  of	  the	  narrative’s	  retreads	  (and,	  by	  extension,	  us),	  the	  threat/warning	  of	  obsolescence	  in	  Fairmont	  High’s	  school	  motto	  is	  doubly	  applicable.	  In	  Vinge’s	  2002	  short	  story	  “Fast	  Times	  at	  Fairmont	  High”	  (the	  basis	  for	  Rainbows	  End),	  the	  school’s	  hyperconnected	  students	  work	  under	  the	  daunting	  dictum	  “‘[t]rying	  hard	  not	  to	  become	  obsolete’”	  (409).	  As	  an	  educational	  mission	  statement	  it	  speaks	  to	  the	  greater	  anxiety	  of	  living	  in	  an	  environment	  constantly	  transformed	  by	  technologies	  that	  always	  already	  threaten	  to	  render	  current	  knowledge	  and	  skillsets	  obsolete.	  The	  students	  must	  operate—like	  all	  of	  us—within	  this	  contemporary	  anxiety.	  In	  our	  moment	  of	  systematic	  digital	  fluctuation	  within	  and	  across	  institutions,	  we	  are	  forced	  to	  confront	  the	  possibility	  of	  being	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outmoded	  by	  shifting	  priorities,	  paradigms,	  and	  discursive	  practices	  that	  accompany	  technological	  progression.	  In	  her	  2011	  work	  Planned	  Obsolescence:	  Publishing,	  Technology,	  
and	  the	  Future	  of	  the	  Academy,	  Fitzpatrick	  explores	  this	  issue,	  asserting	  that	  we	  in	  the	  humanities,	  and	  in	  the	  academy	  more	  broadly,	  face	  what	  is	  less	  a	  material	  obsolescence	  than	  an	  institutional	  one;	  we	  are	  entrenched	  in	  systems	  that	  no	  longer	  serve	  our	  needs.	  But	  because	  we	  are,	  by	  and	  large,	  our	  institutions—or	  rather,	  because	  they	  are	  us—the	  greatest	  challenge	  we	  face	  is	  not	  that	  obsolescence,	  but	  our	  response	  to	  it.	  (13)	  In	  much	  the	  same	  way,	  the	  novel’s	  older	  characters—entrenched	  in	  a	  system	  that	  both	  rewards	  students	  for	  their	  digital	  fluency	  and	  relies	  upon	  their	  tacit,	  native	  knowledge	  of	  its	  codification—must	  attempt	  to	  recalibrate	  their	  response	  to	  these	  shifts	  if	  they	  hope	  to	  assimilate.	  Dr.	  Xiu	  Xiang	  (a	  once-­‐respected	  computer	  scientist)	  expresses	  her	  frustration	  in	  this	  regard	  early	  in	  the	  novel,	  during	  shop	  class.	  To	  Juan,	  shop	  class	  is	  “like	  a	  premium	  game;	  there	  were	  real	  gadgets	  to	  touch	  and	  connect”—where	  tactile	  experience	  is	  a	  novelty	  in	  a	  society	  psychologically	  informed	  by	  the	  virtual.	  He	  is	  proficient	  in	  the	  gesture-­‐based	  routines	  favored	  by	  the	  era’s	  digital	  tools,	  and	  cringes	  when	  he	  has	  to	  assist	  Dr.	  Xiang	  by	  “spelling	  out	  navigation	  in	  words”	  (Vinge,	  Rainbows	  End	  64).	  Dr.	  Xiang,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  can	  only	  lament	  her	  fall	  from	  techno-­‐scientific	  excellence:	  “‘Once	  I	  knew	  these	  things,’	  she	  said.	  ‘See	  that.’	  She	  pointed	  at	  a	  section	  in	  the	  museum	  pages:	  Xiang’s	  Secure	  Hardware	  
Environment.	  ‘I	  designed	  that	  system.’”	  After	  Juan’s	  reply,	  she	  adds,	  “‘I	  don’t	  understand	  even	  the	  principles	  of	  these	  new	  components.	  They	  look	  more	  like	  pond	  scum	  than	  self-­‐respecting	  optical	  semiconductors’”	  (Vinge,	  Rainbows	  End	  64).	  Dr.	  Xiang’s	  struggle	  to	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comprehend	  the	  current	  iteration	  of	  a	  digital	  architecture	  that	  she	  initially	  designed—a	  work	  now	  archived	  as	  a	  museum	  exhibit—is	  acutely	  ironic.	  The	  sadness	  she	  expresses	  is	  surely	  magnified	  by	  both	  Juan’s	  native	  aptitude	  as	  a	  born	  digital	  high	  school-­‐age	  student,	  far	  beyond	  her	  own,	  and	  his	  assumed	  role	  as	  her	  instructor.	  Moreover,	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  Secure	  Hardware	  Environment	  also	  attest	  to	  Dr.	  Xiang’s	  once	  critical	  role	  in	  developing	  technologies	  that	  would	  allow	  every	  aspect	  of	  the	  humanities	  to	  be	  monitored	  and	  regulated	  by	  the	  NSA	  and	  shady	  corporate	  interests.	  Obsolescence	  is,	  in	  this	  sense,	  more	  than	  an	  empty	  signifier	  in	  a	  school	  motto.	  But	  while	  there	  are	  obvious	  differences	  between	  the	  born	  digital	  natives	  and	  the	  older	  retreads	  of	  Rainbows	  End,	  both	  generations	  share	  in	  the	  era’s	  relentless	  flood	  of	  information,	  dealing	  to	  varying	  degrees	  of	  success	  with	  issues	  of	  “information	  quality	  and	  overload”	  (Palfrey	  and	  Gasser	  276).	  In	  this	  new	  framework,	  Robert	  and	  the	  other	  older	  students	  are	  forced	  to	  become	  “Digital	  Immigrants”—non-­‐native	  users	  of	  digital	  technologies	  born	  before	  the	  dawn	  of	  the	  digital	  era	  (Palfrey	  and	  Gasser	  352).	  Robert,	  like	  his	  peers	  Dr.	  Xiang	  and	  Winston	  Blount	  (the	  former	  Dean	  of	  Arts	  and	  Letters	  at	  the	  University	  of	  California	  –	  San	  Diego),	  must	  brave	  the	  challenges	  of	  attaining	  digital	  literacy.	  Marveling	  at	  the	  concept	  of	  wearable	  tech—“IBM	  PC	  meets	  Epiphany-­‐brand	  high-­‐fashion”—Robert’s	  eventual	  mastery	  of	  Epiphany	  eye	  contacts	  is	  described	  as	  “a	  moment	  of	  pure	  joy,”	  allowing	  him	  to	  type	  a	  query	  on	  a	  phantom	  keyboard	  and	  view	  the	  Google	  response	  floating	  in	  the	  air.	  Indeed,	  he	  reflects,	  there	  is	  “a	  feeling	  of	  power	  in	  being	  able	  to	  draw	  answers	  out	  of	  thin	  air.”	  Moreover,	  Juan’s	  lessons	  in	  “‘ensemble	  coding’”	  make	  him	  feel	  giddy	  like	  “a	  boy	  with	  a	  new	  computer	  game”	  and,	  paradoxically,	  like	  “a	  trained	  rat”	  (Vinge,	  Rainbows	  End	  111).	  Later,	  as	  he	  improves	  his	  digital	  literacy	  and	  gesture-­‐based	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abilities	  in	  ensemble	  coding,	  such	  contradictions	  are	  resolved.	  His	  technological	  accomplishments	  fill	  him	  with	  exuberance.	  Projections	  of	  virtual	  reality	  are	  no	  longer	  hollow	  deceptions,	  but	  “three-­‐dimensional	  success[es],	  and	  everything	  that	  [Juan]	  had	  claimed	  about	  retinal	  painting”	  (106).	  Technology	  is	  empowering.	  The	  traditional	  humanist	  tendencies	  in	  Robert	  held	  him	  back	  from	  the	  possibilities	  alluded	  to	  by	  the	  very	  name	  of	  the	  OS,	  Epiphany.	  The	  transition	  from	  stubborn	  humanist	  to	  a	  dynamic	  posthuman	  intimately	  connected	  with	  his	  past	  correlates	  with	  his	  adjustment	  to	  digital	  society	  as—to	  paraphrase	  Rainie	  and	  Wellman—a	  networked	  individual	  who	  thrives	  (272).	  The	  Orozco-­‐Gu	  collaborative	  multimodal	  project,	  presented	  for	  the	  final	  exam	  in	  Ms.	  Chumlig’s	  Creative	  Composition	  class	  (more	  on	  this	  later),	  represents	  the	  culmination	  of	  this	  transition.	  Digital	  natives	  and	  immigrants	  must	  also	  both	  navigate	  one	  of	  the	  novel’s	  core	  allegorical	  anxieties:	  the	  educational	  efficacy/value	  of	  digital	  tools	  and	  whether	  they	  help	  (enable)	  or	  hurt	  (disable)	  one’s	  social	  and	  cognitive	  development.	  According	  to	  Gardner	  and	  Davis,	  such	  tools	  “are	  great	  if	  they	  take	  care	  of	  ordinary	  stuff	  and	  thereby	  free	  us	  to	  explore	  new	  paths,	  form	  deeper	  relationships,	  ponder	  the	  biggest	  mysteries	  of	  life,	  forge	  a	  unique	  and	  meaningful	  identity.”	  But	  these	  same	  tools,	  they	  suggest,	  also	  continually	  threaten	  to	  “turn	  us	  into	  more	  skilled	  couch	  potatoes	  who	  do	  not	  think	  for	  ourselves,	  or	  pose	  new	  questions,	  or	  develop	  significant	  relationships,	  or	  fashion	  an	  appropriate,	  rounded,	  and	  continually	  evolving	  sense	  of	  self”	  (9).	  Like	  many	  of	  us	  these	  days,	  for	  whom	  the	  answer	  to	  a	  question	  is	  merely	  a	  Google	  search	  away,	  Juan	  and	  his	  cohorts	  have	  access	  to	  a	  vast,	  infinite	  information	  network—an	  external	  brain	  that	  can	  and	  often	  does	  take	  care	  of	  the	  heavy	  lifting	  in	  thinking	  and	  communicating	  practices.	  When	  Ms.	  Chumlig	  makes	  a	  passing	  reference	  in	  her	  class	  to	  “‘deuces	  and	  treys,’”	  for	  example,	  some	  of	  the	  students	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immediately	  begin	  to	  search	  the	  network	  for	  her	  meaning:	  “[Y]ou	  could	  see	  their	  fingers	  tapping	  away,	  searching	  on	  ‘deuces’	  and	  ‘treys’”	  (Vinge,	  Rainbows	  End	  60).	  On	  the	  topic	  of	  Google’s	  powerful	  search	  functionality	  (the	  obvious	  analogue	  here),	  Nicholas	  Carr	  suggests	  that	  digital	  technologies	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  erode	  the	  “capacity	  for	  concentration	  and	  contemplation.	  My	  mind	  now	  expects	  to	  take	  in	  information	  the	  way	  the	  Net	  distributes	  it:	  in	  a	  swiftly	  moving	  stream	  of	  particles”	  (“Is	  Google	  Making	  Us	  Stupid?”).	  Cris	  Rowan	  reiterates	  the	  point,	  noting	  that	  digital	  “[h]igh	  speed	  media	  content	  can	  contribute	  to	  attention	  deficit,	  as	  well	  as	  decreased	  concentration	  and	  memory”	  in	  children	  and	  adolescents	  unless	  it	  is	  carefully	  regulated.	  This	  issue	  is	  broached	  again	  in	  Rainbows	  End	  through	  the	  convenience	  of	  wearable	  tech	  audio	  search.	  “[W]hen	  you	  heard	  a	  word	  you	  didn’t	  know,	  if	  you	  could	  tag	  it,	  then	  search	  results	  would	  appear	  automatically.	  That	  explained	  the	  marvelous	  vocabulary—and	  equally	  marvelous	  screw-­‐ups…	  in	  the	  children’s	  language”	  (Vinge	  149).	  	  The	  threat	  of	  attenuated	  concentration	  and/or	  shallow	  understanding	  posed	  by	  digital	  technologies,	  especially	  for	  digital	  natives,	  is	  either	  a	  problem	  or	  of	  no	  concern	  (being	  part	  of	  a	  natural	  posthuman	  progression)	  depending	  on	  the	  perspective.	  Either	  way,	  as	  the	  narrative	  indicates,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  widespread	  sociocultural	  embrace	  of	  Internet	  search,	  cloud	  storage,	  app-­‐	  and	  smartphone-­‐based	  conveniences,	  etc.,	  is	  permanently	  binding	  us	  to	  our	  external	  brains.	  And	  in	  many	  institutional	  humanities	  environments	  such	  as	  the	  classroom—again,	  as	  the	  narrative	  shows—this	  can	  actually	  be	  advantageous	  to	  learning,	  research,	  and	  pedagogy	  processes	  and	  practices.	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In	  many	  ways,	  the	  parts	  of	  Vinge’s	  narrative	  that	  relate	  to	  Fairmont	  High	  can	  be	  read	  as	  a	  response	  to	  Isaac	  Asimov’s	  predictions	  for	  the	  future	  direction	  of	  U.S.	  education,	  literacy	  and	  creativity.	  In	  a	  1988	  television	  interview	  with	  Bill	  Moyers,	  Asimov	  suggested	  that	  computers	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  revolutionize	  the	  paradigm	  of	  learning	  by	  establishing	  “for	  the	  first	  time…	  a	  one-­‐to-­‐one	  relationship	  between	  information	  source	  and	  information	  consumer.”	  Far	  from	  being	  tools	  that	  simply	  “dehumanize	  learning,”	  he	  argued,	  such	  machines	  not	  only	  liberate	  humans	  from	  stultifying	  labor,	  but	  also	  offer	  dynamic	  solutions	  that	  can	  help	  educate	  children	  “into	  appreciating	  [and	  developing]	  their	  own	  creativity”	  from	  an	  early	  age	  (Bill	  Moyers	  Journal).	  As	  contextual	  digital	  spaces,	  Ms.	  Chumlig’s	  composition	  classes	  (Search	  and	  Analysis,	  and	  Creative	  Composition,	  respectively)	  are	  rendered	  holistically	  as	  digital	  learning	  environments	  that	  extend	  far	  beyond	  their	  physical	  walls.	  Jon	  Lanestedt	  defines	  “[d]igital	  learning	  environments”	  as	  “a	  common	  label	  for	  digital	  media	  solutions…	  [that]	  include	  tools,	  various	  levels	  of	  infrastructure,	  media,	  and	  learning	  resources	  supporting	  teaching	  and	  learning	  processes	  in	  educational	  institutions”	  (67).	  In	  the	  utilization	  of	  digital	  technologies	  to	  empower	  and	  reshape	  the	  linear,	  one-­‐way	  nature	  of	  learning,	  research,	  and	  pedagogy	  practices,	  the	  digital	  learning	  environments	  of	  Rainbows	  End	  offer	  readers	  a	  suggestion	  of	  where	  such	  environments	  in	  western	  education	  are	  heading.	  In	  Search	  and	  Analysis,	  one	  of	  core	  subjects	  in	  the	  school’s	  curriculum,	  Juan,	  Robert,	  and	  the	  other	  students	  are	  trained	  in	  the	  narrative	  world’s	  primary	  cultural	  and	  economic	  currency	  of	  information	  retrieval,	  processing,	  and	  manipulation.	  These	  digital	  research	  techniques	  are	  similar	  to	  current	  digital	  humanities	  practices	  and	  methodologies.	  Indeed,	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true	  to	  the	  digital	  humanities’	  goal	  of	  “making	  creative	  use	  of	  digital	  technology	  to	  advance	  humanities	  research	  and	  teaching,”	  as	  the	  4Humanities	  mission	  statement	  makes	  clear	  (“Mission”),	  the	  class	  combines	  the	  “fundamental	  interpretive	  methodologies	  of	  humanities	  disciplines”	  with	  supplementary	  digital	  tools	  that	  have	  significantly	  shifted,	  expanded,	  and	  reshaped	  educational	  practices	  (Gold	  ix).	  The	  sentiment	  is	  assembled	  into	  something	  of	  a	  mission	  statement	  on	  the	  Digital	  Humanities	  Quarterly	  website—that	  digital	  humanities	  is	  a	  diverse	  and	  still	  emerging	  field	  that	  encompasses	  the	  practice	  of	  humanities	  research	  in	  and	  through	  information	  technology,	  and	  the	  exploration	  of	  how	  the	  humanities	  may	  evolve	  through	  their	  engagement	  with	  technology,	  media,	  and	  computational	  methods.	  (“About	  DHQ”)	  In	  the	  novel,	  the	  actual	  process	  of	  search	  and	  analysis	  tracks	  closely	  with	  these	  kinds	  of	  digital	  research	  and	  pedagogical	  practices—particularly,	  as	  Matthew	  K.	  Gold	  outlines,	  “algorithmic	  approaches	  to	  large	  humanities	  data	  sets…	  [and]	  the	  incorporation	  of	  geospatial	  data	  into	  classroom	  projects”	  (ix).	  More	  than	  that,	  digital	  technologies	  have	  reached	  a	  vanishing	  point	  in	  this	  educational	  environment.	  These	  technologies—especially	  via	  augmented	  reality—integrate	  “research,	  knowledge,	  methodologies,	  and	  expertise	  from	  radically	  distributed	  existing	  fields”	  (Davidson	  and	  Goldberg	  15-­‐16)	  as	  a	  standardized,	  multimodal	  foundation	  of	  the	  learning	  and	  teaching	  ecosystem.	  In	  other	  words,	  as “the	  level	  of	  technological	  skill	  of	  students	  [rises],”	  David	  Mimno	  suggests,	  digital	  humanities	  practices	  and	  pedagogies	  move	  a	  step	  closer	  to	  the	  goal	  of	  invisibility.	  The	  inauguration	  of	  such	  an	  environment	  marks	  the	  moment	  when	  there	  is	  “no	  such	  thing	  as	  ‘digital	  humanities,’	  just	  digital	  tools	  that	  are	  a	  natural	  and	  integral	  part	  of	  [humanities]	  scholarship”	  and	  pedagogical	  method.	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One	  of	  Ms.	  Chumlig’s	  key	  pedagogical	  approaches	  harnesses	  the	  power	  of	  wearable	  computing	  for	  collaborative	  purposes.	  Collaboration	  is	  a	  key	  aspect	  of	  digital	  humanities	  work,	  and	  its	  intrinsic	  open-­‐endedness	  “promotes	  collaboration	  and	  creation	  across	  domains	  of	  expertise”	  (Schnapp	  and	  Presner	  4).	  At	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  class,	  she	  tells	  the	  students	  that	  at	  times	  “‘it’s	  best	  to	  coordinate	  with	  lots	  of	  other	  people	  who	  together	  can	  make	  the	  answers’”	  (Vinge,	  Rainbows	  End	  59).	  As	  Juan	  explains,	  these	  crowdsourced	  virtual	  think	  tanks—known	  as	  answerboards—“could	  generate	  solid	  results,	  usually	  for	  zero	  cost.”	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  monetized	  ‘affiliances’	  that	  regulate	  the	  narrative’s	  U.S.	  economy,	  they	  (much	  like	  the	  web’s	  myriad	  forums,	  social	  networks,	  and	  content	  management	  systems)	  provide	  a	  free	  conceptual	  space	  for	  “kindred	  minds	  [to	  bat]	  problems	  around”	  (Vinge,	  
Rainbows	  End	  61).	  This	  teaching	  strategy	  translates	  into	  something	  Ms.	  Chumlig	  calls	  “‘synthetic	  serendipity’”—a	  kind	  of	  personal	  growth	  or	  success	  gained	  through	  proactive	  and	  collaborative	  digital	  knowledge	  making	  and	  contribution	  (Vinge,	  Rainbows	  End	  60).	  Ms.	  Chumlig’s	  second	  class,	  Creative	  Composition,	  focuses	  more	  upon	  the	  practical	  side	  of	  knowledge	  production.	  In	  this	  class,	  students	  are	  expected	  to	  develop	  and	  present	  multimodal	  compositions	  that	  utilize	  different	  technologies	  and	  genres.	  Like	  many	  contemporary	  digital	  learning	  environments	  that	  “[bring]	  together	  print,	  video,	  and	  audio	  into	  multimedia	  presentations”	  and	  provide	  “new	  opportunit[ies]	  for	  communicating	  information”	  (Collins	  and	  Halverson	  24),	  the	  assignments	  in	  Creative	  Composition	  combine	  scholarly	  approaches	  to	  composition	  with	  the	  creative	  possibilities	  that	  digital	  technologies	  unleash.	  Just	  as	  today’s	  students	  make	  use	  of	  tools	  such	  as	  Twitter,	  YouTube,	  Google,	  Microsoft	  PowerPoint	  and	  other	  creative	  platforms	  to	  supplement	  their	  research	  and	  presentations,	  Ms.	  Chumlig’s	  Creative	  Composition	  is	  a	  performative	  digital	  space	  that	  
115	  	  
requires	  digital	  performativity	  from	  its	  students.	  Indeed,	  this	  setup	  parallels	  our	  own	  evolving	  institutional	  paradigms.	  In	  at	  least	  the	  last	  decade,	  many	  humanities	  learning	  environments	  have	  begun	  to	  transition	  to	  a	  hybrid,	  multimodal,	  and	  digitally	  supplemented	  model	  that	  fuses	  scholarship	  and	  creativity.	  “After	  much	  tension	  between	  media	  makers	  and	  media	  scholars,”	  writes	  Fitzpatrick,	  “an	  increasing	  number	  of	  programs	  are	  bringing	  the	  two	  modes	  together	  in	  a	  rigorously	  theorized	  praxis,	  recognizing	  that	  the	  boundaries	  between	  the	  critical	  and	  the	  creative	  are	  arbitrary.”	  Since	  “the	  best	  scholarship	  is	  always	  creative,	  and	  the	  best	  production	  is	  always	  critically	  aware,”	  a	  digitally	  conceived	  humanities,	  or	  posthumanities,	  offers	  “a	  space…	  where	  the	  divide	  between	  making	  and	  interpreting	  might	  be	  bridged	  in	  productive	  ways”	  (“Humanities”	  14).	  To	  appreciate	  the	  dynamic,	  flexible	  and	  multifaceted	  skills	  that	  students	  in	  these	  environments	  attain,	  it	  useful	  to	  return	  to	  the	  digital	  native/digital	  immigrant	  split	  that	  Vinge	  establishes	  early	  in	  his	  novel.	  Coming	  to	  this	  class,	  Robert	  can	  “see	  only	  a	  fraction	  of	  the	  ‘compositions’	  the	  students	  allegedly	  [create]”	  (literally,	  because	  he	  is	  not	  yet	  wearing	  the	  right	  technology,	  and	  figuratively).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  he	  sneers	  at	  the	  younger	  students’	  widespread	  but	  shallow	  grasp	  on	  knowledge,	  operating	  in	  a	  society	  that	  values	  breadth	  over	  depth.	  By	  contrast,	  he	  tells	  himself,	  there	  is	  “no	  doubt	  they	  [can]	  appreciate	  very	  little	  about	  [the	  depth	  of]	  his	  work”	  (Vinge,	  Rainbows	  End	  69).	  The	  condescension	  of	  these	  opinions	  is	  palpable;	  but	  they	  mask	  the	  deeper	  fear	  of	  irrelevance	  with	  which	  Robert	  is	  suddenly	  faced.	  He	  initially	  channels	  the	  brunt	  of	  this	  anxiety	  into	  verbal	  attacks	  on	  his	  family	  and	  fellow	  classmate	  Juan.	  To	  Robert,	  Juan	  epitomizes	  the	  below-­‐average	  digital	  native—a	  kid	  whose	  critical	  and	  interpretive	  faculties	  have	  been	  blunted	  by	  hyperconnectivity	  and	  on-­‐demand	  access	  to	  information.	  In	  fact,	  in	  some	  respects,	  this	  is	  
116	  	  
true;	  Juan	  often	  uses	  class	  time	  to	  attend	  to	  his	  own	  clandestine	  affairs:	  “Like	  most	  kids,	  he	  kept	  lots	  of	  stuff	  saved	  on	  his	  wearable…	  [Ms.	  Chumlig]	  was	  real	  good	  at	  nailing	  the	  mentally	  truant.	  But	  Juan	  was	  good	  at	  ensemble	  coding,	  driving	  his	  wearable	  with	  little	  gesture	  cues	  and	  eye-­‐pointer	  menus”	  (61).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  we	  might	  argue	  that	  Juan’s	  near-­‐flawless	  talent	  for	  ensemble	  coding—quickly	  switching	  and	  processing	  reams	  of	  information	  with	  a	  finessed,	  barley	  noticeable	  body	  language—exhibits	  the	  kind	  of	  research-­‐based,	  supplemental	  skills	  Ms.	  Chumlig	  is	  trying	  to	  instill	  in	  her	  students.	  	  In	  similar	  fashion,	  on	  the	  topic	  of	  academic	  exam	  cheating	  videos	  posted	  to	  YouTube,	  Elizabeth	  Losh	  notes	  that	  the	  students	  responsible	  were	  “performing	  online	  knowledge-­‐networking	  activities	  that	  constituted	  a	  form	  of	  real	  learning,	  even	  if	  such	  learning	  would	  be	  considered…	  fundamentally	  in	  violation	  of	  the	  scholarly	  social	  contract.”	  To	  be	  sure,	  Juan’s	  actions	  constitute	  knowledge-­‐networking,	  much	  of	  which	  he	  also	  channels	  into	  his	  class	  work.	  And	  although	  he	  is	  mentally	  truant,	  the	  scene	  does	  foreshadow	  a	  future	  era	  of	  socially	  networked	  computing,	  when	  one	  would	  hope	  that	  academic	  and	  popular	  forms	  of	  instruction	  would	  be	  converging	  to	  work	  in	  concert,	  thereby	  supporting	  a	  life-­‐long	  culture	  of	  inquiry,	  collective	  intelligence,	  and	  distributed	  research	  practices.	  (Losh)	  Like	  the	  students	  who	  made	  the	  cheating	  videos,	  Juan	  possesses	  a	  mixture	  of	  initiative,	  digital	  creativity,	  independence,	  curatorial	  ability,	  and—most	  important—multimodal	  fluency.	  Moving	  beyond	  what	  Steve	  Anderson	  and	  Tara	  McPherson	  identify	  as	  “the	  traditional	  domain	  of	  knowledge	  production”	  in	  educational	  environments,	  these	  digital	  natives	  are	  attuned	  to	  juggling	  the	  consumption,	  organization	  and	  production	  of	  multiple	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media.	  With	  “the	  proliferation	  of	  digital	  archives	  and	  information	  systems,”	  they	  argue,	  “the	  ability	  to	  structure,	  organize,	  and	  access	  data	  [is]	  a	  more	  valuable	  skill	  than	  ever	  before”	  (148).	  Moreover,	  since,	  as	  Cynthia	  Selfe	  and	  Gail	  Hawisher	  point	  out,	  “new	  technologies	  and	  new	  media	  demand	  new	  multimodal	  understandings	  of	  key	  educational	  concepts	  like	  literacy	  and	  composition”	  (17),	  the	  development	  of	  multimodal	  literacies	  occurs	  organically	  in	  environments	  that	  are	  codified	  in	  this	  way.	  	   During	  Creative	  Composition,	  Juan	  and	  Robert	  are	  called	  upon	  to	  deliver	  presentations	  to	  the	  class	  and,	  needless	  to	  say,	  the	  irrespective	  styles	  and	  content	  are	  very	  different.	  Juan	  opts	  for	  a	  visually	  and	  aurally	  spectacular	  musical	  composition.	  From	  Robert’s	  perspective	  (since	  he	  is	  still	  not	  wearing	  an	  Epiphany	  Lite,	  and	  thus	  cannot	  see	  augmented	  reality),	  Juan	  engages	  in	  a	  silent,	  “random	  mime”	  to	  which	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  class	  “[nod]	  their	  heads	  as	  if	  in	  time	  to	  music.”	  When	  Robert	  realizes	  this	  is	  more	  of	  the	  “invisible	  nonsense”	  that	  undergirds	  his	  society’s	  digital	  age	  and	  must	  turn	  on	  the	  “fantasy	  overlays”	  of	  his	  view-­‐page,	  readers	  are	  treated	  to	  the	  real	  show	  (albeit	  through	  his	  and	  the	  author’s	  cynical	  point	  of	  view):	  In	  the	  window	  on	  Robert’s	  view-­‐page,	  rainbows	  formed	  around	  the	  boy’s	  image.	  Fluffy	  white—ferrets?—hopped	  into	  existence	  at	  every	  jerk	  of	  his	  hands.	  Now	  all	  the	  other	  kids	  were	  laughing.	  Juan	  was	  laughing	  too,	  but	  his	  handwaving	  became	  desperate.	  Ferrets	  covered	  the	  floor,	  shoulder-­‐to-­‐shoulder,	  and	  the	  music	  was	  frenetic.	  The	  creatures	  misted	  together	  into	  snow	  and	  lifted	  on	  miniature	  tornadoes.	  The	  boy	  slowed	  his	  rhythm,	  and	  the	  sound	  became	  something	  like	  lullaby	  music.	  The	  snow	  glistened,	  sublimating	  into	  invisibility	  as	  the	  music	  faded…	  It	  was	  as	  impressive	  as	  any	  advertising	  video	  that	  Robert	  had	  seen	  in	  the	  twentieth	  century.	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At	  the	  same	  time	  it	  was	  essentially	  incoherent,	  a	  garbage	  dump	  of	  special	  effects.	  So	  much	  technology,	  so	  little	  talent.	  (Vinge,	  Rainbows	  End	  70)	  A	  little	  rough	  around	  the	  edges,	  to	  be	  sure,	  but	  Juan’s	  attempt	  at	  creating	  a	  virtual	  canvas—one	  that	  mixes	  visual	  and	  sonic	  multimedia	  elements/genres	  in	  surprising	  (albeit	  seemingly	  random)	  combinations—is	  indicative	  of	  an	  inherent	  understanding	  of	  digital	  discourses	  that	  Robert	  struggles	  to	  appreciate.	  Rather	  than	  being	  simply	  “a	  garbage	  dump	  of	  special	  effects,”	  the	  piece	  shows	  promise	  in	  its	  control	  of	  rhythm	  and	  musical	  voice,	  matching	  the	  fluid	  tonal	  transmogrification	  of	  the	  white	  ferrets	  into	  frenetic	  “miniature	  tornadoes”	  and,	  during	  the	  fade	  out,	  peaceful,	  glistening	  snow.	  Even	  so,	  the	  highest	  compliment	  Robert	  can	  muster	  relegates	  Juan’s	  effort	  to	  the	  realm	  of	  advertising.	  The	  final	  damning	  aphorism,	  “So	  much	  technology,	  so	  little	  talent,”	  speaks	  to	  his	  belief	  that,	  in	  spite	  of	  increased	  access	  to	  and	  use	  of	  digital	  tools	  in	  educational	  environments—and	  likely	  because	  of	  it—academic	  talent	  has	  been	  severely	  attenuated.	  	   Following	  Juan’s	  composition,	  Robert	  gives	  a	  short	  poetry	  reading	  for	  his	  presentation	  that	  has	  “‘none	  of—’	  his	  gaze	  swept	  the	  class,	  nailing	  Juan	  for	  an	  instant	  ‘the	  pictures	  and	  sound	  that	  seem	  expected.’”	  Again,	  the	  staunch	  humanist	  condescension	  in	  his	  tone	  is	  evident.	  As	  he	  warns	  Ms.	  Chumlig,	  deadpan,	  “‘I	  don’t	  do	  audiovisuals’”	  (Vinge,	  
Rainbows	  End	  71-­‐72).	  Indeed,	  flashy	  “special	  effects”	  are	  to	  his	  sensibility	  a	  distraction	  to	  artistic	  composition,	  not	  an	  enhancement.	  In	  this	  way,	  though	  it	  is	  similarly	  naturalistic	  (“the	  land	  of	  North	  County	  as	  it	  really	  is,	  here	  and	  beyond”	  [Vinge,	  Rainbows	  End	  72])	  the	  piece	  acts	  as	  a	  counterpoint	  to	  Juan’s;	  and	  for	  Juan	  himself,	  the	  words	  alone	  are	  spellbinding:	  [Robert]	  just…	  talked.	  No	  special	  effects,	  no	  words	  scrolling	  through	  the	  air…	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And	  then	  Juan	  wasn’t	  really	  aware	  of	  the	  words	  anymore.	  He	  was	  seeing;	  he	  was	  there…	  He	  sat	  for	  a	  few	  seconds,	  dazed.	  Words.	  That’s	  all	  they	  were.	  But	  what	  they	  did	  was	  more	  than	  visuals.	  It	  was	  more	  than	  haptics.	  There	  had	  even	  been	  the	  smell	  of	  the	  dry	  reeds	  along	  the	  creek	  bed.	  (Vinge,	  Rainbows	  End	  72)	  In	  this	  hyperconnected,	  visually	  stunning	  digital	  age,	  words	  and	  their	  ability	  to	  transport	  Juan	  to	  another	  place—to	  produce	  synesthetic	  sensations	  like	  beautiful	  mental	  imagery	  and	  “the	  smell	  of	  dry	  reeds	  along	  the	  creek	  bed”—are	  a	  powerful	  and	  unexpected	  revelation.	  Their	  very	  nakedness	  harks	  back	  to	  an	  older	  time,	  unencumbered	  by	  the	  schizophrenic	  nature	  of	  constantly	  networked	  consciousness	  and	  the	  deluge	  of	  digital	  information.	  And	  for	  Juan,	  the	  power	  of	  their	  delivery	  alone	  outweighs	  all	  the	  sense	  impact	  of	  the	  age’s	  best	  haptics	  and	  simulacra.	  (Dean	  Blount,	  however,	  being	  Robert’s	  generational,	  liberal	  humanist	  contemporary,	  is	  not	  so	  easily	  impressed.	  What	  might	  seem	  profound	  to	  the	  all-­‐digital	  younger	  students	  is	  for	  the	  Dean	  a	  shadow	  of	  Robert’s	  former	  mastery	  of	  poetic	  performance—though	  Robert	  fails	  to	  catch	  his	  sarcastic	  expression).	  	   After	  class,	  outside,	  Juan	  tries	  to	  impress	  Robert	  by	  paying	  him	  the	  highest	  compliment	  he	  can	  think	  of—that	  his	  writing	  abilities	  are	  “‘as	  good	  as	  any	  of	  the	  top	  game	  advertisers’”	  (Vinge,	  Rainbows	  End	  75).	  Again,	  there	  is	  a	  vast	  cultural	  divide	  in	  artistic	  value	  here.	  Earlier,	  Robert	  had	  inwardly	  called	  Juan’s	  presentation	  “impressive	  as	  any	  advertising	  video	  [he]	  had	  seen	  in	  the	  twentieth	  century”;	  in	  other	  words,	  ostentatious	  and	  vacuous.	  But	  for	  Juan	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  his	  generation	  in	  2025,	  advertising	  (especially	  for	  the	  virtual	  and	  augmented	  reality	  games	  he	  often	  plays	  at	  Pyramid	  Hill)	  is	  both	  a	  popular,	  ubiquitous	  medium	  and	  a	  pinnacle	  of	  artistic	  expression.	  	   However,	  though	  they	  seem	  mismatched,	  Juan	  and	  Robert	  pair	  up	  for	  the	  final	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presentation	  in	  Creative	  Composition.	  These	  collaborative	  presentations	  are	  intended	  to	  showcase	  the	  students’	  ability	  to	  synthesize	  various	  genres	  and	  digital	  media	  across	  knowledge	  disciplines	  into	  coherent	  performances.	  The	  assignment	  is	  both	  a	  reflexive	  response	  to	  and	  extension	  of	  current	  real-­‐life	  trends	  in	  digital	  learning	  environments	  in	  which	  “signifying	  media”	  and	  “computer	  systems”	  are	  leveraged	  in	  pedagogy	  and	  learning	  practices	  to	  bring	  together	  strands	  of	  “media	  studies,	  pedagogy,	  and	  informatics”	  in	  various	  interdisciplinary	  and	  collaborative	  configurations	  (Lanestedt	  66).	  Juan	  and	  Robert’s	  presentation	  is	  similarly	  interdisciplinary,	  mashing	  up	  genres	  and	  utilizing	  different	  modalities	  to	  create	  their	  canvas.	  Moreover,	  through	  their	  “‘synthetic	  serendipity’”	  of	  collaborative	  information	  building,	  the	  work	  benefits	  from	  the	  synthesis	  of	  cross-­‐disciplinary	  skillsets	  that	  each	  brings	  to	  the	  table.	  	   In	  the	  run	  up	  to	  exam	  day,	  Robert	  helps	  Juan	  improve	  his	  writing	  skills,	  and	  Juan	  teaches	  Robert	  how	  to	  effectively	  navigate	  wearable	  technology.	  Although,	  in	  Robert’s	  estimation,	  his	  pupil	  is	  “[b]y	  twentieth	  century	  standards…	  subliterate,”	  or	  perhaps	  “[p]araliterate”	  like	  all	  the	  developmentally	  “crippled	  children”	  of	  2025,	  Juan	  begins	  to	  make	  real	  progress:	  “There	  came	  a	  time	  when	  he	  didn’t	  play	  with	  his	  fonts	  anymore.	  There	  came	  a	  day	  when	  he	  wrote	  something	  that	  had	  affect	  and	  image.	  It	  was	  not	  utter	  crap.	  It	  was	  almost	  up	  to	  the	  standards	  of	  muddled	  cliché”	  (Vinge,	  Rainbows	  End	  150).	  As	  Juan	  improves	  his	  basic	  literacy	  skills,	  Robert	  also	  makes	  massive	  leaps	  forward	  in	  digital	  literacy.	  Their	  project	  begins	  to	  take	  shape	  around	  these	  improvements,	  combining	  Robert’s	  newfound	  digital	  interests	  in	  “far	  coordination”	  and	  “video	  effects,”	  as	  well	  as	  “‘manual	  music’”	  and	  choreographed	  dance	  (150).	  Even	  the	  language	  of	  their	  work,	  to	  Robert’s	  pleasant	  surprise,	  “while	  not	  poetry,	  had	  risen	  above	  the	  level	  of	  egregious	  noise.”	  
121	  	  
Later,	  these	  ideas	  begin	  to	  crystallize	  into	  a	  multimodal	  work	  that	  both	  challenges	  and	  draws	  upon	  the	  presenters’	  new	  literacies	  through	  “the	  power	  of	  the	  libraries	  of	  clichés	  and	  visual	  gimmicks	  that	  lay	  in	  their	  tools”	  (162).	  The	  presentation	  itself	  is	  given	  as	  part	  of	  public	  demonstration	  to	  an	  audience	  of	  parents,	  teachers,	  and	  students.	  One	  of	  its	  most	  interesting	  aspects	  is	  its	  utilization	  of	  the	  virtual	  presence	  of	  “real	  people	  with	  real	  musical	  instruments.”	  “‘Meet	  the	  Orchestra	  of	  the	  Americas,’”	  Juan	  announces	  to	  the	  audience,	  “‘created	  especially	  for	  you	  this	  evening	  from	  the	  Charles	  River	  High	  School	  orchestra	  and	  chorus,	  cheapnet	  live	  from	  Boston	  and…	  the	  Gimnasio	  Clásico	  de	  Magallanes,	  also	  cheapnet	  live	  but	  from	  Punta	  Arenas,	  Chile!’”	  This	  global	  musical	  collaboration,	  Beethoven’s	  EU	  anthem	  with	  “lyrics	  by	  Orozco	  and	  Gu,	  and	  network	  synchrony	  by	  Gu	  and	  Orozco,”	  makes	  for	  quite	  a	  spectacle.	  While	  the	  American	  musicians	  sing	  Juan’s	  lyrics	  in	  English,	  the	  Chilean	  musicians	  sing	  the	  same	  lines	  in	  Spanish.	  Robert’s	  contribution	  to	  the	  piece—	  “the	  magic	  of	  the	  adaptive	  delays	  that	  [his]	  scheme	  injected	  into	  the	  transmissions”—helps	  keep	  the	  performers,	  virtual	  imagery,	  music,	  and	  lyrics	  in	  sync	  (Vinge,	  Rainbows	  End	  337-­‐38).	  	  At	  the	  coda	  of	  the	  performance,	  the	  students’	  experiment	  in	  collaboration,	  genre	  mash-­‐ups,	  and	  multimodal	  technologies	  comes	  into	  full,	  successful	  alignment:	  “[T]he	  synch	  survived.	  The	  hybrid	  did	  not	  fragment…	  The	  performance	  hit	  some	  slightly	  ragged	  crescendos,	  and	  then,	  by	  some	  miracle,	  everything	  came	  together	  for	  the	  last	  two	  seconds.	  Juan’s	  lyrics	  ended,	  and	  the	  central	  melody	  swept	  into	  silence”	  (Vinge,	  Rainbows	  End	  338).	  In	  every	  important	  sense,	  this	  project	  is	  the	  epitome	  of	  collaborative	  enterprise	  and	  exploration	  in	  the	  digital	  humanities,	  harnessing	  “an	  array	  of	  convergent	  practices”	  (emphasis	  removed)	  that	  “facilitate	  the	  formation	  of	  networks	  of	  knowledge	  production,	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exchange,	  and	  dissemination	  that	  are,	  at	  once,	  local	  and	  global”	  (Schnapp	  and	  Presner	  2).	  In	  such	  digital	  learning	  environments,	  which	  are	  marked	  by	  “democratization	  of	  culture	  and	  scholarship”	  (3),	  all	  participants	  (students,	  teachers,	  researchers,	  administrators,	  audiences,	  etc.)	  become—reflexively,	  necessarily—digital	  humanists.	  
Virtual	  Research	  and	  JITT	  
	   The	  young	  natives	  and	  retreads	  of	  Rainbows	  End	  are	  not	  the	  only	  groups	  engaged	  in	  research	  and	  learning	  practices.	  Outside	  the	  high	  school	  system,	  many	  of	  the	  novel’s	  adults	  also	  make	  use	  of	  various	  technologies	  and	  techniques	  to	  supplement,	  extend	  or	  otherwise	  gain	  access	  to	  information	  and	  skills.	  The	  two	  most	  notable	  characters	  in	  this	  regard	  are	  Zulfikar	  Sharif,	  a	  doctoral	  student	  in	  English	  Literature	  whose	  thesis	  concentrates	  upon	  the	  poetry	  of	  Robert	  Gu;	  and	  Alice	  Gong	  Gu,	  a	  Colonel	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Marines,	  Miri’s	  mother,	  and	  Robert’s	  daughter-­‐in-­‐law.	  Though	  they	  are	  very	  different	  in	  temperament	  and	  occupation,	  and	  approach	  learning	  from	  entirely	  different	  angles,	  they	  both	  exploit	  greater	  access	  to	  information	  provided	  by	  the	  advanced	  digital	  technologies	  of	  2025.	  	  Most	  of	  Zulfikar	  Sharif’s	  time	  at	  the	  Ohio	  State	  University	  is	  expended	  upon	  a	  research	  assistantship	  under	  his	  thankless	  thesis	  adviser,	  and	  a	  part-­‐time	  job	  as	  a	  411	  operator	  (equivalent	  of	  the	  fastest	  on-­‐demand	  search	  engines)	  for	  the	  American	  Poetry	  Association.	  Struggling	  to	  develop	  a	  thesis	  topic,	  he	  is	  forced	  to	  advertise	  for	  help	  through	  “high	  technology,”	  eliciting	  “endless	  adverts	  for	  plagiarized	  and	  custom-­‐writ	  material”	  (Vinge,	  Rainbows	  End	  107).	  When	  he	  learns	  from	  a	  mysterious	  virtual	  woman	  in	  black	  that	  Robert	  Gu	  is	  still	  alive	  and	  well	  and	  living	  in	  San	  Diego—he	  previously	  believed	  the	  poet	  
123	  	  
had	  died	  years	  earlier—Sharif	  is	  eager	  to	  buy	  the	  direct	  access	  to	  Robert	  that	  she	  offers.	  The	  woman,	  however,	  is	  one	  of	  the	  many	  virtual	  personas	  of	  the	  equally	  mysterious	  Rabbit—itself	  a	  digital	  manifestation	  of	  an	  anonymous,	  manipulative	  computer	  hacker.	  But	  convinced	  that	  “[i]nterviewing	  Robert	  Gu	  would	  run	  a	  close	  second	  to	  chatting	  up	  William	  Shakespeare,”	  Sharif	  blindly	  grants	  the	  woman	  full	  security	  access	  to	  his	  wearable	  and,	  through	  him,	  secondary	  access	  to	  Robert,	  “‘occasionally	  to	  make	  a	  suggestion	  or	  ask	  a	  question’”	  (109).	  It	  is	  in	  this	  manner	  that	  Sharif	  finds	  his	  thesis	  topic,	  on	  the	  poems	  of	  Robert	  Gu,	  whom	  he	  believes	  “to	  be	  from	  the	  highest	  rank	  of	  modern	  literature,	  up	  there	  with	  Williams	  and	  Cho”	  (110).	  Sharif’s	  first-­‐time	  appearance	  to	  Robert	  as	  a	  virtual	  presence	  for	  interview	  purposes	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  new	  type	  of	  academic	  research	  methodology	  that	  subverts	  the	  constraints	  of	  time,	  distance,	  and	  limited	  access.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  action	  corresponds	  with	  methodologies	  in	  the	  digital	  humanities	  that	  afford	  unique	  and	  liberating	  opportunities	  to	  access	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  quantitative	  and	  qualitative	  data	  through	  digital	  tools.	  Carl	  Stahmer	  suggests	  that	  	  [i]t	  has	  always	  been	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  humanist	  to	  follow	  the	  trails	  of	  influence	  and	  overlap	  from	  one	  cultural	  product	  and/or	  moment	  to	  the	  next.	  The	  “value	  added”	  that	  the	  Digital	  Humanities	  brings	  to	  the	  table	  is	  the	  notion	  that	  this	  work	  can	  be	  automated	  and	  that	  such	  automation	  liberates	  the	  process	  from	  both	  (a)	  the	  limited	  time,	  and	  (b)	  the	  limited	  perspective	  of	  the	  individual	  scholar.	  Sharif,	  like	  Robert,	  is	  caught	  between	  two	  worlds	  in	  fluctuation:	  from	  the	  traditional	  humanism	  he	  has	  always	  been	  comfortable	  in—“follow[ing]	  the	  trails	  of	  influence	  and	  overlap”	  in	  deep	  academic	  lines	  of	  inquiry—to	  digital	  research	  methods	  that	  “free	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knowledge	  from	  the	  limited	  perspective	  of	  the	  individual	  scholar	  and	  ‘connect	  related	  data	  that	  wasn’t	  previously	  linked’”	  (Stahmer).	  In	  a	  similar,	  albeit	  pessimistic	  vein,	  Vinge	  himself	  asserts	  that	  humanity	  has	  “tools	  right	  now…	  that	  release	  us	  from	  most	  low-­‐level	  drudgery”	  (“Technological	  Singularity”	  14).	  Like	  Robert	  before	  him,	  Sharif	  must	  weather	  and,	  in	  fact,	  capitalize	  upon	  the	  “evolving	  nature	  of	  authorship	  and	  collaboration”	  and	  vast	  changes	  to	  “the	  fundamental	  interpretive	  methodologies	  of	  humanities	  disciplines”	  that	  occur	  with	  the	  implementation	  of	  laborsaving	  digital	  technologies	  (Gold	  ix).	  However,	  Stahmer	  reminds	  us,	  it	  is	  crucial	  to	  remember	  that	  the	  “seminal	  proposition	  of	  the	  Digital	  Humanities”	  is	  to	  “offer	  new	  knowledge”	  above	  and	  beyond	  the	  automation	  of	  data.	  As	  a	  qualitative	  exercise,	  then,	  doctoral	  student’s	  use	  of	  holographic	  technology	  to	  conduct	  an	  interview	  with	  a	  famous	  poet	  about	  his	  poetics	  (much	  as	  today’s	  video	  conferencing	  tools	  might	  allow)	  certainly	  constitutes	  the	  retrieval	  and/or	  production	  of	  new	  knowledge.	  	   The	  image	  of	  Sharif—“perfect	  except	  for	  the	  misplaced	  shadows	  and	  the	  shoes	  that	  disappeared	  a	  quarter	  inch	  into	  the	  floor”—is	  thus	  able	  to	  tell	  Robert	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  that	  “‘[i]nterviewing	  you	  would	  be	  my	  great	  honor.	  You	  are	  a	  resource	  for	  all	  humanity.’”	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  connect	  on	  a	  more	  personal	  level	  with	  the	  poet,	  Sharif	  notices	  Robert’s	  makeshift	  bookshelf,	  inferring	  that	  he	  must	  be	  “‘one	  who	  still	  treasures	  the	  real	  thing.’”	  In	  this	  capacity,	  he	  suggests,	  appealing	  to	  the	  humanist	  in	  Robert,	  they	  “‘share	  the	  same	  values.	  By	  helping	  me,	  you’ll	  be	  advancing	  those	  noble	  passions’”	  (Vinge,	  Rainbows	  End	  112-­‐13).	  The	  same	  might	  be	  said	  for	  their	  mutual	  grudging	  toleration	  of	  digital	  technologies:	  Sharif	  laments	  the	  fact	  that	  scholarly	  research	  is	  wholly	  dependent	  upon	  data	  backups,	  susceptible	  to	  hacking,	  viruses	  and	  theft.	  Mirroring	  the	  vulnerable	  and	  often	  mutable	  nature	  of	  data	  in	  real	  life,	  data	  loss	  is	  a	  ‘“debacle’”	  that	  had	  previously	  “‘cost	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[Sharif]	  more	  than	  a	  semester	  of	  progress	  toward	  [his]	  degree,’”	  forcing	  him	  to	  “‘fry-­‐clean’”	  the	  wearable	  technology	  embedded	  in	  his	  clothes	  (163).	  	   In	  subsequent	  interviews,	  Sharif	  again	  harnesses	  the	  power	  of	  virtual	  digital	  technology	  to	  discuss	  some	  of	  his	  subject’s	  major	  poetic	  works,	  including	  Robert’s	  serial	  masterpiece,	  Secrets	  of	  the	  Ages.	  When	  the	  image	  of	  Sharif	  is	  not	  being	  hacked	  into	  by	  entities	  such	  as	  the	  Rabbit	  persona,	  whom	  Robert	  identifies	  as	  the	  highly	  intelligent	  “Mysterious	  Stranger”23	  (Vinge,	  Rainbows	  End	  158),	  he	  is	  amenable	  to—if	  somewhat	  bored	  by24—such	  discussions	  with	  the	  graduate	  student.	  During	  one	  of	  these	  conversations	  he	  invites	  authentic	  virtual	  Sharif	  to	  accompany	  him	  to	  visit	  his	  old	  friends	  at	  the	  UCSD	  library,	  where	  the	  student	  might	  observe	  his	  poetic	  process.	  Such	  an	  environment,	  he	  claims,	  “will	  give	  me	  some	  insights	  into	  the	  plight	  of	  the,	  er,	  vanquished	  aged…	  If	  you	  watch	  carefully,	  you	  may	  learn	  things	  about	  how	  I	  work.”	  Moreover,	  he	  is	  willing	  to	  “critique	  [Sharif’s]	  conclusions”	  (Vinge,	  Rainbows	  End	  164).	  As	  with	  Robert	  and	  Juan’s	  collaboration	  for	  Ms.	  Chumlig’s	  Creative	  Composition	  class,	  which	  is	  often	  conducted	  remotely,	  Sharif’s	  use	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  projection	  technology	  is	  leveraged	  as	  a	  powerful,	  flexible	  medium	  for	  humanities	  fieldwork	  that	  extends	  beyond	  its	  associated	  limitations.	  In	  other	  words,	  this	  methodology	  is	  a	  fictional	  corrective	  to	  the	  notion	  that	  “[s]hifts	  in	  technology	  and	  funding	  that	  favor	  computational	  methods	  may	  disadvantage	  those	  whose	  research	  is	  based	  on	  fieldwork”	  (Borgman	  153).	  In	  fact,	  such	  a	  ubiquitous	  (and,	  it	  would	  seem,	  free)	  technology	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Most	  likely	  a	  reference	  to	  Mark	  Twain’s	  final	  unfinished	  works,	  particularly	  No.	  44,	  the	  Mysterious	  Stranger:	  
Being	  an	  Ancient	  Tale	  Found	  in	  a	  Jug	  and	  Freely	  Translated	  from	  the	  Jug	  (c.1902-­‐1908).	  Like	  the	  multi-­‐persona	  image	  of	  Sharif,	  this	  tale	  explores	  the	  duality	  of	  self,	  in	  both	  dream	  and	  waking	  states,	  through	  the	  protagonist’s	  duplication	  of	  a	  group	  of	  print	  shop	  workers.	  24	  Through	  the	  course	  of	  the	  novel,	  Robert’s	  former	  passion	  for	  the	  traditional	  humanities	  and	  his	  artistic	  accomplishments	  in	  poetry	  begin	  to	  give	  way	  to	  a	  newfound	  passion/talent	  for	  the	  technical	  aspects	  of	  digital	  technologies.	  As	  we	  learn,	  his	  “school	  projects”	  in	  digital	  multimodal	  composition	  are	  “more	  interesting	  to	  the	  new	  Robert	  Gu	  than	  Sharif’s	  admiring	  interviews—and	  far	  more	  interesting	  than	  his	  occasional	  visits	  to	  UCSD”	  and	  its	  library	  (Vinge,	  Rainbows	  End	  150).	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renders	  moot	  some	  of	  the	  issues	  that	  plague	  digital	  scholarship	  in	  the	  humanities	  today.	  Sharif	  is	  a	  traditional	  scholar	  whose	  place	  in	  history	  frees	  him	  from	  the	  constraints	  of	  a	  past	  in	  which	  institutional	  investment	  in	  digital	  technologies,	  as	  Borgman	  puts	  it,	  “may	  defer	  funds	  from	  field	  research,	  travel	  to	  libraries	  and	  archives	  where	  unique	  materials	  are	  held,	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  scholarship	  that	  are	  less	  dependent	  on	  a	  data-­‐intensive	  infrastructure”	  (29).	  Indeed,	  from	  a	  remote	  location,	  he	  has	  unfettered	  access	  to	  the	  UCSD	  library	  archives	  and,	  more	  importantly,	  the	  primary	  source	  of	  his	  thesis,	  Robert	  Gu	  himself.	  	   The	  other	  side	  of	  adult	  learning	  comes	  in	  the	  form	  of	  JITT,	  or	  “just-­‐in-­‐time	  training”	  (Vinge,	  Rainbows	  End	  104)—a	  popular,	  albeit	  neurologically	  dangerous	  shortcut	  to	  immediate	  knowledge	  on	  any	  given	  subject.	  One	  of	  the	  more	  culturally	  popular	  depictions	  of	  the	  concept	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  1999	  film	  The	  Matrix,	  in	  which	  knowledge	  of	  combat	  styles,	  weapons	  and	  vehicles	  for	  use	  inside	  the	  virtual	  matrix	  are	  uploaded	  into	  human	  consciousness	  via	  real-­‐world	  biotechnological	  wetware.	  Gardner	  and	  Davis	  highlight	  our	  own	  sociocultural	  shift	  toward	  digital	  technologies—smartphone	  apps,	  in	  this	  case—that	  simplify	  and	  speed	  up	  access	  to	  knowledge.	  “Crucially,”	  they	  suggest,	  “[apps]	  are	  fast,	  on	  demand,	  just	  in	  time.	  You	  might	  think	  of	  them	  as	  shortcuts:	  they	  take	  you	  straight	  to	  what	  you’re	  looking	  for,	  no	  need	  to	  perform	  a	  web	  search	  or,	  if	  determinedly	  old-­‐fashioned,	  a	  search	  through	  your	  own	  memory”	  (7).	  Like	  performance-­‐enhancing	  drugs,	  however,	  JITT	  occupies	  a	  moral	  gray	  area,	  variously	  condemned,	  used	  and	  abused	  without	  any	  regulation	  and	  no	  real	  lawful	  enforcement.	  	   During	  a	  virtual	  discussion	  group	  session	  (an	  extrapolation	  of	  Internet	  forums	  of	  today),	  Miri,	  her	  friend	  Jin,	  and	  other	  young	  adults	  debate	  some	  of	  the	  aspects	  of	  just-­‐in-­‐time	  training.	  Some	  of	  its	  participants,	  like	  Miri,	  are	  physically	  present	  on	  the	  beach	  where	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it	  is	  being	  held.	  Others	  listen	  in	  as	  virtual	  “sand	  crabs	  or	  simply	  presence	  icons.	  A	  few	  [present]	  human	  forms,	  maybe	  their	  real-­‐world	  appearance.”	  On	  the	  subject	  of	  retread	  medicine	  and	  the	  need	  for	  older	  people	  to	  retrain	  professionally	  to	  stay	  relevant	  in	  the	  digital	  age,	  JITT	  is	  offered	  as	  a	  possible	  solution.	  Indignant,	  Miri	  points	  out	  that,	  technically,	  “‘JITT	  is	  illegal.’”	  Jin	  calls	  it	  a	  form	  of	  “‘mind	  control.’”	  And	  indeed,	  the	  image	  of	  the	  little	  girl	  lauding	  the	  treatment	  (there	  is	  strong	  evidence	  that	  this	  is	  the	  Rabbit	  in	  virtual	  disguise	  again,	  pushing	  a	  sinister	  JITT	  agenda)	  even	  admits	  that,	  although	  her	  grandma	  “‘lives	  pretty	  well	  as	  long	  as	  she	  keep	  taking	  her	  upgrades,’”	  she	  nonetheless	  “‘cries	  a	  lot’”	  (Vinge,	  
Rainbows	  End	  103-­‐04).	  	   For	  Colonel	  Alice	  Gong	  Gu,	  one	  of	  the	  top	  strategic	  leaders	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Marine	  Corps,	  staying	  on	  the	  edge	  is	  not	  only	  integral,	  but	  also	  a	  matter	  of	  life	  and	  death.	  Just-­‐in-­‐time	  training	  provides	  the	  kind	  of	  instantaneous	  jolt	  she	  needs	  to	  access	  and	  process	  large	  swathes	  of	  differentiated,	  simultaneous	  data	  and	  skillsets	  that	  otherwise	  exist	  outside	  her	  natural	  purview.	  In	  this	  context,	  JITT	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  supplementary,	  if	  illicit,	  domain	  of	  white-­‐collar	  knowledge	  workers	  who	  make	  up	  the	  majority	  of	  their	  society’s	  workforce.	  However,	  the	  practice	  eventually	  becomes	  too	  much	  for	  Alice	  to	  handle,	  endangering	  her	  physical	  health.	  According	  to	  an	  in-­‐text	  definition	  of	  JITT,	  “‘just-­‐in-­‐time-­‐training’	  (also,	  ‘just-­‐in-­‐time-­‐trainee’,	  when	  referring	  to	  a	  victim	  of	  the	  procedure)…	  combines	  addressin	  therapy	  and	  intense	  data	  exposure,	  capable	  of	  installing	  large	  skill	  sets	  in	  less	  than	  100	  hours”	  (Vinge,	  Rainbows	  End	  178).	  Users	  of	  the	  treatment	  are,	  in	  practice,	  victims,	  overloaded	  and	  over-­‐stimulated	  with	  information.	  Her	  husband	  Bob	  (Robert’s	  son)	  notices	  with	  much	  emotional	  pain	  the	  changes	  that	  JITT	  has	  wrought	  in	  his	  wife:	  She	  wandered	  about,	  stony-­‐faced	  and	  terse.	  Anyone	  else	  in	  her	  position	  would	  be	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dead	  by	  now,	  or	  a	  raving	  lunatic.	  Somehow	  she	  hung	  on,	  often	  simulating	  something	  like	  her	  natural	  self,	  and	  successfully	  managing	  the	  prep	  for	  her	  latest	  assignment.	  
That’s	  why	  the	  Corps	  keeps	  driving	  her	  harder	  and	  harder.	  (158-­‐59)	  Though	  just-­‐in-­‐time	  training	  assures	  Alice’s	  professional	  edge	  in	  an	  environment	  that	  demands	  the	  management	  of	  multiple,	  complex	  systems	  of	  knowledge,	  the	  trade-­‐off	  leaves	  her	  feeling	  burnt	  out,	  zombie-­‐like,	  coping	  only	  by	  a	  thin	  simulation	  of	  self-­‐composure.	  Another	  JITT	  user,	  Carlos	  Rivera,	  encounters	  similar	  unpredictable	  psychological	  issues.	  As	  the	  definition	  notes,	  JITT	  is	  “[m]ost	  famous	  for	  its	  tragic	  use	  in	  the	  <link>Sino-­‐American	  Conflict</link>,	  when	  100,000	  U.S.	  military	  recruits	  were	  trained	  in	  Mandarin,	  Cantonese—”	  (178-­‐79).	  And	  for	  a	  short	  time	  Carlos	  experiences	  the	  mental	  takeover	  of	  a	  Mandarin	  Chinese	  language	  upgrade,	  able	  to	  speak	  and	  think	  only	  in	  that	  language.	  Naturally,	  his	  doctor	  immediately	  requests	  a	  brain	  scan.	  
The	  Digital	  Library	  
	   The	  UCSD	  library	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  in	  Vinge’s	  novel,	  because	  it	  is	  depicted	  in	  the	  transition	  stage	  from	  physical	  stacks	  to	  virtual	  reality—what	  I	  refer	  to	  as	  an	  approximation	  of	  the	  digital	  library.	  Following	  Clifford	  Lynch,	  Borgman	  notes	  that	  the	  digital	  library	  as	  a	  concept	  has	  often	  been	  met	  with	  resistance	  because	  it	  “obscures	  the	  complex	  relationship	  between	  electronic	  information	  collections	  and	  libraries	  as	  institutions”	  (17).	  However,	  she	  writes,	  scholars	  of	  the	  National	  Science	  Foundation	  have	  attempted	  to	  salvage	  and	  redeploy	  the	  term,	  formalizing	  it	  as	  “a	  set	  of	  electronic	  resources	  and	  associated	  technical	  capabilities	  for	  creating,	  searching,	  and	  using	  information.”	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Moreover,	  as	  digital	  learning	  environments,	  they	  are	  “constructed—collected	  and	  organized—by	  [and	  for]	  a	  community	  of	  users,	  and	  their	  functional	  capabilities	  support	  the	  information	  needs	  and	  uses	  of	  that	  community.”	  “In	  this	  sense,”	  the	  NSF	  scholars	  note,	  digital	  libraries	  “are	  an	  extension,	  enhancement,	  and	  integration	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  information	  institutions	  as	  physical	  places	  where	  resources	  are	  selected,	  collected,	  organized,	  preserved,	  and	  accessed	  in	  support	  of	  a	  user	  community”	  (Borgman	  17-­‐18).	  In	  Rainbows	  
End,	  the	  university	  library	  is	  extended,	  enhanced	  and	  integrated	  with	  other	  physical	  information	  institutions	  through	  its	  patrons’	  wearable	  technology	  and	  the	  provision	  of	  virtual	  overlays.	  It	  is	  also	  undergoing	  a	  radical	  transformation,	  through	  mass-­‐digitization,	  from	  storage	  of	  traditional	  print	  media	  collections	  to	  virtual	  representations.	  	  Running	  commentary	  is	  provided	  by	  “the	  Elder	  Cabal”	  (Vinge,	  Rainbows	  End	  118)—made	  up	  of	  Dean	  Blount,	  Carlos	  Rivera,	  an	  old	  computer	  programmer	  named	  Tommy	  Parker,	  and	  Robert—who	  meet	  on	  the	  library’s	  sixth	  floor.	  The	  four	  men,	  who	  all	  belong	  to	  that	  older	  historical	  era	  in	  which	  life	  was	  still	  partly	  analogue,	  use	  the	  meetings	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  support	  group	  to	  mourn	  the	  passing	  of	  traditional	  humanities	  and	  attempt	  to	  “figure	  out	  what,	  if	  anything,	  their	  skills	  are	  good	  for	  anymore”	  (Tierney).	  Throughout	  the	  novel,	  the	  Elder	  Cabal	  is	  most	  concerned	  with	  the	  apparent	  onset	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  Librareome	  Project—a	  massive	  print	  digitization/shredding	  effort	  that	  is	  putting	  print	  media,	  libraries	  and	  archives	  in	  jeopardy.	  As	  John	  Tierney	  suggests,	  the	  sketch	  can	  be	  read	  autobiographically.	  During	  a	  2008	  interview	  with	  the	  author,	  Tierney	  noted	  that	  “Dr.	  Vinge,	  who	  is	  63,	  can	  feel	  the	  elders’	  pain,	  if	  only	  because	  his	  books	  are	  in	  that	  building.”	  For	  the	  interview,	  Vinge	  took	  Tierney	  to	  “the	  Elder	  Cabal’s	  meeting	  room	  in	  the	  library	  and	  talked	  about	  his	  own	  concerns	  about	  2025—like	  whether	  anyone	  will	  still	  be	  reading	  books,	  and	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whether	  networked	  knowledge	  will	  do	  to	  intellectuals	  what	  the	  Industrial	  Revolution	  did	  to	  the	  Luddite	  textile	  artisans.”	  Vinge’s	  own	  fears	  correlate	  closely	  with	  the	  cabal’s,	  beneath	  whose	  floor	  the	  book	  shredding	  process	  has	  already	  begun.	  Today,	  we	  see	  massive	  global	  initiatives	  by	  tech	  companies	  such	  as	  Google	  to	  digitize,	  index,	  and	  make	  searchable	  the	  collective	  knowledge,	  literature,	  and	  art	  of	  humanity.	  For	  Google,	  Inc.,	  Steven	  Levy	  writes,	  the	  “audacious	  attempt	  to	  digitize	  every	  book	  ever	  printed,	  so	  that	  anyone	  in	  the	  world	  [can]	  locate	  the	  information	  within”	  is	  considered	  no	  less	  than	  “a	  boon	  to	  civilization”	  (11)	  and	  “the	  world’s	  most	  valuable	  font	  of	  knowledge”	  (349).	  According	  to	  Vaidhyanathan,	  however,	  such	  a	  perspective—explicit	  in	  their	  founding	  mission	  “‘to	  organize	  the	  world’s	  information	  and	  make	  it	  universally	  accessible	  and	  useful’”—takes	  on	  a	  sinister	  tone	  when	  we	  consider	  how	  deep	  and	  insidiously	  “Google	  has	  permeated	  our	  culture.”	  “Googlization,”	  he	  suggests,	  rewrites	  traditional	  schemas	  of	  human	  epistemology	  in	  three	  key	  areas:	  “[U]s”	  (through	  Google’s	  effects	  on	  our	  personal	  information,	  habits,	  opinions,	  and	  judgments);	  “the	  world”	  (through	  the	  globalization	  of	  a	  strange	  kind	  of	  surveillance	  and…	  infrastructural	  imperialism);	  and	  “knowledge”	  (through	  its	  effects	  on	  the	  use	  of	  great	  bodies	  of	  knowledge	  accumulated	  in	  books,	  online	  databases	  and	  the	  Web).	  (2)	  For	  Michael	  Gorman,	  writing	  in	  2004	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  library	  collections,	  this	  revision	  of	  knowledge	  and	  its	  translation	  into	  information	  is	  especially	  troubling.	  Google’s	  digitization	  efforts	  amount	  to	  “an	  assault	  on	  library	  contents	  to	  obtain	  an	  exhaustive	  collection	  of	  knowledge	  that,	  in	  their	  opinion,	  [is]	  comparable	  to	  ‘the	  mind	  of	  God’”	  (quoted	  in	  Polastron	  34).	  Digitization	  is	  useful	  for	  semantically	  structured	  reference	  materials	  like	  photo	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collections	  or	  encyclopedias,	  but	  robs	  non-­‐reference	  books	  of	  their	  contextual	  essence.	  It	  is	  the	  epitome,	  he	  argues,	  of	  confusing	  the	  attainment	  of	  information	  for	  the	  preservation	  of	  knowledge	  	  In	  any	  case,	  this	  is	  certainly	  the	  way	  the	  Elder	  Cabal	  sees	  things.	  Their	  microcosmic	  representation	  of	  this	  reality—the	  UCSD	  library—is	  similarly	  “rendered	  part	  of	  the	  vast	  data	  storm”	  that	  Huertas	  International,	  the	  novel’s	  satirical	  version	  of	  Google,	  Inc.,	  “has	  taken	  as	  its	  challenge	  to	  organize	  and	  make	  available”	  (Vaidhyanathan	  2).	  As	  architect	  of	  the	  UCSD	  Librareome	  Project,	  Carlos	  informs	  Robert,	  Huertas	  International	  plans	  to	  establish	  a	  digital	  “collection	  [that]	  will	  contain	  almost	  all	  human	  knowledge	  up	  to	  about	  twenty	  years	  ago.	  All	  correlated	  and	  connected’”	  (Vinge,	  Rainbows	  End	  167).	  But	  the	  project	  takes	  this	  process	  further	  than	  Google	  (for	  now—reality	  is	  quickly	  catching	  up	  to	  Vinge’s	  scenario).	  Google’s	  typical	  process	  involves	  “‘nondestructive	  scanning’”	  where	  books	  are	  physically	  preserved	  (Levy	  348).	  As	  Carlos	  points	  out,	  though,	  The	  Librareome	  Project	  isn’t	  just	  the	  video	  capture	  of	  premillennium	  books.	  It’s	  not	  just	  the	  digitization.	  It	  goes	  beyond	  Google	  and	  company.	  Huertas	  intends	  to	  combine	  all	  classical	  knowledge	  into	  a	  single,	  object-­‐situational	  database	  with	  a	  transparent	  fee	  structure.”	  (Vinge,	  Rainbows	  End	  166)	  In	  Huertas’	  process	  the	  books	  are	  digitized	  and	  destroyed.	  Here,	  the	  sum	  total	  of	  human	  endeavor	  and	  insight—the	  whole	  corpus	  of	  history—will	  be	  quantified	  into	  binary	  data	  in	  one	  massive	  “object-­‐situational	  database.”	  An	  object-­‐situational	  database	  presumably	  treats	  any	  given	  set	  of	  data	  (the	  object)	  as	  part	  of	  the	  user’s	  real-­‐life	  contexts.	  In	  other	  words,	  for	  a	  subscription	  fee,	  information	  is	  pushed	  automatically	  to	  a	  user’s	  augmented	  reality	  wearable	  on	  a	  basis	  of	  situational	  need,	  context	  and/or	  location	  without	  the	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requirement	  of	  user	  action.	  In	  this	  framework,	  the	  substance	  of	  the	  past	  is	  at	  once	  fixed,	  correlated	  and	  seamlessly	  available	  across	  any	  and	  all	  hyperconnected,	  on-­‐demand	  digital	  contexts	  in	  an	  industrial	  process	  we	  might	  think	  of	  as	  destructive	  scanning.	  	   The	  fate	  of	  UCSD’s	  print	  materials	  under	  this	  new	  knowledge	  paradigm	  is	  thus	  quite	  clear.	  Robert’s	  journey	  up	  to	  the	  sixth	  floor	  takes	  him	  through	  a	  veritable	  Dante’s	  Inferno	  of	  biblio-­‐horrors.	  Indeed,	  the	  digitization/shredding	  process,	  metonymically	  designated	  by	  the	  plastic	  crates	  labeled	  with	  the	  sanitized	  title	  of	  “‘Rescued	  Data,’”	  confronts	  him	  at	  every	  step	  (Vinge,	  Rainbows	  End	  122).	  At	  first,	  he	  perceives	  the	  shredded	  book	  paper	  raining	  down	  through	  the	  central	  stairwell	  as	  “[t]iny	  flecks	  of	  white	  float[ing]	  and	  swirl[ing]	  in	  the	  column	  of	  light.”	  “Snowflakes?”	  he	  wonders.	  Amidst	  “the	  ripping	  buzz	  of	  [a]	  saw…	  [and]	  the	  sound	  of	  a	  giant	  vacuum	  cleaner”	  that	  “beat	  him	  around	  the	  head,”	  Robert	  reaches	  the	  fourth	  floor	  (122).	  “Beyond	  would	  be	  the	  library	  stacks,”	  he	  assures	  himself	  hopefully.	  All	  the	  books	  you	  could	  ever	  want,	  miles	  of	  them.	  The	  beauty	  of	  ideas	  waiting	  in	  ambush…	  	  But	  this	  was	  like	  no	  stacks	  he	  had	  ever	  seen.	  The	  floor	  was	  draped	  in	  white	  tarpaulin.	  The	  air	  was	  hazy	  with	  drifting	  debris.	  He	  took	  a	  breath,	  smelled	  pine	  pitch	  and	  burnt	  wood—and	  for	  a	  moment	  he	  couldn’t	  stop	  coughing.	  (123)	  In	  fact,	  he	  realizes,	  the	  roaring	  saw-­‐like	  sounds	  he	  has	  been	  hearing	  are	  actually	  coming	  from	  a	  tree	  shredder.	  Instead	  of	  the	  treasure	  trove	  of	  physical	  knowledge	  he	  expects	  to	  find,	  he	  sees	  “empty	  shelves,”	  “a	  littering	  of	  paper	  scraps	  and	  deep	  dust,”	  and	  “empty	  bookcases,	  skeletons”	  surrounded	  by	  “a	  fog	  of	  floating	  paper	  dust”	  (123).	  	  The	  machinery	  itself	  becomes	  metaphorized	  as	  something	  monster-­‐like	  from	  Greek	  mythology.	  The	  combination	  vacuum/shredding	  tube	  is	  a	  “monster	  worm”	  devouring	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shredded	  book	  pages	  in	  its	  great	  “maw.”	  As	  it	  continues	  to	  suck	  up,	  shred	  and	  digitally	  photograph	  the	  millions	  of	  paper	  scraps,	  “like	  leaves	  in	  a	  tornado,	  twisting	  and	  tumbling,”	  Robert	  watches	  helplessly	  as	  “[t]he	  monster	  advance[s]	  another	  foot	  into	  the	  stacks,	  leaving	  another	  foot	  of	  empty	  shelves	  behind	  it.”	  Meanwhile,	  the	  augmented	  reality	  labels	  provided	  by	  his	  Epiphany	  give	  “calm	  phrases	  of	  the	  horror:	  [t]he	  raging	  maw	  was	  a	  ‘NaviCloud	  custom	  debinder.’	  The	  fabric	  tunnel	  that	  stretched	  out	  behind	  it	  was	  a	  ‘camera	  tunnel.’”	  Even	  the	  two	  white-­‐suited	  technicians	  operating	  the	  machinery,	  who	  remind	  Robert	  of	  construction	  workers,	  conceal	  the	  darker	  truth	  of	  the	  process	  as	  “the	  ultimate	  in	  deconstruction”	  of	  knowledge	  (Vinge,	  Rainbows	  End	  123).	  When	  Robert	  finally	  reaches	  the	  sixth	  floor	  and	  the	  cabal,	  he	  holds	  up	  a	  scrap	  of	  paper	  and	  asks	  them	  “‘What	  madness	  explains	  destroying	  the	  book	  this	  was	  part	  of?’”	  The	  scrap,	  it	  turns	  out,	  was	  part	  of	  a	  science	  fiction	  novel,	  and	  Dean	  Blount,	  in	  his	  bitterness,	  recognizes	  the	  irony	  of	  such.	  “‘Those	  sci-­‐fi	  bastards	  are	  just	  getting	  what	  they	  deserve,’”	  he	  declares.	  “‘For	  thirty	  years	  they	  had	  literature	  education	  hijacked—and	  this	  is	  what	  all	  their	  reductionism	  has	  gotten	  them.	  Good	  riddance’”	  (Vinge,	  Rainbows	  End	  127-­‐28).	  Indeed,	  the	  predictions	  in	  science	  fiction	  (particularly	  cyberpunk	  and	  its	  descendants)	  about	  a	  digital	  event	  horizon	  and	  the	  death	  of	  analogue	  and	  physical	  media	  are	  here	  being	  turned	  back	  upon	  that	  same	  literature.	  In	  light	  of	  Tierney’s	  interview	  with	  Vinge,	  the	  science	  fiction	  author,	  anxious	  about	  the	  fate	  of	  books,	  the	  moment	  is	  decidedly	  meta-­‐referential.	  Robert’s	  observation	  that	  “[t]here	  may	  be	  nothing	  burning,	  but	  this	  does	  seem	  like	  Fahrenheit	  451”	  only	  completes	  the	  point	  (128).	  	   A	  short	  time	  later,	  Robert	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  cabal	  discuss	  the	  Librareome	  Project	  and	  research	  methodologies	  with	  Sharif	  (who	  appears	  to	  them	  as	  a	  virtual	  presence).	  In	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Sharif’s	  opinion,	  the	  project	  is	  useful	  because	  “it	  will	  open	  up	  all	  past	  literature	  to	  everyone—and	  faster	  than	  any	  other	  project	  could	  do	  it”	  (Vinge,	  Rainbows	  End	  131).	  Defending	  this	  position,	  he	  explains	  that	  he	  love[s]	  the	  old	  poets,	  but	  old-­‐time	  literature	  is	  so	  hard	  to	  get	  at.	  If	  your	  interest	  is	  in	  post-­‐2000	  topics,	  critical	  sources	  are	  everywhere	  and	  research	  gets	  results.	  But	  for	  the	  rest,	  you	  have	  to	  search	  through	  that.”	  Sharif	  waved	  at	  the	  orderly	  ranks	  of	  books,	  the	  stacks	  that	  filled	  the	  library’s	  sixth	  floor.	  “It	  can	  take	  days	  to	  gain	  even	  trivial	  insights.”	  (131)	  Though	  Robert	  and	  Dean	  Blount	  have	  come	  a	  long	  way	  in	  their	  adjustment	  to	  the	  digital	  age	  and	  contemporary	  humanities	  practices	  (especially	  Robert	  with	  his	  newfound	  appreciation	  for	  wearable	  tech),	  both	  men	  still	  retain	  some	  degree	  of	  respect	  for	  traditional	  methodologies	  of	  scholarly	  research.	  In	  Dean	  Blount’s	  view,	  Sharif	  is	  simply	  ignorant	  of	  “the	  purpose	  of	  the	  stacks.”	  Library	  research,	  he	  informs	  the	  graduate	  student,	  should	  not	  be	  about	  finding	  “the	  precise	  answer	  to	  your	  burning-­‐question-­‐of-­‐the-­‐moment.”	  Instead,	  it	  should	  proceed	  as	  an	  associative	  exercise	  in	  which	  one	  might	  find	  “answers	  to	  questions	  that	  [they]	  had	  never	  thought	  to	  ask”	  and	  that	  take	  their	  research	  “in	  new	  directions”	  entirely	  (131).	  However,	  although	  the	  preservation	  of	  traditional	  methodologies	  is	  important	  in	  an	  increasingly	  digital	  world	  like	  our	  own,	  both	  fail—either	  through	  obstinacy	  or	  non-­‐awareness—to	  recognize	  the	  fundamental	  socioeconomic	  and	  sociocultural	  impact	  that	  “new	  technologies”	  have	  had	  on	  research	  paradigms.	  For	  better	  or	  worse,	  digital	  tools	  “make	  it	  possible	  to	  generate	  and	  capture	  more	  data	  than	  was	  previously	  possible”	  (Borgman	  125).	  It	  is,	  after	  all,	  with	  disdain	  that	  Robert	  reflects	  on	  the	  memory	  of	  such	  a	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“trend	  even	  in	  his	  own	  teaching	  days.	  It	  wasn’t	  just	  the	  students	  who	  refused	  to	  get	  their	  hands	  dirty.	  Even	  so-­‐called	  researchers	  ignored	  the	  universe	  of	  things	  that	  weren’t	  online”	  (Vinge,	  Rainbows	  End	  131).	  But	  while	  digital	  fetishism	  often	  eclipses	  the	  universe	  of	  things	  and	  the	  urgency	  of	  embodied	  reality,25	  “networked	  information	  technologies”	  have	  nonetheless	  proven	  useful	  in	  scholarly	  work,	  providing	  “enhancements…	  [that]	  accomplish	  the	  same	  functions	  more	  efficiently	  and	  effectively”	  (Borgman	  75).	  These	  two	  competing	  sides	  of	  Robert—a	  loyalty	  to	  humanistic	  tradition	  and	  a	  fascination	  with	  futurity,	  much	  like	  the	  tensions	  within	  Rick	  Powers	  in	  Galatea	  2.2—create	  in	  him,	  as	  with	  all	  the	  older	  humanists,	  a	  confusing	  superposition	  in	  which	  they	  are,	  as	  the	  chapter	  titles	  tell	  us,	  “Guardians	  of	  the	  Past”	  and	  “Handmaidens	  of	  the	  Future”	  (Vinge,	  Rainbows	  End	  118).	  Finally,	  the	  transformation	  of	  the	  UCSD	  library	  into	  something	  resembling	  the	  virtual	  reality	  playground	  of	  Pyramid	  Hill	  suggests	  the	  possibility	  of	  reinvention	  for	  libraries,	  archives	  and	  similar	  institutions	  strained	  by	  rising	  costs,	  outmoded	  technologies,	  and	  the	  evolving	  nature	  of	  publishing	  in	  the	  digital	  age.	  Vinge’s	  rendering	  is	  a	  radical	  departure	  from	  what	  we	  have	  now,	  to	  be	  sure,	  but	  it	  still	  accounts	  for	  the	  need	  for	  the	  library	  as	  an	  ideological	  space	  and	  physical	  system	  of	  knowledge.	  Bill	  Simpson,	  Director	  of	  the	  John	  Rylands	  Library	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Manchester,	  notes	  that	  for	  years	  the	  notion	  that	  libraries	  will	  soon	  be	  made	  obsolete	  by	  evolving	  technologies	  stems	  from	  the	  attitude	  that	  “‘I	  can	  get	  everything	  I	  need	  from	  my	  computer	  and	  have	  no	  need	  of	  a	  library.’”	  Indeed,	  he	  continues,	  such	  a	  point	  of	  view	  confuses	  “the	  computing	  infrastructure	  with	  the	  content”	  and	  shortchanges	  “students,	  for	  whom	  the	  library	  is	  much	  more	  than	  a	  purveyor	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  See,	  for	  example,	  N.	  Katherine	  Hayles’	  How	  We	  Became	  Posthuman:	  Virtual	  Bodies	  in	  Cybernetics,	  Literature,	  
and	  Informatics	  (1999),	  Donna	  J.	  Haraway’s	  “A	  Cyborg	  Manifesto”	  (published	  in	  Simians,	  Cyborgs,	  and	  Women	  1991),	  Stacy	  Alaimo	  and	  Susan	  Heckman’s	  Material	  Feminisms	  (2008),	  and	  Rosi	  Braidotti’s	  Metamorphoses:	  
Towards	  a	  Materialist	  Theory	  of	  Becoming	  (2002).	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information,”	  and	  “academics	  in	  areas	  such	  as	  the	  humanities	  for	  whom	  instant,	  up-­‐to-­‐the-­‐minute	  online	  information”	  is	  not	  integral	  to	  their	  work	  (89).	  	  In	  Vinge’s	  narrative,	  therefore,	  institutional	  reinvention	  trumps	  dissolution.	  In	  place	  of	  the	  old	  stacks,	  the	  library	  now	  contains	  a	  fantasy	  “‘digitization	  of	  what’s	  been	  destroyed	  so	  far.’”	  Through	  the	  enhanced	  reality	  of	  their	  Epiphany	  eye	  contacts,	  the	  cabal	  (except	  Tommie,	  who	  still	  uses	  a	  laptop	  and	  can	  “‘see	  the	  illusions,	  but	  only	  when	  [he]	  want[s]	  them’”)	  moves	  through	  a	  virtual	  landscape	  of	  folkloric	  metaphor	  and	  whimsicality.	  The	  overlay	  is	  oddly	  fitting	  for	  a	  space	  most	  often	  characterized	  by	  its	  very	  antiquity	  as	  a	  center	  of	  erudition.	  Among	  the	  stacks,	  Robert	  sees	  “‘Knights	  Guardian’	  hunched	  over	  tables…	  piled	  with	  books	  and	  parchment.”	  The	  “[i]lluminated	  manuscripts”	  are	  “printed	  in	  a	  cracked	  Gothic	  script,”	  and	  turn	  out	  on	  closer	  inspection	  to	  be	  mundane	  economics	  textbooks.	  Leather-­‐bound	  tomes	  sit	  on	  shelves	  that	  go	  upward	  forever,	  “like	  one	  of	  those	  fractal	  forests	  in	  old	  graphics,”	  flying	  down	  when	  called	  and	  “riffl[ing]	  themselves	  open”	  (Vinge,	  
Rainbows	  End	  173).	  In	  another	  part	  of	  the	  library,	  the	  Escher	  Wing,	  visitors	  are	  treated	  to	  moving	  staircases	  and	  other	  elements	  of	  M.C.	  Escher’s	  visual	  illusions.	  As	  Dean	  Blount	  suggests,	  however,	  such	  trickery	  is	  a	  pale	  replacement	  for	  the	  real	  thing.	  “Our	  students	  might	  as	  well	  go	  to	  Pyramid	  Hill,”	  he	  exclaims	  (174);	  and	  a	  little	  while	  later,	  “‘these	  kids	  will	  lose	  all	  respect	  for	  the	  permanent	  record	  of	  the	  human	  heritage’”	  (175).	  There	  is,	  indeed,	  a	  fine	  line	  between	  human	  history	  and	  the	  simulacrum	  of	  that	  history.	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Conclusion	  
	   The	  vision	  presented	  in	  Rainbows	  End	  of	  classroom	  and	  library	  environments	  radically	  shaped	  by	  digital	  technologies	  is	  an	  ambitious	  potential	  snapshot	  of	  where	  the	  humanities	  are	  heading.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  is	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  evolutions	  that	  current	  institutional	  ideologies,	  infrastructures,	  and	  practices	  are	  undergoing.	  Since	  the	  early	  1990s,	  the	  digital—as	  a	  network	  of	  wires,	  nodes,	  and	  data-­‐bits;	  as	  an	  end-­‐user	  product;	  and,	  most	  important,	  as	  a	  conceptual	  psychological	  metonymy—has	  permeated	  nearly	  every	  facet	  of	  western	  culture	  and	  society.	  According	  to	  Harwood	  and	  Asal,	  such	  “technologies	  are	  embedded	  within	  the	  fabric	  of	  American	  life—the	  way	  we	  shop,	  do	  business,	  obtain	  information,	  communicate	  with	  others,	  and,	  increasingly,	  educate	  our	  youth”	  (2).	  As	  U.S.	  culture	  continues	  to	  be	  identified	  with	  the	  digital—as	  being,	  in	  fact,	  quintessentially	  digital	  in	  itself—the	  humanities	  fields	  at	  its	  center	  are	  also	  fundamentally	  transformed.	  Education	  and	  archival	  organizations	  have	  largely	  followed	  this	  paradigm,	  adapting	  to	  digital	  modalities	  as	  knowledge	  production	  and	  dissemination	  have	  become	  increasingly	  dependent	  upon	  digital	  technologies	  and	  ecologies.	  Within	  these	  emerging	  digital	  learning	  environments,	  writes	  Ethan	  Zuckerman,	  we	  are	  “digital	  cosmopolitans”	  empowered	  by	  technology	  “to	  take	  responsibility	  for	  shaping	  the	  tools	  we	  use	  to	  encounter	  the	  world”	  (27).	  Indeed,	  we	  as	  users	  define	  the	  parameters	  of	  such	  environments.	  As	  Vinge’s	  novel	  shows	  us,	  successful	  digital	  learning	  environments	  rely	  not	  only	  upon	  technology,	  but	  also	  upon	  their	  networks	  of	  interconnected	  participants.	  The	  relationships	  are	  interdependent,	  not	  subordinate.	  Digital	  learning	  environments	  “provide	  functionality	  and	  tools	  for	  collaboration	  and	  communication	  in	  various	  modes	  between	  students	  and	  faculty”	  and	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researchers,	  as	  well	  as	  flexible	  platforms	  for	  “information	  exchange”	  and	  “learning	  resources”	  (Lanestedt	  71).	  The	  students	  and	  library	  patrons	  of	  Rainbows	  End	  have	  an	  active	  stake—through	  the	  virtual	  imagery	  produced	  by	  wearable	  technology	  of	  Epiphany	  Lite—in	  the	  elastic	  and	  collaborative	  discourse	  communities	  they	  help	  build	  as	  digital	  makers	  and	  collaborators.	  Epiphany	  Lite,	  like	  the	  Internet,	  “lies	  at	  the	  core	  of	  an	  advanced	  scholarly	  information	  infrastructure	  to	  facilitate	  distributed,	  data-­‐	  and	  information-­‐intensive	  collaborative	  research”	  (Borgman	  xvii).	  But	  it	  is	  also	  wholly	  dependent	  upon	  its	  users	  distributed	  across	  multiple	  “discourse	  networks”	  and	  communities	  in	  global	  and	  local	  processes	  of	  knowledge	  making.	  Discourse	  network,	  a	  term	  coined	  by	  Kittler,	  denotes	  “[t]he	  network	  of	  technologies	  and	  institutions	  [and	  participants]	  that	  allow	  a	  given	  culture	  to	  select,	  store,	  and	  process	  relevant	  data”	  (Discourse	  Networks	  369).	  In	  these	  networks	  (of	  which	  the	  digital	  learning	  environments	  of	  Rainbows	  End	  are	  a	  part),	  technology	  and	  its	  users	  exist	  as	  part	  of	  what	  Geoffrey	  Winthrop-­‐Young	  calls	  a	  mutually	  resonant	  “techno-­‐cultural	  configuration”	  that	  helps	  articulate	  and	  plug	  them	  into	  culture	  (97).	  Like	  all	  high-­‐caliber	  science	  fiction,	  Vinge’s	  novel	  is	  as	  much	  a	  representation	  of	  the	  present	  and	  reflection	  of	  the	  humanistic	  past	  as	  it	  is	  a	  speculation	  on	  the	  future.	  As	  such,	  similar	  to	  the	  tension	  inherent	  in	  Powers’	  Galatea	  2.2	  protagonist	  Rick,	  Rainbows	  End	  explores	  the	  dialectic	  between	  art	  and	  the	  traditional	  humanities,	  and	  a	  burgeoning	  fascination	  with	  digital	  technologies	  that	  initially	  seem	  to	  threaten	  those	  traditions.	  The	  narrative	  foregrounds	  and	  thus	  represents	  information—in	  the	  guise	  of	  search	  and	  analysis—as	  an	  increasingly	  important	  cultural	  and	  economic	  currency.	  Called	  “‘the	  heart	  of	  the	  economy’”	  (Vinge,	  Rainbows	  End	  59),	  search	  and	  analysis	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  retrieve,	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process,	  manipulate,	  and/or	  change	  digital	  data	  through	  global	  collaboration	  and	  the	  networked	  “intelligence	  of	  others”	  (213).	  Not	  surprisingly,	  it	  is	  taught	  to	  all	  high	  school	  students	  as	  a	  core	  competency	  and	  thus	  parallels	  a	  perspective	  affirmed	  during	  the	  Clinton	  administration:	  that	  technological	  literacy	  is	  “‘fundamental	  to	  a	  person’s	  ability	  to	  navigate	  through	  society	  as	  traditional	  skills	  like	  reading,	  writing	  and	  arithmetic’”	  and,	  by	  extension,	  the	  U.S.	  economy.	  Looming	  over	  all	  of	  this	  is	  the	  run-­‐up	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  Technological	  Singularity,	  which	  (though	  in	  some	  respects	  spiritually	  and	  psychologically	  alarming)	  Vinge	  has	  described	  as	  vastly	  useful	  for	  education	  and	  humanities	  knowledge	  networks.	  While	  the	  narrative	  refuses	  to	  definitively	  answer	  whether	  or	  not	  “‘computers	  and	  communication	  automation	  [favor]	  tyranny	  or	  [favor]	  liberty’”	  (Vinge,	  quoted	  in	  Moravec),	  Vinge	  sees	  the	  near-­‐term	  acceleration	  of	  technological	  development	  as	  a	  boon	  to	  democratic	  cultural	  and	  scholarly	  loci.	  The	  run-­‐up	  to	  the	  Singularity,	  he	  suggests,	  will	  bring	  “‘real	  changes	  to	  education’”	  and	  skills	  training	  in	  general.	  “‘[W]e	  have	  seven	  billion	  people	  out	  there	  who	  are	  variously	  good…	  at	  different	  things.	  And	  there	  are	  ways	  of	  enhancing	  and	  amplifying	  that	  by	  collaboration’”	  via	  digital	  networks.	  Like	  the	  novel’s	  search	  and	  analysis	  collectives,	  Internet	  communities,	  crowdsourcing	  and	  other	  knowledge	  commons	  reveal	  the	  ongoing	  development	  of	  a	  “‘very	  great	  imagination	  that	  can	  be	  exercised	  in	  making	  collaboration	  effective.’”	  In	  these	  digital	  learning	  environments,	  such	  as	  digital	  classrooms	  and	  libraries,	  technology	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  teach	  students	  “‘to	  learn	  how	  to	  learn’”	  (Vinge,	  quoted	  in	  Moravec).	  Rainbows	  End,	  in	  turn,	  expands	  upon	  Cathy	  N.	  Davidson’s	  hope	  for	  the	  “research	  and	  pedagogical	  possibilities	  of	  an	  open-­‐knowledge	  commons”	  provided	  by	  the	  digital	  “for	  scholars	  and	  students	  of	  the	  humanities”	  and	  culture	  at	  large	  (484).	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In	  the	  final	  chapter,	  “Hacktivists:	  Privacy,	  Play,	  and	  the	  Battle	  for	  Digital	  Freedom	  in	  Cory	  Doctorow’s	  Little	  Brother,”	  I	  trace	  the	  development	  of	  this	  born-­‐digital	  generation	  through	  the	  digital	  reshaping	  of	  high-­‐stakes	  political	  and	  ideological	  discourses	  in	  a	  post-­‐9/11	  America.	  Working	  from	  the	  foundations	  of	  digital	  culture	  and	  economy	  established	  by	  the	  preceding	  texts,	  I	  will	  position	  Doctorow’s	  narrative—a	  near-­‐future	  speculative	  work—as	  a	  politically	  conscious	  commentary	  on	  the	  state	  of	  freedom	  in	  the	  digital	  age.	  As	  digital	  narratives	  continue	  to	  inform	  the	  humanities	  and	  humanity	  in	  general,	  a	  serious	  consideration	  of	  digital	  civil	  liberties	  (privacy,	  surveillance,	  etc.)	  in	  the	  humanities	  is	  increasingly	  necessary.	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4	  
Hacktivists	  Privacy,	  Play,	  and	  the	  Battle	  for	  Digital	  Freedom	  	  in	  Cory	  Doctorow’s	  Little	  Brother	  
In	  “The	  Conscience	  of	  a	  Hacker,”	  a	  short	  but	  influential	  manifesto	  published	  in	  1986	  in	  the	  ezine	  Phrak,	  a	  hacker	  operating	  under	  the	  handle	  The	  Mentor	  (real	  name	  Lloyd	  Blankenship)	  laid	  the	  foundation	  for	  hacktivism.	  “This	  is	  our	  world	  now,”	  it	  reads,	  “the	  world	  of	  the	  electron	  and	  the	  switch…	  We	  explore…	  and	  you	  call	  us	  criminals.	  We	  seek	  after	  knowledge…	  and	  you	  call	  us	  criminals.	  We	  exist	  without	  skin	  color,	  without	  nationality,	  without	  religious	  bias…	  and	  you	  call	  us	  criminals.”	  Blankenship	  wrote	  the	  essay	  while	  in	  prison	  on	  a	  charge	  of	  computer	  crimes	  associated	  with	  bank	  tampering.	  In	  fact,	  he	  suggests,	  the	  only	  crime	  he	  is	  guilty	  of	  is	  “curiosity,”	  and	  a	  desire	  for	  social	  and	  political	  justice.	  He	  is	  a	  hacktivist,	  pushing	  back	  against	  a	  rigged	  system.	  	  Marcus	  Yallow,	  the	  protagonist	  of	  Cory	  Doctorow’s	  Little	  Brother	  (2008),	  is	  also	  a	  hacktivist,	  combining	  a	  passion	  for	  digital	  DIY	  with	  an	  acute	  sociopolitical	  awareness	  about	  personal	  freedoms	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  It	  is	  in	  the	  intersection	  of	  these	  qualities	  that	  we	  find	  the	  humanity	  that	  coalesces	  around	  technology.	  According	  to	  Tim	  Jordan	  and	  Paul	  A.	  Taylor,	  hacktivism	  is	  a	  form	  of	  digital	  civil	  disobedience	  that	  combines	  “grassroots	  political	  protest	  with	  computer	  hacking”	  in	  both	  real-­‐life	  and	  cyberspatial	  contexts	  (1).	  Molly	  Sauter	  locates	  the	  concept	  as	  “disruptive	  activism”	  practiced	  in	  online	  environments	  (2),	  with	  ties	  to	  historical	  activist	  causes	  such	  as	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  movement	  and	  anti-­‐Vietnam	  War	  
142	  	  
protests.	  Though	  in	  many	  ways	  a	  typical	  high	  school	  student,	  Marcus	  acts	  as	  a	  conduit	  for	  Doctorow’s	  professional	  and	  personal	  engagement	  with	  digital	  security,	  privacy,	  copyright,	  digital	  rights	  management,	  open	  source	  technologies	  and	  initiatives,	  and	  other	  humanities-­‐based	  digital	  issues.	  Doctorow	  has	  positioned	  himself	  as	  a	  “mouthpiece/activist	  type”	  on	  these	  issues	  (“Microsoft	  Research”	  3),	  utilizing	  his	  fiction	  and	  essay	  writing	  to	  explore	  “the	  personal	  and	  ethical	  need	  for	  a	  better	  relationship	  with	  information	  technology”	  (Grossman).	  In	  Marcus,	  he	  has	  created	  a	  fictional	  analogue	  whose	  passion	  for	  building	  and	  hacking	  digital	  technologies	  (both	  hard-­‐	  and	  software)	  is	  central	  to	  the	  character’s	  identity.	  This	  passion	  is	  illustrated	  in	  an	  early	  passage:	  “If	  you've	  never	  programmed	  a	  computer,”	  says	  Marcus	  to	  the	  reader,	  “you	  should.	  There’s	  nothing	  like	  it	  in	  the	  whole	  world.	  When	  you	  program	  a	  computer,	  it	  does	  exactly	  what	  you	  tell	  it	  to	  do…	  It’s	  awesome	  in	  the	  truest	  sense:	  it	  can	  fill	  you	  with	  awe”	  (Doctorow,	  Little	  Brother	  119).	  Computer	  programming	  is	  for	  Marcus	  both	  an	  intimate	  act—working	  in	  the	  entrails	  of	  raw	  code—and	  a	  form	  of	  artistic	  expression	  that	  carries	  with	  it	  a	  potential	  subversive	  power.	  	   Like	  the	  other	  novels	  of	  this	  project,	  Little	  Brother	  employs	  speculative	  and	  plot-­‐driven	  story	  elements	  to	  conduct	  a	  timely	  analysis	  of	  the	  cultural	  impact	  of	  the	  digital	  and	  the	  humanistic	  relationship	  to	  it.	  Tim	  O’Reilly	  sees	  this	  aspect	  of	  Doctorow’s	  rhetorical	  style	  as	  part	  of	  his	  role	  as	  a	  “context-­‐setter…	  helping	  us	  all	  to	  understand	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  technology	  being	  unleashed	  around	  us…	  The	  ideas	  behind	  his	  stories	  are	  tools	  to	  think	  with	  about	  hard	  problems	  in	  futures	  few	  are	  even	  prescient	  enough	  to	  predict”	  (9).	  Most	  crucially,	  Little	  Brother	  confronts	  the	  malleable	  and	  volatile	  nature	  of	  digital	  technologies	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  render	  positive	  change,	  to	  empower,	  and	  to	  corrupt—particularly	  as	  such	  configurations	  have	  evolved	  since	  the	  September	  11,	  2001	  terrorist	  attacks	  on	  the	  United	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States.	  This	  plays	  out	  as	  a	  digital	  power	  struggle	  (and	  struggle	  for	  the	  digital)	  between	  the	  Department	  of	  Homeland	  Security	  and	  ordinary	  American	  citizens,	  including	  Marcus	  and	  his	  classmates,	  following	  a	  9/11-­‐like	  terror	  event.	  Through	  a	  portrayal	  of	  the	  bombing	  of	  the	  San	  Francisco-­‐Oakland	  Bay	  Bridge	  and	  the	  BART	  system,	  Doctorow	  initiates	  an	  exploration	  of	  U.S.	  authority	  and	  its	  response	  to	  terrorism	  in	  the	  digital	  age.	  The	  speculative	  (that	  is,	  allegorical)	  aspect	  of	  the	  novel	  affords	  scrutiny	  of	  certain	  Bush	  II-­‐era	  policies	  that,	  under	  the	  administration’s	  jingoistic	  and	  oftentimes	  indiscriminate	  War	  on	  Terror,	  implicitly	  legitimized	  constitutional	  violations	  of	  basic	  civil	  liberties.26	  The	  work	  is	  thus	  also	  an	  indirect	  response	  to	  the	  social	  contract	  philosophies	  of	  Thomas	  Hobbes	  and	  others,	  upon	  which	  most	  contemporary	  democracies	  are	  based.	  In	  his	  Leviathan	  (1651),	  Hobbes	  argued	  for	  a	  trade-­‐off	  between	  civic	  freedom	  and	  sovereign	  security	  in	  which	  the	  individual	  surrenders	  some	  of	  their	  rights	  for	  the	  promise	  of	  protection	  by	  the	  state.	  This,	  he	  suggested,	  would	  prevent	  “a	  warre…	  of	  every	  man,	  against	  every	  man”	  (185).	  However,	  it	  is	  not	  difficult	  to	  see	  how	  those	  in	  power	  can	  corrupt	  such	  theories.	  The	  novel	  also	  acts	  as	  a	  projection	  of	  the	  role	  information	  technologies	  and	  digital	  spaces	  might	  play	  under	  these	  circumstances,	  where	  surveillance	  and	  the	  control	  of	  communications	  and	  data	  are	  paramount.	  In	  a	  global	  reality	  codified	  and	  interconnected	  by	  digital	  technologies,	  such	  policies	  (reactionary	  and	  pre-­‐emptive,	  built	  upon	  the	  notion	  of	  American	  exceptionalism)	  are	  made	  all	  the	  more	  dangerous	  and	  invasive.	  According	  to	  Rebecca	  MacKinnon,	  government	  and	  corporations	  are	  complicit	  in	  this	  erosion	  of	  Fourth	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  According	  to	  Andrew	  Morgan,	  “Under	  the	  auspices	  of	  combating	  terror,	  the	  Bush	  administration	  took	  many	  steps	  following	  9/11	  that	  according	  to	  some	  have	  curtailed	  civil	  rights.	  Chief	  among	  these	  was	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  USA	  Patriot	  Act	  of	  2001”	  signed	  into	  law	  by	  George	  W.	  Bush	  on	  October	  26,	  2001.	  Among	  its	  ten	  provisions,	  the	  law	  grants	  unilateral	  powers	  to	  law	  enforcement	  agencies	  in	  the	  surveillance	  and	  indefinite	  detention	  of	  immigrants;	  the	  authorization	  of	  National	  Security	  Letters,	  which	  allow	  agencies	  to	  seize	  telecommunication	  and	  financial	  records	  without	  warrant;	  and	  access	  to	  business	  records,	  including	  library	  and	  subscriber	  records.	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Amendment	  protections.27	  “As	  we	  grow	  increasingly	  dependent	  on	  the	  Internet	  and	  cellphones,”	  she	  writes,	  “government	  abuse	  of	  citizens’	  privacy	  requires	  the	  cooperation	  of	  the	  private	  sector.”	  Simultaneously,	  in	  Sauter’s	  view,	  we	  are	  seeing	  the	  development	  of	  “an	  entire	  public	  sphere,	  the	  internet,	  which	  by	  accidents	  of	  evolution	  and	  design,	  has	  none	  of	  the	  inherent	  free	  speech	  guarantees	  we	  have	  come	  to	  expect”	  (4).	  Indeed,	  the	  “spying	  and	  invasive	  Net”	  of	  post-­‐9/11,	  as	  Lessig	  calls	  it	  (Code	  xv),	  has	  become	  a	  digitally	  enshrined	  aspect	  of	  human	  life	  justified	  by	  the	  need	  for	  ever-­‐greater	  national	  security	  frameworks.	  However,	  the	  digital	  has	  always	  been	  something	  of	  a	  double-­‐edged	  sword.	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  “[d]issenting	  voices	  are	  pushed	  out	  of	  the	  paths	  of	  potential	  audiences,	  effectively	  removing	  them	  from	  the	  public	  discourse”28	  (Sauter	  4),	  digital	  technologies	  can	  provide	  powerful	  tools	  and	  knowledge	  sets	  for	  marginalized	  voices	  to	  be	  heard	  and	  to	  gather.	  Science	  fiction	  and	  many	  spaces	  of	  the	  Internet	  both	  offer,	  in	  this	  sense,	  lively	  democratic	  commons	  with	  the	  potential	  to	  help	  liberate	  their	  readers	  and	  users.	  On	  the	  contentious	  issue	  of	  citizenship	  in	  the	  digital	  age,	  Stephen	  Coleman	  argues	  that	  “e-­‐citizenship	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  democratic	  space	  where	  anyone	  can	  stake	  a	  claim	  to	  be	  heard	  and	  respected	  and	  all	  proposals	  have	  a	  chance	  of	  being	  acted	  upon”	  (391).	  Despite	  cynical	  commercial	  and/or	  political	  efforts	  to	  censor	  or	  leverage	  the	  contemporary	  e-­‐citizen—what	  Coleman	  refers	  to	  as	  “a	  technologically	  facilitated	  means	  of	  subsuming	  political	  subjects	  within	  the	  agenda,	  logic,	  and	  language	  of	  the	  state”	  (391)—the	  Internet	  continues	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  medium	  for	  performative	  and	  activist	  possibility.	  Its	  innumerable	  spaces	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  “The	  right	  of	  the	  people	  to	  be	  secure	  in	  their	  persons,	  houses,	  papers,	  and	  effects,	  against	  unreasonable	  searches	  and	  seizures,	  shall	  not	  be	  violated,	  and	  no	  warrants	  shall	  issue,	  but	  upon	  probable	  cause,	  supported	  by	  oath	  or	  affirmation,	  and	  particularly	  describing	  the	  place	  to	  be	  searched,	  and	  the	  persons	  or	  things	  to	  be	  seized”	  (U.S.	  Const.	  amend.	  IV).	  28	  For	  example,	  Edward	  Snowden	  and	  Julian	  Assange	  are	  both	  wanted	  in	  connection	  with	  breach-­‐of-­‐trust	  acts	  of	  political	  dissention,	  including	  the	  leaking	  of	  sensitive	  data.	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continue	  to	  coalesce	  as	  a	  democratizing	  phenomenon	  that	  challenges,	  subverts,	  and	  revises	  white	  male	  sociocultural	  and	  political	  power	  structures.	  	  Similarly,	  science	  fiction	  is	  increasingly	  being	  positioned	  in	  the	  mainstream	  as	  a	  literature	  of	  political	  and	  social	  empowerment.	  Science	  fiction,	  Octavia	  Butler	  once	  said	  in	  a	  2000	  interview	  with	  Charlie	  Rose,	  is	  a	  genre	  where	  “[y]ou	  [get]	  to	  make	  your	  own	  worlds;	  you	  [get]	  to	  write	  yourself	  in.”	  Jane	  Greenway	  Carr	  takes	  this	  a	  step	  further,	  arguing	  that	  science	  fiction	  “invite[s]	  marginalized	  people	  to	  read	  themselves	  into	  the	  story,	  to	  imagine	  themselves	  as	  participants	  and	  agents	  in	  changing	  the	  systems	  of	  culture,	  technology,	  and	  politics	  that	  govern	  their	  lives.”	  These	  “conduit[s]	  to	  feelings	  of	  citizenship”	  offer	  “outsider	  heroes”	  like	  Marcus	  a	  means	  to	  “interrogate	  systems	  of	  power”	  (J.G.	  Carr)	  and	  “architectures	  of	  regulation”	  (Lessig,	  Code	  xv).	  Bukatman	  largely	  agrees	  with	  this	  point	  of	  view,	  citing	  McCaffery’s	  proposal	  that	  “through	  its	  deployment	  of	  new	  ‘terminologies	  and	  metaphors,’	  contemporary	  American	  science	  fiction	  has	  ‘produced	  a	  body	  of	  work	  that	  addresses	  and	  analyzes…	  new	  technological	  modes	  of	  “being	  in	  the	  world”	  ’”	  (Terminal	  
Identity	  8).	  This	  chapter	  will	  address	  some	  of	  the	  issues	  in	  Little	  Brother	  that	  revolve	  around	  privacy,	  surveillance	  and	  civil	  rights	  in	  the	  digital	  age.	  Doctorow’s	  novel,	  a	  manifesto	  of	  peaceful	  “digital	  disobedience”	  that	  forms	  the	  basis	  of	  “the	  technophile’s	  civil	  protest”	  (Huang,	  “Reviews”),	  is	  a	  prime	  candidate	  for	  this	  kind	  of	  literary	  interrogation.	  I	  will	  begin	  by	  analyzing	  Marcus’s	  experiences	  in	  high	  school,	  the	  digital	  surveillance	  he	  is	  subjected	  to	  and	  his	  creative	  methods	  for	  evading	  and/or	  circumventing	  it	  as	  a	  tech	  hobbyist.	  Next,	  I	  will	  move	  onto	  a	  discussion	  of	  games	  and	  play	  as	  central	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  digital	  cultures	  through	  virtual	  and	  real-­‐life	  games	  including	  ARGs	  (Alternate	  Reality	  Games),	  LARPing	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(Live	  Action	  Role	  Playing)	  and	  MMORPGs	  (Massively	  Multiplayer	  Online	  Role	  Playing	  Games).	  In	  the	  final	  two	  sections	  of	  the	  chapter,	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  tense	  relationship	  between	  national	  security	  and	  digital	  liberty—including	  an	  analysis	  of	  hacktivism	  as	  an	  emergent	  form	  of	  democratic/sociopolitical	  resistance	  in	  the	  digital	  age.	  
Hackers	  as	  Pioneers	  
	   From	  the	  outset,	  we	  see	  how	  Marcus’s	  digital	  DIY	  and	  thoughts	  on	  privacy	  and	  constitutional	  rights	  converge	  in	  an	  ethics	  of	  hacktivism.	  For	  Andrew	  “bunnie”	  Huang,	  the	  MIT	  graduate	  who	  first	  hacked	  the	  Xbox	  platform	  in	  2002,	  “Hackers	  [like	  Marcus]	  are	  explorers,	  digital	  pioneers.”	  It	  is	  “in	  a	  hacker’s	  nature	  to	  question	  conventions	  and	  be	  tempted	  by	  intricate	  problems.”	  This	  is	  especially	  true	  for	  the	  security	  of	  a	  “large	  and	  complex	  system”	  like	  society,	  which	  is	  patched	  together	  by	  an	  ever	  evolving,	  but	  highly	  regulated	  set	  of	  laws	  and	  customs	  (Afterword	  371).	  In	  many	  important	  ways,	  Marcus	  is	  the	  activist,	  socio-­‐politically	  responsible	  and	  responsive	  torchbearer	  of	  the	  born	  digital	  generation.	  Where	  Miri	  Gu	  of	  Rainbows	  End	  sees	  the	  mastery	  of	  cutting	  edge	  digital	  technologies	  and	  literacies	  as	  an	  end	  in	  itself—a	  skillset	  that	  grants	  access	  to	  the	  social	  and	  economic	  benefits	  of	  entrenched	  power	  systems—Marcus	  and	  his	  high	  school	  friends	  use	  their	  digital	  savvy	  for	  social	  and	  political	  empowerment	  to	  circumvent	  or	  buck	  those	  systems.	  	  The	  novel	  begins	  at	  Cesar	  Chavez	  High	  School	  in	  San	  Francisco’s	  Mission	  district,	  which,	  as	  Marcus	  claims,	  “makes	  [him]	  one	  of	  the	  most	  surveilled	  people	  in	  the	  world”	  (Doctorow,	  Little	  Brother	  9).	  Almost	  immediately,	  a	  narrative	  dichotomy	  between	  student	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and	  adult	  authority	  figure	  is	  constructed	  that	  telegraphs	  the	  central	  ideological	  thrust	  of	  
Little	  Brother.	  Vice-­‐Principal	  Benson	  summons	  Marcus	  to	  his	  office	  to	  grill	  the	  student	  about	  his	  alleged	  involvement	  in	  a	  “‘criminal	  conspiracy	  to	  subvert	  this	  school’s	  security	  system.’”	  As	  evidence	  of	  culpability,	  Benson	  cites	  the	  expulsion	  of	  a	  student	  for	  using	  one	  of	  the	  “‘security	  countermeasures’”	  that	  he	  states	  Marcus	  supplied	  (12).	  And	  while	  these	  claims	  do	  not	  hold	  water,	  he	  also	  accuses	  Marcus	  of	  being	  w1n5t0n,	  the	  individual	  responsible	  for	  hacking	  and	  stealing	  the	  previous	  year’s	  digital	  standardized	  tests.	  Although	  it	  is	  true	  that	  Marcus	  operates	  in	  digital	  spheres	  as	  w1n5t0n—the	  handle	  he	  uses	  to	  post	  his	  “contributions	  to	  the	  field	  of	  applied	  security	  research”	  on	  network	  message	  boards	  (11)—Benson	  again	  has	  the	  wrong	  person.	  His	  threats	  of	  imprisonment	  for	  non-­‐cooperation	  are	  troubling,	  and	  presage	  the	  novel’s	  wider	  critical	  interests	  in	  the	  culture	  of	  fear,	  paranoia,	  and	  widespread	  surveillance	  fostered	  by	  America’s	  allergic	  psychological	  response	  to	  terrorism.	  Many	  hackers,	  like	  many	  digital	  humanists,	  are	  driven	  by	  curiosity	  and	  a	  creative	  impulse	  for	  digital	  tinkering.	  As	  Benson	  demonstrates,	  though,	  this	  impulse	  is	  often	  mischaracterized	  as	  subversive,	  “defy[ing]	  social	  norms	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  defiance”	  (Huang,	  Afterword	  371).	  In	  fact,	  Marcus	  is	  more	  closely	  aligned	  with	  security	  technologist	  Bruce	  Schneier’s	  philosophy,	  in	  which	  “security	  is	  a	  mindset”	  (Afterword	  367).	  A	  security-­‐minded	  person	  is	  always	  “think[ing]	  about	  security	  systems	  and	  how	  to	  break	  them”	  from	  a	  theoretical	  perspective	  (367).	  Marcus	  embodies	  this	  way	  of	  thinking,	  Schneier	  suggests.	  “I'll	  bet	  he	  couldn’t	  walk	  into	  a	  store	  without	  figuring	  out	  a	  way	  to	  shoplift.	  Not	  that	  he’d	  do	  it—there’s	  a	  difference	  between	  knowing	  how	  to	  defeat	  a	  security	  system	  and	  actually	  defeating	  it—but	  he’d	  know	  he	  could”	  (368).	  Such	  a	  mentality	  (embodied	  by	  the	  pop	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cultural	  image	  of	  the	  amoral	  criminal	  hacker29)	  is	  threatening	  to	  many	  people,	  particularly	  the	  owners	  of	  proprietary	  content/data	  protected	  by	  security	  systems.	  The	  irony	  of	  this	  antipathy,	  however,	  becomes	  clear	  in	  a	  formulation	  that	  Doctorow	  calls	  “Schneier’s	  Law,”	  after	  Schneier’s	  own	  writings	  on	  the	  subject.	  “Anyone	  can	  come	  up	  with	  a	  security	  system	  so	  clever	  that	  [they]	  can’t	  see	  its	  flaws,”	  argues	  Doctorow.	  “The	  only	  way	  to	  find	  flaws	  in	  security	  is	  to	  disclose	  the	  system’s	  workings	  and	  invite	  public	  feedback.	  But	  now	  we	  live	  in	  a	  world	  where	  any	  cipher	  used	  to	  fence	  off	  a	  copyrighted	  work	  is	  off-­‐limits	  to	  that	  kind	  of	  feedback”	  (“Microsoft	  Research,”	  Content	  10).	  	   After	  the	  confrontation	  with	  the	  vice-­‐principal,	  we	  are	  introduced	  to	  this	  security-­‐centric	  mindset.	  As	  Marcus	  makes	  his	  way	  through	  the	  school	  hallway,	  “gait-­‐recognition	  cameras”	  track	  his	  every	  physical	  movement.	  These	  devices,	  which	  “Benson	  and	  a	  lot	  of	  other	  paranoid	  school	  administrators	  had	  spent	  [the	  students’]	  textbook	  dollars	  on,”	  are	  designed	  to	  measure	  and	  profile	  individuals	  based	  on	  the	  way	  they	  walk	  (Doctorow,	  Little	  
Brother	  14).	  According	  to	  Marcus,	  they	  are	  products	  of	  bureaucratic	  and	  hawkish	  trading	  of	  educational	  materials	  for	  redundant	  layers	  of	  security,	  and	  idiotic	  in	  their	  capacity	  to	  be	  easily	  exploited.	  But	  they	  also	  represent	  the	  increasing	  adoption	  in	  western	  socioculture	  of	  biometric	  technologies	  that	  attempt	  to	  quantify	  the	  human	  body	  for	  security	  purposes.	  For	  critics	  of	  the	  technology,	  such	  as	  Shoshana	  Amielle	  Magnet,	  this	  (commercial	  as	  much	  as	  political)	  trend	  threatens	  the	  very	  notion	  of	  embodied	  subjectivity.	  “Biometric	  representations	  of	  the	  body,”	  she	  points	  out,	  redeploy	  the	  individuated	  human	  body	  “as	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  See,	  for	  example,	  Ira	  Winkler’s	  2009	  New	  York	  Times	  article	  “‘Hackers	  Wanted’	  Ad	  Fuelled	  Security	  Misconception.”	  The	  original	  ad,	  posted	  by	  General	  Dynamics	  Information	  Technology	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Department	  of	  Homeland	  Security,	  sparked	  a	  debate	  in	  mainstream	  culture	  about	  hackers	  and	  national	  security.	  In	  response	  to	  an	  earlier	  article	  by	  Lolita	  C.	  Baldor	  (“US	  Looks	  to	  Hackers	  to	  Protect	  Cyber	  Networks,”	  Boston.com,	  2009),	  Winkler	  finds	  fault	  with	  the	  “implication	  that	  hackers	  are	  criminals.”	  This	  stance,	  he	  argues,	  is	  reflected	  in	  her	  article’s	  lead:	  “Federal	  authorities	  are	  looking	  for	  hackers—not	  to	  prosecute	  them,	  but	  to	  pay	  them	  to	  secure	  the	  nation’s	  networks”	  (Baldor).	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simple	  series	  of	  ones	  and	  zeroes,”	  thereby	  dehumanizing	  it	  (65).	  In	  this	  respect,	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  violation	  of	  civil	  rights,	  the	  gait-­‐recognition	  cameras	  tread	  a	  line	  of	  dubious	  legality.	  However,	  since	  the	  central	  assumption	  of	  biometric	  science	  designates	  “the	  human	  body…	  [as]	  a	  stable,	  unchanging	  repository	  of	  personal	  information,	  from	  which	  we	  can	  collect	  data	  about	  identity,”	  it	  is	  necessarily	  prone	  to	  error	  or	  manipulation	  (Magnet	  2).	  Marcus	  knows	  this	  and,	  with	  a	  little	  creativity,	  is	  able	  to	  exploit	  the	  system’s	  flaw.	  As	  he	  explains,	  the	  technology	  “takes	  pictures	  of	  your	  motion,	  tries	  to	  isolate	  you	  in	  the	  pics	  as	  a	  silhouette,	  and	  then	  tries	  to	  match	  the	  silhouette	  to	  a	  database	  to	  see	  if	  it	  knows	  who	  you	  are”	  (Doctorow,	  Little	  Brother	  18).	  Although	  it	  is	  “a	  biometric	  identifier,	  like	  fingerprints	  or	  retina-­‐scans,”	  it	  is	  subject	  to	  many	  more	  “biometric	  ‘collisions’”—when	  the	  software	  fails	  to	  differentiate	  between	  individuals	  based	  on	  their	  gait	  alone	  and	  instead	  returns	  multiple	  false	  positives	  (18).	  “There	  are	  a	  lot	  of	  people	  who	  walk	  kind	  of	  like	  you,”	  he	  continues.	  What’s	  more,	  it’s	  easy	  not	  to	  walk	  kind	  of	  like	  you—just	  take	  one	  shoe	  off.	  Of	  course,	  you'll	  always	  walk	  like	  you-­‐with-­‐one-­‐shoe-­‐off	  in	  that	  case,	  so	  the	  cameras	  will	  eventually	  figure	  out	  that	  it’s	  still	  you.	  Which	  is	  why	  I	  prefer	  to	  inject	  a	  little	  randomness	  into	  my	  attacks	  on	  gait-­‐recognition:	  I	  put	  a	  handful	  of	  gravel	  into	  each	  shoe.	  Cheap	  and	  effective,	  and	  no	  two	  steps	  are	  the	  same.	  Plus	  you	  get	  a	  great	  reflexology	  foot	  massage	  in	  the	  process.	  (18)	  It	  is	  this	  kind	  of	  humanist	  digital	  DIY	  approach	  to	  hacking	  invasive	  surveillance	  systems	  that	  marks	  him	  as	  both	  a	  digital	  humanist	  and	  a	  sensitive	  and	  engaged	  member	  of	  the	  born	  digital	  generation.	  In	  effect,	  his	  actions	  reinforce	  Magnet’s	  claim	  that	  “[a]ny	  technology	  that	  takes	  as	  its	  premise	  the	  assumption	  that	  bodies	  are	  stable	  entities	  that	  can	  be	  reliably	  quantified	  is	  problematic”	  (49).	  For	  both	  Magnet	  and	  Marcus,	  the	  problem	  is	  at	  once	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practical	  and	  metaphysical.	  In	  the	  metaphysical	  sense,	  technologies	  that	  attempt	  to	  superimpose	  standardized	  metrics	  on	  human	  subjects	  attenuate	  and	  homogenize	  individual	  subjectivities.	  In	  practical	  terms,	  however	  (and	  as	  Marcus	  demonstrates),	  the	  objective	  rigidity	  of	  these	  same	  technologies	  allows	  them	  to	  be	  deceived	  or	  exploited—ironically—by	  the	  embodied	  subjectivities	  they	  are	  programmed	  to	  contain.	  	   Similar	  ingenuity	  is	  applied	  to	  the	  hacking	  of	  both	  the	  SchoolBook	  Intranet	  system	  and	  RFID	  tags	  in	  hardcopy	  school	  library	  books.	  As	  Marcus	  again	  explains	  to	  the	  reader,	  the	  proprietary	  laptops	  (known	  as	  SchoolBooks)	  assigned	  to	  each	  student	  to	  use	  during	  class	  time	  are	  “the	  snitchiest	  technology	  of	  them	  all,	  logging	  every	  keystroke,	  watching	  all	  the	  network	  traffic	  for	  suspicious	  keywords,	  counting	  every	  click,	  keeping	  track	  of	  every	  fleeting	  thought	  you	  put	  out	  over	  the	  net”	  (Doctorow,	  Little	  Brother	  14).	  Like	  the	  hallway	  cameras,	  these	  devices—loaded	  with	  “a	  never-­‐ending	  parade	  of	  obnoxious	  ads”	  (14)—are	  an	  important	  part	  of	  the	  school’s	  burdensome	  and	  invasive	  surveillance	  array.	  To	  get	  circumvent	  this,	  and	  to	  retain	  some	  semblance	  of	  personal	  agency,	  many	  of	  the	  students	  use	  an	  illicit	  software	  crack	  to	  install	  “hidden	  programs…	  that	  would	  stay	  hidden	  even	  when	  the	  Board	  of	  Ed	  did	  its	  daily	  remote	  integrity	  checks	  of	  the	  machines”	  (14).	  One	  of	  the	  hidden	  programs	  is	  IMParanoid,	  the	  “secret	  instant	  messenger”	  the	  students	  use	  when	  they	  want	  to	  have	  a	  private	  “off-­‐the-­‐record	  discussion	  right	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  class”	  (15).	  As	  its	  name	  suggests,	  IMParanoid	  is	  a	  direct	  consequence	  of	  the	  climate	  of	  fear	  fostered	  by	  overbearing	  state	  institutions	  that	  figure	  transparency	  of	  the	  digital	  footprint	  as	  a	  civil	  good.	  Doctorow’s	  opposition	  to	  copy-­‐protected	  systems	  that	  rely	  on	  digital	  rights	  management	  and	  other	  proprietary	  software	  to	  regulate	  digital	  activities,	  creativity	  and	  production	  is	  palpable	  here.	  In	  his	  essay	  “The	  DRM	  Sausage	  Factory,”	  he	  outlines	  digital	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rights	  management	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  intellectual	  fortress	  that	  curtails	  and	  dictates	  ownership	  of	  digital	  property:	  At	  root,	  DRMs	  are	  technologies	  that	  treat	  the	  owner	  of	  a	  computer	  or	  other	  device	  as	  an	  attacker,	  someone	  against	  whom	  the	  system	  must	  be	  armored.	  Like	  the	  electrical	  meter	  on	  the	  side	  of	  your	  house,	  a	  DRM	  is	  a	  technology	  that	  you	  possess,	  but	  that	  you	  are	  never	  supposed	  to	  be	  able	  to	  manipulate	  or	  modify.	  (27)	  The	  answer	  to	  this	  question	  is	  equal	  parts	  commercial	  and	  sociopolitical	  control.	  By	  extension,	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  creative	  freedoms,	  Doctorow	  has	  also	  argued	  that	  “the	  purpose	  of	  copyright”	  has	  always	  been	  “to	  decentralize	  who	  gets	  to	  make	  art.”	  And	  as	  the	  digital	  age	  continues	  to	  position	  itself	  as	  the	  latest	  in	  a	  long	  line	  of	  “technological	  shifts	  in	  cultural	  production,”	  artistic	  production	  and	  freedoms	  are	  fragmented	  and	  siloed	  to	  an	  even	  greater	  degree	  by	  the	  spaghetti	  junction	  of	  digital	  copyright	  law	  (“Science	  Fiction”	  77).	  Palfrey	  and	  Gasser	  echo	  this	  point,	  observing	  that	  “[t]he	  copyright	  war—a	  war	  of	  litigation	  involving	  content	  owners,	  Digital	  Natives,	  and	  technologists—has	  become	  a	  defining	  feature	  of	  the	  digital	  age”	  (149).	  These	  anxieties	  appear	  throughout	  Little	  Brother,	  which	  is	  as	  much	  a	  story	  as	  it	  is	  a	  lesson	  from	  Doctorow	  on	  digital	  liberties.	  Inside	  the	  walled	  garden	  of	  the	  SchoolBook	  technology,	  Marcus	  has	  to	  contend	  with	  “a	  locked-­‐down	  spyware	  version	  of	  Internet	  Explorer,”	  which	  is	  run	  on	  “Windows	  Vista4Schools,	  an	  antique	  operating	  system	  designed	  to	  give	  school	  administrators	  the	  illusion	  that	  they	  controlled	  the	  programs	  their	  students	  could	  run”	  (Doctorow,	  Little	  Brother	  19).	  Again,	  he	  is	  able	  to	  bypass	  the	  surveillance	  dragnet	  with	  a	  mixture	  of	  creativity,	  patience,	  and	  the	  skillset	  of	  a	  born	  digital:	  by	  using	  an	  indie	  copy	  of	  the	  Firefox	  browser	  (hidden	  from	  the	  operating	  system	  with	  a	  little	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programmatic	  trickery)	  routed	  through	  a	  real-­‐life,	  volunteer-­‐driven,	  and	  open	  source	  global	  network	  called	  Tor	  (aka	  The	  Onion	  Router).	  Tor,	  first	  developed	  for	  the	  U.S.	  Navy	  in	  2002,	  uses	  a	  protocol	  known	  as	  onion	  routing	  to	  encrypt	  communications	  data	  in	  successive	  layers	  and	  randomly	  bounce	  it	  between	  many	  thousands	  of	  relays.	  Tor	  Project,	  the	  non-­‐profit	  organization	  that	  hosts	  and	  maintains	  Tor,	  describes	  the	  program	  as	  	  a	  network	  of	  virtual	  tunnels	  that	  allows	  people	  and	  groups	  to	  improve	  their	  privacy	  and	  security	  on	  the	  Internet.	  It	  also	  enables	  software	  developers	  to	  create	  new	  communication	  tools	  with	  built-­‐in	  privacy	  features.	  Tor	  provides	  the	  foundation	  for	  a	  range	  of	  applications	  that	  allow	  organizations	  and	  individuals	  to	  share	  information	  over	  public	  networks	  without	  compromising	  their	  privacy.	  The	  open	  source	  combination	  of	  Firefox	  and	  Tor,	  for	  Marcus,	  is	  the	  perfect	  solution	  to	  turn	  him	  “into	  the	  invisible	  man,	  impervious	  to	  Board	  of	  Ed	  snooping”	  (Doctorow,	  Little	  Brother	  20).	  Since	  the	  network	  “was	  set	  up	  by	  the	  US	  Office	  of	  Naval	  Research	  to	  help	  their	  people	  get	  around	  the	  censorware	  in	  countries	  like	  Syria	  and	  China,”	  he	  explains,	  “it’s	  perfectly	  designed	  for	  operating	  in	  the	  confines	  of	  an	  average	  American	  high	  school”	  (20).	  In	  these	  terms,	  a	  conflation	  of	  U.S.	  education	  and	  countries	  the	  average	  American	  citizen	  might	  think	  of	  as	  heavily	  surveilled	  police	  states	  is	  both	  dramatic—inasmuch	  as	  this	  is	  speculative	  fiction—and,	  whether	  we	  choose	  to	  ignore	  it	  or	  not,	  increasingly	  realistic.	  	   Rather	  than	  posing	  a	  threat	  to	  school	  or	  national	  security,	  however,	  Marcus	  utilizes	  his	  digital	  literacy	  for	  creative,	  non-­‐destructive	  purposes,	  such	  as	  visiting	  the	  blacklisted	  Harajuku	  Fun	  Madness	  website—an	  ARG	  (Alternate	  Reality	  Game)	  he	  plays	  with	  his	  friends.	  In	  this	  way,	  he	  is	  no	  different	  than	  his	  born	  digital	  peers:	  “Advancements	  in	  digital	  technologies	  have	  enabled	  practically	  any	  user	  with	  basic	  digital	  literacy	  skills	  and	  fast	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Internet	  access	  to	  engage	  in	  self-­‐expression	  in	  creative	  ways	  at	  low	  cost.	  The	  impulse	  is	  nothing	  new,	  but	  the	  forms	  of	  expression	  are”	  (Palfrey	  and	  Gasser	  124-­‐25).	  Like	  the	  synners	  of	  Cadigan’s	  novel	  and	  the	  younger	  students	  of	  Rainbows	  End,	  Marcus	  is	  complicit	  in	  “the	  shaping	  of	  culture,	  the	  making	  of	  ‘meaning’”	  (125).	  No	  less	  than	  a	  “creative	  revolution,”	  the	  digital	  playground	  offers	  innumerable	  opportunities	  “to	  shape	  and	  reshape	  cultural	  understanding	  through	  digital	  creativity…	  And	  it	  is	  Digital	  Natives	  who	  are	  best	  poised	  to	  engage	  in	  this	  process”	  (125).	  Indeed,	  Marcus	  is	  an	  embodiment	  of	  the	  digital	  native,	  actively	  engaged	  in	  the	  production	  and	  remediation	  of	  a	  new	  cultural	  understanding	  that	  subverts	  the	  restrictions	  placed	  upon	  digital	  liberty	  and	  creativity.	  This	  spirit	  of	  digital	  DIY	  is	  neatly	  captured	  during	  the	  RFID	  scene,	  when,	  upon	  cutting	  class,	  Darryl	  realizes	  he	  still	  has	  an	  RFID-­‐equipped	  library	  book	  with	  him.	  RFID30	  tags,	  like	  the	  gait-­‐recognition	  cameras,	  can	  be	  used	  to	  track	  a	  student’s	  movements.	  Again,	  Marcus	  is	  on	  hand	  to	  handle	  the	  situation:	  “Library	  books	  are	  bad	  news.	  Every	  one	  of	  them	  has	  an	  arphid—Radio	  Frequency	  ID	  tag—glued	  into	  its	  binding”	  (Doctorow,	  Little	  Brother	  21).	  These	  tags	  help	  libraries	  sort	  and	  keep	  track	  of	  their	  books,	  but	  they	  also	  allow	  school	  administrators	  to	  track	  their	  students.	  “It	  was	  another	  one	  of	  those	  legal	  loopholes,”	  Marcus	  explains.	  “[T]he	  courts	  wouldn’t	  let	  the	  schools	  track	  
us	  with	  arphids,	  but	  they	  could	  track	  library	  books,	  and	  use	  the	  school	  records	  to	  tell	  them	  who	  was	  likely	  to	  be	  carrying	  which	  library	  book”	  (21-­‐22).	  He	  could	  use	  a	  device	  to	  simply	  reprogram	  the	  tag,	  but,	  as	  a	  humanist,	  this	  is	  akin	  to	  “tearing	  pages	  out	  of	  a	  book…	  since	  a	  book	  with	  a	  reprogrammed	  arphid	  can’t	  be	  shelved	  and	  can’t	  be	  found.	  It	  just	  becomes	  a	  needle	  in	  a	  haystack.”	  The	  solution?	  “[Nuke]	  the	  thing.	  Literally.	  30	  seconds	  in	  a	  microwave	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Radio-­‐frequency	  identification.	  For	  a	  dystopian	  portrayal	  of	  this	  emergent	  technology,	  see	  The	  Last	  Enemy	  (2008),	  a	  BBC	  drama	  set	  in	  a	  hyper-­‐surveilled,	  near-­‐future	  London.	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will	  do	  in	  pretty	  much	  every	  arphid	  on	  the	  market”	  (24);	  and	  upon	  its	  return,	  the	  book	  will	  be	  recoded	  with	  a	  replacement	  tag.	  In	  this	  reality,	  something	  as	  seemingly	  innocuous	  as	  a	  library	  book—an	  object	  that	  has	  historically	  represented	  liberation	  through	  knowledge—is	  turned	  into	  a	  tool	  for	  the	  invasion	  of	  one’s	  privacy.	  By	  pairing	  these	  two	  ideologically	  opposed	  concepts	  of	  books	  and	  RFIDs,	  and	  having	  the	  ever-­‐resourceful	  Marcus	  disrupt	  the	  pairing,	  the	  scene	  strikes	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  anxieties	  surrounding	  discourses	  of	  national	  security,	  biometric	  data	  collection,	  and	  surveillance.	  
Play	  in	  Digital	  Cultures	  
	   	  One	  of	  Marcus’s	  favorite	  social	  events	  is	  Harajuku	  Fun	  Madness,	  which	  he	  plays	  in	  a	  team	  with	  his	  friends	  Van,	  Jolu,	  and	  Darryl.	  As	  a	  type	  of	  Alternate	  Reality	  Game,	  Harajuku	  Fun	  Madness	  combines	  “physical,	  online,	  and	  mental	  component[s]”	  (Doctorow,	  Little	  
Brother	  21)	  by	  “balance[ing]	  out	  running	  around	  in	  the	  real	  world,	  figuring	  out	  online	  puzzles	  and	  strategizing	  with	  your	  team”	  (134-­‐35)	  in	  a	  stimulating,	  competitive	  and	  collaborative	  multimodal	  experience.	  Jaakko	  Stenros	  and	  others	  suggest	  that	  ARGs	  function	  as	  “storytelling	  vehicles,”	  or	  “transmedia,”	  in	  which	  participants	  get	  to	  influence	  the	  direction	  and	  outcome	  of	  the	  narrative	  in	  social	  groups	  (1).	  These	  games	  are	  designed	  with	  notions	  of	  teamwork,	  movement,	  meaning	  making,	  and	  identity	  play	  in	  mind,	  	  transport[ing]	  the	  players	  to	  a	  fictional	  world	  superimposed	  on	  the	  reality	  of	  everyday	  life	  and	  delivering	  an	  interactive	  narrative	  grounded	  in	  that	  setting.	  The	  play	  style	  is	  largely	  collective:	  through	  locating	  content	  in	  the	  real	  world	  and	  online,	  players	  uncover,	  piece	  together	  and	  influence	  a	  given	  narrative.	  (1)	  
155	  	  
The	  element	  of	  narrative	  construction,	  or	  transmedia,	  is	  important	  in	  these	  games.	  According	  to	  Edward	  Castronova,	  being	  allowed	  to	  construct	  narrative	  “[gives]	  users	  the	  maximum	  amount	  of	  freedom	  to	  manipulate	  their	  involvement	  with	  them”	  while	  “retaining	  all	  that	  is	  good	  about	  the	  fantasy	  atmosphere	  of	  the	  synthetic	  world”	  (147).	  Within	  these	  conceptual	  spaces,	  participants	  articulate	  themselves	  through	  the	  principles	  and	  ideals	  of	  second-­‐wave	  digital	  humanities.	  Marcus	  and	  the	  others	  collaborate	  in	  the	  rhizomatic	  creation	  of	  “‘rich	  and	  layered’”	  living	  texts	  that	  “weav[e]	  text,	  images,	  sound,	  and	  video…	  for	  delivery	  within	  and	  across	  digital	  spaces”	  (DigiRhet.org	  240).	  They	  harness	  “multimedia	  practices”	  and	  knowledge	  sets	  that	  “explore	  the	  fusion	  of	  text-­‐based	  humanities	  with	  film,	  sound,	  animation,	  graphics,	  and	  other	  multimodal	  practices	  across	  real,	  mixed,	  and	  virtual	  reality	  platforms”	  (Hayles,	  “How	  We	  Think”	  43).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  they	  exhibit	  “a	  deep	  attention	  to	  context,	  audience,	  and	  meaning-­‐making	  across	  multiple	  tools	  and	  media”	  critical	  to	  digital	  composition	  and	  collaboration	  (DigiRhet.org	  241)	  through	  the	  “collective	  intelligence”	  the	  genre	  encourages	  (Stenros,	  et	  al.	  1).	  	  The	  students’	  enjoyment	  for	  such	  activity	  is	  also	  indicative	  of	  their	  generation’s	  digital-­‐cultural	  emphasis	  on	  multimodal	  composition.	  Henry	  Jenkins	  understands	  multimodality	  as	  a	  fundamental	  part	  of	  transmedia	  storytelling,	  where	  “integral	  elements	  of	  a	  fiction	  get	  dispersed	  systematically	  across	  multiple	  delivery	  channels	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  creating	  a	  unified	  and	  coordinated	  entertainment	  experience.”	  Marcus	  makes	  this	  clear	  in	  Harajuku	  Fun	  Madness:	  Imagine	  the	  best	  afternoon	  you’ve	  ever	  spent	  prowling	  the	  streets	  of	  a	  city,	  checking	  out	  all	  the	  weird	  people,	  funny	  hand-­‐bills,	  street-­‐maniacs,	  and	  funky	  shops.	  Now	  add	  a	  scavenger	  hunt	  to	  that,	  one	  that	  requires	  you	  to	  research	  crazy	  old	  films	  and	  songs	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and	  teen	  culture	  from	  around	  the	  world	  and	  across	  time	  and	  space.	  (Doctorow,	  Little	  
Brother	  15)	  Jon	  Dovey	  and	  Helen	  W.	  Kennedy	  have	  noted	  the	  importance	  of	  games	  and	  gaming—what	  they	  refer	  to	  as	  “‘technoplay’”—as	  “a	  key	  signature	  of	  digital	  culture”	  and	  hacker	  identity	  (39).	  “Conventional	  accounts	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  contemporary	  digital	  cultures,”	  they	  report,	  emphasize	  “the	  synergistic	  relationship	  between	  computer	  code,	  probability	  and	  rules	  that,	  in	  turn,	  manifests	  itself	  in	  particular	  kinds	  of	  experimental	  and	  playful	  attitudes	  towards	  computer	  technologies”	  (38).	  A	  crucial	  aspect	  of	  this	  relationship	  is	  the	  “hacking	  sensibility,”	  which	  contributes	  to	  our	  increasingly	  “‘ludic	  culture’”	  and	  in	  fact	  “predates	  the	  digital	  age”	  (38).	  Marcus	  and	  his	  friends,	  though	  steeped	  in	  a	  digital	  and	  highly	  mediated	  culture,	  embody	  the	  original	  concept	  of	  hacking	  in	  the	  creative	  and	  intelligent	  “manipulation	  of	  complex	  systems”	  (Dovey	  and	  Kennedy	  38).	  They	  operate	  within	  this	  definition	  with	  a	  “playful	  cast	  of	  mind	  that	  [is]	  a	  direct	  reaction	  to	  the	  systems	  of	  scientific	  and	  corporate	  instrumentality”	  (38).	  We	  see	  this	  later	  in	  the	  novel,	  when	  Marcus	  takes	  the	  digital	  fight	  back	  to	  the	  Department	  of	  Homeland	  Security.	  	   ARGs,	  as	  well	  as	  other	  kinds	  of	  games	  that	  Marcus	  expresses	  an	  interest	  in,	  such	  as	  LARPing	  (Live	  Action	  Role	  Playing)	  and	  MMORPGs	  (Massively	  Multiplayer	  Online	  Role	  Playing	  Games),	  rely	  upon	  diegetic	  participation	  in	  the	  collective	  building	  of	  their	  worlds.	  Participation	  is	  one	  of	  the	  key	  ingredients	  in	  discourses	  of	  digital	  activism.	  David	  Buckingham	  emphasizes	  this	  aspect	  of	  gaming,	  noting	  “the	  fundamental	  difference	  between	  games	  and	  other	  kinds	  of	  cultural	  texts	  [is	  that]…	  	  games	  are	  played”	  (6).	  Harajuku	  Fun	  Madness	  challenges	  players	  to	  their	  fullest	  abilities,	  both	  intellectually	  and	  physically,	  and	  helps	  build	  social	  and	  collaborative	  problem-­‐solving	  skills.	  LARPing	  features	  many	  of	  the	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same	  qualities	  and	  rewards	  of	  Alternate	  Reality	  Games.	  “It's	  like	  Capture	  the	  Flag	  in	  monster-­‐drag,	  with	  a	  bit	  of	  Drama	  Club	  thrown	  in,”	  he	  explains	  (Doctorow,	  Little	  Brother	  17).	  The	  emphasis	  is	  always	  on	  the	  multifaceted	  nature	  of	  role-­‐playing	  as	  a	  performative,	  creative,	  imaginative	  and	  physically	  demanding	  act.	  For	  Marcus,	  the	  best	  of	  these	  involved	  “all-­‐day	  hikes”	  through	  California	  forest,	  “epic	  battles	  with	  foam-­‐and-­‐bamboo	  swords,	  [and]	  casting	  spells	  by	  throwing	  beanbags	  and	  shouting	  ‘Fireball!’”	  (17).	  One	  particular	  LARP	  that	  he	  attends,	  dubbed	  Wretched	  Daylight	  (about	  vampires),	  is	  organized	  by	  “a	  well-­‐known	  literacy	  charity	  that	  [runs]	  kids’	  writing	  workshops…	  [and]	  drama	  workshops,”	  promoting	  a	  program	  of	  collective	  creativity,	  social	  structure,	  competition,	  and	  exercise	  (290).	  Another,	  VampMob	  (exactly	  what	  it	  sounds	  like),	  is	  used	  to	  great	  effect	  as	  a	  form	  of	  culture	  jamming	  to	  disrupt	  DHS	  operations	  on	  the	  ground.	  	   Later	  on,	  as	  Marcus’s	  group	  wages	  its	  resistance	  against	  the	  DHS	  through	  the	  Xnet	  computer	  network	  (more	  on	  this	  later),	  he	  uses	  the	  MMO	  Clockwork	  Plunder	  to	  hold	  a	  virtual	  press	  conference	  at	  “Patcheye	  Pete’s	  because	  it	  was	  the	  market	  closest	  to	  the	  village	  square	  where	  new	  players	  spawned”	  (Doctorow,	  Little	  Brother	  232).	  As	  his	  avatar	  M1k3y,	  he	  responds	  via	  text	  chat	  to	  reporters’	  questions	  about	  the	  Xnet	  and	  its	  philosophy:	  	  >	  …	  I	  use	  the	  Xnet	  because	  I	  believe	  in	  freedom	  and	  the	  Constitution	  of	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America.	  I	  use	  Xnet	  because	  the	  DHS	  has	  turned	  my	  city	  into	  a	  police-­‐state	  where	  we're	  all	  suspected	  terrorists.	  I	  use	  Xnet	  because	  I	  think	  you	  can't	  defend	  freedom	  by	  tearing	  up	  the	  Bill	  of	  Rights.	  (235)	  Again,	  we	  see	  how	  the	  fundamentally	  creative,	  collaborative	  and	  communicative	  aspects	  of	  gaming—especially	  networked	  gaming—can	  be	  utilized	  in	  service	  of	  activist	  (or	  hacktivist)	  causes.	  Hilde	  G.	  Corneliussen	  and	  Jill	  Walker	  Rettberg	  argue	  that	  MMOs	  are	  “social	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framework[s]	  for	  communication”	  from	  which,	  in	  turn,	  “we	  get	  culture”	  (9).	  The	  formation	  of	  tight-­‐knit	  cultural	  discourse	  communities	  (guilds	  in	  World	  of	  Warcraft	  parlance)	  in	  MMOs	  often	  coalesce	  around	  collaborative	  and	  goal-­‐oriented	  activity—both	  within	  and	  outside	  virtual	  parameters.	  Occurences	  of	  virtual	  social	  activism	  (or,	  indeed,	  simulations	  of	  catastrophe)	  have	  been	  described	  by	  Elijah	  Meeks	  as	  examples	  of	  “real-­‐world	  emergent	  phenomena”	  that,	  by	  extension,	  provide	  both	  a	  model	  and	  a	  platform	  for	  social	  and	  political	  protest/change.	  Clearly	  such	  games	  are	  systematized	  by	  a	  similar	  set	  of	  criteria	  as	  digital	  humanities	  work,	  often	  correlating	  (and	  sometimes	  literally	  intersecting31)	  with	  one	  another	  in	  the	  field’s	  clarion	  call	  for	  projects	  and	  scholarship	  that	  are	  “qualitative,	  interpretive,	  experiential,	  emotive,	  [and]	  generative	  in	  character”	  (emphasis	  removed)	  (Schnapp	  and	  Presner	  2).	  As	  a	  result,	  Corneliussen	  and	  Rettberg	  assert,	  we	  must	  confront	  MMOs	  as	  both	  “game[s]	  and…	  cultural	  site[s]	  requiring	  the	  application	  of	  multiple	  disciplines’	  analytical	  tools,	  concepts,	  and	  methods”	  (9).	  I	  would	  also	  argue	  that	  participation	  in	  MMOs	  (and	  similar	  active	  participation	  games—ARGs,	  tabletop	  RPGs,	  collectible	  card	  games,	  etc.)	  often	  demands	  a	  certain	  “application	  of…	  analytical	  tools,	  concepts	  and	  methods”	  (Corneliussen	  and	  Rettberg	  9)	  that	  pulls	  together	  various	  intellectual,	  structural	  and	  creative	  modes	  of	  inquiry	  and	  ingenuity.	  A	  similar	  story	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Second	  Life,	  another	  MMO	  that	  allows	  its	  users	  to	  contribute	  to	  “a	  world	  that	  is,	  by	  and	  large,	  conducive	  to	  self-­‐expression	  and	  creativity”	  (Palfrey	  and	  Gasser	  121).	  Its	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Many	  digital	  humanities	  projects	  have	  been	  conducted	  through	  or	  have	  used	  MMO	  environments.	  Corneliussen	  and	  Rettberg	  organized	  a	  guild	  meeting	  in	  World	  of	  Warcraft	  to	  discuss	  the	  chapters	  of	  their	  work	  (9).	  Lessig	  has	  conducted	  cyberlaw	  classes	  in	  MUDs	  (Multi-­‐User	  Domains)	  (Code	  5).	  Bryan	  Carter’s	  Virtual	  Harlem	  project,	  initially	  designed	  “as	  an	  immersive	  VR	  [virtual	  reality]	  representation	  of	  10	  sqaure	  blocks	  of	  the	  New	  York	  neighborhood	  during	  the	  Harlem	  Renaissance	  period	  of	  the	  1920s-­‐1930s,”	  found	  a	  new	  home	  in	  2005	  in	  Second	  Life	  (Jones	  114).	  Other	  examples	  include	  the	  HUMlab	  Second	  Life	  project	  at	  Umeå	  University,	  and	  David	  Rumsey’s	  collection	  of	  historical	  maps	  (one	  of	  the	  largest	  private	  collections	  in	  the	  world),	  which	  have	  been	  recreated	  in	  Second	  Life	  (the	  David	  Rumsey	  Maps	  Island)	  and	  Google	  Earth	  using	  3D	  modeling	  tools.	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conceptual	  spaces	  are	  “user-­‐defined,”	  with	  “residents	  themselves	  creat[ing]	  most	  of	  the	  content”	  using—and	  consequently	  being	  empowered	  by—design	  tools	  made	  available	  to	  them	  by	  the	  game’s	  developer	  (121-­‐22).	  Far	  from	  being	  “a	  means	  of	  escapism	  for	  technology	  fiends	  the	  world-­‐over,”	  Chris	  Haller	  observes,	  platforms	  like	  Second	  Life	  are	  being	  “harnessed	  for	  collaborative	  purposes	  with	  educational	  and	  informational	  goals	  in	  mind.”	  In	  Marcus’s	  hands,	  the	  virtual	  space	  becomes	  what	  Christopher	  M.	  Kelty	  terms	  a	  “recursive	  public”—“a	  collective	  independent	  of	  other	  forms	  of	  constituted	  power”	  that	  is	  “capable	  of	  speaking	  to	  existing	  forms	  of	  power	  through	  the	  production	  of	  actually	  existing	  alternatives”	  (304).	  MMOs	  can	  act	  as	  global	  “laboratories”	  for	  “economic	  and	  democratic	  experiments”32	  that	  have	  far-­‐reaching	  impact	  in	  virtual	  and	  real-­‐life	  contexts	  (304).	  
Terrorism,	  Digital	  Liberty,	  and	  the	  DHS	  
	   The	  watershed	  moment	  of	  the	  story	  is	  the	  terrorist	  bombing	  of	  the	  San	  Francisco-­‐Oakland	  Bay	  Bridge	  and	  the	  Bay	  Area	  Rapid	  Transit	  (BART)	  system.	  Marcus,	  Darryl	  and	  the	  others	  are	  occupied	  with	  Harajuku	  Fun	  Madness	  in	  the	  busy	  downtown	  streets	  when	  it	  happens,	  effectively	  stranding	  them	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  a	  mass	  panic.	  The	  sudden,	  utterly	  transformative	  nature	  of	  the	  attack,	  bearing	  clear	  parallels	  to	  9/11,	  is	  summed	  up	  in	  a	  single	  sentence:	  “Then	  the	  world	  changed	  forever”	  (Doctorow,	  Little	  Brother	  32).	  But	  while	  this	  terror	  event	  and	  the	  visceral,	  almost	  feral	  human	  reactions	  to	  it	  are	  undoubtedly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Since	  its	  inception	  in	  2003,	  Second	  Life	  has	  been	  used	  for	  education,	  business,	  governmental	  work,	  and	  many	  other	  kinds	  of	  real-­‐world	  group	  work	  and	  training.	  See,	  for	  example,	  Karine	  Joly,	  “A	  Second	  Life	  for	  Higher	  Education?”	  (University	  Business,	  2007);	  Mitch	  Wagner,	  “Using	  Second	  Life	  as	  a	  Business-­‐to-­‐Business	  Tool”	  (Information	  Week,	  2007);	  Tim	  Goral,	  “Sizing	  Up	  Second	  Life”	  (University	  Business,	  2008);	  Mark	  Tutton,	  “Going	  to	  the	  Virtual	  Office	  in	  Second	  Life”	  (CNN,	  2009);	  and	  Chris	  Haller,	  “Government	  Using	  Second	  Life”	  (Engaging	  Cities,	  2010).	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horrific;	  for	  Marcus	  and	  the	  others,	  the	  real	  terror	  is	  still	  ahead	  of	  them.	  A	  short	  time	  after	  the	  bombings,	  the	  group	  is	  violently	  abducted	  by	  soldiers	  in	  unmarked	  fatigues	  and	  taken	  to	  an	  unidentified	  detention	  facility	  that	  gains	  the	  nickname	  Guantanamo-­‐by-­‐the-­‐Bay.	  This	  sequence	  of	  events,	  from	  the	  first	  rumble	  of	  the	  terrorist	  attacks	  to	  Marcus’s	  initial	  interrogation	  by	  a	  Department	  of	  Homeland	  Security	  agent,	  is	  crucial	  in	  setting	  the	  stage	  for	  the	  DHS’s	  systematic	  stripping	  of	  his	  digital	  and	  other	  civil	  liberties.	  Indeed,	  Alex	  Reid	  notes,	  “it’s	  not	  hard	  to	  imagine	  that	  if	  there	  were	  another	  terrorist	  attack	  of	  a	  similar	  magnitude	  to	  9/11	  that	  it	  could	  result	  in	  the	  abridgment	  of	  civil	  rights.”	  As	  Marcus	  is	  subjected	  to	  this	  humiliating	  process,	  we	  are	  reminded	  of	  “how	  important	  privacy	  is	  to	  freedom	  and	  how	  important	  encryption	  can	  be	  for	  privacy	  in	  the	  cognisphere”	  (“Cory	  Doctorow’s	  Little	  Brother”).	  	  Marcus	  asks	  the	  agent	  who	  interrogates	  him	  if	  he	  is	  under	  arrest.	  Instead,	  she	  holds	  up	  his	  cellphone	  and	  demands	  to	  know	  what	  it	  is	  used	  for.	  “The	  screen	  was	  showing	  the	  error	  message	  you	  got	  if	  you	  kept	  trying	  to	  get	  into	  its	  data	  without	  giving	  the	  right	  password.	  It	  was	  a	  bit	  of	  a	  rude	  message—an	  animated	  hand	  giving	  a	  certain	  universally	  recognized	  gesture—because	  I	  liked	  to	  customize	  my	  gear”	  (Doctorow,	  Little	  Brother	  48).	  Marcus	  repeats	  his	  question	  and	  is	  finally	  informed,	  presumably	  under	  a	  Patriot	  Act-­‐style	  suspension	  of	  habeas	  corpus	  (which	  justifies	  unlawful	  imprisonment	  “in	  cases	  of	  rebellion	  or	  invasion	  [when]	  the	  public	  safety	  may	  require	  it”	  [U.S.	  Const.	  art.	  I,	  sec.	  9]),	  that	  he	  is	  “‘being	  detained	  as	  a	  potential	  enemy	  combatant’”	  by	  the	  DHS	  (Doctorow,	  Little	  Brother	  48).	  “‘We	  found	  a	  number	  of	  suspicious	  devices	  on	  your	  person,’”	  the	  agent	  continues.	  “‘We	  found	  you	  and	  your	  confederates	  near	  the	  site	  of	  the	  worst	  terrorist	  attack	  this	  country	  has	  ever	  seen.	  Put	  those	  two	  facts	  together	  and	  things	  don’t	  look	  very	  good	  for	  you,	  Marcus’”	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(48-­‐49).	  Much	  of	  the	  DHS’s	  evidence	  against	  Marcus	  is	  circumstantial—including	  the	  discovery	  (after	  googling	  his	  name)	  of	  “‘a	  lot	  of	  very	  ugly	  stuff	  on	  the	  public	  Internet’”	  (49).	  He	  is	  ordered	  to	  “‘unlock	  [his]	  phone	  and	  then	  decrypt	  the	  files	  in	  its	  memory’”	  (49).	  This,	  for	  Marcus,	  is	  a	  blatant	  invasion	  of	  privacy,	  and	  he	  refuses	  to	  comply.	  “My	  phone’s	  memory	  had	  all	  kinds	  of	  private	  stuff	  on	  it:	  photos,	  emails,	  little	  hacks	  and	  mods	  I’d	  installed”	  (49).	  This	  is	  a	  problem	  unique	  to	  the	  digital	  age.	  “Before	  the	  Internet,”	  Lessig	  observes	  in	  Free	  
Culture,	  “most	  of	  us	  didn’t	  have	  to	  worry	  much	  about	  data	  about	  our	  lives	  that	  we	  broadcast	  to	  the	  world”	  (277).	  In	  public	  physical	  spaces,	  your	  privacy	  was	  [more	  or	  less]	  assured	  because	  of	  an	  inefficient	  architecture	  for	  gathering	  data	  and	  hence	  a	  market	  constraint	  (cost)	  on	  anyone	  who	  wanted	  to	  gather	  that	  data…	  Now,	  because	  of	  the	  architecture	  of	  the	  Net	  and	  the	  function	  of	  cookies	  on	  the	  Net,	  it	  is	  easier	  to	  collect	  the	  data	  than	  not.	  The	  friction	  has	  disappeared,	  and	  hence	  any	  “privacy”	  protected	  by	  the	  friction	  disappears,	  too.	  (278)	  But	  while	  data	  is	  more	  porous	  in	  the	  digital	  age—not	  to	  mention	  the	  fact	  that	  Marcus	  should	  not	  have	  to	  surrender	  his	  right	  to	  privacy	  as	  proof	  of	  innocence—the	  agent’s	  command	  is	  legitimized	  through	  its	  Patriot	  Act	  analogue	  that	  provides	  government	  agencies	  such	  as	  the	  NSA	  access	  to	  “telecommunication,	  financial,	  and	  credit	  records	  without	  a	  court	  order”	  (MacKinnon).	  In	  other	  words,	  he	  is	  stuck	  in	  a	  catch-­‐22	  that	  exposes	  the	  delicate	  tension	  between	  digital	  civil	  rights	  and	  security.	  	   Lessig	  makes	  a	  related	  point,	  via	  Fred	  von	  Lohmann,	  about	  the	  bulk	  confiscation	  of	  civil	  liberty	  protections	  in	  music	  copyright	  infringement.	  Like	  Marcus,	  whose	  entire	  range	  of	  civil	  liberties	  is	  being	  contravened	  on	  suspicion	  and	  circumstance	  alone,	  copyright	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infringers—“‘a	  remarkable	  percentage	  of	  the	  American	  Internet-­‐using	  population’”—are	  routinely	  considered	  “‘criminals’”	  and	  therefore	  underserving	  of	  the	  rights	  to	  privacy	  that,	  for	  example,	  guarantee	  security	  “‘against	  seizures	  of	  your	  computer’”	  (Free	  Culture	  205).	  And	  indeed,	  “‘If	  you	  can	  treat	  someone	  as	  a	  putative	  lawbreaker,’”	  as	  the	  DHS	  does	  with	  Marcus	  and	  his	  friends,	  “‘then	  all	  of	  a	  sudden	  a	  lot	  of	  basic	  civil	  liberty	  protections	  evaporate	  to	  one	  degree	  or	  another’”	  (205).	  	  We	  see	  this	  particular	  logic	  applied	  time	  and	  again	  throughout	  the	  novel.	  Through	  a	  combination	  of	  the	  detention	  facility’s	  squalid	  conditions,	  rough	  treatment	  from	  the	  guards,	  and	  emotional/psychological	  blackmail	  by	  the	  agent,	  Marcus	  is	  coerced	  into	  surrendering	  all	  the	  security	  measures	  that	  safeguard	  his	  digital	  privacy.	  After	  placing	  his	  “phone,”	  “arphid	  sniper/cloner,”	  “wifinder”	  (a	  device	  used	  to	  find	  wifi	  signal	  clues	  in	  Harajuku	  Fun	  Madness),	  and	  “memory	  sticks”	  on	  the	  table,	  the	  agent	  tells	  Marcus	  that	  if	  he	  unlocks	  his	  phone,	  he	  will	  “‘get	  outdoor	  and	  bathing	  privileges’”	  (Doctorow,	  Little	  Brother	  54).	  “‘Tomorrow,’”	  she	  adds,	  “‘we’ll	  bring	  you	  back	  and	  ask	  you	  to	  decrypt	  the	  data	  on	  these	  memory	  sticks.	  Do	  that,	  and	  you’ll	  get	  to	  eat	  in	  the	  mess	  hall.	  The	  day	  after,	  we’re	  going	  to	  want	  your	  email	  passwords,	  and	  that	  will	  get	  you	  library	  privileges’”	  (54).	  The	  agent	  sells	  this	  carrot-­‐and-­‐stick	  approach	  by	  claiming	  it	  is	  “‘about	  [his]	  security’”	  (54);	  Marcus	  replies	  that	  she	  is	  “‘talking	  about	  defending…	  freedom	  by	  tearing	  up	  the	  Bill	  of	  Rights’”	  (55).	  It	  is	  a	  noble	  counterargument,	  but—when	  his	  resolve	  is	  finally	  broken	  and	  he	  is	  forced	  into	  submission—ultimately	  a	  futile	  one.	  This	  is	  especially	  painful	  given	  the	  code	  of	  ethics	  he	  has	  developed	  around	  the	  preservation	  of	  personal	  (digital)	  memory.	  Violation	  of	  his	  digital	  devices	  exposes	  the	  color	  and	  shape	  of	  his	  whole	  life,	  which,	  to	  use	  his	  analogy,	  is	  like	  being	  required	  by	  law	  to	  “tak[e]	  a	  dump…	  in	  a	  glass	  room	  perched	  in	  the	  middle	  of	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Times	  Square…	  buck	  naked”	  (57).	  With	  access	  to	  the	  data	  on	  these	  devices,	  “you	  could	  get	  a	  pretty	  good	  idea	  of	  who	  my	  friends	  were,	  what	  I	  thought	  of	  them,	  all	  the	  goofy	  things	  we’d	  done.	  You	  could	  read	  the	  transcripts	  of	  the	  electronic	  arguments	  we’d	  carried	  out	  and	  the	  electronic	  conciliations	  we’d	  arrived	  at”	  (56).	  In	  short,	  there	  is	  an	  entire	  register	  of	  personal	  history	  at	  stake	  here.	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	  Gitte	  Stald’s	  suggestion	  that	  the	  cellphone	  has	  “dual,	  but	  interdependent	  qualities	  for	  young	  people”	  (143).	  In	  one	  sense,	  it	  has	  a	  “communicative	  function,”	  which	  facilitates	  its	  role	  as	  “a	  tool	  and	  a	  channel	  for	  the	  exchange	  of	  information.”	  In	  another,	  it	  has	  a	  “social	  meaning,	  which	  develops	  from	  the	  communication”	  and	  aids	  in	  the	  performative	  construction	  of	  identity	  (143).	  Thus,	  Marcus’s	  phone	  is	  “doubly	  articulated”—as	  a	  piece	  of	  hardware,	  but	  also	  as	  a	  subjective,	  socially	  constructed	  “medium	  through	  which	  [he]	  communicate[s]…	  and	  maintain[s]	  social	  contact”	  (Ling,	  paraphrased	  in	  Stald	  143).	  For	  digital	  natives,	  the	  conceptual	  space	  of	  the	  digital	  has	  overtaken	  more	  traditional	  methods	  for	  expressing	  and/or	  extending	  the	  self	  and	  its	  networks,	  “shifting	  many	  of	  their	  core	  social	  activities	  from	  the	  offline	  space	  to	  the	  hybrid	  online-­‐offline	  world”	  (Palfrey	  and	  Gasser	  264).	  Kirschenbaum	  supports	  these	  arguments,	  noting	  that	  the	  “impulse	  toward	  equating	  subjective	  identity	  with	  personal	  data	  stores	  is	  emerging	  as	  one	  of	  the	  most	  dramatic	  features	  of	  contemporary	  discourse	  networks”	  (Mechanisms	  102).	  Marcus’s	  most	  treasured	  memories	  are	  stored	  in	  his	  data,	  not	  a	  shoebox—but	  the	  formative	  effect	  upon	  his	  ego	  is	  the	  same:	  “There’s	  something	  really	  liberating	  about	  having	  some	  corner	  of	  your	  life	  that's	  yours,	  that	  no	  one	  gets	  to	  see	  except	  you.”	  The	  actions	  of	  the	  DHS,	  he	  laments,	  “were	  taking	  that	  from	  me,	  piece	  by	  piece,”	  essentially	  deconstructing	  his	  sense	  of	  self	  (Doctorow,	  Little	  Brother	  57).	  
164	  	  
The	  coup	  de	  grâce	  arrives	  in	  the	  form	  of	  an	  invasion	  of	  Marcus’s	  private	  email.	  Though	  he	  believed	  it	  would	  be	  safe,	  since	  his	  home	  laptop	  “downloaded	  and	  deleted	  [his]	  mail	  from	  the	  server	  every	  sixty	  seconds,”	  the	  DHS	  manages	  to	  find	  a	  workaround	  (Doctorow,	  Little	  Brother	  61).	  Like	  Vice-­‐Principal	  Benson,	  the	  agent	  abuses	  her	  position	  of	  power	  to	  manufacture	  a	  prejudicial	  narrative	  of	  criminality	  that	  she	  extrapolates	  from	  Marcus’s	  passion	  for	  digital	  DIY.	  In	  his	  (and,	  indeed,	  the	  reader’s)	  mind,	  his	  activities	  are	  an	  expression	  of	  “free	  speech”	  and	  “technological	  tinkering,”	  protected	  by	  the	  constitution	  (62).	  Nevertheless,	  all	  his	  “little	  gizmos,”	  as	  well	  as	  “‘the	  data	  we	  recovered	  from	  you	  phone	  and	  memory	  sticks,’”	  and	  “‘the	  subversive	  material	  we’d	  no	  doubt	  find	  if	  we	  raided	  your	  house	  and	  took	  your	  computer’”	  are	  enough	  to	  symbolically	  condemn	  the	  teen	  for	  acts	  of	  terrorism	  against	  the	  U.S.	  government	  (62).	  
Hacktivism	  
Since	  at	  least	  the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  hacktivism	  has	  emerged	  as	  a	  digital	  form	  of	  culture	  jamming	  that	  combines	  “traditional	  methods	  of	  political	  protest	  with	  the	  technological	  knowledge	  of	  computer	  hacking”	  (Taylor	  59)	  to	  disrupt	  or	  critique	  “popular/mainstream	  culture,	  particularly	  corporate	  capitalism,	  commercialism,	  and	  consumerism”	  (by	  mining	  and	  remediating	  it)	  (Lievrouw	  22),	  and	  to	  highlight	  sociopolitical,	  civic	  and	  legal	  injustices.	  The	  “alternative/activist	  new	  media”	  that	  it	  relies	  upon,	  writes	  Lievrouw	  (following	  Chris	  Atton),	  “employ	  or	  modify	  the	  communication	  artifacts,	  practices,	  and	  social	  arrangements	  of	  new	  information	  and	  communication	  technologies	  to	  challenge	  or	  alter	  dominant,	  expected	  or	  accepted	  ways	  of	  doing	  society	  culture	  and	  politics”	  (emphasis	  removed)	  (19).	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By	  1998,	  Stefan	  Wray	  was	  already	  casting	  digital	  technologies	  as	  integral	  tools	  in	  future	  forms	  of	  political	  protest:	  “Given	  increasing	  computer	  prevalence	  and	  the	  fact	  our	  political	  opponents	  are	  among	  the	  most	  wired	  in	  the	  world,	  it	  is	  foolish	  to	  ignore	  the	  computer.	  Rather,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  turn	  our	  attention	  toward	  the	  computer,	  to	  understand	  it,	  and	  to	  transform	  it	  into	  an	  instrument	  of	  resistance.	  For	  the	  luddites	  of	  the	  world	  who	  resist	  the	  computer,	  consider	  using	  computers	  to	  resist.”	  (Quoted	  in	  Jordan	  and	  Taylor	  17)	  Although	  the	  commercial	  and	  mainstream	  adoption	  of	  digital	  technologies	  has	  to	  some	  extent	  rendered	  the	  public	  notion	  of	  hacking	  commonplace,	  hacktivism	  goes	  some	  way	  to	  re-­‐establishing	  such	  activity	  as	  “the	  imaginative	  re-­‐appropriation	  of	  technology’s	  potential	  within	  countercultural	  and	  oppositional	  communities”	  (Jordan	  and	  Taylor	  5).	  The	  idea	  behind	  this	  kind	  of	  civil	  disobedience	  is	  to	  promote	  “mass	  decentered	  electronic	  direct	  action”	  across	  emergent	  digital	  technologies	  that	  make	  such	  action	  possible	  on	  a	  “global,	  mass,	  collective	  and	  simultaneous”	  scale	  (Wray,	  “Electronic	  Disturbance	  Theater”).	  In	  recent	  years,	  powerful	  but	  controversial	  hacktivist	  groups	  such	  as	  Anonymous	  and	  LulzSec	  have	  engaged	  in	  hacktivism	  (often	  through	  DDoS	  attacks33)	  against	  what	  they	  perceive	  to	  be	  international	  sociopolitical,	  economic	  and	  cultural	  inequities.	  	   After	  Marcus’s	  terrible	  ordeal	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  DHS,	  he	  devises	  his	  own	  form	  of	  hacktivism	  to	  take	  back	  many	  of	  the	  digital	  civil	  liberties	  the	  agency	  robbed	  from	  him,	  and	  to	  help	  free	  those	  of	  his	  friends	  who	  are	  still	  being	  detained.	  We	  might	  think	  of	  Lessig’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Distributed	  Denial	  of	  Service—a	  technique	  in	  which	  “a	  large	  number	  of	  computers	  attempt	  to	  access	  one	  website	  over	  and	  over	  again	  in	  a	  short	  amount	  of	  time,	  in	  the	  hopes	  of	  overwhelming	  the	  server,	  rendering	  it	  incapable	  of	  responding	  to	  legitimate	  requests”	  (Sauter	  2).	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dictum	  for	  the	  digital	  age	  here,	  that	  Marcus	  “must	  take	  affirmative	  steps	  to	  secure	  a	  kind	  of	  freedom	  that	  was	  passively	  provided	  before”	  the	  advent	  and	  mainstream	  adoption	  of	  digital	  technologies	  (Free	  Culture	  278-­‐79).	  He	  makes	  use	  of	  a	  range	  of	  open	  source	  hardware	  and	  social	  networking	  technologies	  that	  are	  encrypted	  against	  government	  surveillance	  techniques—a	  resourcefulness	  illustrated	  through	  the	  discovery	  that	  his	  home	  laptop	  has	  been	  bugged.	  Although	  the	  laptop	  has	  considerable	  sentimental	  value—Marcus	  built	  the	  machine	  from	  scratch	  and	  named	  it	  “the	  Salmagundi,	  which	  means	  anything	  made	  out	  of	  spare	  parts”	  (Doctorow,	  Little	  Brother	  85)—and	  although	  the	  DHS	  continues	  to	  spy	  on	  him,	  the	  digital	  DIY	  spirit	  soon	  returns.	  After	  building	  a	  makeshift	  “camera-­‐detector”	  out	  of	  a	  “toilet-­‐paper	  roll	  and	  three	  bucks’	  worth	  of	  parts”	  (85),	  he	  turns	  his	  Xbox	  Universal	  gaming	  console	  (a	  fictional	  iteration	  of	  the	  Microsoft	  console)	  into	  a	  computing	  device	  running	  an	  operating	  system	  known	  as	  “ParanoidXbox”	  (87).	  This	  OS,	  an	  offshoot	  of	  “Paranoid	  Linux,”	  works	  in	  similar	  fashion	  to	  Tor:	  [The	  OS]	  assumes	  that	  its	  operator	  is	  under	  assault	  from	  the	  government	  (it	  was	  intended	  for	  use	  by	  Chinese	  and	  Syrian	  dissidents),	  and	  it	  does	  everything	  it	  can	  to	  keep	  your	  communications	  and	  documents	  a	  secret.	  It	  even	  throws	  up	  a	  bunch	  of	  “chaff”	  communications	  that	  are	  supposed	  to	  disguise	  the	  fact	  that	  you're	  doing	  anything	  covert.	  So	  while	  you’re	  receiving	  a	  political	  message	  one	  character	  at	  a	  time…	  [the	  OS]	  is	  pretending	  to	  surf	  the	  Web	  and	  fill	  in	  questionnaires	  and	  flirt	  in	  chat-­‐rooms.	  Meanwhile,	  one	  in	  every	  five	  hundred	  characters	  you	  receive	  is	  your	  real	  message,	  a	  needle	  buried	  in	  a	  huge	  haystack.	  (87)	  The	  ritual	  of	  connecting	  the	  console	  to	  the	  Internet	  and	  connecting	  to	  other	  Xbox	  Universals	  in	  range—thanks	  to	  its	  network	  multiplayer	  capabilities—reminds	  Marcus,	  as	  a	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digital	  hobbyist,	  of	  the	  feeling	  of	  being	  “in	  control.”	  “My	  technology	  was	  working	  for	  me,	  serving	  me,	  protecting	  me.	  It	  wasn’t	  spying	  on	  me.	  This	  is	  why	  I	  loved	  technology:	  if	  you	  used	  it	  right,	  it	  could	  give	  you	  power	  and	  privacy”	  (Doctorow,	  Little	  Brother	  88).	  Doctorow	  has	  commented	  on	  the	  ideological	  duality	  of	  technology	  as	  a	  key	  difference	  between	  Orwell’s	  Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four	  and,	  with	  the	  benefit	  of	  technological	  hindsight,	  his	  own	  fiction.	  In	  a	  2010	  interview,	  he	  points	  out	  that	  “Orwell	  existed	  in	  an	  era	  in	  which	  technology	  had	  not	  yet	  gotten	  to	  the	  most	  important	  part	  of	  its	  life	  cycle:	  the	  part	  at	  which	  it	  becomes	  not	  just	  a	  tool	  for	  people	  who	  have	  power,	  but	  also	  a	  tool	  for	  people	  who	  lack	  it.”	  In	  contemporary	  urban	  culture,	  he	  argues,	  	  people	  who	  have	  power	  have	  a	  lot	  of	  power,	  but	  they	  also	  rely	  on	  a	  fairly	  fragile	  technical	  infrastructure	  to	  sustain	  themselves.	  People	  who	  lack	  power	  don’t	  have	  much	  power,	  but	  what	  they	  do	  have	  is	  access	  to	  the	  same	  technologies	  and	  all	  they	  need	  to	  do	  to	  upset	  the	  status	  quo	  is	  find	  one	  failure—one	  weak	  point	  in	  a	  technology—to	  disrupt	  it.	  (Quoted	  in	  Bernick,	  Steele,	  and	  Bernick,	  438)	  The	  point	  here	  is	  that	  Little	  Brother	  is	  concerned	  with	  showing	  how	  social	  and	  political	  empowerment	  through	  technology	  “cuts	  both	  ways,”	  serving	  authority	  and	  providing	  a	  means	  for	  the	  oppressed	  to	  reign	  in	  or	  uncut	  that	  authority	  (438).	  	  Connected	  to	  this	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  “politics	  can	  undermine	  technology,”	  but	  “technology	  can	  [also]	  undermine	  politics.	  Neither	  trumps	  the	  other.	  If	  we	  are	  going	  to	  fix	  things,	  we	  need	  to	  fight	  on	  both	  the	  technological	  and	  political	  fronts”	  (Schneier,	  Data	  and	  
Goliath	  214).	  Since	  digital	  technologies	  (which	  in	  and	  of	  themselves	  are	  effectively	  neutral)	  can	  be	  used	  to	  shore	  up	  the	  power	  of	  authority,	  hacktivist	  causes	  work	  better	  if	  they	  also	  contain	  a	  traditional	  activist	  component.	  In	  narrative	  terms,	  this	  occurs	  through	  Marcus’s	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distribution	  of	  the	  ParanoidXbox	  OS,	  which	  happens	  physically	  by	  word-­‐of-­‐mouth	  and	  on	  the	  streets	  of	  downtown	  San	  Francisco.	  For	  many	  activists,	  Sauter	  reports,	  “worthwhile	  activism	  is	  performed	  on	  the	  streets,	  where	  the	  activist	  puts	  [her/himself]	  in	  physical	  and	  legal	  peril	  to	  support	  [their]	  ideals”	  (6).	  Marcus’s	  efforts	  provide	  a	  decisive	  illustration	  of	  the	  continuing	  existence	  of	  grassroots	  political	  and	  social	  engagement	  in	  the	  digital	  age,	  and	  offer	  a	  counterargument	  for	  the	  “‘slacktivist’	  critique”	  of	  digital,	  non-­‐physical	  forms	  of	  activism	  (Sauter	  5).	  He	  goes	  into	  the	  city	  to	  distribute	  copies	  of	  the	  OS	  to	  people	  he	  has	  “heard	  [are]	  willing	  to	  burn	  sixty	  of	  their	  own	  and	  hand	  them	  out	  to	  their	  friends”	  (Doctorow,	  Little	  Brother	  97).	  This	  is	  how	  the	  revolution	  begins.	  Soon,	  he	  starts	  hearing	  stories	  of	  the	  Xnet,	  a	  nickname	  for	  the	  ParanoidXbox	  network,	  which	  has	  been	  “sneakernetted	  and	  copied	  all	  the	  way	  to	  Oakland	  in	  the	  space	  of	  two	  weeks”	  (97).	  	  Operating	  under	  the	  new	  handle	  M1k3y,	  he	  uses	  the	  Xnet	  to	  conduct	  all	  future	  online	  communications,	  in	  private	  chat	  rooms	  and	  on	  message	  boards,	  and	  to	  “set	  up	  a	  fake	  email	  address	  through	  the	  Pirate	  Party,	  a	  Swedish	  political	  party	  that	  hated	  Internet	  surveillance	  and	  promised	  to	  keep	  their	  mail	  accounts	  a	  secret	  from	  everyone,	  even	  the	  cops”	  (Doctorow,	  Little	  Brother	  96).	  The	  uninhibited	  computing	  such	  technology	  provides	  aligns	  with	  David	  Sheridan,	  Jim	  Ridolfo,	  and	  Anthony	  J.	  Michel’s	  conception	  of	  a	  “multimodal	  public	  sphere”	  that	  “is	  contingent	  upon	  nonspecialist	  citizens	  having	  access	  to	  an	  array	  of	  cultural	  and	  material	  resources,	  including	  technologies,	  knowledge	  bases,	  and	  skill	  sets”	  (807).	  Xnet	  users	  post	  and	  repost	  tidbits	  and	  how-­‐to’s	  of	  hacktivism	  and	  culture	  jamming.	  One	  user	  posts	  “a	  link	  to	  an	  Electronic	  Frontier	  Foundation	  white	  paper	  on	  the	  ways…	  [contactless	  transit	  cards]	  could	  be	  used	  to	  track	  people”	  (Doctorow,	  Little	  Brother	  96).	  Even	  Marcus	  shares	  his	  seemingly	  endless	  fount	  of	  knowledge	  in	  the	  Xnet’s	  wiki-­‐style	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spaces	  to	  help	  others	  “troubleshoot	  their	  Xnet	  configurations	  and	  connections”	  (96).	  Mimno	  echoes	  this	  point,	  suggesting	  that,	  for	  digital	  humanities	  projects,	  “Collaboration	  between	  experts	  will	  become	  the	  model	  for	  the	  near	  future”—a	  model	  that	  is	  guided	  by	  “enough	  common	  language	  for	  people	  to	  work	  together,	  and	  enough	  social	  engineering	  to	  make	  connections	  happen.”	  In	  fact,	  the	  comparison	  to	  Wikipedia	  (and	  other	  wikis)	  is	  a	  good	  one:	  the	  Xnet	  delivers	  on	  all	  of	  Sheridan,	  Ridolfo,	  and	  Michel’s	  prerequisites	  for	  a	  multimodal	  public	  space	  powered	  by	  open	  source	  participation,	  collaboration,	  and	  knowledge	  sharing.	  As	  within	  real	  knowledge	  networks,	  the	  Xnet	  facilitates	  “a	  fractional	  shift	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  participation	  to	  create	  remarkable	  new	  educational	  resources.”	  And	  the	  interactive	  “linking	  together”	  of	  these	  resources	  “lets	  [users]	  tap	  [their]	  cognitive	  surplus”	  (Shirky).	  Perhaps,	  when	  Doctorow	  was	  writing	  Little	  Brother,	  Wikipedia’s	  existence	  as	  “a	  collective	  endeavour,	  undertaken	  by	  thousands,	  sprawling	  and	  brawling,	  and	  conducted	  without	  deference	  to	  individual	  authority”	  served	  as	  a	  tentative	  model	  for	  the	  Xnet	  (Doctorow,	  “Why	  Philip	  Roth”).	  	   In	  his	  first	  blog	  post	  on	  his	  Xnet	  site	  Open	  Revolt,	  channeling	  Bill	  Schneier,	  Marcus	  declares	  that	  “[t]he	  important	  thing	  about	  security	  systems	  isn’t	  how	  they	  work,	  it’s	  how	  they	  fail”	  (Doctorow,	  Little	  Brother	  127).	  This	  inaugural	  call	  to	  arms	  puts	  him	  in	  line	  with	  “activist	  technologists”	  who	  are	  directly	  involved	  in	  “reconfiguring	  the	  infrastructure	  itself…	  in	  a	  society	  where	  all	  aspects	  of	  expression	  and	  interaction	  are	  pervasively	  mediated	  by	  extensive	  computing	  networks”	  (Lievrouw	  117).	  The	  blogging	  format	  operates	  as	  another	  kind	  of	  “recursive	  public”—“a	  space	  of	  opinion	  and	  discussion	  that	  is	  radically	  open	  to	  the	  voices	  of	  massive	  numbers	  of	  people”	  (Kelty	  304)—and	  as	  platform	  that	  actively	  supports	  Coleman’s	  notion	  of	  democratic	  and	  decentralized	  e-­‐citizenship.	  One	  of	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the	  first	  jamming	  events	  is	  dubbed	  “Operation	  False	  Positive,”	  in	  which	  Xnetters	  all	  over	  San	  Francisco	  overwhelm	  the	  DHS’s	  indiscriminate	  terrorist	  surveillance	  systems	  and	  throw	  the	  city	  into	  chaos.	  Like	  the	  cameras	  at	  Chavez	  High,	  the	  DHS	  is	  “trying	  to	  spot	  incredibly	  rare	  events—a	  person	  is	  a	  terrorist—with	  inaccurate	  systems”	  (129).	  The	  jamming	  of	  its	  surveillance	  systems—which	  stops	  people	  from	  using	  ATMs,	  entering	  certain	  buildings,	  etc.,	  and	  which	  costs	  the	  city	  millions—works	  by	  marking	  everyone	  as	  a	  terrorist	  and	  overloading	  its	  sensors.	  Naturally,	  this	  results	  in	  a	  general	  consensus	  that	  “the	  DHS	  [has]	  gone	  haywire,	  blaming	  it	  all	  on	  the	  fake-­‐ass	  ‘security’	  that	  was	  supposed	  to	  be	  protecting	  us	  from	  terrorism”	  (132).	  In	  a	  rhetorical	  sense,	  these	  forms	  of	  hacktivism	  underscore	  the	  stake	  digital	  natives	  have	  in	  shaping	  “the	  public	  agenda	  in	  the	  digital	  age”	  (Palfrey	  and	  Gasser	  264).	  Digital	  technologies	  have	  allowed	  young	  people	  to	  become	  “active	  users	  and	  participants	  in	  public	  conversations”	  (264).	  They	  often	  utilize	  “the	  new	  media	  environment”	  (which	  contributes	  to	  the	  erosion	  of	  conventional	  information	  and	  power	  hierarchies)	  as	  a	  set	  of	  tools	  for	  sociopolitical	  activism,	  and	  to	  voice	  “observations,	  experiences	  and	  concerns”	  outside	  and	  beyond	  mass	  media	  infrastructures	  and	  traditional	  civic	  discourse	  networks	  (264).	  Lievrouw	  makes	  a	  similar	  observation,	  suggesting	  that	  within	  the	  “fundamentally	  constructive	  and	  interactive”	  framework	  of	  digital	  new	  media,	  “Participation…	  makes	  people	  ‘active	  agents	  in	  the	  process	  of	  meaning-­‐making’”	  (14).	  Furthermore,	  she	  argues,	  “‘Interactive’	  new	  media	  offer	  more	  opportunities	  for	  communicative	  action,	  and	  interaction,	  than	  do	  most	  traditional	  mass	  media	  formats,	  and	  thus	  more	  opportunities	  for	  participation”	  (15).	  	  	   At	  length,	  however,	  DHS	  spies	  manage	  to	  infiltrate	  the	  Xnet,	  forcing	  Marcus	  to	  host	  a	  web	  of	  trust	  key	  signing	  party.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  powerful	  weapons	  Marcus	  has	  against	  such	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incursions	  is	  a	  collaborative,	  open	  source	  commons	  built	  on	  trust	  and	  participation.	  In	  the	  digital	  sphere,	  such	  a	  commons	  stands	  in	  contradistinction	  to	  the	  closed	  proprietary	  systems	  of	  authority	  and	  commercial	  interests	  that	  have	  flooded	  its	  spaces.	  The	  Xnet,	  to	  borrow	  from	  Fitzpatrick,	  is	  structured	  as	  a	  bulwark	  against	  “the	  dominant,	  often	  exclusionary	  ideological	  structures	  of	  the	  Internet”	  (Planned	  Obsolescence	  36)	  by	  positioning	  “‘trust…	  [as]	  the	  currency	  of	  the	  participation	  age’”	  (37).	  Marcus’s	  digital	  grassroots	  movement,	  predicated	  upon	  the	  “recombination,	  networked	  architecture,	  ubiquity,	  and	  interactivity”	  that	  “make	  new	  media	  new”	  (Lievrouw	  15),	  generates	  participation	  through	  trust	  and	  cooperation.	  	  Channeling	  father	  of	  cryptography	  Alan	  Turing,	  Marcus	  explains	  that	  a	  web	  of	  trust	  is	  a	  type	  of	  cryptography	  that	  provides	  “a	  nearly	  foolproof	  way	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  you	  could	  talk	  to	  the	  people	  you	  trusted,	  but	  that	  no	  one	  else	  could	  listen	  in”	  (Doctorow,	  Little	  Brother	  149).	  Public	  key	  cryptography	  is	  defined	  as	  an	  	  encryption	  method	  that	  uses	  a	  two-­‐part	  key:	  a	  public	  key	  and	  a	  private	  key.	  To	  send	  an	  encrypted	  message	  to	  someone,	  you	  use	  the	  recipient’s	  public	  key,	  which	  can	  be	  sent	  to	  you	  via	  regular	  e-­‐mail	  or	  made	  available	  on	  any	  public	  Web	  site	  or	  venue.	  To	  decrypt	  the	  message,	  the	  recipient	  uses	  the	  private	  key,	  which	  he	  or	  she	  keeps	  secret.	  (“web	  of	  trust”)	  In	  a	  web	  of	  trust,	  this	  two-­‐way,	  two-­‐part	  exchange	  of	  keys	  is	  extended	  to	  a	  group	  of	  trustworthy	  individuals.	  Marcus	  uses	  the	  analogy	  of	  a	  phonebook,	  in	  which	  individuals	  who	  trust	  one	  another	  share	  phone	  numbers	  that	  are	  by	  extension	  also	  trusted.	  This,	  he	  says,	  is	  a	  form	  of	  “‘transitive	  trust’—trust	  that	  moves	  across	  the	  web	  of	  our	  relationships”	  (Doctorow,	  Little	  Brother	  153).	  He	  also	  compares	  the	  web	  of	  trust	  to	  the	  concept	  of	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keyrings.	  A	  keyring	  in	  this	  context	  is	  	  a	  list	  of	  keys	  that	  I’ve	  signed	  with	  my	  private	  key…	  I	  hand	  you	  my	  keyring	  and	  provided	  that	  you	  trust	  me	  to	  have	  actually	  met	  and	  verified	  all	  the	  keys	  on	  it,	  you	  can	  take	  it	  and	  add	  it	  to	  your	  keyring.	  Now,	  you	  meet	  someone	  else	  and	  you	  hand	  the	  whole	  ring	  to	  him.	  Bigger	  and	  bigger	  the	  ring	  grows,	  and	  provided	  that	  you	  trust	  the	  next	  guy	  in	  the	  chain,	  and	  he	  trusts	  the	  next	  guy	  in	  his	  chain	  and	  so	  on,	  you’re	  pretty	  secure.	  (153-­‐54)	  To	  this	  end,	  Marcus	  and	  his	  friend	  Jolu	  organize	  a	  key	  signing	  party	  to	  meet	  with	  potential	  web	  of	  trust	  associates.	  During	  the	  party,	  in	  which	  everyone	  trades	  keys,	  he	  gives	  a	  speech	  that	  lays	  bare	  the	  sociopolitical	  agenda	  of	  Doctorow’s	  tale.	  “‘It’s	  no	  coincidence	  that	  the	  Xnet	  was	  created	  right	  after	  the	  DHS	  took	  over	  the	  city.	  The	  people	  who	  did	  that	  are	  an	  organization	  devoted	  to	  personal	  liberty,	  who	  created	  the	  network	  to	  keep	  us	  safe	  from	  DHS	  spooks	  and	  enforcers’”	  (162).	  And	  although	  the	  Xnet	  is	  no	  longer	  “‘pure,’”	  infiltrated	  by	  DHS	  agents	  who	  attempt	  to	  use	  “‘social	  engineering	  hacks’”	  to	  fish	  for	  Xnet	  users’	  identities	  and	  locations	  (such	  as	  by	  posting	  electronic	  questionnaires	  from	  fake	  profiles),	  key	  signing	  will	  ensure	  “‘a	  network	  within	  a	  network’”	  that	  blocks	  such	  invasions	  (162).	  “It’s	  the	  last	  open	  communications	  network	  in	  America,”	  Marcus	  proclaims	  later;	  and	  the	  web	  of	  trust	  will	  guarantee	  that	  it	  remains	  “the	  last	  way	  to	  communicate	  without	  being	  snooped	  on	  by	  the	  DHS”	  (164).	  	  A	  great	  deal	  of	  this	  digital	  civil	  disobedience	  manifests	  itself	  as	  a	  generational	  conflict,	  as	  Xnetters—the	  majority	  of	  whom	  are	  teenagers—and	  hipster	  stores	  popularize	  the	  “DON’T	  TRUST	  ANYONE	  OVER	  25”	  meme	  in	  a	  clear	  echo	  of	  1960s	  countercultural	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movements	  in	  the	  U.S.34	  (Doctorow,	  Little	  Brother	  174).	  We	  might	  recall	  the	  digital	  native/digital	  immigrant	  divide	  in	  Vinge’s	  novel,	  here.	  Youth	  has	  always	  been	  at	  odds	  with	  adult	  authority	  and	  the	  hacktivism	  of	  the	  Xnet	  collective	  is	  mischaracterized	  and/or	  feared	  by	  the	  DHS,	  parents,	  and	  news	  agencies	  alike.	  In	  the	  novel,	  Al	  Jazeera—which	  labels	  the	  event	  a	  “youth	  riot”	  and	  the	  Xnet	  “a	  network	  used	  by	  students	  and	  Al	  Qaeda	  sympathizers”	  (205)—reports	  on	  a	  peaceful	  demonstration	  by	  Xnetters	  in	  Dolores	  Park	  that	  was	  violently	  dispersed	  by	  police	  with	  pepper	  spray	  gas.	  But	  for	  Marcus’s	  father,	  the	  police	  are	  not	  the	  enemy,	  and	  those	  who	  use	  the	  Xnet	  to	  simply	  play	  networked	  computer	  games	  are	  “‘providing	  cover	  for	  people	  who	  plan	  on	  attacking	  and	  destroying	  this	  country’”	  (206).	  From	  this	  media-­‐distorted	  perspective,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  conflate	  the	  media	  line	  on	  the	  Xnet	  with	  the	  terrorists	  responsible	  for	  bombing	  the	  Oakland-­‐Bay	  Bridge	  and	  BART	  system	  and	  killing	  thousands	  of	  people.	  Paul	  Taylor	  has	  written	  extensively	  on	  this	  subject,	  exploring	  “how	  perceptions	  of	  hacking	  have	  been	  heavily	  distorted	  by	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  media	  and	  the	  various	  social	  actors	  who	  have	  actively	  sought	  to	  promote	  negative	  ethical	  interpretations	  of	  the	  activity”	  (59).	  On	  the	  contrary,	  Marcus’s	  collective	  is	  committed	  to	  showing	  that	  “universal	  surveillance	  is	  more	  dangerous	  than	  terrorism”	  (Doctorow,	  Little	  Brother	  210).	  The	  Xnet	  is	  a	  force	  for	  good,	  even	  as	  its	  members’	  culture	  jamming	  begins	  to	  get	  out	  of	  hand	  and	  the	  risk	  of	  arrest	  grows.	  One	  such	  benefit	  of	  the	  Xnet	  is,	  as	  mentioned,	  its	  collaborative,	  open	  source	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  This	  slogan	  is	  an	  adaptation	  of	  “Don’t	  Trust	  Anyone	  Over	  30,”	  a	  phrase	  uttered	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1960s	  by	  UC	  Berkeley	  student	  Jack	  Weinberg	  during	  an	  interview	  with	  the	  San	  Francisco	  Chronicle.	  In	  the	  decade	  of	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  movement,	  protests	  against	  the	  Vietnam	  War,	  and	  the	  explosion	  of	  free	  love,	  the	  slogan	  seemed	  tailor-­‐made	  for	  a	  generation’s	  rejection	  of	  American	  sociocultural	  norms	  established	  in	  the	  years	  following	  World	  War	  II	  (Sarwate).	  Interestingly	  enough,	  Becky	  Sarwate	  uses	  language	  of	  the	  digital	  age	  to	  describe	  the	  history	  of	  the	  slogan,	  further	  fusing	  the	  period	  with	  Doctorow’s	  narrative	  of	  rebellion:	  “In	  an	  era	  when	  the	  phrase	  ‘going	  viral’	  had	  yet	  to	  be	  invented,	  Weinberg's	  legendary	  soundbite	  quickly	  became	  the	  unofficial	  motto	  of	  1960s	  youth	  culture,	  a	  warning	  against	  placing	  faith	  in	  those	  with	  a	  vested	  interest	  in	  the	  status	  quo	  and	  the	  reproduction	  of	  dominant	  ideology.”	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framework	  that	  encourages	  users	  to	  exercise	  their	  right	  to	  free	  speech	  and	  peaceful	  assembly	  as	  specified	  in	  the	  First	  Amendment	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Constitution.35	  Although	  the	  DHS	  and	  other	  institutions	  work	  to	  curtail	  the	  rights	  provided	  under	  this	  law,	  the	  Xnet	  still	  exists	  as	  an	  outlet	  for	  activism	  and	  defense	  against	  tyranny.	  Enfranchised	  by	  the	  participatory	  nature	  of	  the	  medium,	  participants	  wield	  its	  digital	  tools	  to	  create,	  collaborate,	  remix	  and	  remediate	  their	  dissent	  in	  local	  or	  “little	  narrative[s]…	  of	  imaginative	  invention”	  that	  challenge	  the	  grand	  narratives	  of	  existing	  power	  structures	  (Lyotard	  60).	  The	  Xnet	  is	  particularly	  well	  suited	  to	  this	  task	  because,	  through	  its	  interactivity,	  the	  network	  facilitates	  “the	  process	  of	  social/political	  change”	  by	  “support[ing]	  or	  provid[ing]	  conditions	  for	  participation”	  that	  define	  “alternative	  and	  activist	  new	  media”	  (Lievrouw	  13).	  The	  digital’s	  singular	  features	  of	  non-­‐linearity,	  multimodality	  and	  capabilities	  of	  remediation	  are	  facets	  of	  “hypermediacy,”	  which,	  as	  Bolter	  and	  Grusin	  argue,	  accounts	  for	  and	  makes	  visible	  the	  medium’s	  “multiple	  acts	  of	  representation”	  (33).	  In	  this	  environment,	  digital	  natives	  are	  creators	  in	  the	  fullest	  sense—“When	  they	  post	  video,	  when	  they	  make	  and	  share	  music,	  when	  they	  post	  and	  point	  to	  news,	  when	  they	  tag	  and	  bookmark	  stories	  on	  the	  Web,	  and	  when	  they	  make	  or	  ply	  new	  networks”	  (Palfrey	  and	  Gasser	  115).	  Often	  satirical	  and	  socially	  conscious	  in	  nature,	  their	  creations	  constitute	  “a	  new	  art	  form,	  a	  type	  of	  digital	  collage	  called	  the	  ‘remix’”	  or	  “‘mash-­‐up’”	  (115).	  Digital	  remixes—works	  that	  repurpose	  existing	  artifacts	  to	  make	  something	  entirely	  new—allow	  their	  creators	  to	  “interact	  with	  cultural	  objects	  in	  a	  way	  that	  affects	  how	  cultures	  develop	  and	  are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  The	  language	  of	  the	  First	  Amendment	  is	  well	  known,	  but	  I	  am	  including	  it	  here	  for	  clarity:	  “Congress	  shall	  make	  no	  law	  respecting	  an	  establishment	  of	  religion,	  or	  prohibiting	  the	  free	  exercise	  thereof;	  or	  abridging	  the	  freedom	  of	  speech,	  or	  of	  the	  press;	  or	  the	  right	  of	  the	  people	  peaceably	  to	  assemble,	  and	  to	  petition	  the	  government	  for	  a	  redress	  of	  grievances”	  (U.S.	  Const.	  amend.	  I).	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understood”	  (115).	  Lievrouw	  conceives	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  as	  “‘remix	  culture,’”	  which,	  like	  its	  modernist	  antecedent	  Dadaism,	  features	  “sampling,	  fragmentation,	  juxtaposition,	  and	  recombination”	  of	  disparate	  and	  diverse	  media	  in	  digital	  environments	  (29).	  Both	  of	  these	  formulations	  closely	  follow	  Bolter	  and	  Grusin’s	  concept	  of	  remediation	  as	  “the	  mediation	  of	  
mediation”	  (55),	  where	  the	  ideas,	  concepts,	  theories	  and	  signs	  produced	  by	  traditional	  media	  (which	  have	  likely	  also	  been	  remediated	  from	  previous	  media	  forms)	  are	  repackaged	  and	  repurposed	  through	  new	  digital	  media.	  One	  example	  of	  a	  digital	  remix	  is	  the	  Internet	  meme.	  For	  Limor	  Shifman,	  digital	  memes	  form	  “a	  fundamental	  part	  of	  what	  participants	  experience	  as	  the	  digital	  sphere”	  (19).	  Constituted	  by	  the	  twin	  elements	  of	  “mimicry	  and	  remix”	  (20),	  digital	  memes	  are	  elastic	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  be	  endlessly	  replicated	  “by	  various	  means	  of	  repackaging	  or	  imitation”	  (emphasis	  removed)	  (19),	  and	  through	  linking	  and	  reposting.	  The	  rapid	  circulation	  of	  these	  cultural	  phenomena	  in	  the	  public	  consciousness	  is	  often	  described	  as	  a	  form	  of	  electronic	  virality.	  	  	  Marcus	  encounters	  an	  example	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  reflexive	  composition	  in	  an	  email.	  An	  Xnet	  user	  recently	  posted	  a	  video	  of	  DHS	  agents	  “being	  really	  crazy…	  disassembling	  a	  baby’s	  stroller	  after	  a	  bomb-­‐sniffing	  dog	  had	  shown	  an	  interest	  in	  it”	  (Doctorow,	  Little	  
Brother	  224).	  The	  video	  went	  viral,	  downloaded	  many	  times	  over.	  And	  because	  the	  video	  was	  uploaded	  to	  the	  Internet	  Archive’s	  Alexandria	  mirror	  in	  Egypt	  (which,	  unlike	  the	  U.S.	  archive,	  will	  still	  host	  anything),	  the	  work	  is	  hosted	  “for	  free…	  under	  the	  Creative	  Commons	  license,	  which	  let	  anyone	  remix	  it	  and	  share	  it”	  (225).	  Doctorow	  is	  passionate	  about	  Creative	  Commons,	  which,	  according	  to	  its	  About	  page,	  is	  committed	  to	  “realizing	  the	  full	  potential	  of	  the	  Internet—universal	  access	  to	  research	  and	  education,	  full	  participation	  in	  culture—to	  drive	  a	  new	  era	  of	  development,	  growth,	  and	  productivity.”	  Given	  the	  rhetorical	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agenda	  of	  Little	  Brother,	  it	  stands	  to	  reason	  that	  both	  Marcus	  and	  Doctorow	  should	  gravitate	  toward	  an	  intellectual	  licensing	  policy	  like	  Creative	  Commons	  that	  “develops,	  supports,	  and	  stewards	  legal	  and	  technical	  infrastructure	  that	  maximizes	  digital	  creativity,	  sharing,	  and	  innovation”	  (“About”).	  In	  the	  narrative,	  the	  Xnet	  functions	  as	  the	  representation	  of	  a	  digital	  epistemology	  similar	  to	  Kelty’s	  “recursive	  public”	  (304),	  in	  dialogue	  with	  the	  Creative	  Commons	  doctrine.	  
Conclusion	  
	   At	  its	  center,	  Little	  Brother	  is	  a	  novel	  about	  the	  age-­‐old	  ideological	  battle	  between	  privacy	  and	  security,	  grappling	  with	  the	  social	  contract	  laid	  out	  by	  Hobbes,	  Jean-­‐Jacques	  Rousseau	  and	  other	  political	  theorists	  over	  the	  last	  500	  years.	  In	  the	  digital	  age,	  however,	  this	  battle	  is	  waged	  as	  a	  contest	  for	  data	  supremacy	  through	  the	  mediated	  channels	  of	  cyberspace.	  The	  idea	  of	  cyberspace	  existed	  in	  the	  1980s	  as	  “a	  metaphor	  for	  the	  global	  information	  network,	  but	  in	  the	  decade	  that	  followed,	  it	  made	  a	  material	  difference	  in	  technology	  and	  culture,	  and	  in	  the	  perceived	  relation	  between	  the	  two”	  (Jones	  18).	  What	  this	  means	  is	  that,	  in	  contemporary	  networked	  societies,	  the	  social,	  political,	  and	  judicial	  organizing	  principles	  of	  real-­‐world	  and	  digital	  spheres	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  considered	  distinct.	  They	  are	  hybrid—overlapping	  spaces	  in	  which,	  as	  Lessig	  puts	  it,	  “‘code	  is	  law’”	  (Code	  5).	  In	  a	  2013	  congressional	  committee	  on	  cybersecurity,	  Jane	  Holl	  Lute	  (who,	  interestingly	  enough,	  was	  at	  the	  time	  the	  Deputy	  Secretary	  of	  the	  DHS)	  asserted	  that	  the	  digital	  “‘is	  woven	  into	  the	  fabric	  of	  our	  daily	  lives’”	  and	  that	  it	  “functions	  as	  the	  very	  endoskeleton	  of	  modern	  life’”	  (Jones	  18).	  “No	  longer	  a	  place	  apart	  (some	  other	  ‘space’),”	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Steven	  E.	  Jones	  argues,	  the	  discourses,	  languages	  and	  tools	  of	  the	  digital	  have	  become	  “the	  infrastructure	  inside	  the	  ‘body’	  of	  everyday	  existence”	  (18-­‐19).	  In	  his	  novel	  Spook	  Country	  (2007),	  Gibson	  calls	  this	  an	  “everting”	  process	  in	  which	  cyberspace	  “[t]urns	  itself	  inside	  out”	  (22)—a	  fitting	  descriptor	  for	  Doctorow’s	  narrative	  of	  disruptive	  techno-­‐rebellion.	  Of	  course,	  the	  design	  and	  application	  of	  the	  code	  that	  supports	  the	  body	  of	  everyday	  existence	  is	  entirely	  dependent	  upon	  the	  ideology	  of	  its	  coders,	  who	  operate	  as	  potential	  gatekeepers	  of	  a	  new	  social	  order.	  In	  Code:	  Version	  2.0,	  Lessig	  suggests	  that	  code	  is	  the	  greatest	  threat	  to	  both	  liberal	  and	  libertarian	  ideals,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  greatest	  promise.	  We	  can	  build,	  or	  architect,	  or	  code	  cyberspace	  to	  protect	  values	  that	  we	  believe	  are	  fundamental.	  Or	  we	  can	  build,	  or	  architect,	  or	  code	  cyberspace	  to	  allow	  those	  values	  to	  disappear.	  There	  is	  no	  middle	  ground.	  There	  is	  no	  choice	  that	  does	  not	  include	  some	  kind	  of	  building.	  Code	  is	  never	  found;	  it	  is	  only	  ever	  made,	  and	  only	  ever	  made	  by	  us.	  (5)	  Code,	  and	  the	  digital	  technologies	  that	  produce	  it,	  is	  the	  essence	  of	  humanity.	  Although,	  as	  Hector	  Postigo	  reminds	  us,	  code	  plays	  a	  part	  in	  “regulating	  or	  acting	  as	  a	  surrogate/partner	  for	  enforcing	  legal	  regimes”	  (10),	  it	  remains	  an	  assemblage	  or	  taxonomy	  of	  our	  subjective	  and	  ethical	  relationships	  to	  the	  world	  around	  us.	  We	  no	  longer	  move	  toward,	  but	  inhabit	  cyberspace,	  just	  as	  it	  inhabits	  us.	  “[W]e	  made	  it,	  or	  at	  least	  we	  contribute	  our	  own	  data	  to	  it	  daily,”	  Jones	  argues	  (19),	  and,	  whether	  we	  know	  it	  or	  not,	  that	  data—our	  collective	  hopes,	  dreams,	  and	  fears—is	  the	  sum	  of	  its	  parts.	  	  As	  such,	  as	  I	  have	  argued,	  digital	  technologies	  can	  be	  used	  as	  tools	  for	  both	  activist	  causes	  and	  in	  the	  accumulation	  and	  concentration	  of	  power.	  Orwell’s	  Nineteen	  Eighty-­‐Four	  situates	  technology	  as	  a	  purely	  “repressive	  State	  apparatus,”	  to	  employ	  Louis	  Althusser’s	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term	  (139),	  that	  fuels	  state	  control	  and	  authority.	  Through	  Marcus’s	  campaign	  of	  hacktivism	  and	  the	  collaborative,	  creative	  discourses	  of	  the	  Xnet,	  however,	  the	  digital	  is	  used	  to	  empower	  and	  grant	  citizenship	  to	  individuals	  who	  have	  previously	  (in	  traditional	  media	  and	  political	  environments,	  at	  least)	  remained	  voiceless.	  Despite	  the	  increasingly	  privatized	  nature	  of	  the	  Internet	  that	  blocks	  out	  public	  spaces	  for	  free	  speech	  (Sauter	  3),	  Marcus	  successfully	  implements	  through	  the	  Xnet	  a	  form	  of	  digital	  political	  protest	  that	  carves	  out	  space	  for	  the	  work	  of	  protest.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  Xnet	  is	  a	  fertile	  and	  performative	  “digital	  public	  sphere,	  inviting	  arguments	  that	  are	  more	  diverse,	  multifaceted,	  and	  participatory”	  than	  the	  traditional,	  partisan	  mass	  media	  that	  serve	  the	  DHS’s	  political	  agenda	  (Zuckerman,	  Foreword	  xiii).	  Where	  participants	  of	  the	  digital	  public	  sphere—including	  Xnetters—are	  vulnerable,	  however,	  “is	  not	  [in	  their]	  exclusion	  but	  [their]	  invisibility”	  (xiii).	  Following	  Herbert	  Simon,	  Zuckerman	  suggests	  that	  this	  occurs	  when	  “a	  surplus	  of	  information	  leads	  to	  a	  surfeit	  of	  inattention,”	  effectively	  creating	  an	  open	  but	  noisy	  commons	  in	  which	  not	  everyone	  can	  or	  will	  be	  heard	  (xiii).	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  have	  tried	  to	  sketch	  out	  the	  contingent	  relationship	  between	  emergent	  digital	  technologies,	  digital	  natives,	  and	  traditional	  forms	  of	  social	  and	  political	  activism.	  Marcus	  and	  his	  friends,	  as	  victims	  of	  institutional	  surveillance,	  illegal	  detainment,	  and	  invasions	  of	  privacy,	  use	  digital	  tools	  for	  direct	  action	  against	  institutions	  and	  agencies	  that	  limit	  their	  freedoms.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  they	  must	  remain	  sensitive	  to	  the	  “general	  social	  climate	  of	  fear	  and	  vulnerability	  that	  has	  accompanied	  the	  advent	  of	  advanced	  communication	  networks”	  (Jordan	  and	  Taylor	  3),	  and	  which	  has	  increased	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  terrorist	  events	  and	  (thanks	  to	  the	  ubiquity	  of	  digital	  information)	  contemporary	  discourses	  about	  terrorism.	  Thus,	  the	  Xnet	  collective	  carries	  out	  its	  hacktivism	  in	  line	  with	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Jordan	  and	  Taylor:	  “as	  a	  form	  of	  virtual	  politics	  that	  seeks	  to	  adapt	  its	  mode	  of	  dissent	  to	  the	  reality	  of	  these	  complex	  networks,	  which	  it	  re-­‐imagines	  as	  webs	  to	  be	  traversed	  in	  a	  proactive	  rather	  than	  reactive	  manner”	  (3).	  I	  also	  discussed	  a	  few	  of	  the	  discourses	  that	  play	  into	  this	  ethics	  of	  hacktivism,	  particularly	  the	  element	  of	  play	  as	  integral	  to	  the	  identity	  formation	  of	  digital	  cultures,	  and—through	  a	  register	  of	  shared	  beliefs,	  ideals,	  and	  conventions—the	  Xnet’s	  existence	  as	  a	  vibrant	  and	  interconnected	  commons,	  or	  “recursive	  public”	  (Kelty	  304).	  We	  already	  know	  that	  the	  Internet	  “acts	  as	  a	  vital	  arena	  of	  communication,	  self-­‐expression,	  and	  interpersonal	  organizing”	  (Sauter	  2),	  even	  as	  and	  often	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  its	  “overwhelmingly	  privatized	  nature…	  is	  a	  challenge	  to	  the	  practice	  of	  activism	  online”	  (3).	  The	  rhetorics	  of	  play	  and	  gaming	  hold	  a	  special	  place	  in	  digital	  cultures,	  nurturing	  many	  of	  the	  different	  skills	  integral	  to	  hacktivist	  and	  digital	  humanities	  projects.	  Marcus	  and	  his	  friends	  thrive	  in	  ludic	  communities	  that	  promote	  a	  multimodal	  roster	  of	  digital,	  physical,	  creative,	  collaborative,	  and	  social	  activities	  and	  challenges.	  Harajuku	  Fun	  Madness,	  the	  Alternate	  Reality	  Game	  that	  brings	  them	  together,	  is	  all	  about	  building	  a	  networked	  and	  interactive	  transmedia	  narrative—“the	  aggregate	  effect	  of	  multiple	  texts/media	  artifacts”	  (Watson)—that	  encourages	  social,	  compositional,	  and	  technical	  skills.	  It	  shares	  with	  the	  digital	  humanities	  what	  Patrik	  Svensson	  identifies	  as	  a	  “multimodal”	  framework	  that	  binds	  “scholarly	  tools,	  databases,	  networked	  writing	  and	  peer-­‐to-­‐peer	  commentary”	  across	  real-­‐world	  and	  digital	  environments	  “while	  also	  leveraging	  the	  potential	  of	  the	  visual	  and	  aural	  media	  that	  are	  part	  of	  contemporary	  life.”	  As	  in	  digital	  humanities	  scholarship	  and	  education,	  through	  the	  vital	  act	  of	  participation,	  players	  learn	  how	  to	  “ask	  humanistic	  questions	  and	  think	  critically	  about	  the	  past	  using	  digital	  tools”—an	  outcome	  that,	  notes	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Mimno,	  “may	  look	  much	  more	  like	  traditional	  scholarly	  education	  than	  we	  expect.”	  Moreover,	  Marcus’s	  clever	  utilization	  of	  the	  MMORPG	  platform	  as	  a	  space	  for	  virtual	  activism	  brings	  this	  notion	  full	  circle—where	  the	  strands	  of	  hacktivism,	  creativity,	  self-­‐expression,	  community,	  and	  education	  are	  tied	  together.	  The	  terror	  event	  and	  systematic	  oppression	  wrought	  by	  the	  DHS	  on	  San	  Francisco	  and	  Marcus	  in	  particular	  act	  as	  galvanizing	  moments	  for	  the	  narrative—moments	  in	  which	  Marcus	  is	  transformed	  from	  socially	  conscious	  technology	  hobbyist	  to	  the	  hacktivist	  leader	  of	  a	  techno-­‐rebellion.	  Doctorow	  uses	  the	  terrorist	  event	  to	  explore	  how	  many	  of	  the	  civil	  liberties	  we	  take	  for	  granted	  in	  the	  U.S.—both	  digital	  and	  concrete—have	  been	  abridged	  or	  contravened	  for	  national	  security	  reasons	  in	  the	  years	  since	  9/11.	  In	  its	  capacity	  as	  allegory	  (masquerading	  as	  speculative	  fiction,	  like	  all	  the	  other	  fictions	  in	  this	  project),	  the	  novel	  reads	  as	  a	  how-­‐to	  manual	  for	  resisting	  digital	  strictures,	  surveillance	  and	  proprietary	  controls	  by	  turning	  digital	  technologies—through	  interactive	  acts	  of	  participation	  and	  trust—into	  tools	  for	  political	  and	  social	  activism.	  Doctorow	  is	  unreserved	  in	  his	  support	  for	  digital	  privacy,	  open	  source	  technologies	  and	  digital	  copyright	  reform.	  One	  of	  the	  best	  real-­‐world	  examples	  of	  his	  philosophy	  is	  surely	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  makes	  all	  his	  writing	  available	  for	  free	  under	  the	  Creative	  Commons	  license.	  This	  is	  hardly	  surprising	  from	  a	  writer	  who,	  as	  Ed	  Park	  notes	  in	  his	  New	  York	  Times	  review	  of	  Little	  Brother,	  “‘believe[s]	  that	  we	  live	  in	  an	  era	  where	  anything	  that	  can	  be	  expressed	  as	  bits	  will	  be.’”	  And	  like	  data,	  political	  and	  commercial	  interests	  will	  never	  be	  able	  to	  appropriate	  or	  regulate	  the	  transmissible,	  endlessly	  reproducible	  flow	  of	  ideas	  entirely.	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Conclusion	  
Throughout	  this	  project,	  I	  have	  tried	  to	  make	  a	  case	  for	  science	  fiction	  that	  focuses	  on	  the	  human	  relationship	  with	  digital	  technologies	  as	  being,	  more	  than	  any	  other	  mode	  of	  writing,	  singularly	  attuned	  to	  contemporary	  digital	  humanities	  discourses	  and	  practices.	  As	  cultural	  artifacts,	  the	  relevance	  and	  usefulness	  of	  such	  texts	  in	  today’s	  increasingly	  digital	  world	  should	  not	  be	  underestimated.	  Indeed,	  Lisa	  Swanstrom	  argues,	  “in	  all	  its	  diverse	  manifestations,”	  science	  fiction	  “enjoys	  an	  intimate	  relationship	  with	  technology.”	  The	  respective	  “histories	  of	  science	  fiction	  and	  technological	  development	  are	  not	  only	  coextensive;	  they	  are…	  wholly	  entwined”	  (113).	  	  In	  Cadigan’s	  Synners,	  Powers’	  Galatea	  2.2,	  Vinge’s	  Rainbows	  End,	  and	  Doctorow’s	  
Little	  Brother,	  there	  is	  a	  shared	  engagement	  with	  what	  Richard	  Utz	  calls	  “interdisciplinary	  humanistic	  perspectives	  in	  an	  increasingly	  technological	  world”	  (17)—a	  human-­‐oriented	  architecture	  of	  digital	  rhetorics,	  modalities	  and	  media.	  Beginning	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  cyberpunk	  fiction	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  early	  nineties,	  these	  novels	  (among	  many	  others)	  have	  been	  “essential	  for	  making	  sense	  of	  the	  cultural	  and	  technological	  evolution	  of	  digitization”	  (Swanstrom	  113).	  They	  have	  contributed,	  whether	  explicitly	  or	  implicitly,	  to	  the	  ongoing	  development	  of	  popular	  cultural	  and	  community-­‐produced	  narratives	  about	  the	  digital	  by	  providing	  us	  with	  the	  opportunity	  to	  acclimate	  to	  and	  navigate	  its	  innumerable	  configurations.	  Swanstrom	  even	  goes	  so	  far	  as	  to	  argue	  that	  “the	  evolution	  of	  digital	  culture	  is	  so	  tied	  to	  the	  history	  of	  cyberpunk”	  and	  its	  descendants	  that	  without	  them,	  “the	  digital	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humanities	  as	  a	  discipline	  would	  not	  exist	  in	  its	  current	  form”	  (113).	  If	  we	  are	  to	  judge	  the	  fields	  of	  science	  fiction	  and	  digital	  humanities	  as	  intersectional	  and,	  in	  many	  instances,	  confluent,	  we	  must	  recognize	  in	  the	  root	  of	  their	  epistemologies	  an	  anticipation	  of	  new,	  real-­‐world	  ontologies.	  In	  light	  of	  this,	  I	  have	  attempted	  to	  show	  that	  science	  fiction	  about	  the	  digital	  is,	  or	  at	  least	  should	  be,	  considered	  part	  of	  the	  literary	  expression	  of	  digital	  humanities.	  The	  four	  novels,	  each	  of	  which	  exists	  as	  time-­‐specific	  cultural	  artifact	  and	  snapshot	  of	  its	  particular	  moment	  in	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  digital	  age,	  are	  (despite	  being	  traditional	  print-­‐based	  works)	  digital	  humanities	  texts.	  They	  are	  part	  of	  a	  diverse	  array	  of	  practices	  and	  discourses	  that,	  along	  with	  the	  many	  diverse	  fields	  of	  inquiry	  contained	  in	  the	  digital	  humanities,	  are	  integrated	  in	  the	  cultural	  and	  technical	  history	  of	  computer	  networks.	  Just	  as	  “there	  is	  no	  [single]	  history	  of	  computers,	  but	  multiple	  histories	  of	  computer	  technologies,	  components,	  and	  practices”	  (Parikka	  249),	  the	  texts	  operate	  as	  speculative	  media	  assemblages	  that	  both	  record	  and	  stimulate	  the	  cultural	  collaborative	  construction	  of	  a	  digital	  humanities	  that	  must,	  by	  necessity,	  respond	  to	  the	  burgeoning	  digitization	  of	  humanity.	  As	  speculative	  fictions	  that	  function	  as	  allegories	  of	  the	  digital	  age,	  they	  move	  into	  and	  occupy	  the	  schisms	  in	  the	  continuity	  of	  consciousness	  caused	  by	  technological	  innovation.	  In	  this	  sense,	  we	  should	  see	  the	  texts	  as	  fragments	  of	  the	  same	  postmodern	  impulses	  that	  attempt	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  and/or	  are	  produced	  by	  a	  “radical	  break”	  with	  the	  grand	  narratives	  of	  “a	  dominant	  culture	  and	  aesthetic”	  and	  its	  “socioeconomic	  organization”	  (Jameson,	  Foreword	  vii).	  As	  the	  matrices	  of	  technology	  continue	  to	  grow,	  spread,	  and	  evolve,	  science	  fiction	  functions	  as	  both	  a	  “literature	  of	  change”	  and	  an	  agent	  of	  change	  (Pohl	  11,	  15)—an	  ontological	  narrative	  rejoinder	  to	  the	  “crisis	  of	  narratives”	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(Lyotard	  xxiii)	  that	  continues	  to	  signify	  “the	  electric	  drama…	  [of]	  new	  environments	  created	  by	  electronic	  informational	  media”	  (McLuhan	  and	  Fiore	  9).	  This	  is	  borne	  out	  in	  the	  novels,	  and	  in	  science	  fiction	  writing	  in	  general,	  through	  a	  formal	  and	  aesthetic	  structuration	  that	  bridges	  the	  humanities	  and	  the	  sciences.	  Not	  surprisingly,	  science	  fiction	  and	  digital	  humanities	  scholarship	  have	  found	  a	  natural	  home	  at	  technology-­‐focused	  institutions	  like	  the	  Georgia	  Institute	  of	  Technology,	  where	  scholars	  and	  teachers	  work	  across	  disciplines	  “to	  solve	  twenty-­‐first	  century	  problems	  by	  innovating	  at	  the	  intersection	  of	  science,	  technology,	  and	  the	  arts”	  (Yaszek,	  “Amazing	  Stories”	  53).	  The	  hybrid,	  transformative,	  and	  inclusive	  nature	  of	  these	  fields—a	  nebula	  of	  disparate,	  dialogic,	  and	  overlapping	  ideas—allows	  them	  to	  be	  what	  Yaszek	  identifies	  as	  inherent	  in	  science	  fiction:	  “a	  truly	  global	  language	  that	  allows	  people	  to	  communicate	  their	  experiences	  with	  science	  and	  technology	  across	  centuries,	  continents,	  and	  cultures”	  (53).	  This	  is	  a	  universal	  narrative,	  then—one	  that	  transcends	  specific	  organizing	  structures,	  systems,	  and	  historical	  contexts.	  In	  the	  digital	  age	  (perhaps	  more	  than	  ever	  before,	  since	  the	  stakes	  for	  humanity	  are	  so	  high	  in	  the	  face	  of	  rapid	  digitization),	  “We	  shape	  our	  culture	  and	  it	  shapes	  us,	  and	  the	  struggle	  for	  an	  artistic	  voice	  is	  part	  of	  the	  struggle	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  fully	  human.”	  The	  novels	  in	  this	  study	  are	  populated	  with	  characters	  mired	  in	  the	  fantasies,	  nightmares,	  amputations,	  extensions,	  and	  fragmentations	  of	  the	  technoscape;	  but	  they	  are	  nevertheless	  connected	  in	  this	  simple	  human	  desire.	  Lyotard	  has	  suggested	  that	  the	  articulation	  of	  science,	  although	  it	  has	  “always	  been	  in	  conflict	  with	  narratives,”	  necessitates	  the	  production	  of	  “a	  discourse	  of	  legitimation	  with	  respect	  to	  its	  own	  status,	  a	  discourse	  called	  philosophy”	  (xxiii).	  Science,	  including	  digital	  technologies,	  needs	  a	  way	  to	  account	  for	  itself	  in	  human	  terms.	  I	  suggest	  that	  science	  fiction	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and	  the	  digital	  humanities,	  bucking	  Snow’s	  two	  cultures	  dialectic,	  are	  contemporary	  iterations	  of	  this	  philosophy.	  If	  science	  is	  predicated	  upon	  agency,	  connection,	  and	  reflexivity,	  we	  find	  its	  creative,	  ideological,	  and	  scholarly	  analogues	  in	  these	  discourses.	  They	  are	  built	  on	  dialogic	  relationships	  that	  cut	  across	  and	  fill	  the	  spectrum—Julia	  Flanders	  calls	  this	  the	  “information	  nebula”—of	  human	  culture	  and	  consciousness.	  After	  all,	  as	  Reid	  writes,	  “relation	  powers	  agency”	  (“Network	  Exposure”).	  Collectively,	  the	  novels	  by	  Cadigan,	  Powers,	  Vinge,	  and	  Doctorow	  point	  in	  literary	  terms	  toward	  a	  multivalent,	  multimodal	  humanities	  that	  is	  enhanced,	  not	  diminished	  or	  eclipsed,	  by	  digital	  tools	  and	  platforms.	  Digital	  humanities	  work	  has	  at	  times	  been	  criticized	  for	  being	  too	  data-­‐oriented	  and	  neglectful	  of	  the	  humanistic	  side	  of	  inquiry.36	  As	  “[t]he	  next	  big	  idea	  in	  language,	  history,	  and	  the	  arts…	  [is]	  data,”	  reports	  Patricia	  Cohen,	  the	  humanities	  is	  transitioning	  to	  a	  “‘methodological	  moment’”	  that	  utilizes	  computer	  processing	  power	  to	  quantify	  the	  humanities.	  The	  danger	  is	  in	  losing	  the	  sense	  that,	  as	  Anthony	  Grafton	  reminds	  us,	  “‘So	  much	  of	  humanistic	  scholarship	  is	  about	  interpretation…	  It’s	  easy	  to	  forget	  the	  digital	  media	  are	  means	  not	  ends’”	  (quoted	  in	  Cohen).	  These	  fictional	  narratives,	  which	  are	  contingent	  upon	  the	  humanistic	  relationship	  with	  digital	  technologies,	  work	  to	  repatriate	  the	  human	  perspective	  as	  a	  core	  strength	  at	  the	  center	  of	  such	  research	  and	  pedagogy.	  In	  my	  analysis	  of	  the	  novels,	  I	  was	  able	  to	  identify	  a	  shared	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  See,	  for	  example,	  Helle	  Porsdam’s	  essay	  “Too	  Much	  ‘Digital’,	  Not	  Enough	  ‘Humanities’?”	  The	  idea	  that	  traditional	  humanities	  are	  being	  eclipsed	  by	  digital	  tools,	  Porsdam	  argues,	  began	  during	  the	  “discursive	  shift”	  from	  a	  traditional	  humanities	  “led	  or…	  modified	  by	  the	  technological/digital”	  (as	  in	  the	  first-­‐wave)	  to	  a	  mode	  in	  which	  digital	  “visions	  and…	  initiatives	  come	  from	  within	  the	  humanities.”	  As	  the	  digital	  becomes	  increasingly	  central	  to—and	  an	  indivisible	  part	  of—traditional	  humanities	  practices,	  however,	  “we	  are	  no	  longer	  talking	  about	  processing	  and	  statistically	  analyzing	  large	  collections	  of	  text,	  but	  rather	  about	  the	  changes	  that	  digital	  technologies	  are	  producing	  or	  generating	  across	  the	  many	  fields	  of	  humanist	  inquiry”	  (5).	  This	  may	  be	  a	  hard	  pill	  for	  many	  humanities	  scholars	  to	  swallow.	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underlying	  goal	  of	  humanistic	  empowerment	  (and	  concern	  for	  disempowerment)	  in	  the	  digital	  age	  that	  real-­‐world	  digital	  humanities	  practitioners	  continue	  stress	  the	  need	  for	  in	  and	  across	  their	  fields.	  It	  is	  the	  kind	  of	  empowerment	  that,	  as	  Flanders	  notes,	  places	  actors	  and	  audiences	  “inside	  the	  process,	  inside	  the	  tools,	  as	  they	  mediate	  between	  us	  and	  field[s]	  we	  are	  seeking	  to	  grasp.”	  In	  the	  preceding	  chapters,	  I	  have	  identified	  various	  aspects	  of	  the	  novels	  that	  typify	  or	  suggest	  new	  directions	  for	  the	  digital	  humanities.	  By	  bringing	  them	  together	  in	  this	  way,	  I	  have	  tried	  to	  highlight	  depictions	  of	  doing	  digital	  humanities	  in	  science	  fiction	  as	  a	  fertile	  and	  dialogic	  array	  of	  intersecting	  and	  symbiotic	  practices.	  Cadigan’s	  Synners	  deals	  with	  some	  of	  the	  earliest	  concerns	  in	  digital	  humanities	  discourses,	  including	  the	  posthuman	  relationship	  between	  technology	  and	  the	  body,	  commercial	  production,	  synthesis,	  and	  consumption	  of	  knowledge	  data,	  and	  the	  nature/role	  of	  art	  in	  the	  digital	  age.	  Set	  against	  the	  frenetic	  backdrop	  of	  a	  digitally	  saturated	  Los	  Angeles,	  the	  book	  resists	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  work	  of	  digital	  humanities	  “speaks	  outside	  of	  time,	  space,	  and	  the	  physicality	  of	  the	  human	  body”	  (Schnapp	  and	  Presner	  5).	  In	  Powers’	  Galatea	  2.2,	  Rick	  and	  his	  friend	  Dr.	  Philip	  Lentz	  collaborate	  on	  an	  academic	  artificial	  intelligence	  project	  that	  bridges	  computer	  science,	  neuroscience,	  English	  language	  and	  literature.	  This	  hybrid	  form	  of	  scholarship	  is	  called	  “connectionism”	  and,	  as	  I	  suggested,	  is	  one	  of	  the	  first	  comprehensive	  representations	  of	  digital	  humanities	  work	  in	  literature.	  Arriving	  shortly	  after	  the	  activation	  of	  the	  hyperlinked	  World	  Wide	  Web,	  Powers’	  work	  fits	  with	  Fitzpatrick’s	  2010	  conception	  of	  digital	  humanities	  as	  “‘a	  nexus	  of	  fields	  within	  which	  scholars	  use	  computing	  technologies	  to	  investigate	  the	  kinds	  of	  questions	  that	  are	  traditional	  to	  the	  humanities,	  or…	  ask	  traditional	  kinds	  of	  humanities-­‐oriented	  questions	  about	  computing	  technologies’”	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(“Humanities”	  12).	  Digital	  methods	  in	  education	  and	  library-­‐based	  knowledge	  preservation	  form	  the	  basis	  of	  Vinge’s	  Rainbows	  End.	  Like	  Galatea	  2.2,	  the	  novel	  wrestles	  with	  the	  rough	  transition	  from	  traditional	  to	  digital	  humanities	  in	  its	  generational	  dialectic	  of	  born	  digital	  high	  school	  kids	  (Juan	  Orozco	  and	  Miri	  Gu)	  and	  a	  group	  of	  old,	  white	  male	  traditionalists	  that	  call	  themselves	  the	  Elder	  Cabal	  (Robert	  Gu,	  Winston	  Blount,	  and	  others).	  Vinge	  paints	  a	  vivid	  portrait	  of	  the	  future	  of	  composition	  pedagogy,	  learning	  methodologies,	  and	  the	  virtualization	  of	  knowledge,	  emphasizing	  contemporary	  digital	  humanities’	  inclination	  toward	  collaborative	  “design,	  multimediality,	  and	  the	  experiential”	  that	  “expand	  the	  compass	  of	  [its]	  affective	  range”	  (Schnapp	  and	  Presner	  5).	  Doctorow’s	  Little	  Brother	  explores	  the	  civil	  rights	  and	  liberties	  of	  the	  American	  citizen	  in	  a	  post-­‐9/11	  digital	  age,	  touching	  on	  some	  of	  the	  most	  important	  debates	  in	  the	  digital	  humanities.	  On	  one	  hand,	  digital	  technologies	  liberate	  and	  connect	  Marcus	  Yallow	  and	  his	  friends	  in	  democratic,	  politically	  active	  (hacktivist)	  networks	  that	  favor	  “[o]penness,	  freedom,	  and	  meritocracy”	  (Stryker	  87).	  Hacktivist	  culture	  has	  thrived	  through	  the	  “computer	  technology	  [that	  has]	  leveled	  the	  playing	  field	  and	  enabled	  [hacktivists]	  to	  achieve	  a	  sense	  of	  social	  equality	  within	  the	  virtual	  world”	  (87).	  On	  the	  other,	  however,	  the	  same	  technologies	  can	  be	  exploited	  for	  government/commercial	  surveillance	  or	  seizure,	  and	  severely	  delimited	  by	  proprietary	  software	  and	  digital	  rights	  management.	  Macus’s	  efforts	  to	  oppose	  these	  can	  be	  read	  as	  an	  example	  of	  what	  Postigo	  calls	  “technological	  resistance”—“a	  strategy	  wherein	  users/hackers	  design	  and	  deploy	  politically	  motivated	  technologies	  that	  challenge…	  technological	  enforcement”	  (12)	  and	  the	  “stringent	  laws	  and	  technological	  measures	  that	  lock	  up	  access	  to	  the	  ‘cultural	  commons’”	  (5).	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So	  what	  do	  these	  texts	  suggest	  about	  the	  future	  of	  digital	  humanities	  scholarship	  and	  pedagogy?	  What	  do	  they	  teach	  us	  as	  readers	  and	  as	  human	  beings?	  Without	  question,	  no	  popular	  artistic	  medium	  is	  more	  invested	  in	  helping	  us	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  the	  digital	  present,	  and	  in	  orienting	  us	  toward	  a	  digital	  future.	  Indeed,	  science	  fiction	  is	  primed	  for	  one	  such	  aspect	  of	  this	  future:	  that	  of	  big	  mechanism,	  the	  next	  step	  in	  the	  evolution	  of	  digital	  information.	  According	  to	  DARPA,	  the	  Department	  of	  Defense	  agency	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  big	  mechanism	  research,	  complex	  systems	  contain	  “many	  parts	  and	  processes,	  but	  they	  are	  studied	  piecewise,	  and	  their	  literatures	  and	  data	  are	  fragmented,	  distributed	  and	  inconsistent.”	  Big	  mechanism	  offers	  researchers	  an	  opportunity	  to	  draw	  these	  fragmentary	  datasets	  together	  into	  “large,	  explanatory	  models.”	  Future	  work	  in	  digital	  humanities	  will	  have	  to	  account	  for	  this	  shift,	  in	  new	  and	  hybrid	  literacies	  and	  literary	  forms,	  and	  the	  sprawling	  systems	  that	  fill	  science	  fiction37	  will,	  once	  again,	  provide	  a	  humanistic	  roadmap.	  As	  the	  divisions	  between	  human	  expression/practices	  and	  digital	  media	  grow	  smaller,	  and	  data	  becomes	  more	  tightly	  integrated	  within	  large	  systems,	  heuristic	  methodologies	  that	  mitigate	  tensions	  between	  quantitative	  and	  qualitative	  interpretation	  are	  becoming	  increasingly	  urgent	  in	  the	  humanities	  and	  elsewhere.	  Our	  tools	  should	  always	  only	  be	  the	  sum	  of	  human	  design;	  but	  their	  power	  should	  be	  leveraged	  if	  it	  means	  they	  can	  bring	  us	  closer	  to	  an	  understanding	  of	  ourselves.	  Science	  fiction	  gives	  us	  a	  forward-­‐looking	  narrative	  for	  this	  challenge,	  which,	  it	  turns	  out,	  is	  a	  decidedly	  human	  one.	  I	  agree	  with	  Delany	  that	  science	  fiction—being	  a	  literature	  of	  immense	  educational	  and	  cultural	  value—can	  be	  utilized	  as	  “a	  tool	  to	  help	  you	  think”	  (35).	  It	  is	  an	  assertion	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  See,	  for	  example,	  the	  precrime	  system	  of	  the	  2002	  Steven	  Spielberg	  film	  Minority	  Report,	  which	  combines	  vast	  quantities	  of	  data	  from	  many	  different	  sources	  and	  actors	  into	  a	  single	  touchscreen	  interface	  to	  determine	  (in	  the	  qualitative	  sense)	  a	  person’s	  culpability	  before	  they	  have	  committed	  any	  illegal	  activity.	  The	  film	  is	  a	  loose	  adaptation	  of	  Philip	  K	  Dick’s	  short	  story	  “The	  Minority	  Report”	  (1956).	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continues	  to	  resonate	  far	  into	  the	  digital	  age,	  expanding	  to	  include	  all	  of	  the	  rich	  portrayals	  of	  digital	  creativity,	  synthesis,	  collaboration,	  multimodality,	  heuristic	  discovery,	  and	  remediation	  that	  define	  science	  fiction’s	  interface	  with	  digital	  humanities.	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